ALEX WATSON

THE SELF'S AWARENESS OF ITSELF

BHAṬṬA RĀMAKAṆṬHA'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF NO-SELF

Wien 2006

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PUBLICATIONS
OF THE DE NOBILI RESEARCH LIBRARY

EDITED BY

GERHARD OBERHAMMER AND UTZ PODZEIT

VOLUME XXXII

COMMISSION AGENT FOR INDIA:
Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi

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ISBN 3-900271-38-0

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Sammlung de Nobili
Institut für Südasien-, Tibet- und Buddhismuskunde
der Universität Wien
Druck: Interpress Co. Ltd., Bécsi str. 67, 1037 Budapest, Hungary

For

Harunaga Isaacson

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PREFACE

The present work is an attempt to understand the ideas of an author writing over a thousand years ago in a civilisation profoundly different from our own. Those who undertake to study the products of an alien culture, such as anthropologists, historians and philologists, will always have to confront the question of whether the other's thinking can be understood in the terms of their own thinking. The fact that, in western scholars' encounter with Buddhism over the last two centuries, Buddhist authors have been interpreted as Hegelian, Heideggerian, Wittgensteinian, Platonic, Stoic, transcendental idealist, phenomenologist, and as akin to Husserl, Russell or Whitehead,[1] indicates that, instead of letting the texts speak for themselves, we have a tendency to superimpose on them perspectives with which we are more familiar. This raises worrying questions about our ability to recognize what is unfamiliar as unfamiliar.

If we want the classical Indian traditions to reveal themselves, not our own preconceptions, and the voices of their thinkers to come across louder than our voices, our most powerful tool is philology. While we can never completely eliminate our own subjectivity, we can, as philologists, attempt to set it aside to some extent by sticking closely to an observation of the texts themselves, and, when interpreting, allowing our analysis to be guided by concepts and ideas derived from the text itself or other texts of the same general period and tradition. By devoting energy to the recovery of the precise wording of the author prior to the many copying mistakes that have entered the transmission—through gathering variants and parallel passages, and identifying and solving corruptions—we can, as if turning the dial of a radio closer to the precise frequency of the station, reduce background noise and allow the voice to come across with more clarity, and consequently with less distortion or blur-

[1] See Kapstein 2001 3–8.

ring of the thought behind the words. By accumulating more and more information about the cultural, linguistic and religio-philosophical context of authors/texts and by setting them more deeply in that context, we move further from our own thought-world and closer to theirs. As we read more sources, the back and forth of the hermeneutic process mean that the categories we apply to the texts are tested against richer and richer materials, shown to be inadequate and hence repeatedly refined, such that we move closer and closer to the author's own perspective.

Therefore the approach of this book is primarily that of philology. I give the Sanskrit text of those passages of Rāmakaṇṭha's in which he discusses the Buddhist doctrine of No-Self, having edited them with the aid of manuscripts and parallel passages neglected by previous editors (as well as by following certain emendations suggested by Sanskritists far more advanced than I with whom I was fortunate to read), I give a translation that aims to be as literal as possible without sacrificing readability, and I explain how Rāmakaṇṭha's points are related to points he makes elsewhere or to views found in earlier texts of his own or other traditions.

But in order to avoid a certain one-sidedness, I have tried to balance this perspective with another. One could caricature the field of the study of Indian philosophy as consisting of a continuum of publications running from those written by self-effacing and erudite textual scholars attending arduously to the primary sources but seeing them as mere pieces of a historical jigsaw puzzle, to those written by more vociferous but less learned comparative philosophers or historians of philosophy who are more skilled in abstract thinking and analysis but less sensitive to context. If some such continuum exists (and of course many if not most scholars combine elements from both sides) this book aspires to fall more toward the first end, but there are aspects of that extreme that it seeks to avoid.

Though I have focused on the precise wording of texts, it is their content rather than their form that is the centre of interest and that I have sought to elucidate in my commentary; the concentration on the particularities of the language used is simply the necessary means of reaching an appreciation of the nuances of the thoughts and ideas that it expresses. As Schopenhauer (1851 555) wrote, 'Thoughts reduced to paper are generally nothing more

than the footprints of a man walking in the sand. It is true that we see the path he has taken; but to know what he saw on the way, we must use our own eyes.' Scholars engaged in producing critical editions—and this is not always realized by other specialists who pride themselves on being more analytical—do and must 'use their own eyes', for in deciding how to constitute texts they must (on the basis of an intimate knowledge of the author, his tradition and those traditions to which he was responding) have hypotheses about what the author 'saw on the way'; but a difference between the present study and a critical edition is that I include for the reader an account of my deliberations about what Rāmakaṇṭha 'saw'. These deliberations, furthermore, often take the form of engagement with, rather than pure observation of, the lines of thought that Rāmakaṇṭha travels down. The book has been written in the belief that, if a philological perspective is accompanied by a philosophical perspective, the value of the work will, so long as the philosophy remains within the reach of textual evidence, be enhanced rather than diluted. I have tried, in my exegesis, to enter into the spirit of Rāmakaṇṭha's arguments and those of his opponents; to tease out the assumptions behind their positions; to consider the validity of their reasoning; to reflect on how they would respond to questions not directly addressed by them; to bring out what is most philosophically significant, what will be of most interest to philosophers and historians of philosophy; to aim not only at 'encyclopedic breadth' through the accumulation of contextually related material, but also at 'analytic depth'.[2]

There are three other closely related attitudes from which I distance myself. When explaining a position of Rāmakaṇṭha's by influence from earlier thinkers, by pointing to an earlier occurrence of the same idea, or a close approximation to it, I do not wish to imply that Rāmakaṇṭha simply cut and pasted into his writings chunks from various earlier streams of thought. He was grappling, in the passages examined below, with philosophical problems in much the same way as contemporary philosophers do. Conformity to earlier tradition was far from the be all and end all, as I hope will come across clearly in the following pages. Equally if not more important was what constituted a good argument. While insufficient attention to context is perhaps the most common source of error in modern presentations of ancient and me-

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[2] The pair of terms are Oetke's (1999 265).

diaeval Indian ideas, surely context is not all-determining. When Rāmakaṇṭha sat down to write he did not think, 'let me choose this that X said, mix it with this that Y said etc'. He wrote what he wrote because he thought it to be the case. Why he thought it to be the case is not always best explained by reference to contextual features, but sometimes by reference simply to the logic of the ideas, a logic that we, to a large extent, share.

Secondly, by seeing Rāmakaṇṭha's or Dharmakīrti's or Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's etc. arguments *only* as reactions to a specific historical, linguistic and religio-philosophical context, we cease to take them seriously. By regarding these writers only as products of their time, we historicize away penetrating insights that they may have had. If we see our task purely as the assigning of their ideas to the correct place in a museum of historical antiquities, we rule out *a priori* the possibility that they discovered something of relevance to our own self-understanding.[3]

Thirdly, though our thought-world may be a long way from theirs, I do not believe there to be an uncrossable boundary between the two. A purely historical-philological approach sometimes leads to a one-sided commitment to the 'otherness' of the ideas, the setting up of an exaggerated barrier between us and their formulators, as though it were impossible that their concerns could overlap with our own. If this were the case, what would be the point of studying their writings at all? Surely the fact that their writings are capable of capturing our imagination, and of eliciting empathy, is evidence that it is not the case. Do we not share with them the desire to understand what it is to be a sentient being? Some studies of ancient Indian views leave their concepts mysteriously unrelated to anything we can relate to; whereas in my view a successful understanding should leave us quite able to imagine having held those same views had we lived then and there.

I am in agreement with some remarks that Wezler made concerning such matters. He (1993 328–329) mentions a distinction asserted by Alsdorf between European scholars' initial encounter with India, characterized by 'rap-

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[3] For an example of the way in which the contemporary debate about personal identity, in analytic philosophy, could be enhanced by drawing on classical Indian ideas, see Tillemans 1996 841–844.

turous imagination and uncritical idealisation' and the more scientific approach of later scholars. He concedes that 'much of what Herder and the Romantics said about India was possible only because their knowledge about India was still very limited indeed', but then continues as follows:

> However, if the history of Indology is viewed only as a progress from belief to knowledge, from phantastic idealisation and romantic involvement to unbiased and sober investigation of facts, then retrospectively Indologists can, on the other hand, hardly avoid asking themselves critically whether in following this course they have not entirely lost the sense of a great and noble adventure and are all too content with counting the legs of flies. What has become of the initial enthusiasm, who has still a good eye for what is really important in Indian culture? [...] Where are the outstanding intellectuals ready to risk an encounter with India and her spirit? [...] We cannot only be proud of the achievements of our discipline, very remarkable though they are, but should also be aware of what we have lost!

This book is a slightly modified version of my DPhil thesis. I was unusually fortunate in the amount of help I received during the doctorate. For six terms I met weekly with Alexis Sanderson to read Sanskrit together: first the *ātmavāda* chapter of the *Ślokavārttika* and then the first chapter of the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa.* Furthermore Harunaga Isaacson acted as a second supervisor for no reason other than his seemingly infinite willingness to read Sanskrit with anyone who showed a genuine interest. The texts covered in the many hours spent reading with him—some of the most enjoyable times I had during the years that I worked on the thesis—were, among others, the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa,* the two earliest surviving commentaries on those *Nyāyasūtra*s that concern the Self, and a large part of the seventh chapter of the *Nyāyamañjarī.* Both waited patiently as I gave my slow and stumbling translations, and aided me with their encyclopedic knowledge and keen sense of what precisely is obstructing someone's understanding at particular points of the text. Harunaga Isaacson also gave me detailed feedback on drafts of the thesis at every stage of its development. Without their help I would not have been able to begin, let alone finish, a work such as this, based on a close examination of primary sources.

Somdev Vasudeva, Dominic Goodall and Harunaga Isaacson were extremely generous in sharing e-texts, the former giving me an almost library-length

collection (as well as regularly helping me with computer problems), and the latter two between them typing in and sending me (among other texts) the entire *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa.*

To those three, as well as Kei Kataoka, Ferenc Ruzsa and Birgit Kellner, I owe thanks for responding to e-mails full of questions about their areas of expertise. Ferenc Ruzsa proofread not only the whole first draft of the thesis but also a large part of the last draft of the book, and gave me many useful comments. Since finishing the doctorate I have, intermittently, been working on the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* with Dominic Goodall and Anjaneya Sarma; from both I have learnt much, some of which has doubtless informed the modification of the present work from thesis to book.

During the third year of my doctorate I spent a wonderful three months in Vienna, studying Dharmakīrti under Ernst Steinkellner. I greatly benefited from his thorough comments on and corrections to my attempts to translate Dharmakīrti and his commentators, and was grateful for the way he enabled me to feel very welcome in the institute. I would also like to thank Ernst Prets, Roque Mesquita, Helmut Krasser, and especially Birgit Kellner. She not only put up with me moving into her office, but also put at my disposal her entire collection of books and articles, her computer, and was always available to answer questions.

The thesis was examined by Lambert Schmithausen and Karin Preisendanz. I could not have hoped for more learned readers and was fortunate to receive their various comments and corrections. Karin Preisendanz was also kind enough to meet for further sessions in Vienna in order to answer questions I had and to elucidate her comments in more detail. I thank her for, among other things, explaining various subtle points of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, pointing me to secondary literature that I had neglected, significantly increasing my knowledge of typesetting conventions, applying for funding for one of my visits and responding to huge numbers of e-mails. I am honoured and grateful to her for proposing the book for publication in this prestigious series, and to Professor Oberhammer and the de Nobili committee for accepting it.

For financial help from the British Academy, the Boden Fund, the Max-Müller Fund, the Spalding Fund, the Muktabodha Graduate Fellowship and

the Wolfson Junior Research Fellowship in Indology, I am extremely thankful. I am much obliged to Wolfson College for the money from its Academic Fund for Fellows which was given to the de Nobili Research Library to cover some of the cost of printing this book.

Thanks also to Alexandre Piatigorsky (for inspiring me to continue my studies of Indian Philosophy beyond MA level), Richard Gombrich, Jim Benson, James Mallinson, Csaba Dezső, Isabelle Onians, Peter Bisschop, Ryugen Tanemura, Whitney Cox, Fabio Boccio, Marcus Schmücker, Lance Cousins, Isabelle Ratié, Keith Allen, Takamichi Fujii, Sadananda Das, Godabarisha Mishra, Achyutananda Das, Venkataraja Sharma, Taisei Shida, Marion Rastelli, Jonathan Miller, Christian Ferstl, Simon Lawson, Gillian Evison, Peter Mole, Alan Hancock, Elizabeth Pacheco, my family (a special mention for my father, who proof-read a whole draft) and, more than anyone, Sara.

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AK(AL) — Amarakośa: *Amarakośa: with the Unpublished South Indian Commentaries*. Ed. Ramanathan, A. A. 3 Volumes. Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras, 1971.

AKBh(BBS) — Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: *Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with Sphuṭārthā Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra*. Ed. Śāstrī, Swāmi Dwārikā Dās. Bauddha Bhāratī Series 5, 6, 7, 9. Vārāṇasī, 1981.

AKBh(P) — Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu*. Ed. Pradhan, P. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 8. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1967 (second, revised edition by Aruna Haldar, without improvement of the text: 1975).

AKBh(S) — Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: *Passages in the 5th and 9th Chapters of Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. Ed., translated and annotated by Alexis Sanderson. Unpublished Teaching Material for M.Phil in Classical Indian Religion, Oxford 1995.

AP — Aṣṭaprakaraṇam: *Tattvaprakāśa, Tattvasaṅgraha, Tattvatrayanirṇaya, Ratnatraya, Bhogakārikā, Nādakārikā, Mokṣakārikā, Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*. Ed. Dvivedī, Brajavallabha. Yogatantra-granthamālā 12. Vārāṇasī, 1988.

ĀTV — Ātmatattvavivekaḥ: *The Ātmatattvaviveka of Śrī Udayanāchārya with the* (*Nārāyaṇī*) *Commentary of Śrī Nārāyaṇāchārya Ātreya & the* (*Bauddhādhikāra*) *Dīdhiti Commentary of Śrī*

Raghunātha Śiromani with Bauddhādhikāra Vivṛti of Śri Gadādhara Bhaṭṭāchārya. Ed. Śâstri, Dhundhirâja. Chowkhambâ Sanskrit Series 463, 464, 465, 466 & 467 (rebound together as no. 84). Benâres, 1940.

BhoKā Bhogakārikā by Sadyojyotis: in AP.

BoCaAvPa Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā: *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā. Prajñākaramati's Commentary to the Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva*. Ed. de la Vallée Poussin, Louis. Bibliotheca Indica, New Series 1139. Calcutta, 1907.

BoYoCaṬī Bodhisattvayogācāracatuḥśatakaṭīkā: *Sanskrit Fragments and Tibetan Translation of Candrakīrti's Bodhisattvayogācāracatuḥśatakaṭīkā*. Ed. Suzuki, Kōshin. Tokyo, 1994.

Bṛh Bṛhatī: *Bṛhatī, a Commentary on Śābarabhāṣya by Prabhākara Miśra with the Commentary Ṛjuvimalā of Śālikanātha Miśra*. Ed. Sastri, P. A. Chinnaswami. Chowkhambâ Sanskrit Series 391, 406, 414 (rebound together as no. 67). Benares, 1929–1933.

BS Brahmasiddhi: *Brahmasiddhi by Acharya Maṇḍaṇamiśra, with Commentary by Śaṅkhapāṇi*. Ed. Sastri, Vacaspati Mahamahopadhyaya Vidya Kuppuswami. Sri Garib Das Oriental Series 16. Delhi, 1984. (Original Edition Madras, 1937: Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Series 4).

BSBhā Brahmasūtrabhāṣya: *The Brahmasūtra Śāṅkara Bhāṣya with the Commentaries Bhāmatī, Kalpataru, and Parimala*. Ed. Sastri, Nurani Anantha Krishna and Pansikar, Vasudev Laxman Shastri. Bombay, 1917.

CaSa Carakasaṃhitā: *Agniveśa's Caraka Saṃhitā: Text with English Translation & Critical Exposition, Based on Cakrapāṇi Datta's Āyurvedadīpikā*. Volume 2. Ed. Sharma, Ram Karan and Bhagwan Dash. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies 94. Varanasi, 1977.

D sDe dge edition of Tibetan canon: *sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka, bsTan 'gyur Tshad ma*. 20 Volumes. Tokyo, 1981–1984.

GBhā Gauḍapādabhāṣya: *The Sāṃkhya-Kārikā: Iśvara Kṛṣṇa's Memorable Verses on Sāṃkhya Philosophy with the Commentary of Gaudapādācārya*. Ed. Sharma, Har Dutt. Poona Oriental Series 9. Poona, 1933.

ĪPVV Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī: *The Īśvarapratyabhijñā Vivṛtivimarśinī by Abhinavagupta*. Ed. Kaul, Madhusūdan. 3 Volumes. KSTS 60, 62, 65. Srinagar, 1938–1967.

ĪśPraKā Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā: *The Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā of Utpaladeva with the Author's Vṛtti: Critical Edition and Annotated Translation*. Ed. Torella, Raffaele. Serie Orientale Roma 71. Roma, 1994.

Kāś Sucaritamiśra's commentary, Kāśikā, on the Ślokavārttika: in ŚV(S).

Ked KSTS edition of Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa: see NPP.

KiTa Kiraṇatantra: in KV.

KV Kiraṇavṛtti: *Kiraṇavṛttiḥ. Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha's Commentary on the Kiraṇatantra. Volume 1: Chapters 1–6*. Ed. Goodall, Dominic. Publications du département d'indologie, Institut français de Pondichéry / École française d'Extrême-Orient 86(1). Pondichéry, 1998. (In references to this edition, line numbers are not counted from the top of the page; they rather follow the line numbers printed in the edition, which start counting from the previous verse-segment.)

MaAl Madhyamakālaṅkāra: in *Studies in the Literature of the Great Vehicle: Three Mahāyāna Buddhist texts*. Ed. Gómez, Luis O. and Silk, Jonathan A. Michigan studies in Buddhist literature 1. Ann Arbor, 1989.

MaPra Mahānayaprakāśa: *The Mahānaya-Prakāsha of Rājānaka Shiti Kaṇṭha*. Ed. Shāstrī, Mukunda Rāma. KSTS 21. Srinagar, 1918.

MatPā Mataṅgapārameśvara: in MatV.

MatV KP Mataṅgavṛtti, Kriyāpāda: *Mataṅgapārameśvarāgama*: *Kriyāpāda, Yogapāda, et Caryāpāda, avec le commentaire de Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha*. Ed. Bhatt, N. R. Publications de l'Institut français d'Indologie 65. Pondichéry, 1982.

MatV VP Mataṅgavṛtti, Vidyāpāda: *Mataṅgapārameśvarāgama*: *Vidyāpāda, avec le commentaire de Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha*. Ed. Bhatt, N. R. Publications de l'Institut français d'Indologie 56. Pondichéry, 1977.

MoKā Mokṣakārikā by Sadyojyotis: in AP.

MoKāVṛ Mokṣakārikāvṛtti by Rāmakaṇṭha: in AP.

MMK Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti*. Ed. Poussin, L. de la Vallée. Bibliotheca Buddhica 4. St. Pétersbourg, 1913.

MT Mṛgendratantra: *The Śrī Mṛgendra Tantram*: *Vidyāpāda & Yogapāda, with the Commentary* (*-vṛtti*) *of Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha*. Ed. Śāstrī, Madhusūdan Kaul. KSTS 50. Bombay-Srinagar, 1930. (Reprint New Delhi 1982).

MTV Mṛgendratantravṛtti: in MT.

NB Nyāyabindu: *Nyāyabinduḥ by Dharma Kirti, with a Commentary of Srh*(sic)*idharmottaracharya*. Ed. Shastri, Chandra Shekhar. Kashi Sanskrit Series (Haridas Sanskrit Granthamālā) 22, Buddhist Nyāya Section 1. Benares, 1924.

NBhā(NCG) Nyāyabhāṣya: *Gautamīyanyāyadarśana with Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana*. Ed. Thakur, Anantalal. Nyāyacaturgranthikā 1. New Delhi, 1997.

NBhū Nyāyabhūṣaṇa: *Śrīmadācāryabhāsarvajñapraṇītasya Nyāyasārasya svopajñaṃ vyākhyānaṃ Nyāyabhūṣaṇam*. Ed. Yogīndrānanda. Ṣaḍdarśanaprakāśanagranthamālā 1. Vārāṇasī, 1968.

NCG(MIS) Nyāyacaturgranthikā: *Nyāyadarśana of Gautama, with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, the Vārttika of Uddyotakara, the Tātparyaṭīkā of Vācaspati and the Pariśuddhi of Udayana*. Ed. Thakur, Anantalal. Mithila Institute Series 20. Darbhanga, 1967.

NK Nyāyakandalī: *Praśastapādabhāṣya* (*Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*) *with Commentary Nyāyakandalī by Srīdhara Bhatta along with Hindi Translation*. Ed. Jhā, Durgādhara. Gaṅgānātha-Jhā-Granthamālā 1. Varanasi, 1977.

NM(K) Nyāyamañjarī: *The Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa*. Ed. Śukla, Sūrya Nārāyaṇa. 2 Volumes. Kashi Sanskrit Series 106, Nyaya section, 15. Benares, 1934–1936.

NM(M) Nyāyamañjarī: *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa, with Ṭippaṇi—Nyāyasaurabha by the Editor*. Ed. Varadacharya, K. S. 2 Volumes. Oriental Research Institute Series 116, 139. Mysore, 1969 and 1983.

NP Nareśvaraparīkṣā of Sadyojyotis: in NPP.

NPP Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa: *Nareśvaraparīkṣā of Sadyojyotis with the Prakāśa Commentary of Rāmakaṇṭha*. Ed. Śāstrī, Madhusūdan Kaul. KSTS 45. Delhi, 1989. (Original Edition Śrīnagar 1926).

NPP(SS) Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa: *Acharya Sadyojyoti's Nareshwarapariksha with Prakasha Commentary of Shri Ram Kanthachary*. Ed. Sagar, Krishnanand. Shri Shivoham Sagar 20. Dharmaj, Gujerat, 1985.

NPP(YG) Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa: *Nareśvaraparīkṣā of Ācārya Sadyojyoti, with the Commentary 'Prakāśa' by Śrī Rāmakaṇṭhācārya*. Ed. Mālavīya, Rāmajī. Yogatantra Granthamālā 15. Varanasi, 2000.

NS Nyāyasūtra: in NBhā(NCG).

NVā(BI) Nyāyavārttika: *Nyāya-Vārttika*. Ed. Dvivedin, V. P. Bibliothica Indica. Delhi, 1986 (Original Edition Calcutta 1887).

NVā(NCG) Nyāyavārttika: *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika of Bhāradvāja Uddyotakara*. Ed. Thakur, Anantalal. Nyāyacaturgranthikā 2. New Delhi, 1997.

NVTṬ Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā: in NCG(MIS).

NVV Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇam: *Nyāya Viniścaya Vivaraṇa of Śrī Vādirāja Sūri, the Commentary on Bhaṭṭākalankadeva's Nyāya Viniścaya*. Ed. Jain, Mahendra Kumar. 2 Volumes. Jñāna-Pīṭha Mūrtidevi Jaina Granthamālā, Sanskrit Grantha 3, 12. Benares, 1949, 1954.

NyBi Nyāyabindu: in DhPr.

NyPr Nyāyapraveśa: *The Nyāyapraveśa. Part 1. Sanskrit Text with Commentaries*. Ed. Dhruva, Anandshankar B. Gaekwad's Oriental Series 38. Baroda, 1930.

P Peking Edition of Tibetan canon.

PaBhā Pañcārthabhāṣya: in *Pasupata Sutras with Pancharthabhashya of Kaundinya*. Ed. Sastri, R. Ananthakrishna. Trivandrum Sanskrit Series 143. Trivandrum, 1940.

PaTa Parākhyatantra: *The Parākhyatantra. A Scripture of the Śaiva Siddhānta*. Ed. Goodall, Dominic. Collection Indologie, Institut français de Pondichéry / École française d'Extrême-Orient 98. Pondichéry, 2004.

Ped Pandit Edition of Nareśvaraparīkṣā with -prakāśa: *Nareśvaraparīkṣā*, in Pandit 2. Benaras, 1867–1868. 1st kāṇḍa: pp. 72–78, 93–101, 119–126, 141–144. The rest of the text begins on p. 145 and ends on p. 221, roughly half of the intervening pages being devoted to other texts.

PMNK Paramokṣanirāsakārikā by Sadyojyotis: in AP.

PMNKV Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti by Rāmakaṇṭha: in AP.

PPañc — Prakaraṇapañcikā: *Prakaraṇa Pañcikā of Śrī Śālikanātha Miśra with Nyāya-Siddhi*. Ed. Sastri, A.S. Benares Hindu University Darśana Series 4. Benares, 1961.

Pr — Prasannapadā of Candrakīrti: in MMK.

PrBhā(Br) — Praśastapādabhāṣya: *Word Index to the Praśastapādabhāṣya*: *a Complete Word Index to the Printed Editions of the Praśastapādabhāṣya*. Ed. Bronkhorst, Johannes and Ramseier, Yves. Delhi, 1994.

PrSa — Pramāṇasamuccaya: *Dignāga on Perception*: *being the pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya from the Sanskrit Fragments and the Tibetan Versions*. Ed. Hattori, Masaaki. Harvard Oriental Series 47. Cambridge, Mass., 1968.

PVā — Pramāṇavārttika: *Pramāṇavārttikam by Ācārya Dharmakīrti*. Ed. Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Rāhula. Appendix to Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 24. Patna, 1937. Unless otherwise stated I follow the readings of this edition, but I do not use its numbering, adopting instead that suggested by Vetter. Thus the order of the chapters according to my numbering is: 1 = *svārthānumāna*; 2 = *pramāṇasiddhi*; 3 = *pratyakṣa*; 4 = *parārthānumāna*; and the verse-numbers are those given on pp. 116–117 of Vetter 1964.

PVā(M) — Pramāṇavārttika: *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika with a Commentary by Manorathanandin*. Ed. Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Rāhula. Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 24. Patna, 1937.

PVBh — Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam: *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta*. Ed. Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Rāhula. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 1. Patna, 1953.

PVin — Pramāṇaviniścaya: *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ 1. Kapitel*: *Pratyakṣam*. Ed. Vetter, Tilmann. Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte 250(3). Wien, 1966.

PVSV Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti: *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary*. Ed. Gnoli, Raniero. Serie Orientale Roma 23. Roma, 1960.

PVV Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti of Manorathanandin: in PVā(M).

Ṛju Ṛjuvimalā of Śālikanātha Miśra: in Bṛh.

ŚBh(F) Śābarabhāṣya: *Śabarasvāmi's Bhāṣyam zu den Mīmāṃsāsūtren 1.1.1–5*: *Materialien zur ältesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmamīmāṃsā*. Ed. Frauwallner, Erich. Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Süd- und Ostasiens 6. 1968.

ŚiStĀ Śivastotrāvalī: *Śivastotrāvalī* [...] *Utpaladevācāryaviracitā*. Ed. Kālīcaraṇamitra, Śrī. Caukhambā 15. Kashi, 1903.

ŚV(P_1) Ślokavārttika: *The Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, with the Commentary Nyāyaratnākara by Pārthasārathimiśra*. Ed. Tailaṅga, Rāma Śāstrī. Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24. Benares, 1898–1899.

ŚV(P_2) Ślokavārttika: *Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with the Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra*. Ed. Śāstrī, Dvārikādāsa. Prāchyabhārati Series 10. Varanasi, 1978.

ŚV(P_3) Ślokavārttika: *Mīmāṃsā Darśana Ślokavārttika of Kumārilabhaṭṭa, with Śābarabhāṣya, the Commentary Nyāyaratnākara and Notes* (*Vol.1*). Ed. Musalgaonkar, Gajānana Śastrī. Varanasi, Delhi, 1979.

ŚV(S) Ślokavārttika: *The Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with the Commentary Kāśikā of Sucaritamiśra*. Ed. Sastri, Sambasiva (Part 1 and 2) and Sastri, Ramasvami (Part 3). Trivandrum Sanskrit Series 90, 99, 150. Trivandrum, 1926, 1929, 1943.

ŚV(U_1) Ślokavārttikavyākhyā: *Ślokavārttikavyākhyā* (*Tātparyaṭīkā*) *of Bhaṭṭombeka*. Ed. Sastri, Ramanatha. Madras University Sanskrit Series 13. Madras, 1940.

SK	Sāṅkhyakārikā: in Appendix II of YD.
SS	Sāṅkhyasūtra: *The Sāmkhya Aphorisms of Kapila: with Illustrative Extracts from the Commentaries*. Ed. & tr. Ballantyne, James Robert. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies 34. Varanasi, 1963.
SvSūSa	Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha: *The Tantra of Svayaṃbhū, Vidyāpāda, with the Commentary of Sadyojyoti*. Ed. Filliozat, Pierre-Sylvain. Kalāmūlaśāstra Series 13. Delhi, 1994.
TaSa	Tattvasaṅgraha by Sadyojyotis: in AP.
TBV	Tattvabodhavidhāyinī: *Saṃmatitarkaprakaraṇam by Siddhasena Divākara with Commentary Tattvabodhavidhāyinī by Abhayadevasūri*. Ed. Saṅghavi, Sukhlāl and Dośi, Becardās. 5 Volumes. Gujarāta Purātattvamandira Series 10, 16, 18, 19, 21. Ahmedabad, saṃvat 1980–1987 (=1924–1931). (Reprint Kyoto 1984).
TK	Tattvakaumudī: *Vācaspatimiśras Tattvakaumudī: Ein Beitrag zur Textkritik bei kontaminierter Überlieferung*. Ed. Srinivasan, Srinivasa Ayya. Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 12. Hamburg, 1967.
TS(BBS)	Tattvasaṅgraha: *Tattvasangraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalashīla*. Ed. Shastri, Dwarikadas. 2 Volumes. Bauddha Bharati Series 1, 2. Vārāṇasī, 1981–1982.
TS(GOS)	Tattvasaṅgraha: *Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita: with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla*. Ed. Krishnamacharya, Embar. 2 Volumes. Gaekwad's Oriental Series 30–31. Baroda, 1926.
TSP(BBS)	Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā: in TS(BBS).
TSP(GOS)	Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā: in TS(GOS).
VāPa	Vākyapadīya: *Vākyapadīyam Part III (Pada Kāṇḍa) (Jāti, Dravya and Sambandha Samuddeśa) with the Commentary*

Prakāśa by Helārāja and Ambākartrī. Ed. Śarmā, Raghunātha. Sarasvatībhavana-granthamālā 91. Varanasi, 1974.

VāPa(I) Vākyapadīya (Iyer ed.): *The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari, with the Commentary of Helarāja. Kāṇḍa III, Part 1*. Ed. Subramania Iyer, K. A. Deccan College Monograph Series 21. Poona, 1963.

VS(C) Vaiśeṣikasūtra: *Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda*. Ed. Jambuvijayaji, Muni Sri. Gaekwad's Oriental Series 136. Baroda, 1961.

VyV Vyomavatī: *Vyomavatī of Vyomaśivācārya*. Ed. Shastri, Gaurinath. 2 Volumes. M. M. Śivakumāraśāstri-granthamālā 6. Varanasi, 1983, 1984.

YBhā Yogabhāṣya: *The Patanjala Darshana. The Aphorisms of Theistic Philosophy with the Commentary of Maharshi Vedavyasa and the Gloss of Vachaspati Misra*. Ed. Vidyasagara, Jibananda. Calcutta, 1874.

YD Yuktidīpikā: *Yuktidīpikā*: *the Most Significant Commentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikā*. Ed. Wezler, Albrecht and Motegi, Shujun. Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 44. Stuttgart, 1998.

YS Yogasūtra: in YBhā.

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3. Other Abbreviations and Symbols

†	When two of these obeli enclose text, they signal a word or phrase that is uninterpretable and that I cannot improve upon. When they enclose three dots they signal that *akṣara*s I am unable to read occur at that part of the manuscript.
°	Marks where a lemma or quoted word has been extracted from a larger word or compound.
a	Denotes—when occurring in footnotes to the text of the *Mataṅgavṛtti*—a south Indian manuscript used for the edition. I have not seen it but have transcribed its readings from the edition.
ā	A south Indian manuscript used for the edition of the *Mataṅgavṛtti*. I have not seen it but have transcribed its readings from the edition.
ai	A south Indian manuscript used for the edition of the *Mataṅgavṛtti*. I have not seen it but have transcribed its readings from the edition.
ac	*ante correctionem* (appended to the symbol for a manuscript as in P^{ac}, or the symbol for an edition as it Ked^{ac}), indicates the reading of a manuscript or edition before it was subsequently corrected by the scribe or editor respectively.
B	Baroda manuscript of the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (see p. 105).
cf.	*confer*, introduces material that illustrates the preceding.

conj. A conjecture. Differentiated from an emendation on the, admittely, subjective grounds that less confidence can be felt as to its correctness.

C A Malayalam manuscript of the *Nyāyamañjarī* preserved in the Malayalam Department of the University of Calicut, No. 2606. The readings that I report have all been very kindly conveyed to me by Kei Kataoka.

e A Devanāgarī manuscript used for the edition of the *Mataṅgavṛtti*. I have not seen it but have transcribed its readings from the edition.

ed. The edition (in footnotes to the text).

Ed. Edited by (in the bibliography).

em. An emendation. Differentiated from a conjecture on the, admittedly, subjective grounds that more confidence can be felt as to its correctness.

ga A Kashmirian manuscript of the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* whose readings are occasionally reported in the KSTS edition. I have not seen it but have transcribed its readings from there.

ī A south Indian manuscript used for the edition of the *Mataṅgavṛtti*. I have not seen it but have transcribed its readings from the edition.

JIP Journal of Indian Philosophy.

JOR Journal of Oriental Research.

ka A Kashmirian manuscript of the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* whose readings are occasionally reported in the KSTS edition. I have not seen it but have transcribed its readings from there.

kha A Kashmirian manuscript of the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* whose readings are occasionally reported in the KSTS edition. I have not seen it but have transcribed its readings from there.

KSTS Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies.

L London manuscript of the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (see p. 107).

ḷ A south Indian manuscript used for the edition of the *Mataṅgavṛtti*. I have not seen it but have transcribed its readings from the edition.

M Madras manuscript of the *Nareśvaraparīkṣā* (see p. 110).

MS The manuscript.

MSS The manuscripts.

om. An omission.

P Poona manuscript of the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (see p. 108).

pc *post correctionem* (appended to the symbol for a manuscript as in P^{pc}, or the symbol for an edition as it Ked^{pc}), indicates a correction, by a scribe or editor, to what was first written or printed in a manuscript or edition.

r *recto*, the front of a folio of a manuscript (as in 3r).

ṛ One of three Kashmirian manuscripts whose readings have been reported, but often wrongly neglected, by the editor of the *Mataṅgavṛtti*. I have thus frequently transcribed its readings from the edition.

ṝ One of three Kashmirian manuscripts whose readings have been reported, but often wrongly neglected, by the editor of the *Mataṅgavṛtti*. I have thus frequently transcribed its readings from the edition.

sic The preceding words, syllables or letters may be wrong or surprising, but they were indeed written in the source being cited.

u — A south Indian manuscript used for the edition of the *Mataṅga-vṛtti*. I have not seen it but have transcribed its readings from the edition.

ū — One of three Kashmirian manuscripts whose readings have been reported, but often wrongly neglected, by the editor of the *Mataṅgavṛtti*. I have thus frequently transcribed its readings from the edition.

v — *verso*, the back of a folio of a manuscript (as in 3v).

v.l. — *varia lectio*, marks a variant reading.

WZKS — Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens.

4. Conventions

In references to Sanskrit texts I separate chapter and verse numbers with a full stop; and page and line numbers with a comma. For lines near the end of a page, I sometimes count from the bottom. Thus 6.4b means *pāda* b of the fourth verse of chapter six; whereas 6,4b means four lines from the bottom of page six.

References to the page and line number of the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* are to those of the KSTS edition (abbreviated as Ked).

When Rāmakaṇṭha repeats in his commentaries words from the verse being commented upon, the translation of those words is given in italic.

In the middle of a paragraph of Sanskrit text, words in non-italic are conjectures or emendations; see the footnote for details of the transmitted readings.

Two numbers following a contemporary author's name (as in Smith 1980 239) represent year followed by page number.

In translations from the Sanskrit, I use square brackets to enclose insertions required to complete the sense, and round brackets to enclose explanatory

glosses and further elaborations. There are some borderline cases where my choice has been arbitrary.

Sanskrit words in brackets in the translation are given in their pre-sandhi form.

INTRODUCTION

Preliminary Remarks

If there is any ‘central’ issue in the debates between Buddhism and the Brāhmaṇical schools, it is that of the existence or non-existence of a ‘Self’. Its importance is reflected not only in the volume of writing devoted to it and closely related issues, but also in the assertion that the possibility of attaining liberation (*mokṣa, nirvāṇa*), the highest aim of Indian soteriologies, depends on the stance one takes on this very question. For many Brāhmaṇical authors[1] it is correct knowledge of the Self, apprehension of its true nature, that brings about cessation of saṃsāric existence; and, for Buddhist authors, we are destined to remain unenlightened until we realize that the concept of ‘Self’ corresponds to no substantial reality, that the word ‘I’ is misleading unless seen as referring to nothing other than a changing sequence of psycho-physical events. Thus despite their opposed positions, both sides agree that enquiring into the nature of our ‘Self’, and correct understanding of what the term does or does not refer to, is essential for liberation. The purpose of this publication is to introduce scholars and students of Indian Philosophy to the Śaiva Siddhānta voice in this debate, and to contribute to our knowledge of the history of Śaiva Siddhānta. More specifically, it aims to present the arguments of Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha (c. 950–1000 AD), the most prolific and influential exegete of early Śaiva Siddhānta, for the existence of a Self (*ātman*). Of Rāmakaṇṭha’s eight surviving texts,[2] that in which he goes into greatest detail

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[1] Sāṅkhyas, Vedāntins, Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas and (insofar as they could be termed ‘Brāhmaṇical’) non-dualistic Śaivas.

[2] *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti, Mokṣakārikāvṛtti, Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa, Mataṅgavṛtti, Sārdhatriśatikālottaravṛtti* (which includes the *Nādakārikā*), *Kiraṇavṛtti, Tattvatrayanirṇayavivṛti* and *Vyomavyāpistava.* The last of these neither refers to, nor is referred

on this issue is the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (NPP), a commentary on Sadyojyotis' *Nareśvaraparīkṣā* (NP). I thus present the Sanskrit text of the relevant passages in that work;[3] an annotated translation of them; and a commentary that seeks both to alert the reader to what would not necessarily be clear from the translation alone, and to relate the particular point being made to Rāmakaṇṭha's wider system and to the earlier history of Indian philosophy. I supplement this with the presentation of parallel or relevant passages from Rāmakaṇṭha's other texts. In the fourth and final chapter, one of the passages examined is not from the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, but from the *Mataṅgavṛtti*. Of Rāmakaṇṭha's various texts, some extremely long, only the first six chapters of his commentary on the *Kiraṇatantra*, and the twenty-five verses of the *Nādakārikā*, have been translated from the Sanskrit, or begun to be studied seriously. This study will, I hope, improve that situation: it takes into account all of his writings I am aware of on the question of the Buddhist doctrine of no-Self, re-editing, translating and commenting on most, and referring to the rest. But these writings amount to a minute fraction of his total

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to by, any of the other seven as sharing their author, and thus its attribution to Rāmakaṇṭha cannot be confirmed. See Goodall 1998 xix.

Goodall does not mention there, in the list he gives of the works of Rāmakaṇṭha, the *Tattvatrayanirṇayavivṛti*, for at the time of writing he did not know of its existence. He has recently come across a manuscript of the text.

Works bearing the following titles are referred to by Rāmakaṇṭha or by others as written by him, but appear not to have survived: *Svāyambhuvoddyota, Mantravārttikaṭīkā, Sarvāgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa, Āgamaviveka* (which could be the same as the previous) and *Piṅgalāmatavṛtti.* There is also evidence that he wrote a sub-commentary on a lost commentary of Sadyojyotis on the *Raurava*'s treatment of *mudrā*s. See Goodall 1998 xix–xxviii.

[3] The text I present attempts to improve on the text given in the editions published so far. I read through the entire first chapter of NPP at weekly meetings from January 1998 to February 2000 with the help of, among others, Prof. Sanderson, Dr. Harunaga Isaacson and, whenever they were in England, Dr. Dominic Goodall and Kei Kataoka. Outside of term time Prof. Sanderson was not present. Harunaga Isaacson was present at every single session. They proposed several emendations and conjectures, as acknowledged in individual cases in the notes to the text. I subsequently identified parallel passages in other works by Rāmakaṇṭha, and collated the readings of some manuscripts and a second edition. These enabled further improvement and are all recorded in the notes to the text.

oeuvre, so an enormous amount of work remains to be done[4] before a general study of all of his ideas can be contemplated.

1. The Buddhist-Brāhmaṇical *Ātman* Controversy

By the time Rāmakaṇṭha was writing he was entering a debate that already had a history of almost one and a half millennia. According to the Brāhmaṇical schools of philosophy, we have, or rather are, an immaterial and eternal soul or Self. This inner core of our identity, existing beyond our body, sense-faculties and mind, is the perceiver of our perceptions, the subject of our experiences. It is that to which the word 'I' refers.[5] It is unaffected by the death of the body, and begins a new life by becoming associated with another embryo in accordance with the merit and demerit it has acquired through its past actions.

The Buddhist schools also believed, of course, that we survive the death of the body and reincarnate to experience the positive or negative consequences of our past actions. But they attempt to explain this process without adducing a permanent Self.[6] A cornerstone of Buddhist teaching is the doctrine of no-Self (*anātmavāda*), the denial of any unchanging personal identity, any soul, any substantial 'I'.

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[4] In this vein, a first translation (and critical edition) of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* is also being prepared by Dominic Goodall, Anjaneya Sarma and me.

[5] I know of one Brāhmaṇical philosopher for whom 'I' does not, in fact, refer to the Self. The Naiyāyika Jayanta Bhaṭṭa held that if this were the case, the fact that 'I' occurs in our cognitions would commit us to the view that we can perceive the Self. He held that to be impossible on the grounds that it could not simultaneously be the perceiver and perceived. Hence for him 'I' refers to the body. See NM(M) Vol. 2, 268,6–284,5.

[6] For an overview of the views of the different Buddhist schools on the subject of the Self, and an account of their various responses to the resulting tension with belief in reincarnation, see Krishan 1984.

1.1. Early Buddhism

Can this firm rejection of the existence of the Self be traced back to the teaching of the Buddha on the evidence of the sermons in the Pāli canon? The passages that report the Buddha's teaching on this point are somewhat conflicting. Some do indeed represent him as explicitly denying the existence of the Self. But others restrict themselves to the view that none of the experienceable features of people, which the Buddha names as the body (*rūpa*), feeling (*vedanā*), ideation (*saññā*), impulses (*saṃskāra*) and sensation (*vijñāna*),[7] are a Self. None of these five factors (*skandha*s) are the Self for two reasons: they are transitory and we do not have unrestricted control over them. When the Buddha is asked in these passages whether there is a real, substantial Self behind these transitory appearances of the human person, he either expresses a refusal to answer or remains completely silent.[8] In one passage in the *Majjhimanikāya* the Buddha rejects both the view that there is a real Self, and the view that there is not.[9]

This kind of variation has led to an enormous variety in the interpretations of scholars. Schmithausen argues that those passages which fall short of a dogmatic denial of the Self, restricting themselves to the view that no Self is perceivable, fall within the earliest stratum of the canon, and that the absolute denials belong to later strata.[10] Collins argues that the many places where the Buddha leaves open the question as to whether there is a Self beyond the five *skandha*s should not be read in isolation: when supplemented by other clearer denials it can be seen that the Buddha did indeed intend an absolute denial.[11] Oetke argues that seeming contradictions are removed if we remember that the word for Self in these passages is used in two different senses: both to re-

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[7] I use the translations suggested in the study of the *khandha*s by Vetter (2000). For the argument that the *khandha*s should not be seen as 'parts of which a human being is comprised' but as a representation of our 'cognitive system', see Hamilton (2000 78 and forthcoming).

[8] Schmithausen 1973 177.

[9] Ibid. 178.

[10] Ibid. 177.

[11] Collins 1982 98.

fer to a permanent Self or soul as taught by the Brāhmaṇical metaphysicians; and to the common-sense concepts of person or living being. It is the former that the texts deny, not the latter. It is the failure to make this distinction, Oetke argues, that has led several earlier scholars[12] to argue that the Buddha actually accepted a permanent Self beyond the five *skandha*s, like that taught in the Upaniṣads.

It is for those with a closer acquaintance than mine with the Pāli canon to continue this debate. I would just say, first, that Collins' argument only seems to be valid if we assume there to be a consistent teaching (*ekavākyatā*) throughout the canon, something that is not necessarily the case if we accept that it contains different strata; and, secondly, that there seems to be much to be said for a view put by Frauwallner and developed by Schmithausen, namely that the Buddha's primary attitude to the Self was that to concern oneself with its nature is fruitless or even disadvantageous for spiritual advancement.

Such a view, stated explicitly in some passages of the canon, certainly provides a good explanation of the Buddha's reluctance to answer questions about whether a permanent Self exists. And it renders understandable his denial both of the view that there is a real Self as well as of the view that there is not: both are purely theoretical obsessions that have no bearing on the primary aim of Buddhism, the bringing to an end of suffering.[13]

The negative attitude of the Buddha to the Self is explained, on this view, as arising from practical considerations concerning what is most conducive to spiritual progress, not as a philosophical denial of the existence of the Self. According to an assumption of early Buddhism, liberation involves the cessation of passion, craving and desire. These presuppose the concept of 'I' or 'mine', for it is only because we identify the body, feelings, sensations etc. as 'I' or 'mine' that we crave on their behalf.[14] It was thus in order to uproot passion and craving, so argues Schmithausen, that the Buddha showed that the body, feelings and the other *skandha*s, since they are transitory and there-

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[12] Such as Pérez-Remón (1980) and K. Bhattacharya (1973).

[13] Schmithausen 1973 178; Schmithausen 1969 160.

[14] Schmithausen 1969 160.

fore ultimately productive of suffering, are not the true Self. To claim that there existed beyond these experienceable constituents of people an unperceivable Self would have been, at best, unnecessary and, at worst, dangerous, for it could lead to a strengthening of egoism and selfish desire.[15]

Thus on this view the original Buddhism did not deny the Self, but out of purely practical grounds dragged it into the background and excluded it from the group of questions reflection upon which it considered worthwhile.[16] Collins describes this view as attributing 'pragmatic agnosticism' to the Buddha, claims that it emphasizes 'occasional remarks in the texts'[17] and groups it under the category of views that 'refuse to believe that the "real" doctrine taught by the Buddha is what the canonical teaching of *anattā* appears to be'.[18] But there is a certain overlap between his own view and this analysis of the doctrine of no-Self as pragmatic agnosticism. He summarizes his own view in these words:[19]

> To use my own metaphor, the denial of self in whatever can be experienced or conceptualised—that is, in the psycho-physical being who is exhaustively described by the lists of impersonal elements—serves to direct the attribution of value away from that sphere. Instead of supplying a verbalised notion of what

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[15] Ibid. 161; Schmithausen 1973 178.

[16] Schmithausen 1969 161. In order to rid oneself of craving and selfish desire the Buddha prescribed a meditative practice in which one eliminates the concept of 'I' from its association with sensations, perceptions and the rest, seeing these as purely impersonal events. Schmithausen (1973 178) suggests that the dogmatic denial of the Self advocated by later Buddhists and later layers of the canon arose through the desire to metaphysically underpin this spiritual practice of the elimination of the concept of a Self from one's understanding, in order to strengthen the hold of the elimination.

[17] Collins 1982 10. He is referring to Frauwallner's articulation of this view, not Schmithausen's.

[18] Collins 1982 7. Others who emphasize not agnosticism or pragmatism but positive metaphysics in early Buddhist attitudes to the Self are Chandra (1978) and Inada (1981). Gombrich (1996 16) attributes a pragmatic approach to the Buddha: 'Since he was interested in how rather than what, he was not so much saying that people are made of such and such components, and the soul is not among them, as that people function in such and such ways, and to explain their functioning there is no need to posit a soul. The approach is pragmatic, not purely theoretical'.

[19] Collins 1982 83.

> *is* the sphere of ultimate value, Buddhism simply leaves a direction arrow, while resolutely refusing to predicate anything of the destination, to discuss its relationship with the phenomenal person, or indeed to say anything more about it.

He talks not of a general denial of self, but its denial in the experienceable psycho-physical being. He sees this not as a purely metaphysical denial but as having as its aim to point us away from investing the five experienceable aspects of ourselves with value; this reminds of Schmithausen's claim that its aim is to instill in us the attitude that it is not worth striving or craving on their behalf. And the firm silence he attributes to the Buddha on 'the sphere of ultimate value' and 'its relationship with the phenomenal person' smacks of agnosticism, which, even if principally directed at *nirvāṇa*, would also seem to involve the self.

1.2. Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas and the Pramāṇa School

If there is room for doubt over whether early Buddhism denies absolutely the existence of the Self, there is no such room in the case of the branch of Buddhism that is attacked by Rāmakaṇṭha, namely, that which began with the Vaibhāṣikas, was followed by Sautrāntika modifications as articulated by Vasubandhu in his *Abhidharmakośa* and auto-commentary,[20] and was further developed and mixed with elements of Yogācāra idealism by his pupil Dignāga and the latter's followers, most notably Dharmakīrti.

For the Vaibhāṣikas, the Sautrāntikas and the Pramāṇa school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, a person consists only of the five psycho-physical constituents (*skandha*s). Concepts such as 'Self' or 'person' correspond to no real entity. That which they denote is reducible to the five transitory constituents in the way that a forest is nothing other than individual trees. The thinking of these schools is dominated by the thought that parts are more real than wholes, individuals more real than universals, elements more real than conglomerates.

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[20] On this important text's denial of the Self, see Stcherbatsky 1920 and Duerlinger 1989, 1993, 1997, 1998 and 2000.

They distinguish these two orders of reality by designating the first members of those pairs as substantial (*dravyasat*) and the second members as merely notional (*prajñaptisat*). Whatever can be further broken down, either physically or conceptually, is merely notional. Only when non-composite building blocks are reached do we find substantial existence.

Thus their view of the Self is entirely parallel to their view of external objects. Just as some milk, to take an example given by Vasubandhu, can be broken down into, and therefore regarded as nothing more than, a certain form and colour, a certain taste and so on, so likewise that to which we apply the term 'Self' can be broken down into, and therefore regarded as nothing more than, the five constituents.

Furthermore the Vaibhāṣikas radicalized transitoriness into momentariness,[21] and the result was taken on by the other two schools in this branch also. The substantial elements (*dharma*) that are mistakenly taken to constitute objects (such as milk) and the constituents that are mistakenly taken to constitute a Self consist of rows of momentary phases.[22] Each phase is sufficiently similar to the previous, and succeeds it so rapidly, that there is an illusory appearance of a persistent entity. But persistent entities in fact exist only as notions in our mind; the reality to which we apply those notions being these rows of momentary entities, where each entity is linked to the next only in the sense that it causes it to arise in the image of itself, not in the sense that they together form a more temporally extended object.[23]

Thus the Self disappears by being deconstructed both diachronically and synchronically. It is deconstructed diachronically into a plurality of distinct momentary phases; and synchronically in that even the momentary phases are

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[21] Schmithausen 1969 161.

[22] There is variation between (and within) the three schools under examination on the question of what the momentary phases of objects consist of: atoms, sensible qualities such as colour, or simply images (*ākāra*) that are non-separate from their cognition. But all three concur that objects, however analysed, consist of rows of distinct momentary phases.

[23] Nor is it correct, strictly speaking, to say that the phases 'belong to a continuum'. This implies that there is some continuum encompassing the different phases, when in fact nothing exists except the individual phases.

not unitary because they consist of five separate constituents. This model stresses not only the transitory and insubstantial, but also the impersonal, nature of our existence. The idea of a person acting and experiencing is replaced with that of an impersonal stream of transitory mental and physical events.

The Brāhmaṇical schools objected that actions without agents are inconceivable. When we say 'Devadatta moves', the event that that describes depends upon Devadatta as the mover.[24] Vasubandhu responds by describing the situation impersonally without any reference to a persistent agent that initiates the action and sees it through to its completion. What is actually happening, he explains, is that the five constituents at one moment of time cease to exist but cause another similar five to arise in a neighbouring place, which then cease to exist and so on. There is thus not only no mover, but no movement either, because there is nothing that continues to exist over the relevant period of time that could be said to change location. It is like the flame of a candle that appears to 'move' in a breeze, where in fact momentary flames arise successively right next to one another.

Such a radical reductionism in which all those things that in everyday discourse are held to be unitary are taught to be unreal and to disappear into a plurality must explain how the real plural entities come to be joined up in our everyday understanding. Diachronic joining up is explainable from information already given: adjacent phases are so similar and succeed each other so rapidly that we are fooled into thinking that we are observing one thing rather than many different ones. But how about synchronic coherence? If we consist of five separate things with no further entity of which they are parts or in which they inhere, why do those five streams not separate from each other? Why is my body always associated with my feelings, my perceptions and so on? If they are completely distinct what is to stop them from existing in isolation?

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[24] AKBh(BBS) p. 1218. On several occasions I paraphrase, or quote and translate, passages from the ninth chapter of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. Unfortunately, however, the following publication came to my notice too late for me to see it before sending off the final draft of the present work: Lee, J. C. (ed., with critical notes by the late Prof. Yasunori Ejima), *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu, Chapter IX: Ātmavādapratiṣedha.* Bibliotheca Indologica et Buddhologica 11. Tokyo: 2005.

Dharmakīrti's answer is that the five psycho-physical constituents (or the colour/shape, taste, smell and tactility of an object) together form a causal complex (*sāmagrī*). The body at one moment of time (t_1) is the main cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) of the body at the next moment of time (t_2), but it is also the co-operating cause (*sahakāripratyaya*) of the four other constituents at t_2. Similarly the body at t_2 would not arise if it were not for the other four constituents at t_1 acting as co-operating causes for it. Thus it is because all five constituents in one person depend on the same cause, namely the same causal complex, that they cohere.[25]

The process continues beyond death so that 'I' am linked to 'my' past and future incarnations (just like 'I' am linked to past and future moments of 'myself' in this life) not in the sense that 'I' am those, but merely in that there is an unbroken chain of causes and effects leading from 'me' to them.

It is this branch of Buddhism, particularly the Pramāṇa school, that was engaged with most by the non-Buddhist schools of philosophy. It is taken by Rāmakaṇṭha to be representative of Buddhism.

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[25] They also depend on the same karma. At PVā 2.48bc Dharmakīrti answers the question of why the body and cognition always exist together if they are separate. He states that they have the same cause, like seeing and the other faculties of a single person, or like the colour and taste of an object (*hetvabhedāt sahasthitiḥ | akṣavad rūparasavat*). He does not name the cause, but all the commentators give it as karma (see Franco 1997 119).

In a passage in his *Svavṛtti* (7,12–8,11) he had already analysed the case of the colour and taste of an object in detail. The reason that they always exist together (and the reason we can infer one from the other) is that they depend on the same causal complex (*sāmagrī*). That complex includes the colour in the previous moment, which is the main cause of the present colour and the co-operating cause of present taste; and the taste in the previous moment, which is main cause of the present taste and the co-operating cause of the present colour. If we read his remark at 2.48bc in the light of this *Svavṛtti* passage it seems just as likely that he meant by the common cause of body and cognition, not karma, but their causal complex (*sāmagrī*) in which the body in the previous moment is the main cause of the body at the present time and the co-operating cause of cognition at the present time; and cognition in the previous moment is the main cause of the present cognition and the co-operating cause of the body in the present time.

1.3. Mādhyamikas

The Madhyamaka school gave more priority than the branch of Buddhism just dealt with to those passages in the canon where the Buddha refuses to answer questions about metaphysical issues. They justified this attitude of silence on whether or not the Self exists through the view that the true nature of things is ungraspable and empty of essence (*śūnya*).[26] Thus it defies all concepts, both Self and not-Self.[27] The five constituents of a person and all the other elements held by the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas to be the real building blocks of the world are held in this school to be just as unreal as the Self: they too are merely notional (*prajñaptisat*).

For the previous branch of Buddhism it is momentary associations of the five constituents that act, and subsequent momentary associations that experience the results of that action, whether in this life or a future one. The Mādhyamikas rejected this view. Since, for them, the self is not less real than the constituents, both being merely conventional, and since it is the self and not the elements that is conventionally held to act and experience, they held that the self, though merely notional, is indeed that which acts and experiences.[28]

1.4. Vātsīputrīyas

The Vātsīputrīyas, about whom little is known, rejected the existence of an eternal Self as upheld by the Brāhmaṇical schools, but accepted a 'person' (*pudgala*). This they held to be ineffable (*avācya*), and neither identical to the

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[26] Schmithausen 1969 166.

[27] For Mādhyamika arguments about the dangers of holding the Self to be a substantial entity, see Pr ad MMK 18.1–4; BoCaAvPa ad 9.56–75; and BoYoCaṬī ad 10.1–4.

[28] Tillemans 1996 838. This is perhaps more of a Tibetan idea than an Indian one. Although Tillemans attributes it to 'Madhyamakas', the only source he mentions is Go rams pa, a 15th century Tibetan writer. But even if Indian Madhyamakas did not hold that the self acts and experiences, they did, from Nāgārjuna onwards, hold that our deep-seated illusion of an 'I' is the vehicle and driving force of reincarnation (Tillemans 1996 847).

five constituents, nor separate from them. Because the person is not identical to the five constituents it is not transitory like them; and because it is not separate from them it is affected by their changes and therefore not eternally the same. It is the substrate of mental states and of transmigration.[29]

1.5. The Soul Doctrines of Vedānta, Sāṅkhya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā

In the *Upaniṣad*s is found the view that the core of our being, our Self (*ātman*), is identical with the basic essence of the universe, Brahman. Brahman is said to be that from which beings are born, on which, once born, they live, and into which they pass at death.[30] The identity between the essence of human beings and this single source and substrate of the universe became the cornerstone of the later school of Advaita Vedānta. Two strands within Advaita Vedānta are frequently distinguished: the transformationism (*pariṇāmavāda*) of such authors as Bhartṛprapañca and Bhāskara, and the illusionism (*māyāvāda*) of authors such as Śaṅkara and Maṇḍanamiśra. For the former our separate identities are temporary transformations of Brahman and at liberation we dissolve back into it. For the latter our separate identities are not real; liberation consists in realizing that we never have been separate from Brahman.

Sāṅkhya rejected this idea of a single absolute Self, postulating instead a real plurality of individual souls,[31] one for each being, as did Vaiśeṣika. Vaiśeṣika falls further from Vedānta than Sāṅkhya, in many respects. Sāṅkhya souls, although separate from each other, are, like the Vedāntin absolute Self, omnipresent, or at least not delimited by space. The souls of early Vaiśeṣika are,

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[29] See Chau 1984 and 1987, Cousins 1994, Namikawa 2002, Duerlinger 1997, 1998 and 2000, and Schmithausen 1969 163–164. There is also a monograph on *pudgalavāda* that I have not been able to see: Priestley, L. (1999), *Pudgalavāda Buddhism*: *The Reality of the Indeterminate Self,* University of Toronto, Centre for South Asian Studies, Toronto.

[30] *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 3.1.

[31] I use 'soul' more or less synonymously with 'Self'.

by contrast, of definite size. The general orientation of Vaiśeṣika is that of a philosophy of nature, which is just as interested in the external world as it is in souls, and seeks to explain things on an atomistic-mechanistic basis.[32] For Sāṅkhya, by contrast (as for Vedānta), souls form the centre of interest, the entire material world being said to evolve for their benefit.[33]

By the time of the classical formulation of Vaiśeṣika in the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*, the soul was held to be all-pervading, but according to the earliest sūtras it was of limited size. Frauwallner mentions two views from before the change took place, which he sees as two stages of development.[34] In the first stage he claims that what was accepted was a thumb-sized soul (*aṅguṣṭhamātraḥ puruṣaḥ*) that resides in the heart and directs the body as a charioteer directs a chariot. This soul is the bearer of life and when it departs from its body the person dies. In the second stage of development the soul becomes larger. Since sensations occur in all parts of the body, and since the soul can direct movement right up to the extremities of the limbs, it was held to be the size of the body.[35]

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[32] Frauwallner 1956 15. Vaiśeṣika does concern itself with liberation, but, in the view of Frauwallner (as well as earlier scholars such as Faddegon and Ui), this concern is later and less prominent than its drive to explain and classify natural phenomena. Halbfass regards the view that Vaiśeṣika was originally a pure philosophy of nature, uninterested in soteriology, as 'inevitably speculative', but considers it 'undeniable that the soteriological orientation is not genuinely at home in Vaiśeṣika' (1983 288). Houben (1994), however, argues that the Vaiśeṣika teachings on liberation occupied an important place from beginning, and do not contrast problematically with its physics. Adachi, too (1994 659–661), argues for the earliness of *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*s that deal with reincarnation and liberation.

[33] Frauwallner 1956 26.

[34] Ibid. 62.

[35] I reproduce this view of Frauwallner's with a word of caution. For although its source, his 1956 account of early Vaiśeṣika in the second volume of his *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie,* was a work of ground-breaking significance and remains the best overall account of early Vaiśeṣika, it is not without fault. Though based on a thorough familiarity with an impressive number of primary sources, the historical theses it puts forward are not always supported by adequate evidence. (This point has been made by, among others, Wezler (1983) and Preisendanz (1989 and 1994a), who have argued for alternative lines of development on specific issues to those proposed by Frauwallner.) Here for example he gives the *Kāṭhaka Upaniṣad* and the *Mahābhārata* as the sources of his

Alongside the difference between Sāṅkhya and these early stages of Vaiśeṣika in the size they attribute to souls are two more related differences. Sāṅkhya draws a firm distinction between the soul and the psycho-physical organism that is constituted out of the twenty-three evolutes of Primal Matter, namely the three mental faculties, Intellect (*buddhi*), Personalization (*ahaṅkāra*) and Reflection (*manas*), the five faculties of sense-perception (*buddhīndriya*), the five faculties of action (*karmendriya*), the five pure elements (*tanmātra*s) and the five gross elements (*mahābhūta*) from Ether to Earth.[36] For Sāṅkhya it is not the soul that transmigrates, for, being omnipresent, it cannot move. Rather it is this psycho-physical organism (without the gross elements of the body but with subtle forms of them[37] that constitute a subtle

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knowledge of the first view, and of the second he says only that the Jains continued to hold it. In the absence of further evidence that these two views belonged to the same stream as Vaiśeṣika, we should treat his assertion with caution. Furthermore, even if both views can be shown to have existed in Vaiśeṣika, it would require further evidence to show that that in which the soul is smaller is earlier.

That Vaiśeṣika did at least in its earliest stages hold the soul to be of limited size has been confirmed by several more recent Vaiśeṣika specialists. See Adachi 1994 and others that he mentions there. He argues that originally Vaiśeṣika held the soul to be of definite size and mobile; that by 225–250 it had come to regard the soul's size as infinite; and that by the middle of the 5th century it had ceased to hold the soul to be mobile. For a discussion of certain *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*s that seem to ascribe movement to the soul, see Faddegon 1918 272–273, Wezler 1982 654–655 and Bronkhorst 1993 87–92. For skepticism regarding the presence in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*s of Frauwallner's first view, that the soul is smaller than the body and can move around within it, see Preisendanz 1989 153.

[36] I say that it is 'constituted out of' these evolutes rather than 'composed of' them, for the *tanmātra*s and *mahābhūta*s are not part of the microcosmic organism, but rather macrocosmic entities that play their role, as seeds, at the beginning of creation alone. The material elements that compose the individual (*mātāpitṛjaviśeṣa*s) are produced from the sexual relations of the mother and father.

[37] These subtle elements (*sūkṣmaviśeṣa*s), along with the gross elements that constitute external objects (*prabhūta*s), and the elements produced from the parents mentioned in the previous note (*mātāpitṛjaviśeṣa*s) are collectively known as *viśeṣa*s, particulars. See the first half of SK 39: *sūkṣmā mātāpitṛjāḥ saha prabhūtais tridhā viśeṣāḥ syuḥ*. Larson (1983 312) states that the subtle body is made not of *sūkṣmaviśeṣa*s but *tanmātra*s. This seems to be at variance with SK 38–40: *tanmātrāṇy aviśeṣās tebhyo bhūtāni pañca pañcabhyaḥ* | *ete smṛtā viśeṣāḥ śāntā ghorāś ca mūḍhāś ca* ‖38‖ *sūkṣmā mātāpitṛjāḥ saha*

body to carry the faculties to the womb of the next birth).[38] In early Vaiśeṣika by contrast the soul itself transmigrates.[39]

Secondly, Sāṅkhya souls are completely inactive experiencers (*bhoktṛ*) in the form of pure sentience (*caitanya*): mental occurrences such as pleasure, pain and cognition (*jñāna*) thus happen not to them but to the psycho-physical organism, in particular its mental faculties. The Intellect (*buddhi*), though material and unconscious, 'thinks'; the soul merely observes the products of thought. Souls are thus left to remain as unaffected, passive observers above all that is earthly and changing, as a mirror does not have to change in order for changing reflections to occur in it.[40] In the early Vaiśeṣika by contrast the soul is not removed from this world and from the empirical human being: it is itself the bearer and locus of mental processes,[41] and of the latent impressions that cause memories.

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prabhūtais tridhā viśeṣāḥ syuḥ | *sūkṣmās teṣāṃ niyatā mātāpitṛjā nivartante* ||39|| *pūrvotpannam asaktaṃ niyataṃ mahadādisūkṣmaparyantam* | *saṃsarati nirupabhogaṃ bhāvair adhivāsitaṃ liṅgam* ||40|| Verse 38 tells us that the *tanmātra*s are the 'non-particulars' (*aviśeṣa*s) and that from these five are produced the five elements, which are known as the particulars. Verse 39 subdivides these elements/particulars into three, as we have just seen, and verse 40 describes the transmigrating organism (*liṅgam*) as *mahadādisūkṣmaparyantam*, as consisting of the Intellect down to the *sūkṣmaviśeṣa*s. As support for the *liṅgam* requiring, for transmigration, a body composed of the subtle elements, the next verse, *citraṃ yathāśrayam ṛte sthāṇvādibhyo vinā yathā chāyā* | *tadvad vinā viśeṣair na tiṣṭhati nirāśrayaṃ liṅgam* ||, states that an unsupported *liṅgam*, without particulars, cannot stand, like a picture without a support or a shadow without a pillar or the like. Note that Larson's interpretation receives some support from Gauḍapāda, who reads *vinā* in the just quoted verse as joined with *viśeṣaiḥ*, i.e. as meaning 'without non-particulars', and takes °*sūkṣma*° in the compound *mahadādisūkṣmaparyantam* to refer to the *tanmātra*s. But I do not follow this, given that in the previous verse *sūkṣma* is clearly used to refer to one of the kinds of particular elements.

[38] See Johnston 1937 59 for an account of what it is that transmigrates according to the pre-classical Sāṅkhya of the *Upaniṣad*s and *Mahābhārata.*

[39] Frauwallner 1956 65. For the argument that *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 5.2.18 refers to the transmigratory movement of the soul, see Faddegon 1918 272–273 and Adachi 1994 659.

[40] See TS(GOS) 296–8.

[41] Frauwallner 1956 65.

Frauwallner's explanation for the change that occurred in Vaiśeṣika from souls being spatially limited to their being omnipresent is as follows.[42] He sees the change as necessitated when Vaiśeṣika came to accept and classify an invisible force known as *adṛṣṭa*, 'the unseen'.[43] This is created through the actions of beings and is what explains the capacity of the acts to have effects in the future even after they have ceased. Since Vaiśeṣika took on the view that the actions of beings determine not only the individual fates of those beings, but also more macrocosmic features of the world, *adṛṣṭa* too had a twofold function, influencing both individuals and the cosmos. As an example of the latter, it causes, at the beginning of every world period, the movement and gathering together of atoms that leads to the creation of the world. It is also the cause of all processes in nature whose explanation was not known, such as the flaming upward of fire or the movement of iron towards a magnet.[44]

Once accepted, *adṛṣṭa* had to be assigned to a place among the Vaiśeṣika categories.[45] Since it is created from causes and later destroyed it could not be

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[42] Frauwallner 1956 91–97.

[43] Preisendanz (1989 169) mentions this hypothesis approvingly.

[44] There are clearly two types of phenomena that are accounted for by *adṛṣṭa* in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*s and subsequent Vaiśeṣika texts: the karmic fate of individuals, and processes that would today form the subject matter of physics. Certainly in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya, adṛṣṭa*, in both of these contexts, refers to *dharma* and *adharma*, but Wezler (1983), drawing on and extending Halbfass (1983), does not accept that the same is true of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra.* He thinks it quite possible that, in those sūtras where the processes of nature are explained, *adṛṣṭa* did not refer to the potency caused by the actions of individuals, as assumed by Frauwallner, but functioned simply as a gap-filler to account for natural processes that lacked an otherwise ascertainable cause. Since Halbfass and Wezler regard the non-dharmic meaning of *adṛṣṭa* as primary, however, they remain within a wider Frauwallnerian framework that sees Vaiśeṣika primarily as a philosophy of nature: see the following remark of Halbfass (1983 289), quoted approvingly by Wezler (1983 39). '*Adṛṣṭa*, which may primarily have been a gap-filler in the explication of the universe, subsequently offered itself as a channel for a much more decidedly dharmic and soteriological re-interpretation of the Vaiśeṣika theory of the universe'. Bronkhorst (1993 89–92) also argues that the earliest meaning of *adṛṣṭa* had nothing to do with *dharma* and *adharma.*

[45] At the stage of the completion of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* it had been accepted, but not yet categorized (see Halbfass 1983 286). It features there alongside 'gravity' (*gurutva*)

a self-existent entity. Nor could it be a quality of the psychical organ (*manas*) or of atoms as their specific qualities are permanent.[46] Hence it was held to be a quality of the soul. Given that *adṛṣṭa* as a cosmic force could influence any place in the world, and that all influence, for Vaiśeṣika, was through contact, its bearer must be all-pervading. Thus Vaiśeṣika came to give up the restricted size of the soul and brought it in line, in this respect, with the soul of the Vedāntins and Sāṅkhyas.

This meant that the first of the two related differences that I outlined all but disappeared. Once Vaiśeṣika souls were held to be all-pervading they could no longer be regarded as that which transmigrates. This role was assigned to the *manas*.[47]

The difference in the level of souls' involvement in this world according to the two traditions persisted to some extent: the soul of the Vaiśeṣikas (and Naiyāyikas) remained the substrate of mental occurrences, and it remained an agent (*kartṛ*) directing the body and the *manas*. But its all-pervasion meant that both its relation to the mental occurrences that reside in it, and its agency, came to be re-evaluated. There was now a sharp contrast between it and its mental qualities, pleasure, pain, cognition and the like. Since the latter are restricted to the body, and are merely momentary, they differ from the all-pervading and permanent soul both spatially[48] and temporally. Hence they

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and 'fluidity' (*dravatva*) as a cause of physical motion that inheres in the material substance it affects; none of these three are there classified as qualities.

[46] This at least was the argument given by Praśastapāda, but we know that both of these two positions were held by some. They are referred to and rejected in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* and *Vyomavatī* (see Halbfass 1983 287). Prof. Preisendanz also pointed me to the following in the *Nyāyamañjarī*: *adṛśyo bhūtadharmas tu jagadvaicitryakāraṇam* || (NM(M) Vol. 2, 356,9).

[47] Frauwallner (1956 98–99) states that the Vaiśeṣikas, following Sāṅkhya, posited a subtle body (*ātivāhikaśarīra*) to transport the *manas* to the womb of its next birth. He gives no evidence, but Prof. Preisendanz pointed out to me that he makes the same claim later (p. 242), in the context of summarizing the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, where it is possible to infer that he is referring to PrBhā(Br) 80,1.

[48] They are, in a sense, not spatial at all, not having extension since qualities do not have further qualities. But the fact that they occur only in the body, despite their substrate being all-pervading, implies a less intricate relation between them and their substrate than

came to be regarded as something extrinsic to it (even though they occur in it) and accidental;[49] and it, in its true nature, came to be regarded as free of them.[50] Earlier it had been written,[51]

> According to the Sāṅkhyas, souls are without distinguishing marks; distinctions occur [only] among bodies, sense-faculties and mental faculties, between objects, and between this or that cause.[52] [...] According to the Vaiśeṣikas [by contrast] souls are distinguished by their own qualities.

Now this was no longer quite true for the Vaiśeṣikas, given their view that souls, in their true natures, are devoid of all specific qualities. The Vaiśeṣika soul has become a more Sāṅkhya-like static entity, not something that changes as its qualities change. The older view is in a sense more natural. If one holds, unlike in Sāṅkhya, that souls have qualities, would one not expect souls to differ from each other, not only numerically but also qualitatively? If one material object, an apple say, has one colour and another has a different

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between, say, an object and its colour, or between them and the soul when it was considered to be the size of the body.

[49] In characterizations of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika views in the *pūrvapakṣa*s of texts belonging to rival traditions, the soul's mental qualities are described pervasively with such adjectives as *āgantuka* (extrinsic, accidental, adventitious, incidental), a word contrasted with *naisargika* (innate). They are not so described, in fact, in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* (where qualities are just classified into, for example, those that last as long as their substrates, *yāvaddravyabhāvi*, and those that do not, or those that pervade their substrates, *āśrayavyāpi*, and those that do not); but they are in later Vaiśeṣika texts and in such Nyāya texts as the *Nyāyamañjarī* (see NM(M), Vol. 2, 359,5).

[50] See NM(M), Vol. 2, 359,6: *sakalaguṇāpoḍham evāsya rūpam.*

[51] NBhā(NCG) ad 1.1.29, p. 28,15–29,2: *niratiśayāś cetanāḥ, dehendriyamanaḥsu viṣayeṣu tattatkāraṇeṣu ca viśeṣa iti sāṅkhyānām ... svaguṇaviśiṣṭāś cetanā iti yogānām.* Cited by Frauwallner in note 138, p. 241. For Yoga or Yauga in the sense of Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, he points to Jaina works and to Śālikanātha's *Ṛjuvimalā.* For more on this usage, see Chattopadhyaya 1927, Chakravarti 1951 (73–76), Bhattacharya 1974, Bronkhorst 1981 and Kumar 1983 (269).

[52] I have followed Frauwallner's interpretation. Prof. Preisendanz pointed out to me, however, that although this interpretation receives some support from the *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā,* Vātsyāyana may well have intended *tattatkāraṇeṣu* as a *bahuvrīhi* qualifying *viṣayeṣu.* It would then serve to explain why there are distinctions among the objects: because they have different causes.

colour, then we would not say that the two apples are identical. But according to the view that became standard in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, two souls that are having and have had completely different kinds of desires, pleasures, pains, perceptions and so on inhering in them are unmarked by those qualities and are thus qualitatively identical to each other and to all other souls.

It is perhaps to be regretted that the view that souls change when their qualities change did not survive in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, for its disappearance is a contributing factor to the polarization of the debate between Buddhism and the Brāhmaṇical schools. It came to be one between two extremes: that we are eternally unchanging, and that in every moment we are qualitatively and quantitively different, with the middle ground virtually unoccupied.

I said above that the soul's agency was also re-evaluated. How can the soul be an agent if it is all-pervading? Activity in Vaiśeṣika was held to be equivalent to movement, which was now impossible for the soul. Frauwallner (1956 99) claims that previously the Vaiśeṣikas had held that the soul directs the body through vibrating (*parispanda*),[53] but this is clearly not an option for something all-pervading. It is not surprising that the two traditions that from the beginning held souls to be all-pervading, Vedānta and Sāṅkhya, denied that the soul was an agent. The problem of explaining agency in an all-pervading soul also arose for the Mīmāṃsakas. They addressed it by denying that all action is movement, and following the Grammarians in defining it as that which is expressed by any verb, and the agent as the subject of that verb.

Vaiśeṣika also released action's restriction to just movement, but did not widen it to the extent of the Mīmāṃsakas. Rather it postulated just one more kind of action in addition to movement, namely the action of the will that causes motion.[54] It is through this impulse, which they termed effort (*prayatna*), that the soul was said to direct the body and the senses. But, perhaps owing to the persistence of the thought that all action is movement, *prayatna*

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[53] This view is witnessed though, only in Jain, and not in Vaiśeṣika, sources. Frauwallner does not state evidence for it belonging at one time in Vaiśeṣika.

[54] Frauwallner points to Buddhism as the source of this Vaiśeṣika idea. He quotes (note 133 on p. 324) *Abhidharmakośa* 4.1: *cetanā tatkṛtaṃ ca tat*, 'That (i.e. action) is [both] intention and that which is caused by that.'

came to be classified in the Vaiśeṣika lists of categories not as one of the kinds of action (*karman*), but as a quality of the soul along with, for example, cognition, desire, aversion, pleasure and pain. Thus the soul's agency ceases to stand out as such an important part of its nature as it was in earlier Vaiśeṣika before the soul was regarded as all-pervading. Earlier the soul had had a dual nature as director of the body and knower (*jñātṛ*). Now the former comes to consist only in effort, and this was just one out of nine qualities. Furthermore these qualities, as already explained, became merely adventitious.

Because the soul's specific qualities were not regarded as intrinsic to it, there arose the view that in its liberated state it is completely free of cognition and action, like a rock. How does this compare with the liberated state of souls in Sāṅkhya? It was mentioned above that for Sāṅkhya all mental processes happen not to the immaterial soul, but to the psycho-physical organism, all of which is made from Primal Matter. But the soul confuses himself[55] with this organism, particularly with its highest constituent, the Intellect (*buddhi*) and refers to himself what actually belongs to it. This false identification with the Intellect leads him to believe that it is he who feels pain or undergoes the process of cognition, when these in fact happen to a separate material entity and do not affect him. Once this mistake is realized the interest of the soul in the products of Primal Matter, which is what drives her on, ceases. He is no longer seduced by her, and she has now achieved her purpose, which was to lead him to a realization of his separateness from her. He observes matter no more and she shows herself no more. She continues to mould herself into psycho-physical organisms and objects of perception for other souls, but she is as good as non-existent for those that are liberated. They are not rock-like, though, as is the liberated soul of the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. They will never again experience objects of perception through acts of cognition

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[55] The soul is conceived of as masculine, and Primal Matter feminine, both grammatically and in terms of the imagery of *prakṛti* as a skillful courtesan (*vidagdhaveśyā*) seducing the soul.

(*jñāna*), but they are not insentient (*acetana*) for their very nature is sentience.

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I mentioned above that the debate between Buddhists and non-Buddhists over the nature of ourselves was a debate between two extremes. It was dominated by, on the Buddhist side, the view that we are numerically distinct in every moment,[56] and, on the other side, the view of all the Brāhmaṇical schools looked at so far, that we are eternal and unchanging. An assumption that led the Buddhists to their doctrine of momentariness was that an entity cannot change or be transformed and remain the same entity. For a thing to be transformed is thus not to persist and be modified but to cease to exist and to give way to a new entity resembling it but slightly different. The same assumption can be seen in the view that we are eternally unchanging. To have accepted that we are modified (by our qualities, actions, perceptions or whatever) would have entailed that we become a different entity. That would have been a heresy from the point of view of Brāhmaṇical thinking, for it would have meant that the recipient of the karmic consequence of an action would not be the same thing as performed the original action.

But Mīmāṃsā did not accept this assumption that to change means to cease to exist, and they were prepared to hold that the soul is both eternal and changing.[57] According to them, the soul never ceases to exist, never loses its identity as a particular conscious substance;[58] but it is continually changing its states. As it changes from being happy to unhappy, from perceiving a pot to perceiving a cloth, it is like a snake coiling into different positions, or a piece of gold that is remoulded from a dish, to a necklace, to an earring.[59] The snake and the piece of gold are transformed but they do not cease to exist. The Jains also accepted that the Self is both eternal and changing.[60] But Bud-

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[56] It is a pity that so little is known about the Vātsīputrīyas, for they fall in the middle ground between these extremes with their concept of a *pudgala*.

[57] See ŚV(P_2), *ātmavāda* 22.

[58] See ŚV(P_2), *ātmavāda* 26.

[59] See ŚV(P_2), *ātmavāda* 27–28, and Pārthasārathimiśra ad loc.

[60] See Uno 1999.

dhism and most of the other Brāhmaṇical schools were reluctant to take this view. For them something can only have one essence or nature. It cannot be both changing and eternal. They thought there was a logical fault in holding that one thing has two natures.[61]

Having given some outlines of the soul doctrines of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya, and a brief statement of those of Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā, it remains to locate Rāmakaṇṭha's soul doctrine in relation to these. But first we will introduce Śaiva Siddhānta and look at the place of NPP within it, so that we can see what ideas about the soul were available to Rāmakaṇṭha from his own tradition.

2. Śaiva Siddhānta

There is a common misapprehension in secondary literature that Śaivism was divided into Northern or Kashmir Śaivism, comprising various Tantric traditions, and Tamil, Āgamic Śaiva Siddhānta.[62] It is true that Śaiva Siddhānta, after the twelfth century, survived only in the Tamil-speaking South. But inscriptions from the seventh to the twelfth century witness its presence all over India;[63] and a number of pre-twelfth century Saiddhāntika texts survive, of which NPP is one. The Śaiva Siddhānta that survived in South India was very different from the pre-twelfth century pan-Indian Śaiva Siddhānta. Not only

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[61] I say that this was the case for 'most of the other Brāhmaṇical schools'. The Sāṅkhya concept of Primal Matter is an example of something permanent but changing. Occasional such examples are found within the Brāhmaṇical schools of entities that are eternal but not *kūṭasthanitya* (eternal and existing beyond all that is changing).

[62] Many examples of publications that put forward this mistaken view, both general studies of Hinduism and ones concerned specifically with Śaivism, are given in a Preface to Goodall 2002. To those could be added Alper 1979, in which the author identifies the two most 'fertile' traditions of Śaivism as 'Kashmīrī Śaivism', whose major exponents he names as Somānanda, Utpaladeva, Abhinavagupta and Kṣemarāja, and Śaiva Siddhānta, which he regards as a South Indian tradition, arising in Tamilnad in the twelfth century (pp. 346–347).

[63] See Goodall 2002 xv, note 17.

did it undergo major change as a result of the influence of Bhakti and Vedānta, but its texts also teach modes of public worship in Śaiva temples, whereas the earlier Śaiva Siddhānta taught only personal Tantric ritual and practice.[64]

The claim that Śaiva Siddhānta is a Tamil tradition that arose in the twelfth century is thus inaccurate both temporally and geographically, because this Tamil tradition has its historical roots in an earlier pan-Indian Śaiva Siddhānta. The latter was opposed by the syncretistic Trika-Śaivism of Abhinavagupta, and the non-dualistic traditions on which it draws such as the Pratyabhijñā, Spanda and Krama. To refer to these traditions as 'Kashmir Śaivism', as is still the norm in Indology, is quite inappropriate given that, during the period of Abhinavagupta, Śaiva Siddhānta was the dominant form of Śaivism in Kashmir.[65] It was based on a body of scriptures, many of the surviving commentaries on which were composed in Kashmir in the tenth century. Its exegetes produced dualist commentaries and treatises that formed the basis of the religion of such later South Indian Śaiva Saiddhāntikas as Aghoraśiva.

Even more pervasive than the misunderstanding that locates Śaiva Siddhānta exclusively in South India and regards the Śaivism of Kashmir as consisting only of non-dualistic traditions is that which claims the scriptures of Śaiva Siddhānta to be 'Āgamas' and those of non-dualistic Śaivism to be 'Tantras'. In fact the exegetes of early Śaiva Siddhānta refer to their scriptures more often with the term *tantra* than with *āgama*; and the colophons of manuscripts of Saiddhāntika scriptures, even South Indian manuscripts of South Indian redactions of the scriptures, refer to them as Tantras.[66] Abhinavagupta, fur-

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[64] The scriptures and *śāstra*s of South Indian Śaiva Siddhānta were written in both Sanskrit and Tamil; those of the earlier Śaiva Siddhānta were written only in Sanskrit.

[65] See Sanderson 1985a 203; and Sanderson 1987.

[66] After some time, though, the late Tamil Śaiva Siddhāntikas dropped the term Tantra and used only Āgama in its place. Goodall writes, 'That South Indian editors of works of the Śaiva Siddhānta invariably speak of *āgama*s does not stem entirely from a coy reluctance to refer to their scriptures with the now sullied term *tantra*: neo-Saiddhāntikas writing in Tamil from at least the time of Aruḷnandi (see, for example, the second verse of

thermore, refers to the scriptures on which he comments with the term *āgama* as well as with *tantra*.[67]

The general point could also be made here that Śaiva Siddhānta and non-dualist Śaivism were not as separate as they are generally taken to be. Śaiva Siddhānta scriptures were studied, frequently quoted, and regarded as authoritative by Abhinavagupta and those in his tradition.[68] They saw Śaiva Siddhānta as the generic base of their own more specialized and esoteric religion.[69] Both traditions accepted that the Vedas are valid, but held that the sphere of their relevance is transcended by Śaiva initiation.[70]

Almost all of these misunderstandings can be seen to spring from ignorance of the existence of pre-twelfth century Śaiva Siddhānta. Lists of its original twenty-eight scriptures or Tantras are preserved in a number of sources. Many of these scriptures ceased to be transmitted relatively early, something that was taken advantage of by the Tamil reformulators of Śaiva Siddhānta. They composed new scriptures[71] but gave them names of ones of the twenty-eight that were already lost. Thus the mere existence of a text that bears the name of one of the original twenty-eight is not enough for us to presume that it is early or is the same as the original text by that name. This has misled and continues to mislead some scholars. The person who has most clearly identified which surviving scriptures can be known to have existed prior to Rāmakaṇṭha and the other tenth century Kashmiri Saiddhāntika commentators, and who has done most work towards establishing a relative chronology between

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the *Civañānacittiyār*) profess adherence to two classes of scripture: Vedas and Āgamas (Goodall 1998 xxxvi–xxxvii).

[67] See Goodall 1998 xxxvi–xxxix.

[68] Sanderson 1983 161.

[69] Sanderson 1992 281; 1995b 20; 1990 160.

[70] Sanderson 1990 128. *Brahmaloka* and *Satyaloka*, the heavens that await followers of Vedic religion (Vaidikas) who perform austerities, give donations and such like, are located, according to Śaivas, in *pṛthivītattva*, the lowest of the thirty-six levels that comprise the universe. The Brahman of the Upaniṣads is situated higher, but still within the impure universe.

[71] Or in some cases re-redacted the old ones.

them is Dominic Goodall.[72] He names three criteria that prove a scripture to belong to early Śaiva Siddhānta: the existence of an early Nepalese manuscript of the text;[73] the existence of quotations of the text by an early author (i.e. up to and including Rāmakaṇṭha, who can be dated to c. 950–1000[74]); and the existence of a commentary on the text by an early author. Applying these criteria we arrive at the following list of surviving early scriptures: the *Rauravasūtrasaṅgraha, Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha, Kiraṇatantra, Parākhyatantra, Niśvāsatattvasaṃhitā, Pauṣkarapārameśvaratantra, Kālottara, Mataṅgapārameśvaratantra, Mṛgendratantra, Sarvajñānottara.*[75]

The earliest commentator works of whom survive is Sadyojyotis (seventh or eighth century[76]). By him we have the *Svāyambhuvavṛtti, Nareśvaraparīkṣā, Mokṣakārikā, Bhogakārikā, Paramokṣanirāsakārikā, Tattvasaṅgraha* and *Tattvatrayanirṇaya.* After him nothing survives until a number of works from the tenth and early eleventh century, written by a group of Kashmiri exegetes who all belonged to the same lineage: the *Ratnatrayaparīkṣā* by Śrīkaṇṭha, *Mṛgendravṛtti* by Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, Rāmakaṇṭha's father, eight works by Rāmakaṇṭha, listed in footnote 2, and the *Bhāvacūḍāmaṇi* by Vidyākaṇṭha II, Rāmakaṇṭha's pupil.[77] From Mālava we have three works: composed some time after the end of the eleventh century,[78] the *Siddhāntasārapaddhati* by Bhoja; some time before the middle of the twelfth century[79] the *Tattvaprakāśa* also by one Bhoja; and composed some time before the middle of the

[72] See the introductions to Goodall 1998 and Goodall 2002, which are also the most careful editions and most reliable translations of (parts of) the early scriptures. The value of these publications is further increased by the fact that they report elsewhere unpublished information communicated to the author by Sanderson.

[73] The relevant manuscripts all belong to the ninth or early tenth century.

[74] See page 114.

[75] Goodall 1998 xxxix–xlvi.

[76] See page 111.

[77] For the most detailed account of Rāmakaṇṭha's lineage see Goodall 1998 ix–xiii.

[78] This limit to its date stems from Sanderson's discovery that it draws on the *Somaśambhupaddhati* (1095/6).

[79] This limit to its date derives from the fact that the *Tattvaprakāśa* was commented on by Aghoraśiva (fl. 1157). For a study of the text, see Gengnagel 1996.

twelfth century the *Prāyaścittasamuccaya* by Hṛdayaśiva.[80] After this there is no evidence of Saiddhāntika works composed outside South India.

3. The Place of NPP within Śaiva Siddhānta

3.1. Extent and Manner of Engagement with Other Traditions

The sustained defence of the existence of a (particular kind of) Self and of God that we find in NPP, its detailed philosophical argumentation consisting of long sequences of dialogue between opponents (*pūrvapakṣin*s) and the author himself (*siddhāntin*), is not something that is found in the scriptures of the tradition. They belong to the rather different genre of revelation, in which a form of Śiva himself[81] is asked questions and responds with sermons whose validity is assured simply through being spoken by him. That said, there is a continuum rather than a clear distinction between the two genres.[82] Although there is little śāstric discussion in the *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha,* the *Raura-vasūtrasaṅgraha*, the *Niśvāsa,* the *Pauṣkarapārameśvara,*[83] the *Sārdhatriśati-kālottara* or the *Sarvajñānottara*, when we move to the *Kiraṇa*, we find at least that the questioner, Garuḍa, points to what he perceives as inconsistencies in the sermon he is hearing from the Lord, prompting him to clarify.[84]

[80] For Hṛdayaśiva's dates see Sanderson 2001 3, note 1.

[81] There are two exceptions to this: the *Mṛgendra* is spoken not by Śiva but by Indra, who claims that he is setting forth a shortened version of what has been passed down to him from Śiva through a series of intermediaries; and the *Parākhya* is expounded by Prakāśa, who is identified with the sun.

[82] I am here talking only of the sections of the scriptures that concern themselves with knowledge. They also contain, of course, sections on ritual, observance and Yoga, which, being prescriptive in character, are clearly quite different from a text such as NPP.

[83] We have only parts of this work, so in its case the assertion cannot be made with certainty.

[84] See Goodall 2002 xl.

Then in the *Parākhya,* the *Mataṅga* and the *Mṛgendra*[85] the dialectical dimension becomes more pronounced, and we find the questioners putting objections from the point of view of non-Śaiva traditions such as Buddhism, Sāṅkhya, Vedānta, Nyāya, Lokāyata and Mīmāṃsā. Garuḍa's questions confine themselves to the details of the system, but the questioners in these three Tantras challenge fundamentals such as the existence of God and Self. The former challenge is not in fact completely absent in the *Kiraṇa.* Garuḍa had there asked Śiva how he could be known. One verse of Śiva's response asserts that the universe, being gross and diverse, is an effect, and thus requires a cause. That the cause could be past actions is ruled out owing to them being insentient. But apart from that one verse, there is nothing by way of argument that would need to be addressed by those traditions that denied the existence of God. The rest is theology for the already committed: Śiva explains to Garuḍa his nature, his activities at the time of creation, his dispensing of grace, his three forms, and his mantra-body. In the *Parākhya*, by contrast, the theology is supplemented by lengthy śāstric digressions. And it is not only the existence of God (which prompts eight objections) that is challenged but also the existence of the Self. Prakāśa states in one verse[86] its existence and nature, and Pratoda then puts to him a sequence of twelve objections on the matter before he is satisfied. The mere fact that something is stated to be the case in these texts is thus not always enough: assertions must be justified through logically respectable means.

Turning from the scriptures to the earliest commentator whose works survive, we might expect that he would fall slightly further along the continuum that we are delineating. In fact that is not clearly the case. Though his words do not carry the weight of divine revelation, the amount of philosophical arg-

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[85] Not only are these three texts more śāstric in orientation, but also: 1) the latter two certainly, and possibly the *Parākhya*, were composed in four *pāda*s (*jñāna, kriyā, caryā* and *yoga*), a feature that became standard but is not found in any of the other early scriptures (see Goodall 1998 lviii ff.); 2) the *Parākhya* and the *Mṛgendra* are the only two of the early scriptures that show knowledge of illusionist Vedānta (*vivartavāda*) (Goodall 2002 lii); 3) the *Mataṅga* and the *Mṛgendra* do not have names that appear in the lists of the twenty-eight canonical Siddhāntas. Such facts, though inconclusive of course, indicate that these three texts may be the latest of the surviving early scriptures.

[86] PaTa 1.15.

ument as against theological assertion is no greater in the works of Sadyojyotis than in the *Parākhya, Mataṅga* or *Mṛgendra*. Neither is his Sanskrit, which contains many seemingly superfluous particles (such as *hi*), and several instances of relatives not picked up by correlatives, as clear as that of the *Mṛgendra.*[87] In his *Tattvatrayanirṇaya*[88]—an investigation into Śiva, souls and *māyā*—the existence of Śiva and that of eternal, all-pervading souls are not challenged or deemed to require argument. There is no engagement with the views of other traditions. In the *Tattvasaṅgraha*[89] his engagement consists of two verses devoted to refuting the Sāṅkhya view that the soul is not an agent, and three verses at the end in which he very briefly refers to and rejects four non-Saiddhāntika doctrines: the Pāśupata view that God's qualities are transferred to the soul at liberation; the Vedānta view that all souls are part of Brahman and merge with it at liberation; the Vaiśeṣika view that the ability to cognize and act cease at liberation; and the Lākula view that as soon as a soul is liberated, God hands over to it the task of running the universe and withdraws to inactivity, so that rather than one God there is a row of liberated souls taking on this role in turn. His *Svāyambhuva* commentary[90] contains little that is dialectical. The two texts of his that contain most are the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* and *Nareśvaraparīkṣā.* But, as we will be able to observe in the course of Chapters 2 and 3 below, there is an enormous difference between the *Nareśvaraparīkṣā*'s verses and NPP in the depth and seriousness with which opponents' views are treated. Thus for example Sadyojyotis simply adduces I-cognitions (*ahampratyaya*) as evidence of the existence of the Self,[91] without addressing the possibility that these cognitions are

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[87] The fact that in attacking Vedānta he deals only with the doctrine of real transformation of Brahman into the world of plurality (*pariṇāmavāda*), seeming to be unaware of the doctrine of merely apparent transformation (*vivartavāda*) that superseded it, is an indication that he may have been writing before the composition of the *Parākhya* and the *Mṛgendra*, which, as mentioned above, do confront *vivartavāda* in their refutations of Vedānta. (Goodall 2002 lii.)

[88] For a translation of this text see Davis 1997–2000.

[89] This text has been translated into German by Frauwallner (1962), and into French by Filliozat (1988).

[90] This has been translated into French (Filliozat 1991) and English (Filliozat 1994).

[91] 1.15.

invalid. He is also prone to such assertions as that the Yogācāra rejection of the existence of external objects is false because external objects are experienced (*anubhūyate*).[92]

When one compares the discussion with rival traditions in both the works of Sadyojyotis and the three most discursive of the early scriptures, the *Parākhya, Mataṅga* and *Mṛgendra*, with that in the first chapter of NPP, the first group of texts appear to have as their main aim to strengthen the convictions of Śaivas, whereas the latter could sometimes perhaps convince the members of rival traditions that their own arguments are not well-founded.

Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, Rāmakaṇṭha's father, falls just short of Rāmakaṇṭha on the continuum, and thus a long distance from Sadyojyotis and the scriptures. In his one surviving text, the *Mṛgendravṛtti,* the presentation of the views of non-Śaivas, such as Buddhists, is much less simplistic, and the refutation of their arguments shows more subtlety. This is the earliest surviving Śaiva Siddhānta text that shows its author to have a close acquaintance with the primary sources of Buddhism and to have thought hard about how to counter it non-superficially.[93]

Out of all the Śaiva Siddhānta texts that predate Aghoraśiva, I would place NPP at the very extreme of the continuum, devoting as it does most space to dialogue with other traditions.[94] It is not only the amount of space devoted to, but also the manner of, this engagement with other traditions that sets the first chapter of NPP apart from earlier Śaiva Siddhānta texts, and indeed from many of the others by Rāmakaṇṭha. Many of the scriptures themselves and the commentaries thereon by Rāmakaṇṭha and his predecessors argue in one of two ways for the inferiority of other traditions to Śaiva religion. Either they claim that the authors of the texts of other traditions were not omniscient, and for this reason cannot be relied upon to give one the full picture of

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[92] 1.6.

[93] It is possible that his presentation of, and responses to, Buddhism did not originate from him but were derived from works by his guru and father, Vidyākaṇṭha I, or the latter's guru, Rāmakaṇṭha I, none of which have come to light (see Goodall 1998 ix).

[94] The *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* and the 6th chapter of the *Mataṅgavṛtti* are close to it in this respect.

what exists, ultimate aims and the means of attaining those aims.[95] Or, relatedly, they argue that other traditions can only release one from lower levels of the universe, Śaivism being the only religion that recognizes the existence of the upper levels of the impure Universe and that is powerful enough to raise one beyond them to equality with Śiva at the top of the pure universe. They assign other traditions to particular sections of the hierarchy of principles (*tattva*s).[96] Thus for example in the *Sarvāgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa*[97] Rāmakaṇṭha states that the liberation one can attain from following the Pāñcarātra path lands one in *prakṛtitattva*; that the destiny of those enlightened in the Nyāya tradition is *buddhitattva*; and that those who hold the Self to be no more than the vital breaths can reach no higher than *ahaṅkāratattva*. He also locates Pāśupatas, Lākulas, Vedāntins, Sāṅkhyas, Jains, Buddhists and others.

In many cases one can discern a certain logic linking the traditions with the *tattva*s to which they are assigned. The highest level of the universe recognized by the Pāñcarātras (Nārāyaṇa) is held by themselves to be its material cause, and so they are said to be capable of reaching *prakṛtitattva*, the material cause, according to Śaivism, of the world of sense-objects, bodies and sense-faculties. For the same reason those who hold that Brahman is the material cause of *guṇa*s and souls are also placed in *prakṛtitattva*. The Sāṅkhyas hold that the highest aim is attained through discriminating between the soul and the material world composed of the *guṇa*s. Thus they are said to be able to liberate themselves from *guṇatattva* and everything below. The Buddhists hold that the self is nothing more than a stream of cognition, *jñāna,* which

[95] See for example MT 1.2.11 and Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha's commentary ad loc.

[96] Śaivism modified the scale of *tattva*s that they inherited from Sāṅkhya in two ways (see Goodall 1998 li–lii): by adding further *tattva*s on top, and by understanding them not just as principles/constituents/evolutes, but also as levels of the universe through which the soul ascends on its way towards enlightenment. According to Śaiva cosmology, above *puruṣatattva*, the highest level of the universe recognized by Sāṅkhya, come five more levels, known as the Cuirasses (*kañcuka*s), followed by Primal Matter (*māyā*), followed by five levels of the pure universe, the topmost being Śiva. More detail on this is given below (p. 81).

[97] In a fragment preserved in two quotations, identified by Goodall, and reproduced and translated by him on pp. xxii–xxv of Goodall 1998.

is—in the scheme of *tattva*s—a function of the *buddhi*, and hence they are assigned to the functions of the Buddhi (*buddhivṛtti*).[98] The fact that those who hold that the Self is no more than the vital breaths are placed in *ahaṅkāratattva* can be explained by the fact that the Ahaṅkāra is the faculty responsible for their functioning.[99] Those who hold that the Self is nothing other than the *manas* or the sense-faculties are, not surprisingly, placed respectively in *manastattva* and the *indriya*s. In each case that which the tradition in question could be seen to teach as its highest entity or principle correlates with a relatively low level of the Śaiva universe. But despite this 'logic', such passages are little more than assertions of superiority and differ from interaction with other traditions through reasoned argument and dialogue: their claims cannot really be argued against except through bald denial. Rāmakaṇṭha makes such claims not only in the *Sarvāgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa*, but also the *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti,*[100] *Mataṅgavṛtti*[101] and *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti,*[102] but they contrast with the nature of his engagement with other traditions in the first chapter of NPP and would not be at home there.

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[98] It is hard to imagine how the 'functions of the Buddhi' (*buddhivṛtti*) could represent a geographical level of the universe. Hence Prof. Preisendanz wondered whether in passages such as this the 'levels' to which souls are assigned might not denote spiritual levels or levels of meditational experience as in the case of the Buddhist *dhyāna*s, *āyatana*s and *vimokṣa*s.

[99] The relevant half verse reads, *ahaṅkṛtau tu tadvṛtti prāṇamātraṃ bhrameṇa ye*, and Goodall (1998 xxiv) translates: 'In *ahaṅkāratattva* are those who erroneously hold [the self to be] no more than the vital breaths, which are the activities of that [Ahaṅkāra].' Is the position that the vital breaths are functions of the Ahaṅkāra attested elsewhere? SK 29 states that the breaths are a joint function of *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra* and *manas*. The *Yuktidīpikā* ad loc. lists eight kinds of *prāṇa* beginning with *prāṇa, apāna, samāna,* and then says that they are *vaikārika*, i.e. derived from the Ahaṅkāra (*tad etat prāṇāṣṭakaṃ vaikārikam* YD 209,13–14). The vital breaths are associated with the Ahaṅkāra at BhoKā 33a–c and in Aghoraśiva's commentary thereto. I thank Prof. Preisendanz, Ferenc Ruzsa and Fabio Boccio for pointing these passages out to me.

[100] Ad 143–154.

[101] Ad *vidyāpāda* 3.20ab.

[102] Ad v. 58.

3.2. The Soul in Śaiva Siddhānta and NPP

NPP is also distinctive in the way it approaches the subject of the soul. In order to illustrate this point I will now present the characteristics of the soul that are put forward in other Śaiva Siddhānta texts. This will also serve as an introduction for the reader to the basic ideas of Śaiva Siddhānta theology.

Souls, though eternally separate from God (as well as from each other and from matter) are equal to him in being omniscient and omnipotent. That they do not realize this until the time of their liberation is a result of their true nature being concealed from them because of being covered in Impurity (*mala*). The non-dualist Śaivas conceived of *mala* as simply ignorance and thus capable of being removed through knowledge alone. But for the Saiddhāntikas it was an unperceived physical substance. Just as a cataract does not disappear simply through the person's knowledge that they have it, similarly the physical Impurity that obstructs one's powers of knowledge and action can be removed only through active intervention in the form of Śaiva initiation, in which Śiva acts on the soul through the medium of the initiating guru.[103]

Thus souls are characterized as on a beginningless journey that will end, for some, with Śivahood, the manifestation of their innate omniscience and omnipotence. The only difference between souls and Śiva is that they have been beginninglessly bound, while he has been beginninglessly liberated. The descriptions tend to[104] begin from the end of a period of Cosmic Absorption (*mahāpralaya*), which is also the beginning of a new cycle.[105] At that time most souls will still be subject to the bond of Impurity and the bond of past action (*karman*).[106] For their benefit Śiva stimulates the evolution of the ma-

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[103] See MatV KP ad 1.2–3b.

[104] For example in the *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha* and the *Kiraṇa*.

[105] Since God, souls and the Primal Matter out of which the universe is made (*māyā*) are eternal in Śaiva Siddhānta, the 'beginning' of the universe, or the time at which God creates it, is merely the beginning of one cycle, preceded by an infinite number of previous cycles, each containing their own creation of the universe.

[106] Souls that will not are those that have become liberated in previous cycles and a group known as *vijñānakevalin*s or *vijñānākala*s, who have become devoid of the bond of

terial world out of Primal Matter (*māyā*).[107] This is the third of the three bonds, so why is it of benefit to souls to become subject to it?

Two answers are given. It is only through taking on a body and becoming immersed in a world of sense-objects, both of which are made from the products of Primal Matter, that the soul can experience the fruits of its past actions and thus free itself from the bond of *karman.*[108] Secondly, *mala* on its own cannot mature: for a soul's Impurity to ripen, and thus for liberation to take place, experience (*bhoga*), which requires the products of Primal Matter both as instruments and objects, is necessary.[109] Thus in Śaiva Siddhānta *māyā* is not seen only as that which deludes souls, as in Sāṅkhya; for it also, paradoxically, facilitates their release from *saṃsāra* through empowering them for experience.[110] Hence the soul travels downwards, as it were,[111] becoming subject to the bondage of more and more of the products of Primal Matter.

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māyā, and also that of past action, owing to their own knowledge. They are contrasted with *pralayakevalin*s or *pralayākala*s, who are still subject to the bonds of *karman* and *mala,* but not *māyā* because it has been resorbed at the end of a cycle and not yet re-emitted. For the source of this distinction, which is only found in two of the early Saiddhāntika scriptures, but which became orthodox, see Goodall's remarks at PaTa p. xliii.

[107] Although Śaiva Siddhānta strongly opposes Sāṅkhya's denial of agency in the soul, the latter's relegation of agency to lower principles can be seen to have left its trace in Śaiva Siddhānta's attitude towards God's creation of the universe. Although he is said to be its creator, his instrument in the act of creation is his will alone, and it is not he, but Ananta, the seniormost of eight Rudra-souls known as the Vidyeśvaras, that acts directly on Primal Matter, energizing it to produce the material world. For more on this see note 122.

[108] KiTa 2.7–8.

[109] KV ad 2.7–8; NPP ad 2.27c–28b. This is also implied in verse 17 of *Tattvatraya-nirṇaya.*

[110] The claim that Śaiva Siddhānta is opposed in this respect to Sāṅkhya is made at KiTa 2.12c–15d. *māyā* is not a standard Sāṅkhya term, so the *Kiraṇa* presumably intends to contrast the function of *māyā* in Śaiva Siddhānta with that of *prakṛti* in Sāṅkhya. *prakṛti*'s function in Sāṅkhya is in fact not infrequently characterized as the leading of the soul to liberation; but the *Kiraṇa* may well be right that the positive role of *māyā* is stressed more in Śaiva Siddhānta than that of *prakṛti* in Sāṅkhya.

[111] Being all-pervading, any movement attributed to it is merely metaphorical.

First come the five[112] cuirasses[113] (*kañcuka*s), a group of principles (*tattva*s) that fall below the pure universe, but above the levels of the universe recognized by the Sāṅkhyas. These form the innermost layer of the structure of the person surrounding the soul like a skin.[114] Although they are a bond, they empower the soul for experience by splitting apart Impurity and thus allowing the partial manifestation of its powers of cognition and action. After this the soul is enveloped by each in turn of the twenty-five principles that Śaiva Siddhānta inherited from Sāṅkhya. The top principle of the Sāṅkhya universe, that of the soul (*puruṣa*), becomes in the Śaiva hierarchy the bound soul. Lack of agency in that state is regarded, unlike according to Sāṅkhya, as merely a temporary condition that ends when, equipped with the five cuirasses, the soul penetrates the Unmanifest (*avyakta*), the next principle.[115] The latter is the basis of the material world and the faculties, which facilitate the person's state of incarnation. To those outside the tradition this principle of the Unmanifest may appear somewhat redundant, given the existence of Primal Matter above it.[116] It gives rise to the Intellect (*buddhi*),[117] Personalization (*ahaṅkāra*), Attention (*manas*), the five faculties of sense-perception (*buddhīndriya*), the five faculties of action (*karmendriya*), the five subtle elements (*tanmātra*) and the five gross elements (*mahābhūta*) from Ether to

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[112] In some sources there are only three: Activation (*kalā*), Awareness (*vidyā*) and Attachment (*rāga*). The other two of the five are Limitation (*niyati*) and Time (*kāla*).

[113] This is the translation used by Torella 1998 and Goodall 2002. Sanderson 1996 uses 'Integuments'.

[114] See Torella 1998.

[115] Sanderson 1996 20.

[116] Both it and Primal Matter are envisaged as unconscious, undifferentiated stuff out of which the levels of the universe below them are formed. Both also require to be energized: Primal Matter by Ananta, and the Unmanifest by the Rudra Śrīkaṇṭha (see Sanderson 1996 20).

[117] Some sources, for example the *Raurava,* the *Kiraṇa,* the *Mataṅga* and the *Tattvasaṅgraha*, insert an extra principle between the Unmanifest and the Intellect, that of the three Qualities (*guṇa*).

Earth. Thus after the last stage of this process the soul can finally join with what constitutes its gross body, the outermost layer of the person.[118]

Just as it is Śiva who brings about bondage in *māyā* for those who need it, so it is he who is ultimately responsible for the liberation of souls.[119] Until a soul is ready for liberation Śiva will keep it subject to Impurity; when that time comes he intervenes by favouring it with a Descent of Power (*śaktipāta*) that restrains the hold of Impurity on it.[120] This implants an urge in the person, which leads them[121] to realize that they cannot escape from *saṃsāra* through any other system, and prompts them to seek a Śaiva guru. It also leads to certain changes in their behaviour, such as signs of devotion, which enable an initiating guru to see that Śiva desires that person's release and that they are thus worthy to receive initiation. In this initiation Śiva releases them from bondage by acting through the guru.[122] During the ritual the Mantras prevent

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[118] Apart from a gross body the soul also has a subtle body, which it retains between incarnations and during periods of Cosmic Resorption, and which is the receptacle of its karma.

[119] The first verse of the *Tattvatrayanirṇaya* alludes to these two roles. See also MT 1.4.13d–15.

[120] Śiva sends a salvific Descent of Power, according to some sources, when there is a blockage of experience caused by two equally strong traces of past action reaching fruition simultaneously (*karmasāmya*); and according to others, when the soul's Impurity is ripe to the extent that it is ready to drop off (*malaparipāka*). See Goodall 1998 xxxiii–xxxvi.

[121] I use 'they', 'them' and 'their' not only in plural, but also, as here, in singular meaning, as a way of avoiding sexist language.

[122] Although Śiva is the agent, this agency is minimalized such that he is not contaminated by acting in the impure universe. The success of the ritual depends on Mantras, souls that are denoted by syllables chanted by the guru. It is to these that the job of severing the bonds of the initiand is sub-contracted by Śiva, via Ananta. The latter, before he has stimulated Primal Matter, appoints these Mantras, also called *vidyā*s, to the task of liberating the bound. They inhabit worlds within *śuddhavidyā*, the lowest level of the pure universe, above Primal Matter, so that they too do not have to be contaminated by involvement in the impure universe. Thus here too, as in the case of Śiva's creation of the world, we see a version of the Sāṅkhya idea of action taking place below the level of that which impels it. This applies to Śiva and to Ananta through their delegation of the job; and to the Mantras themselves through their remaining in the pure universe while they sever the bonds of initiands in the lowest level of the universe (*pṛthivītattva*). The survival

all future karma and destroy all past karma, both good and bad.[123] But they leave in place 'present karma', in other words past actions that are currently bearing the fruit of that person's life. Neither do they completely destroy the bond of Impurity and that of Materiality (*māyā*). Thus liberation is attained not immediately, but at death.[124] Post-initiatory daily ritual gradually eliminates the remains of the soul's Impurity and Materiality.

That concludes the account of the soul and its journey from bondage to liberation that is characteristic of most Śaiva Siddhānta texts. One might expect that the first chapter of NPP, since it concerns itself with the soul or Self, would follow the same pattern. In fact many of the features of the account outlined above are ignored completely or given little space at the very end of the chapter; a small number are concentrated on at length; and many new details about the soul are introduced. I take this to be a symptom of the fact that had the tradition restricted itself to this kind of theology it would not have been able to enter into detailed rational dialogue with the Buddhist Epistemological School, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and the other philosophical traditions, for too few of its categories and assumptions—for example the doctrine of the three bonds and the soul's dependence on God's grace—are shared by those traditions. Thus we find, roughly speaking, that in the first chapter of NPP those features of the Śaiva Siddhānta view of the soul that are not shared by any of the philosophical traditions are ignored or dealt with briefly at the end of the chapter; those features that are shared by one or more of those traditions, and that had already been aired in the inter-tradition dialogue, are argued for at length; and the new details are all features that arise not from tensions or developments within Śaiva Siddhānta theology but from discussions of the Self outside Śaiva Siddhānta in debates between philosophical schools.

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of the Sāṅkhya ideology that this betrays is striking given its co-existence with the strong Śaiva affirmation of agency in the Lord and in souls, even after they are liberated.

[123] I am talking here of initiation for liberation-seekers (*mumukṣu*), known as *nirvāṇa-dīkṣā*, not of that for Sādhakas seeking supernatural powers or a period in a chosen paradise (*bubhukṣu*), where the situation is slightly more complicated and the sources not unanimous. See Sanderson 1996 33–37.

[124] 'Present karma', Impurity and Materiality are not left in place in that variety of initiation known as *sadyonirvāṇadīkṣā*, which was given to the dying.

To be specific, into the first category fall the omniscience and omnipotence of the soul, its becoming equal to Śiva at liberation, its beginningless connection with the bond of Impurity, the existence of the five cuirasses that surround it, the fact that Impurity is not simply ignorance but a physical substance, the reason for its involvement with the material world being to facilitate its freedom from Impurity and Past Action, Śaiva initiation being its only hope of liberation, the idea that it can receive a descent of power, its dependence on God's grace and the idea that its karma can be cancelled by Mantras. None of these are mentioned before page ninety-nine (of the KSTS edition, out of 112), and the last six not at all.[125] Into the second category fall the fact that

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[125] One can detect a conscious decision to avoid them. Note, for example, the course of the following discussion (ad v. 55, p. 95,8–13): Rāmakaṇṭha states the conclusion of his preceding arguments against a Vedāntin opponent, namely that a plurality of eternal and all-pervading souls must be accepted. The opponent objects that in that case, since all souls would be present in all bodies, people's experiences would be mixed up. Rāmakaṇṭha responds that experiences are kept separate because they are restricted by people's individual karma. The opponent objects that the karma too of one person would not be restricted to that person alone for the same reason that their soul would pervade every other body. Rāmakaṇṭha responds that karma is separate for different agents, since agency, because it is linked to the desire to act, is separate in different individuals. He supports this by pointing out that one person never desires to act as a result of a desire to act in another person. *ity uktayuktyā nityavyāpakasvabhāvā eva te 'bhyupagantavyā iti. yady evaṃ sarvaśarīreṣu sarvātmanāṃ sannidhānād bhogasaṅkaraḥ. na, karmabhir niyamitatvāt. nanu teṣām api sa eva doṣaḥ. na, kartṛbhedena bhedāt, kartṛtvaṃ hi cikīrṣāyogāt pratyātmaṃ bhidyate, nānyacikīrṣayānyaś cikīrṣāvān* [°*nyaś cikīrṣavān* Ked^{pc}, B; °*nyacikīrṣavān* Ked^{ac}; °*nyacikīrṣā vā* Ped] *upapadyate yataḥ.* What is noteworthy about Rāmakaṇṭha's argument is that he does not bring up Limitation/Constraint (*niyati*). This is one of the five cuirasses and its function is precisely to avert what the opponent refers to in this passage as *bhogasaṅkara*, the mixing of experiences. It ensures that a soul experiences only the results of its own past actions. The fact that Rāmakaṇṭha avoids mentioning this specifically Śaiva principle, which could not be more appropriate in the context, appealing instead to agency and 'the desire to act', concepts that are much less controversial, illustrates the avoidance of ideas that would carry no weight in inter-tradition discourse.

I said that none of the members of the list are mentioned before page ninety-nine. On that page Rāmakaṇṭha turns from the task of refuting other traditions to refuting other Śaiva, but non-Saiddhāntika, views of liberation (until page 103). Perhaps because he is addressing other Śaivas, he mentions for the first time in the text the soul's omniscience

souls exist, that they are eternally separate from each other, that they are all-pervading, that they are separate from the body, the sense-faculties and the *manas*, that they are agents, that their power of cognition is innate, that they are non-momentary, that they are separate from objects of perception and that they survive the death of the body. As for the new details, we will encounter them in the course of the four chapters. They concern mostly the claim that the Self is nothing other than cognition, that it can be perceived, and the elaboration of different kinds of such perception.

Thus both in the extent (and manner) of its engagement with the views of other traditions, and in those features of the soul that it focusses on, NPP differs from other Śaiva Siddhānta texts. With regard to the first it was seen not to be unique, but to lie at one end of a continuum. The same is the case with regard to the second. Its avoidance of certain aspects of the soul and concentration on others was enabled by a similar pattern in the text on which it comments, NP. Neither is NP the only other text that has a long examination of the soul, concentrating on philosophical rather than theological issues: a second is the *Parākhya*.

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and its becoming equal to Śiva at liberation, and alludes to its omnipotence with the word *ādi*.

Even during this refutation of other Śaiva views of liberation, he mentions that which obscures the soul's power of cognition as *avidyādyāvaraṇa*, 'hindrances such as ignorance' (ad 59, p. 100,3–4), avoiding the term *mala*, Impurity. It is in the context of this refutation of other Śaiva views of liberation that he first alludes to the five cuirasses with the word *kalādi*, 'Kalā and the others' (100,13–14).

On pages 106–107 he, in one paragraph, argues for the existence of something that obstructs (*āvaraṇa*) the full expression of the soul's powers and names this as Impurity (*mala*). That is the one and only place in the chapter where he deals with the topic. Then from page 107 to 111 he argues for the existence of the bonds above the Sāṅkhya universe that he referred to for the first time a few pages earlier with the word *kalādi*.

3.3. Reliance on Śaiva Scripture

I take these two differences as an indication that through NPP Rāmakaṇṭha is attempting to reach out to a larger audience, one consisting not only of Śaivas. If this were the case then we would expect him not to adduce Śaiva scripture as a means of knowledge in NPP, but to try to establish all of his points by appeal solely to direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*). This is, broadly speaking, the case. The first six chapters of KV comprise roughly the same amount of text as the first chapter of NPP, and whereas in the former Rāmakaṇṭha quotes Śaiva scripture twenty-six times, he does so only twice in the first chapter of NPP.

One of these is in the section where he is refuting Pāśupata and Kāpālika analyses of liberation[126] and it is easily explained as resulting from the assumption that these Śaiva groups would not want their analyses to contradict Śaiva scripture. The other comes in the section in which he deals with the existence of the specifically Śaiva principles (*tattva*s) that constitute further levels of bondage above those levels recognized by the Sāṅkhyas. He informs the reader of their names and their order of emission by quoting the *Raurava*.[127] But the fact that he does not regard the mere citation of Śaiva scripture—outside of the small section where he is addressing other Śaivas—as much of an instrument of proof is indicated by the fact that he then immediately has an opponent ask 'Are these [extra bonds] which are not recognized in other schools, proved for you only by scripture?'[128] He answers in the negative and immediately articulates an inference of their existence.[129]

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[126] Ad v. 65, p. 103,10.

[127] Ad v. 69, p. 107,5b–2b.

[128] Introducing verse 70, p. 108,2–3: *kim āgamenaivaitāni darśanāntarāprasiddhāni bhavatāṃ siddhāni.*

[129] Far and away the most quoted texts are those belonging to the Buddhist Pramāṇa School. Rāmakaṇṭha quotes Dharmakīrti on no less than forty-four different occasions during the first chapter alone, and followers of Dharmakīrti (such as Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta) five times. In general he quotes texts that would be regarded as authoritative by the tradition that is being addressed at the time. The purpose is either to show that his own views, though contrary to those of his opponent, are derivable from or con-

3.4. Comparison with Pratyabhijñā

I conclude from the above that whereas KV, for example, expounds one of the scriptures of the tradition primarily for the benefit of those within it, NPP looks without to the wider philosophical discourse of the time, in which Śaiva Siddhānta was only a marginal voice. It attempts to locate Śaiva Siddhānta within that discourse by taking on in debate a series of interlocutors from other traditions. In this respect we could see it as a Śaiva Siddhānta equivalent of the Pratyabhijñā tradition's texts.[130] It would have been hard to gain ground in that discourse had he concentrated on the more theological aspects of Śaiva Siddhānta, and thus, as we saw above, they take backstage in NPP and are replaced by an emphasis on different aspects of the Self. Torella describes a similar process at play in the Pratyabhijñā's re-working of its inheritance from the non-dualist cults based on the Bhairava Tantras:[131]

> It was necessary to [...] purge it, without changing its essential nature, of all that it was felt could not be proposed to a wider circle—in other words, of all that was bound to create an instinctive and insurmountable resistance—by [...] translating it into a discourse whose categories were shared by its addressees.

Bronkhorst comments on this process:[132]

> The Pratyabhijñā School demonstrates, through its transition, how strong must have been the attraction to join the rational tradition that had united, at least since the beginning of the common era, a variety of mutually opposing

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gruent with their principles and so should be accepted by them; or to show that his opponents' views are contradicted by other views of their own school.

[130] Sanderson (1985a 203) writes of Pratyabhijñā that it presented the idealism of the Trika 'to a wider public by clothing it in the philosophically reasoned, anti-Buddhist discourse of high Brahmanism' (see also Sanderson 1990 162–63). Similarly Rāmakaṇṭha here presents Śaiva Siddhānta in an anti-Buddhist treatise, which in its style, methodology and subject-matter can be seen to belong to the same genre as the works of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Sāṅkhya and Vedānta.

[131] Torella 1994 xiii.

[132] Bronkhorst 1996 604.

> schools of thought in India. Brāhmaṇical thinkers, Buddhists and Jainas had opposed and sometimes viciously attacked each other, without ever desisting from paying heed to each other, and trying to defend their own points of view against the attacks directed against them. The very existence of such a rational tradition in India has never received the attention it deserves, and it goes without saying that not all religious movements chose to be part of it. Pratyabhijñā is an example of a school which originally remained aloof from these discussions, but—in the persons of Somānanda, Utpaladeva and others—felt the need to join in.

Similarly Śaiva Siddhānta is a tradition whose early texts show little concern for this 'rational tradition', but which, in the persons of Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha and Rāmakaṇṭha, shows the desire to enter it.

One should not, however, take the comparison with Pratyabhijñā too far. Pratyabhijñā is a separate school with its own lineages and doctrines. There was no comparable breakaway tradition in Śaiva Siddhānta. The first chapter of NPP may show signs of a similar tendency to focus on and develop those sides of Śaivism that were suitable for confronting the philosophical traditions, but it is a text that is claimed by no tradition other than that which sees itself as following the Śaiva Siddhānta scriptures. Unlike the case of Abhinavagupta, whose Pratyabhijñā texts can be seen to belong to a different tradition from that of his Trika texts, all of Rāmakaṇṭha's texts belong only to Śaiva Siddhānta.

The way that I placed NPP at the end of a continuum that unfolded in what is more or less a plausible chronological order should not be taken to indicate that over time Śaiva Siddhānta evolved into a less theological and more rational tradition. That is certainly not the case. The first chapter of NPP represents, if anything, a fringe phenomenon. The heart of Śaiva Siddhānta for Rāmakaṇṭha is its theology and ritual; the philosophical discussion in which theological assumptions are set aside is a thin layer at its outer edge.

4. Rāmakaṇṭha's Soul Doctrine in Relation to Those of the Brāhmaṇical Schools

4.1. Vedānta and Sāṅkhya in Brief

Concerning Rāmakaṇṭha's relation to Vedānta and Sāṅkhya there is in each case a primary point of contention that is clear and simple to articulate. Against the Vedāntin Rāmakaṇṭha seeks to establish that rather than there being only one soul in the universe, there is a plurality of distinct souls that remain separate from each other even after their liberation. Against Sāṅkhya he seeks to establish that the Self is an agent.

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Bronkhorst has written in some detail about the Śaiva view that the Self is an agent, which he encounters in Utpaladeva's *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā*. He regards it as contrasting strongly with 'practically all schools of Brahmanical philosophy', and as 'surprising' when 'seen from the perspective of earlier Indian philosophy' (1996 611). For him it is characteristic of Brahmanism to maintain that the way to attain liberation from karma is to realize that the Self in its true nature is inactive. By realizing that one is different from everything that acts one frees oneself from one's actions and therefore from their results.

He explains Utpaladeva's attribution of agency to the soul, which he describes as a 'fundamental reversal' (612), in the following way. Utpala holds that something insentient cannot cause existence in something else. Thus the relation of cause and effect is reduced to that of agent and object. This means that in statements like 'the seed produces the shoot' the seed is not the real cause. Rather God is the cause, i.e. the agent. Since God for him is nothing other than the Self, we arrive at the view that the Self is an agent.

Glossing over the problem that this is a rather circular explanation for the rise of the view that the Self is an agent, comparison with Śaiva Siddhānta renders it implausible. For Śaiva Siddhānta too held the Self to be an agent (even in its liberated state), and it holds neither Utpaladeva's view that God is the real referent of cause-terms, nor his view that God is the Self. Bronkhorst writes

as though the agency of the Self first appears in the Pratyabhijñā School, and as though its appearance must be explained as the solution to a philosophical problem. But this doctrine pre-existed Utpaladeva in earlier Śaivism, including in Śaiva Siddhānta (in both the early scriptures and the works of Sadyojyotis), which, being the exoteric base of non-dualistic Śaivism, is likely to be its source.

I am in no better position than Bronkhorst to offer a theory of how the doctrine first arose. But I would have thought it more likely that its origins lie in the religious base of Śaivism than in the philosophical attempt to satisfy what he terms the 'correspondence principle'. For the religious activities of Śaivism had as their aim not only freedom from *saṃsāra*, but also the freedom to do things that are impossible for most of us, the bringing about of supernatural effects (*siddhi*s). Perhaps it was this duality that led to Śaivism holding the Self to be both a knower and a doer.

Towards the end of his article Bronkhorst points out some similarities between Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Utpaladeva. For both, the Self was held to be an agent, and its agency was explained by both in the same way: through the operation of the will alone. But for Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika agency disappears at liberation when insight into the Self's true nature means that all specific qualities leave it and it reaches its real inactive nature. Bronkhorst wonders why there is this difference between Utpaladeva and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. His explanation is that, unlike Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Utpaladeva did not maintain the objective and independent reality of the material world and thus of karma. He writes that whereas 'for Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika the task remained to escape from the effects of one's actions, for Utpaladeva the problem of karma had essentially disappeared' (619). Hence Utpaladeva did not need the Self to be ultimately non-agentive.

But here again the comparison with Śaiva Siddhānta implies that if an explanation for this difference is needed, it should be sought in the religious substrate of Śaivism, not in other philosophical positions held. For Śaiva Siddhānta, like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, upheld the objective and independent reality of the material world, and of karma. But they did not hold that liberation comes about through insight into the inactive nature of the Self. This implies that another explanation is needed for why Utpaladeva and Śaiva Siddhānta

did not have to resort to liberating insight as a means of overcoming karma. And there is quite an obvious one. Both Śaiva Siddhānta and non-dualisic Śaivism claim that one's karma can be cancelled through Śaiva initiation, so the purpose served by asserting that the Self is in its true nature a non-agent was already served by another means.

4.2. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika

The view that consciousness or cognition is a quality that inheres in a soul forms Rāmakaṇṭha's main target in discussions with Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. We saw above that for these two schools cognition, like all of the soul's qualities, is extrinsic to it. They hold that momentary instances of cognition are caused to arise in it owing to the presence of an object, the latter's contact with a sense-faculty, the latter's contact with the *manas* and the latter's contact with the soul. Thus the soul's sentience is not innate but arises in it adventitiously. This accidental relationship of the soul and its cognition, entailing that the soul exists over and above cognition as a separate entity, and implying that the soul itself is insentient, was strongly objected to by Rāmakaṇṭha. For him cognition is not something that sometimes arises in the soul owing to external causes; it is never not in it, being its single nature. Thus for him objects and sense-faculties do not bring about cognition: it exists independently of them and they simply reveal it (*vyañjaka*).[133]

4.3. Sāṅkhya

The tradition from which Rāmakaṇṭha (and Śaivism in general) inherits most is Sāṅkhya. We have already seen that Śaiva Siddhānta accepted their view that the material world, being separate from souls, evolves out of an eternal, unconscious Ur-matter (which is opposed to the Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika

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[133] See KV ad 2.23c–24b, p. 52, 2–3.

view that it is built up, in various stages, out of atoms). Along with this, Śaiva Siddhānta accepted the Sāṅkhya view that the principles of the cosmos are hierarchically ordered, and agreed with them over the identity of the bottom twenty-four or twenty-five. Furthermore it took on the teleological assertion of Sāṅkhya that the unmanifest Ur-matter emits its evolutes for the sake of souls, though for Śaiva Siddhānta it does so urged by God.

The extent of the inheritance from Sāṅkhya sometimes means that Rāmakaṇṭha's debate with another tradition is a version of an earlier debate between Sāṅkhya and that tradition.[134] This is true of the debate between Rāmakaṇṭha and Nyāya outlined in the paragraph before last: from Sāṅkhya Rāmakaṇṭha inherits his view that cognition/consciousness is the innate nature of the soul, not an adventitious quality of it.[135]

It is also true to a large degree of Rāmakaṇṭha's debate with Buddhism. Rāmakaṇṭha's opening move in that debate is to dissociate himself from the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika view that the Self exists as a further entity beyond cognition. He presents this as a kind of ontological extravagance that is quite easy for the Buddhist to refute. The debate between Rāmakaṇṭha and Buddhism is thus not one in which Rāmakaṇṭha has to prove the existence of an entity that the Buddhist does not accept; rather it is one in which he must prove that consciousness or cognition is permanent and the Buddhist must prove that it is momentary. The existence of cognition is not in doubt for either of them. The same situation can be seen in earlier debates between Buddhism and Sāṅkhya. Thus the objections that Rāmakaṇṭha has to confront from Buddhism are ones that Buddhism had previously put to Sāṅkhya. If cognition is the very nature of the Self, then cognition must be single. But how, in that case, can we explain that we experience a cognition of a colour, followed by a cognition of a word and so on? If cognition always had the

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[134] This is also the case with Rāmakaṇṭha's predecessors. Sadyojyotis's argument with the Naiyāyikas at BhoKā 37–43 in which he rejects their position that the sense-faculties consist in material elements (*bhautika*) and asserts that they are derived from the Ahaṅkāra is a replication of Sāṅkhya arguments against the Naiyāyikas.

[135] For more on this see Watson 2006.

same form how would it be able to experience different objects?[136] Surely it must be modified in some way, but if it were then it would not be permanent so the Self would not be permanent.[137] For an articulation of these objections in NPP and Rāmakaṇṭha's response, see Chapter 4 below.

Hand in hand with Sāṅkhya's acceptance of cognition or sentience as the very nature of the Self is a principle of theirs that anything that arises, is destroyed or is modified is insentient.[138] This became a frequently used principle of Śaiva Siddhānta.[139]

Because the Sāṅkhyas had to hold that cognition, since it is the nature of the Self, is eternal, they held that seemingly transitory instances of cognition such as pleasure and pain are in fact objects of cognition. Dharmakīrti produces arguments against this view that seek to establish pleasure and pain as factors associated with cognition (*caitta*s).[140] Rāmakaṇṭha continues this debate, defending the Sāṅkhya—and Śaiva Siddhānta—position.[141]

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[136] TS(BBS) 287–288: *tatrāpi rūpaśabdādicetasāṃ vedyate katham* | *suvyaktaṃ bhedavad rūpam ekā cec cetaneṣyate* || *ekarūpe ca caitanye sarvakālam avasthite* | *nānāvidhārthabhoktṛtvaṃ kathaṃ nāmopapadyate* || 'There too, if cognition is held to be single, how is it that cognitions of colour, words and the like are clearly experienced to have a plural form? And if cognition endures always in the same form, how can [it / the Self] be the enjoyer of many kinds of objects?'

[137] TS(BBS) 295a–c: *vikriyāyāś ca sadbhāve nityatvam avahīyate* | *anyathātvaṃ vikāro hi.* 'And if [it] is modified, then [its] eternality is lost; for modification is to become otherwise.'

[138] TS(BBS) 303: *acetanātmikā buddhiḥ śabdagandharasādivat* | *utpattimattvanāśitvahetubhyām iti cen matam* || 'If [you adduce your] doctrine that the Buddhi is insentient for the reasons that it arises and is destroyed, like sounds, smells, tastes and the like, [our reply is as follows].'

[139] See, for example, KiTa 2.26ab: *pariṇāmo 'cetanasya cetanasya na yujyate.*

[140] See for example *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1.23 (identified in Stern 1991): *aviśeṣe 'pi bāhyasya viśeṣāt prītitāpayoḥ* | *bhāvanāyā viśeṣeṇa nārtharūpāḥ sukhādayaḥ* || 'Because pleasure and pain differ [between people], owing to differences of mental predisposition (*bhāvanā*), even when the external [object] is the same, pleasure and the like are not of the nature of objects [but rather factors associated with cognition].'

[141] See sub-section 4 of Chapter 4.2 below.

But there is a subtle difference between Rāmakaṇṭha and Sāṅkhya, which I have been glossing over by talking of both as holding that 'cognition' is the nature of the Self. The word that Sāṅkhya uses is *caitanya*, which should perhaps rather be translated 'sentience'; for *jñāna,* which quite naturally translates as 'cognition', occupies a different place in Sāṅkhya ontology. It is never described as the nature of the soul, but exists lower down the hierarchy of principles in the Intellect (*buddhi*). The soul's nature is thus pure passive awareness; and cognitions (*jñāna*) are generated by the Intellect and presented as objects of experience to the pure awareness. Rāmakaṇṭha (and earlier Śaiva Siddhānta) inherits this model from Sāṅkhya.[142] But unlike the Sāṅkhyas, Rāmakaṇṭha had no qualms about describing the Self's nature as *jñāna.* The form of the two words, *caitanya* and *jñāna,* indicate that they refer, respectively, to a state of being and an action. This is probably part of the reason for the difference here between the Sāṅkhyas and Rāmakaṇṭha; for Rāmakaṇṭha, unlike the Sāṅkhyas, had no aversion to ascribing actions to the Self. As to the problem of how Rāmakaṇṭha can maintain the Self to be eternal despite its nature being denoted by an action noun, as well as the problem of *jñāna* for him being both the nature of the Self and a product of the Intellect, see Chapter 4 and Watson 2006.

That Rāmakaṇṭha intends his many assertions to the effect that the Self is of the nature of *jñāna* to distinguish his view from that of the Sāṅkhyas can be seen from a section towards the end of the first chapter of NPP[143] in which he is criticizing the notions of liberation of the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas and the Sāṅkhyas. I differentiated above the liberation of the former two schools from that of the Sāṅkhyas in the amount of consciousness they are said to contain. The liberated Sāṅkhya soul may no longer see objects of perception or experience acts of cognition, owing to his complete separation from Primal Matter, but he is still sentient, unlike the liberated Naiyāyika or Vaiśeṣika. But from Rāmakaṇṭha's point of view this difference is insignificant. He

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[142] An important difference is that for the Saiddhāntikas the Intellect alone is not capable of generating cognition (which here means determinative cognition): a further instrument is required, namely Vidyā, one of the cuirasses. But this difference is not relevant here.

[143] Ad 1.66.

treats all together as teaching a liberation devoid of cognition (*jñānarahita*). The Sāṅkhya soul may never lose its nature as *caitanya*, but, for Rāmakaṇṭha, that is so far away from his own view that the Self never loses its nature as *jñāna* as to be practically indistinguishable from the Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika view of a soul that is insentient by nature. For Rāmakaṇṭha, of course, our powers of cognition actually expand at liberation (into omniscience), for they are occluded during saṃsāric existence.

Excursus on Rāmakaṇṭha's Ideas about Liberation

Before looking at a further subtle difference between the views of Rāmakaṇṭha and Sāṅkhya we will remain for a while observing this section of NPP in which Rāmakaṇṭha criticizes the notions of liberation of other traditions, for it gives us an insight into some of his (and Śaivism's) general attitudes to the purpose of religion as compared to those of his rival traditions. He states that a liberation of non-cognition as upheld and striven for by Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas and Sāṅkhyas, in which one enters a rock-like or coma-like state, does not appear as a good thing for any sane (*anunmatta*) person.

It is objected that to strive for the cessation of cognition (*jñāna*) is not as mad or unusual as Rāmakaṇṭha makes out, for people act for the sake of sleeping; and when people suffer extreme and prolonged torment they desire non-cognition and act to bring it about by throwing themselves off cliffs, into fires or by drowning. Rāmakaṇṭha answers the first point by quoting the *Yoga-sūtra*, which includes sleep in a list of kinds of cognition; and the second, somewhat tendentiously, by claiming that in those examples the people are not seeking only to destroy their suffering but also to attain certain other-worldly pleasures that they know from the study of scripture to follow from such fatal hardships.[144]

Rāmakaṇṭha's attitude (following Sadyojyotis) is that it would be better to continue to experience pleasure mixed with suffering than to destroy cogni-

[144] Ad 1.67ab.

tion altogether in order to eradicate suffering. But in any case it is impossible for the Self's cognition ever to cease for it is its very nature. The Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas take the opposite view that since cognition is always mixed with suffering it is better that it cease completely. It is like milk mixed with poison; any sane person would refrain from drinking it altogether.

Having discussed the liberation of the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas and the Sāṅkhyas, Rāmakaṇṭha turns to what he regards as the even more radical view of some Buddhists. Although those three schools all maintain that cognition (*jñāna*) ceases at liberation, they do not hold that we cease altogether, for the Self continues to exist. But for those Buddhists for whom liberation consists of the cessation of the stream of cognition, no part of us remains. Sadyojyotis terms these the most heavyweight of fools (*mūḍhānāṃ jyeṣṭhamallāḥ*). Rāmakaṇṭha regards it as amusing that, on the one hand, the Materialist-Sceptics (Lokāyatas) expect no continuation of life after death and thus live their lives according to the maxim 'As long as one lives one should live happily', free of moral restraints and curbs on sense-pleasures; and, on the other, the Buddhists, having endured many lives of uninterrupted suffering and much striving and abstinence on the Buddhist path, can hope for no more than what comes automatically to the Lokāyatas.[145]

Finally Rāmakaṇṭha holds that this self-destruction is an unwanted consequence of the Vedāntin and Pāñcarātra positions, since for them the individual dissolves at liberation into, respectively, Brahman and Nārāyaṇa. Rāmakaṇṭha concludes with the assertion that if liberation really does deserve to be termed the highest aim of People, then it should be accepted to be, rather than any of the conditions considered so far, nothing other than the manifestation of omniscience and omnipotence.

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The second difference from Sāṅkhya to which I alluded at the beginning of that excursus is that Saiddhāntika souls are not portrayed as sitting motionless, aloft and aloof, but as travelling downwards through the evolutes of Primal Matter, and then, at liberation or at times of cosmic resorption, back

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[145] Ad 1.67cd.

upwards again. They are frequently referred to as being located at specific points in the universe: the souls of Sādhakas reach one of the various worlds (*bhuvana*s) as a result of the variety of initiation they have received; Mantra-souls inhabit worlds within Śuddhavidyā, the lowest level of the pure universe; all of the twenty-one[146] worlds are governed by Rudra-souls located in them; and during periods of cosmic resorption all souls are located in 'the belly of Primal Matter' (*māyodara*).[147] Surely these implications that souls travel and are located are contrary to their all-pervasion? This objection is articulated and the response is that such references should be understood to refer to the subtle body.[148] But it is clear that Śaiva Siddhānta sometimes assumes its souls to be monads of definite size rather than all-pervading. Witness the many references to souls being covered (*āvṛta*) by Impurity. These are not so explainable as referring to the subtle body, for what are obscured by this covering are the soul's powers of knowledge and action. It is these that are partially revealed when the first of the cuirasses 'splits apart' Impurity. Yet these belong to the soul itself, not the subtle body.

4.4. Knowledge of the Self

As to the question of how the Self can be known to exist, Rāmakaṇṭha rejected that it can be known through inference,[149] holding instead that it is

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[146] This is the number according to the *Mataṅga.*

[147] See KiTa 2.9.

[148] See for example KiTa 2.10 and KV ad loc.

[149] His reason for rejecting inference was twofold. He identified logical flaws in the specific inferences commonly used to establish it, as we will see in Chapter 1. And he held the more general position that the Self can never become that which is revealed, for it is always the revealer, and whatever it reveals is other than it. See, for example, PMNKV ad 43, p. 294,14–16: *na ca tasyānumitasyāpy* [*tasyānumitasyāpy* MSS; *tasyāpy anumitasy*° ed.] *ātmatā yuktā, prakāśakatatprakāśyayor* [*prakāśakatatprakāśyayor* MSS; *prakāśavat prakāśyayor* ed.] *ātmapararūpatvāt. yo hi svayam ābhāsate sa evātmā, yas tu tena prakāśyate sa eva tasya para* [*para* MSS; *prakāśyo 'para* ed.] *ity asaṅkaraḥ.* 'And it is not correct that that which is inferred, for its part, is the Self, because the revealer and the

known directly through perception.[150] There were several models available to him for how cognition or the Self (these two being essentially the same for him) is perceived. The Buddhists[151] held that cognition is known through 'self-awareness' (*svasaṃvedana*). They argued that unconscious/uncognized cognitions of objects would not be enough to establish linguistic usage with regard to that object. Rather the cognition itself must also be perceived. Only if the cognition itself is registered can the object be registered sufficiently to be referred to in language by the cognizing subject. The Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas held that a cognition is perceived by the immediately following cognition. But this was not enough for the Buddhists as, given their presupposition, it led to an infinite regress. The first cognition requires the subsequent one to be established; but the subsequent one itself requires a yet subsequent one to be established, and so on ad infinitum. Thus the Buddhists held that every

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revealed are of the nature of Self and other. That which shines forth of itself is the Self, but that which is revealed by that is its other. Thus there is no mixing (i.e. one thing cannot be both).' Rāmakaṇṭha probably has the same point in mind when he writes at the beginning of his examination of the Self in NPP that the perceiver itself cannot be inferred by itself: *svata eva svānumeyatvānupapatteḥ* [*svānumeyatvānupapatteḥ* Ped; *vānumeyatvānupapatteḥ* Ked, B] (ad 1.2, p. 4,6–9). Rāmakaṇṭha takes on these ideas from his father, Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha: see MTV ad 1.6.4ab, p. 153,1–12.

As to how the Self can be perceived if there is an uncrossable barrier between the revealer and the revealed, see below.

[150] Rāmakaṇṭha's father, Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, similarly privileged perception over inference as the means of knowing the Self: *sā ceyam atītānubhavasmṛtiḥ kṣaṇikatāṃ vijñānasya nirasyati, na tu sthirasvabhāvam ātmānam anumāpayati tasya svasaṃvedanasiddhasya svānubhūtyekapramāṇatvāt* (MTV ad 1.2.25ab, p. 91,4b–1b). 'And this memory of a past experience refutes that cognition is momentary, but it does not allow us to infer a Self of stable nature, because the [Self], being established by self-awareness, has as its only means of knowledge self-experience'. Possibly the origin of this tendency was Sadyojyotis's comment at BhoKā 67ab: *neha pramāṇasaṃvādaḥ pratyakṣasya pramāṇataḥ*; 'There is no overlapping of means of knowledge with regard to it, because [its single] means of knowledge is direct perception'. The *Bhogakārikā* is the subject of a PhD thesis by W. A. Borody (1988). The revised thesis has been published in 2005 with the title *Bhoga Kārikā of Sadyojyoti, with the Commentary of Aghora Śiva. An Introduction with English Translation*, but I have not been able to see it. A critical edition and translation of the text are currently being prepared by Fabio Boccio.

[151] Specifically Dharmakīrti and his followers. See PVin1.55ff.

cognition is simultaneously aware both of itself and its object through one and the same momentary act, as a light illuminates both its object and itself. They termed this reflexive awareness *svasaṃvedana*, contrasting it with the Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika concept of cognition of the immediately preceding cognition (*anuvyavasāya*).

As for the perception of the Self, certain Naiyāyikas and the Kaumārila Mīmāṃsakas held that those cognitions that include 'I' as part of their verbalization (*ahampratyaya*) perceive the Self through that 'I'.[152] Certain Sāṅkhyas held that the Self can perceive itself through looking at its reflection in the mirror of the Intellect (*buddhi*).[153] The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas took the model of self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) that the Buddhists had applied to cognition and applied it to the Self. This was the main strategy adopted by Rāmakaṇṭha, although he also included I-cognition as a second valid means of perceiving the Self.

The idea that the Self is known through self-awareness[154] was maintained by Rāmakaṇṭha's father, Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha,[155] but the term is not used by Sad-

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[152] See NVā(NCG) 323,12–324,10; and ŚV(P_2) *ātmavāda* 107–139.

[153] See MoKāVṛ 266,18–20: *nanu puruṣo buddhyupārūḍha eva cetyata iti sāṅkhyāḥ.* [...] *darpaṇasthānīyāyāṃ buddhau viṣayiviṣayayor dvayor api pratibimbakamelanaṃ bhogaḥ*: 'The Sāṅkhyas object: "the soul is perceived only after being projected on to the Buddhi. [...] Experience is the meeting of reflected images of both object and that which [perceives] the object, in the Buddhi, which acts as a mirror." '

[154] From now on it can be assumed that whenever I use the word 'self-awareness' I have in mind the Sanskrit word *svasaṃvedana.*

[155] See MTV ad 1.2.25ab, p. 91,4b–1b, quoted in note 150; MTV ad 1.2.25ab, p. 88,11–13: *tad etat kṣaṇikatvaṃ saṃvedanasya nairātmyabhāvanābhyupagamanaṃ ca na yuktaṃ, svasaṃvedanasiddhasya sthirarūpasyāparokṣasyātmanaḥ prakāśanāt*, 'Neither this momentariness of consciousness nor the acceptance of meditation on no-Self are correct, because the Self, which is established by self-awareness, stable and perceptible, appears [to us]'; and MTV ad 1.2.25ab, p. 88,1b–89,2. Prof. Sanderson pointed out to me that Nārayaṇakaṇṭha is not the first Śaiva author to speak of the Self as *svasaṃvedana-saṃvedya.* The idea and terminology are found in Utpaladeva's *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā* and *vṛtti* thereon. See for example *siddha eva svasaṃvedanasaṃvedyatayā svaparayor īśvaro 'hampratyeya ātmā* ad ĪśPraKā 1.1.5. Torella (1994 87–88) translates, 'The Lord,

yojyotis or by the scriptures of the tradition. Thus the enormous number of times that Rāmakaṇṭha asserts that the Self is known in this way all occur in the course of commenting on verses that make no mention of it.

One of the specific features of the self-awareness model of perception of the Self is that it stresses that the Self is not known thereby as the object of the perception but as its subject.[156] Reluctance to accept that the Self can become the object of perception had been expressed in Śaivism as early as Sadyojyotis. In four verses of the *Mokṣakārikā* he rejects, for this reason, the Sāṅkhya model that the Self can be known, in the form of its reflection, through cognition produced in the Buddhi (*buddhibodha*):[157]

> 102: How can that [Buddhi], for which even the Self is not an object because it is not the experienced [in as much as] it is the experiencer, reveal the Lord Śaṅkara, who is self-revealing?
>
> 103: Awareness (°*māna*) of the soul has always already arisen; it (i.e. the soul) is not the object of experience [through a specific action that happens at a particular time]. There is no time in which it becomes the object of experience by means of [a reflection of itself] in the [Buddhi].[158]
>
> 104) It [would be] correct that cognition of the Self and the [Self] are the perceiver and the perceived if [the Self and the cognition of the Self] occurred one before the other. But because that is not so, it is not true that [they are].[159]

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the Self perceived as 'I' in oneself and others, is established insofar as it is directly experienced through inner awareness.'

[156] That is why Rāmakaṇṭha's objection to the idea that the Self can be inferred, given in note 149, namely that the Self cannot become an object of an act of revelation because it is always the revealer, does not apply to this kind of perception of the Self.

[157] MoKā: *ātmāpy aviṣayo yasyā bhoktābhogyatvataḥ* [*bhoktābhogyatvataḥ* em.; *bhoktā bhogyatvataḥ* ed.] *katham* | *svaprakāśam asau devaṃ prakāśayati śaṅkaram* ||102|| *sarvadotpannamāno 'sau puruṣo nānubhūyate* | *na so 'sti kālo yatrāyam atrasthenānubhūyate* ||103|| *pūrvāparatvato yuktam ātmabodhasya tasya ca* | *upalabhyopalabdhṛtvaṃ* [°*palabdhṛtvaṃ* corr; °*palabdhṛtdaṃ* ed.] *tadabhāvād idaṃ tv asat* ||104|| *pariṇāmī pumān bhogyaḥ prāptas tadgocaro yadi* | *viparītā ca buddhiḥ syāt virodhaś cāpi darśane* ||105||

[158] Rāmakaṇṭha comments: *buddhisthenāpi puruṣapratibimbena puruṣo nāvaiti* (MoKāVṛ 266,8b–7b). 'And the soul does not perceive [itself] through its reflection in the Buddhi.'

[159] The point seems to be that for something to be perceived it must precede its cognition. But since, according to the previous verse, there is never a moment when cognition

105) The soul, if it fell into its (i.e. the Buddhi's) sphere, would be subject to change and an object of experience, and the Buddhi should be the opposite (i.e. unchanging and the experiencer); and there would be a contradiction with [your] tradition.[160]

Thus Rāmakaṇṭha inherits from Sadyojyotis a rejection of the Sāṅkhya model that the Self can be perceived through cognition in the Buddhi on the grounds that it cannot become an object of experience. Furthermore, in Sadyojyotis's statement that 'awareness of the soul has always already arisen' he had the beginnings of an alternative model in which the Self's awareness of itself is never absent. From his father he inherited the terminology, *svasaṃvedana*. But he adds more detail. Most of this can be seen to arise from the concern to avoid the implication that the Self becomes an object of perception. This extra detail resembles in its formulation the writings of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas. I will give three illustrations.

1) Beginning with Prabhākara's remark in the *Bṛhatī*,[161] 'for consciousness is cognized *as consciousness*, not as the object of consciousness,' the Prābhāka-

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of the Self is not there, the Self cannot precede that cognition. Rāmakaṇṭha seems not to interpret *pūrvāparatva*° temporally. He comments: *pratibimbātmakatvād ātmano viṣayatvaṃ bhogyatā ca. tadviṣayatvāc ca buddhibodhasya bhoktṛtvaprasaṅgaḥ, na caitad bhavadbhir abhyupagantavyam*; 'The Self is [in your view] an object of cognition and experience [only] in so far as it is of the nature of a reflection. And because it is cognition in the Buddhi (*buddhibodha*) that has that [reflected Self] as its object, it unwantedly follows that *it* is the perceiver, and you should not accept this.' (MoKāVṛ 266,3b–2b). I take this to point to two faults in the Sāṅkhya position that have nothing to do with temporal sequence: the perceived would not be the actual Self, but only the Self in the form of its reflection; and because it is cognition in the Buddhi that has that reflection as its object, it would unwantedly follow that it, and not the Self, is the perceiver. It struck me that this comment would be more appropriate as a comment on verse 105 than 104. But it comes immediately after verse 104; is separated from 105 by *api ca*; and Rāmakaṇṭha glosses and comments on verse 105 below it.

[160] Sāṅkhya draws a firm distinction between the Self, which is unchanging and the experiencer; and all things below it, such as the Buddhi, which are changing and objects of experience. But if the Buddhi is like a mirror reflecting the Self, then it should be the stable, unchanging perceiver, and that which is reflected in it should be changing and an object of experience. I thank Dr. Ruzsa for help with this and the last verse.

[161] Bṛh 64,2–3: *saṃvittayaiva hi saṃvit saṃvedyā na saṃvedyatayā.*

ras had formed the habit of using the instrumental of abstract suffixes to express that although Self and consciousness are cognized, they are not cognized as the objects of experience. See, for example, in Jayanta's formulation of the Prābhākara position, 'the Self is illuminated *as the perceiver*, not as an object of perception.'[162] The same habit is found in Rāmakaṇṭha's works in the enormous number of places where he says that the Self shines forth in self-awareness 'as the illuminator' (*prakāśakatayā/prakāśakatvena*). For an example that is particularly striking in that, like the two quotes just given, it also negates the unwanted mode of perception with a second parallel instrumental of an abstract suffix, see: '[It is illuminated] not as that which is illuminated, but as the agent [of that illumination].[163]

2) They sometimes used the present participle to contrast the mode in which consciousness exists and is perceived with the mode in which objects are perceived. Rāmakaṇṭha does the same.[164]

3) They held, as does Rāmakaṇṭha, that consciousness (/ the Self) shines forth without requiring any other means, such as sense-faculties;[165] and they often convey this by qualifying a word meaning 'shining forth' with *svayam* or *svata*, as does Rāmakaṇṭha.[166]

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[162] NM(M) Vol. 2, 273,10–11: *ātmā grāhakatayaiva prakāśyate na grāhyatayā.*

[163] MoKāVṛ ad 105, p. 267,8: *na prakāśyatayā kin tu kārakatvena.*

[164] Compare Śālikanātha's *svayaṃ prakāśarūpatvāt saṃvido na parādhīnaprakāśaḥ, iti na karmatā. na ca prakāśābhāvaḥ.* prakāśamānaṃ *cāstīty ucyate, na punaḥ karmataiva vivakṣitā* (Ṛju 64,11b–9b) and Jayanta's *upāyāntaranirapekṣam eva* prakāśamānam *ātmatattvam āsta iti* (Vol. 2, 273,12–13) with Rāmakaṇṭha's: *svaśaktyaiva* prakāśayann *ayam anubhūyate* (NPP 26,6–7). Prof. Preisendanz pointed out to me that Rāmakaṇṭha's sentence is not completely parallel to the other two: their present participles construe with *asti/āste* in durative auxiliary constructions ('is always / does not cease shining forth'); Rāmakaṇṭha's does not, and is causative. On the present participle with *asti/āste* she pointed me to Speijer 1998 294–296.

[165] Each of the three quotes in the previous footnote conveys this. See *na parādhīnaprakāśaḥ*; *upāyāntaranirapekṣam eva*; and *svaśaktyaiva.*

[166] Many examples could be given. Here is one from Jayanta's formulation of the Prābhākara position and two by Rāmakaṇṭha: *na hy ātmānyajanyena jñānena ghaṭādir iva prakāśyate, api tu svata eva prakāśate* [*prakāśate* C; *prakāśyate* ed.] (NM(M) Vol. 2,

5. Constitution of the Text of NPP

The text I present of NPP is based on an evaluation and comparison of the readings of the following editions and manuscripts of NPP, and of parallel passages found in other texts by Rāmakaṇṭha.

5.1. Editions

Four editions of the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* have, to my knowledge, been published: that contained in various releases of 'The Pundit' in 1867 and 1868 (Ped);[167] a Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies edition, edited by Madhusudan Kaul, from 1926 (Ked);[168] a 'Shri Shivoham Sagar' edition, edited by Krishnananda Sagar, from 1985 (NPP(SS)); and a Yogatantra Granthamālā edition, edited by Rāmajī Mālavīya, from 2000 (NPP(YG)).[169]

Ped gives no information about its manuscript basis. Ked seems to have been prepared in ignorance of Ped, and it is very unlikely that any of the four Kashmirian manuscripts it used would have been used by the editors of Ped in Benares. Thus the two are independent witnesses. The Shri Shivoham edition uses no new manuscripts and simply follows Ked, entering the readings

273,3–4); *sarvadārthaprakāśakatvenāsya svato 'vabhāsanāt* (NPP ad 1.2, p. 4,7–8); *tatprakāśakatayātyantaviviktaḥ puruṣaḥ svayam avabhāsate* (MoKāVṛ ad 105, p. 267,9). On the Prābhākara position see Chatterjee 1979.

167 For full bibliographical details see under Ped in the list of primary sources. The text collated for Chapters 1 and 2 is given on pages 74 and 75, for Chapter 3 on pages 94–96, and for Chapter 4 on page 78.

168 For full bibliographical details see under Ked in the list of primary sources. I have inserted page numbers of Ked into the text that I give in the chapters.

169 I know of no translation of Rāmakaṇṭha's text, but it seems that Sadyojyotis' text has been translated into Hindi; I have encountered mention of, but not been able to see, the following 1975 PhD thesis from the University of Lucknow: *Nareśvara-Parīkṣā, a Critical and Comparative Study with Hindi translation*, by Magan Bihari Lal.

of Ked's correction pages into its main text, removing the occasional obvious misprint and adding quite a few new misprints. The Yogatantra Granthamālā edition mainly follows Ked, usually adopting the readings of its correction pages, but occasionally recording them as *pāṭhāntara*s. It also makes sporadic use of Ped, either by accepting its reading or recording it as a *pāṭhāntara*. It introduces new misprints and eyeskips (e.g. p. 6,4), and has not used manuscripts. I thus report the readings of Ked and Ped, but not those of the other two editions.

Ked contains a long list of errata and corresponding corrections at the back of the book—hence the proliferation of readings in my footnotes marked Ked^{ac} and Ked^{pc}. Kaul explains that the reason for this long list is that the fourth manuscript came into his hands at the last minute when it was too late to change the main pages of his edition. In fact Kaul seems to have been uncritically accepting of the readings of this fourth manuscript, without taking the time to consider carefully the meaning of the (usually quite abstract and involved) passages involved; he repeatedly proposes correcting to readings that do not, on close inspection, yield the meaning demanded by context. See below the many footnotes to the text in which I accept Ked^{ac} readings in place of Ked^{pc} ones.

5.2. Manuscripts

I have reported the readings of the following manuscripts,[170] none of which seem to be any of the four used by Kaul:

1) A paper Śāradā manuscript in Baroda (B).[171] I have not seen the manuscript, but have a photocopy of it. Folios typically contain 12 lines—although the first contains 11—and 65–80 *akṣara*s per line. The verso sides contain, at

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[170] I made copies of three of the manuscripts from copies belonging to Dominic Goodall, to whom I am very grateful for thereby saving me much time and energy. A microfilm of the fourth was prepared for me by the helpful staff of the Wellcome Institute, London.

[171] Central Library, Baroda. Sanskrit Section. No. 1829.

the bottom of the left-hand margin, in Śāradā, the abbreviation *na ra pa pra* (which obviously stands for *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*) and a page number, and on the right, either in the top or bottom margin, Devanāgarī numbers, starting with 15 on folio 1v, and increasing by one on the verso side of every folio. I refer to the Śāradā numbering. My photocopy covers only the first of the three chapters, so I do not know how many folios there are in total in this manuscript.

The collation for Chapters 1 and 2 runs from the sixth line of folio 3v to the third line from the bottom of 6r; for Chapter 3 from the sixth line of 10v to five lines from the bottom of the same folio, and from the fifth line from the bottom of 12r to the seventh line of 13v; and for Chapter 4 from the second line from the bottom of 9r to the second line from the bottom of 9v.

*anusvāra*s are used at the end of words, but homorganic nasals at the end of prefixes and in compounds. *jihvāmūlīya, upadhmānīya* and '*s*' (before a word beginning with '*s*') are used in place of *visarga*s, unless there is a break in the sense at that point. The scribe, very rarely, uses two short vertical lines, about half the height of his double *daṇḍa*s, at the bottom of the line. These seem to be some kind of punctuation-marker, but they are inconsistently used. They will not occur for many folios in a row, but then, in a certain passage, will be found several times on each line (e.g. on 4v). They are used at speaker-changes or sentence-breaks or the beginning of *iti* clauses or the kinds of places where we would use a comma.[172] Elsewhere single vertical lines of the same length are sometimes used in these kinds of places; but they may have been added by a second hand, as there are never significant gaps between the adjacent *akṣara*s, as there are either side of the double lines.

I have transcribed all the interlinear and marginal glosses, speaker-indications and comments in this manuscript, which include two commentarial digressions of some length.[173] The latter were clearly copied from an earlier manuscript, not composed by the person who wrote them in this manuscript, as they are considerably corrupt.

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[172] Once they are used, strangely, in the middle of a word—between that *tha* and *m* of *katham* in the sixth line of 4v.

[173] See footnotes 52 and 113 on pages 138 and 245 respectively.

2) A paper Śāradā manuscript in the Wellcome Institute, London (L).[174] I have not seen the manuscript but have a microfilm of it, which gives the following measurements: height 125mm, width 170mm. It has 14 lines of text per folio, and 30–35 *akṣara*s per line. The beginning of the text is missing. The manuscript begins with the *akṣara*s, *saṃvidrūpam asya tu nīlam ahaṃ vedmi iti,* i.e. with a passage that occurs on page 19 of Ked. I have thus not been able to use it for the text presented in Chapters 1 and 2. The first page is not numbered, but the second (the text of which follows on correctly from the first) is labeled 10 in Śāradā at the bottom of the left margin, this numbering increasing from then on by one every two pages. I thus take it that the first page we have is 10r (since the norm for Śāradā manuscripts is that the numbers are written on the verso side) and that the first nine folios are missing. Handwritten Arabic numbers begin with a 1 on the first page, and increase by one every two pages. The final two pages are labeled 112 (Śāradā) and 104 (Arabic); thus there are 207 pages (104 folios) in this manuscript.

The collation for Chapter 3 runs from the fifth line from the bottom of 17r (8 in the Arabic numbering) to the second line from the top of 17v; and from the top line of page 12 according to the Arabic numbering to the second line of 22v (adjacent to folio 14 in the Arabic numbering). Some folios in this section have become disordered: page 12 (Arabic numbering) should come after the folio with 19 in Śāradā on it (19v), but it has been put after 21v; page 11 (Arabic numbering) should come after 20v but it has been put after 19v; page 13 (Arabic numbering) should come after 21v but it has been put after 20v; and 21v should come two pages after 20v, not two before it. The collation for Chapter 4 runs from the penultimate line of 14v (opposite page 6 in the Arabic numbering) to the third line of 16r (page 7 in the Arabic numbering).

Homorganic nasals rather than *anusvāra*s are consistently used at the ends of words and prefixes and in compounds. A *candra-bindu* rather than an *anusvāra* is used when *m* at the end of a prefix or word is followed by a semivowel. Semi-vowels are doubled after a *candra-bindu* (as in *sam̐vvit*), even if they come at the beginning of a word (as in *bhedakam̐ yyadā*). *r* in a conjuct sometimes causes doubling of consonants both before and after it: we find for

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[174] OR MS Indic Alpha 415.

example *pradarśśita* and *cittra*. *jihvāmūlīya, upadhmānīya* and '*s*' (before a word beginning with '*s*') are used in place of *visarga*s. The latter are very rarely found, as *sandhi* is applied at the end of sentences; I have noted them only at the end of verse-lines, or at the end of some prose introducing a verse.

Where the pre-sandhi form of a word ends in *e* and is followed by a word-initial vowel, the scribe frequently inserts a glide. We find for example *anubhūyatay iti* for *anubhūyata iti, upagamyatay iti* for *upagamyata iti* and *śarīray eva* for *śarīra eva*. I have not reported such cases as variants. Whitney (1997) writes, 'The later grammarians allow the y in such combinations to be either retained or dropped; but the uniform practice of the manuscripts, of every age, in accordance with the strict requirement of the Vedic grammars, is to omit the semivowel and leave the hiatus' (§ 133a). It seems that the practice he mentions was not as universal as he claims.

Almost every folio contains some gaps between consecutive *akṣara*s. These occur, apart from before and after verses, where a conjunct in the line above comes down to the level of the headstroke and the scribe has preferred not to cramp the writing there. I have not reported all 'insignificant' variants in this manuscript.

3) A paper Śāradā manuscript in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona (P).[175] I have not seen the manuscript, but have a photocopy of it. It contains 12 lines per page, and usually 20–22 *akṣara*s per line. Some of the pages have become disordered. The first page, on which is written 1 in Śāradā, and which I count as 1v, does indeed contain the beginning of the text (preceded by more invocatory formulas than found in the other manuscripts, and with extensive marginal comments). Every two pages from then on contain Śāradā numbers, increasing by one each time. These are thus ordered correctly, but the intervening sides have often been placed incorrectly. After the first page the text continues on what has been placed as the last page of the whole manuscript. After this we need to jump back to 2v. The pages then fall in the correct order until the end of 4v, after which we have to jump to the page that falls after 9v, then back to 5v. The order is then correct until the end

[175] BORI 536 of 1875–76.

of 6v, after which we have to jump back to the page that has been placed after 4v, then forward to 7v. The order is then correct until the end of 9v, after which we have to jump back to the page that has been placed after 1v, then to 10v, then to the page that has been placed after 30v, then to 11v. The collation for Chapters 1 and 2 begins on the eighth line of 8v and ends on the top line of the page facing 17v (it is ordered correctly there so it can be termed 18r). The collation for Chapter 3 runs from the bottom line of 33v to four lines from the bottom of the next page; and from the fifth line of 39v to the fourth line of 45r. One page is disordered in that section: after 40v we have to jump back to a page that has been placed after 10v, then back to 41v. The collation for Chapter 4 runs from the second line of 29r to the third line from the bottom of the folio that has been placed after 6v, but should in fact come after 30v.

nara° *papra*° is written above the Śāradā page numbers up to and including 105. *nara*° *pa* of course stands for *Nareśvaraparīkṣā*; *pra*° stands not for *prakāśā* but *prathama*, for the numbers 106 to 140 are headed by *nara*° *padvi*°, and 141 to the end by *nara*° *patṛ*°. After 160 the numbers are no longer visible in my photocopy; but counting from there indicates that, assuming no folios are missing, the number on the verso side of the last folio should be 220. After that there is one more recto page; there are thus 440 pages in all. As stated above, the very last (recto) page has been misplaced and contains text from close to the beginning of the work. The last verso page ends with *ata eva yāgasādhanatvānyathānupapattyā yugapad vibhinnadeśavyavasthitānekādhi*, which is part of the commentary to verse 3.103cd, i.e. 80 verses (49 pages in Ked) before the end of the text. It is quite possible that the end of the text is contained in misplaced earlier folios—and that the manuscript is complete; I have not searched for it.

The scribe tends to use homorganic nasals rather than *anusvāra*s at the end of prefixes or in compounds (e.g. *astaṅgatā, ahaṅkāra*), and *anusvāra*s at the end of words. But there are exceptions (e.g. *saṃbhava, arthañ ca, viśiṣṭañ jñātāraṃ*). *jihvāmūlīya* and *upadhmānīya* are used, in place of *visarga*s, sporadically, and '*s*' (before a word beginning with '*s*') regularly. Vertical lines, sometimes arching slightly like a left-hand bracket, are used as hyphens at the end of a line. Occasionally *sandhi* after *e* is not applied; we find, for example,

saṃvedyate iti and *pravāhe eva*. I have not reported all 'insignificant' variants in this manuscript; I have reported the marginal and interlinear glosses, comments and speaker-indications.

4) A paper Devanāgarī transcript in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras (M).[176] I have not seen the transcript, but have a photocopy of it. It transmits only Sadyojyotis' verses, not Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary. On the title page, underneath *Nareśvaraparīkṣā* both in Devanāgarī and Roman, is written 'Transcribed from the Ms. of Kunnakkudimath'. It contains one half-verse per line, and usually 24 lines per page. Some of the folios have become disordered. It is not a useful witness, full of copying mistakes and, for the verses examined in this book, not contributing once to improvement of the text. I have not reported clearly corrupt readings, many of which are underlined with dots to indicate that the scribe was uncertain of the syllables in his exemplar.

Other manuscripts of NPP I know of are a paper Bengali manuscript in the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta,[177] and a paper Śāradā one in Sarasvati Bhavan, Varanasi.[178] I have also heard that one exists in Jammu.

5.3. Parallel Passages

Because Rāmakaṇṭha frequently uses identical wording when covering the same topic in different texts,[179] we often have the evidence of other texts to help us establish correct readings. The two texts that overlap most with the first chapter of NPP are the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* and the (sixth chapter of) the *Mataṅgavṛtti*. I have tried to identify all relevant passages and have presented these too in footnotes to the text. Out of these three texts, though, it is the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* that is in by far the most corrupt state. Thus the direction of help has usually been from the other two to it.

[176] GOML R. No. 16820.

[177] MS No. 1140.

[178] MS. No. 82739 (ka and kha), Serial Nos 85996 and 86006.

[179] See Goodall (1998 xxiv).

5.4. Editorial Policy

The only two witnesses that clearly fall together against the rest are B and P. They share a large number of interlinear and marginal glosses and speaker-indications, as can be seen from the footnotes to the text. The fact that they not infrequently both have mistakes—and interlinear and marginal glosses, speaker-indications and comments—not shared by the other indicates that, rather than one being copied directly from the other, they both descend from the same archetype, from which they copied, directly or via intermediaries, not just the main text but also (selectively perhaps) the marginal and interlinear material.[180]

Thus no source has been clearly derived, directly or indirectly, from another; all of them have mistakes that none of the others have. Hence I have never preferred a reading on the grounds that it is found in a certain witness. I have judged the variants simply on the basis of what is most likely to be what Rāmakaṇṭha wrote given the context of the sentence in question, the readings of any parallel passages and general Sanskrit usage.

6. The Date of Sadyojyotis

Sadyojyotis is difficult to locate both spatially and temporally. It has been assumed that, like Rāmakaṇṭha, he was Kashmiri.[181] But there is no evidence to

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[180] It was noted above that B's scribe very occasionally uses two vertical lines as a punctuation-marker (see above). P's scribe does the same, equally rarely, and there is better agreement as to the placement of these marks than one would expect if the manuscripts were unrelated. Compare for example folio 11v of P with folio 4v of B. Perhaps, then, punctuation-marks were also copied from the archetype.

[181] Thus Kaul, for example, in the introduction to Ked, states that because of the amount of space Sadyojyotis devotes to refuting Buddhism he must have lived when Buddhism was prevalent in the valley of Kashmir.

that effect.[182] Concerning his date, the only firm evidence I have seen adduced in secondary literature is that he was known to Somānanda (c. 900–950).[183] It is not easy to establish a limit after which he must have written, as he does not quote other authors. However he does betray knowledge of Kumārila,[184] who is dated by Frauwallner to 600–650.[185]

He is usually said to have lived in the ninth century.[186] But Sanderson,[187] as tentative evidence for an earlier date, pointed out that when dealing with Vedānta he articulates and attacks only transformationism (*pariṇāmavāda*), not the illusionism (*vivartavāda*) that came to predominate.[188] To this could be added the fact that his long attack on Buddhism in the first chapter of NP, all of which is interpreted by Rāmakaṇṭha as aimed at Dharmakīrti,[189] in fact provides us with almost no evidence of knowledge of Dharmakīrti.[190]

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[182] Sanderson 1990 158.

[183] As evidenced by *Śivadṛṣṭi* 3.13c (mentioned, for example, by Sanderson 1985a 210, note 41).

[184] Prof. Sanderson gave me this list of verses from the second and third chapters of the *Nareśvaraparīkṣā* that echo verses in the *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra* (SĀP) of Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika*: NP 2.22 = SĀP 52cd; NP 2.28cd = SĀP 54ab; NP 3.2cd = SĀP 51; NP 3.50ab = SĀP 71ab. He also pointed out to me that Sadyojyotis' commentary ad SvSūSa 4.5a shows knowledge of SĀP 61abc.

[185] These dates are dependent on a dating of Dharmakīrti to 600–660. If Dharmakīrti lived half a century earlier, however, which is possible (see note 189), then Kumārila should be regarded as having lived half a century earlier. (I thank Kei Kataoka for information about Kumārila's date.)

[186] For example, by Frauwallner 1962 9, and Hannotte 1987.

[187] Sanderson 1985b 568.

[188] Prof. Sanderson has communicated to me that he thinks Sadyojyotis' representation of the liberation of the Vedāntins in PMNK 2b, and in his commentary on SvSūSa 2.2 indicate that he was basing his account of Vedānta on that of the 6th century author Bhartṛprapañca.

[189] Frauwallner (following Vidyabhusana) dates Dharmakīrti to 600–660, for which important evidence is the fact that Xuanzang does not mention him. Lindtner (1980 32–33) and Tillemans (2000 xiii–xv) argue that Frauwallner and those who follow him place too much weight on this argument from silence. There are pieces of evidence for an earlier date: the mention of Dharmakīrti by the Tibetan historian Tāranātha, and a possible mention of Dharmakīrti by Dharmapāla, though the Chinese characters there could also

Prof. Sanderson has recently pointed me to two more pieces of evidence for an earlier date. First, Sadyojyotis's *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgrahaṭīkā* is the source of a verse of Ratnākara's *Haravijaya,*[191] which can be dated to around 830.[192]

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mean *dharmavacana*, or a synonym thereof, and we lack the Sanskrit original to check. (Funayama 2000 argues that they cannot refer to Dharmakīrti.) Tillemans concludes, 'Honesty would seem to demand an acknowledgement that, as things stand, we do not have any genuinely significant grounds for placing Dharmakīrti in the seventh century rather than earlier in the latter half of the sixth. Agnosticism may be unsatisfying, but it is, for the moment, the rational response here' (p. xv).

[190] I write 'almost' because I point to one echo of a point made by Dharmakīrti in footnote 43 of Chapter 3. I do not know however if Dharmakīrti was the first author to make this point.

I asked Prof. Steinkellner how quickly awareness of Dharmakīrti spread in order to find out how much can be concluded from an author's ignorance of him. He kindly gave me the following information, reproduced, almost word for word, from his letter:

Even among Buddhists it was not until the middle of the 8th century that Dharmakīrti was taken up for discussion of philosophical issues. The first two commentators, Dharmakīrti's pupil Devendrabuddhi (c.630–690) and following him Śākyabuddhi (c.660–720), composed their commentaries as 'mere' explanations of words and meanings. The same is true for Vinītadeva (c.710–770). Only the next wave of commentators like Arcaṭa (c.730–790), Dharmottara (c.730–790) and Prajñākaragupta (around 800) are focussing on the philosophical problems (mainly visible in their various digressions). At about the same time reactions from non-Buddhist circles set in, with the possible exception of Kumārila who, according to Frauwallner rewrote the *Ślokavārttika* into a new commentary, the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*, after acknowledging some new ideas from the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*. This conception is, however, not shared by John Taber (who thinks they did not know each other). Maṇḍanamiśra (c.700) seems to be the first Mīmāṃsaka to deal with Dharmakīrti. Among Naiyāyikas the first was Śaṅkarasvāmin (second half of the 8th century).

The dates given in brackets there are all taken from Prof. Steinkellner's letter apart from that of Maṇḍanamiśra.

[191] *Haravijaya* 6.161 is a versification of Sadyojyotis' commentary on SvSūSa 3.16. Prof. Sanderson also pointed to *Haravijaya* 6.139. Although most of its features are based on verses of the Tantra itself (SvSūSa 3.11–13), Ratnākara's *dvidhā sthitā* is likely to be echoing *dvirūpā* in Sadyojyotis' commentary, something that Sadyojyotis introduces without anything corresponding to it in those verses.

[192] For the evidence for this date, see Sanderson 2001 5–6, note 3.

Secondly, the fact that his name ends in *-jyotis* constitutes some evidence for an earlier date. Such sources as the *Vidyāpurāṇa* tell us that Śaivas were divided into four initiation lineages (*gocara*s): Śiva, Jyotis, Śikhā and Sāvitra; that one belonged to the lineage of the Ācārya who initiated him; and that one's initiation name ended in the name of the lineage to which he belonged. But it seems that three of these four lineages died out fairly early, as almost all of the hundreds of recorded initiation names end in *-śiva.* Apart from Sadyojyotis, and his guru Ugrajyotis,[193] there is only one further exception. One Aghorajyotis, a seventh century guru, is mentioned in the unpublished stone inscription of Śivagupta Bālārjuna.[194]

Thus all we can say for sure is that Sadyojyotis wrote some time between 600 and 830. But the facts that his name ends in *-jyotis*, that he did not attack illusionism when dealing with Vedānta, and that the evidence for his knowledge of Dharmakīrti is slim, despite having engaged in a long refutation of Buddhism, suggest that a seventh or early eighth century date is more likely than a late eighth or early ninth.

7. The Date of Rāmakaṇṭha

The evidence that gives us a date after which Rāmakaṇṭha must have written is that his father, Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, has quoted Utpaladeva. Utpaladeva flourished, Sanderson argues (1985b 567), c. 925–975 AD.

The date before which he must have written has been gradually honed in recent years through the finding of references to him or his father in successively earlier authors. In 1977 Bhatt used the fact that Aghoraśiva, who is likely to have lived in the mid-twelfth century, frequently quotes or refers to him to establish this limit. In the same year Brunner pointed out that Kṣemarāja, who can be dated to the first half of the eleventh century, mentions Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, Rāmakaṇṭha's father. In 1994 Torella pointed out that it

[193] He is mentioned by Sadyojyotis in the final verse of NP.
[194] See Shastri 1995 382.

must be Rāmakaṇṭha himself who is referred to in a mention by Kṣemarāja of a commentator on the *Kiraṇa*. In 1996 Sanderson noticed that verses quoted by Abhinavagupta (975–1025)[195] in the *Tantrāloka* were written by Rāmakaṇṭha in his *Mataṅgavṛtti*.[196] Thus we can tentatively date Rāmakaṇṭha's period of activity to 950–1000.[197]

8. Rāmakaṇṭha's Style

Although Rāmakaṇṭha occasionally uses quite simple formulaic arguments, I do not think it would be an exaggeration to say that frequently his prose is extremely difficult. The identification of speaker changes rarely presents problems, but to reconstruct the exact flow of the argument sometimes requires great effort on the part of the reader and the ability to hold several ideas in one's head at the same time. It is not always easy to determine precisely what it was about a previous assertion that the present objection is responding to.[198] Rāmakaṇṭha assembles his arguments more densely, and with more speaker changes, than Jayanta Bhaṭṭa does, for example, though not with the elegance and wit of the latter.

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[195] Abhinavagupta dates three of his texts to 990/91, 992/93 and 1014/15. See Sanderson 2001 3, note 1.

[196] For the texts and page numbers of the quotations and references mentioned in this paragraph, see Goodall 1998 xiii–xvii.

[197] For information about where Rāmakaṇṭha may have lived, and about other Rāmakaṇṭhas with whom he is still confused, see Goodall 1998 ix–xiii and the introduction to the forthcoming critical edition and translation of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* by Goodall, Sarma and Watson.

[198] See for example *yojitaviṣayaṃ tad* on page 243. These are common difficulties of course when reading many, if not most, philosophical texts in Sanskrit.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CONTENTS OF THE FIRST CHAPTER OF NPP

Verse 1

Verse itself:

Statement that Sadyojyotis will give an examination of the Lord, preceded by an examination of the soul.

Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary:

Brief statements of the views concerning God that will be refuted in the second and third chapters of the text.

Justification of the need for an examination of the soul, given that the primary subject of the treatise is the Lord.

Verse 2

The verse itself reads:

> *jñātā kartā ca bodhena buddhvā bodhyaṃ pravartate* |
> *pravṛttiphalabhoktā ca yaḥ pumān ucyate 'tra saḥ* ||
>
> In this [chapter] is taught a soul that is a perceiver and an agent, that undertakes action having cognized objects of cognition through cognition, and that is the experiencer of the fruits of [that] activity.

Rāmakaṇṭha identifies this as the 'assertion sūtra' (*pratijñāsūtra*), taking it to state the programme of the rest of this chapter, which is concerned entirely with the examination of the soul. He regards the structure of the verses in the rest of this chapter as consisting in systematic elaboration of each of the

words in this assertion sūtra in turn.[1] Thus he structures his commentary into sections that each focus on one of these words.

His commentary on this particular verse consists in, for each word in the verse, giving a very brief statement of the views that will be refuted when that word comes to be elaborated later in the chapter.

Verses 3–5: 'perceiver' (*jñātā*)

3: Defence of the view that action would not be possible unless the factors of action (*kārakas*) existed as separate entities.[2]

4: Refutation of the Vedāntin doctrine that all is one.

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[1] Though it is no doubt true that Sadyojyotis intended this verse to lay out the programme for the rest of the chapter, the following verses do not seem to have been composed as rigidly as Rāmakaṇṭha maintains, i.e. as forming discrete sections, each one an elaboration of one particular word from the 'assertion sūtra'. None of the three verses that Rāmakaṇṭha regards as coming in the section concerned with *jñātā* ('perceiver'), for example, are any more focused on that word/concept than they are on *kartā, pravṛttiphalabhoktā* or *pumān*, and two of the three are just as much concerned with *bodhena, buddhvā, bodhyam* and *pravartate* as any of the three just mentioned words. The verses that Rāmakaṇṭha includes in the two sections concerned with elaborating *bodhena* ('through cognition') and *buddhvā* ('having cognized') all have to do, in some way, with cognition; but why one set is more concerned with elaborating *bodhena* than *buddhvā* is not clear. Four out of the six verses that belong, according to Rāmakaṇṭha, to a section elucidating *kartā* (agent) deal not with such a topic (and are not interpreted by Rāmakaṇṭha as such when he expounds the individual verses), but with the question of whether there are, unlike according to Vedānta, a real plurality of souls. Several more examples could be given.

[2] I am summarizing here, and for the remainder of this synopsis, not the contents of the verses but the contents of Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary on them, i.e. his interpretation of their intention. Here, for example, the verse does not mention the *kārakas* and is not likely to be talking about them. I consider the original intention of this verse at the beginning of Chapter 2.

5: Refutation of the attempts of the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas and the Sāṅkhyas to establish the existence of a Self. (I translate this section in Chapter 1.)

Defence of the view that the Self is proved through self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*). (I translate this section in Chapter 2.)

Verse 6ab: 'having cognized' (*buddhvā*)

6ab: Response to the objection that if cognition were unchanging we would not be able to cognize different objects. (I translate part of this section in Chapter 4.1.)

Verses 6c–14: 'objects of cognition' (*bodhyam*)

Refutation of the Yogācāra denial of the existence of external objects:

6c–9: Refutation of Dharmakīrti's argument that whatever one is conscious of is of the nature of consciousness.

10–14: Refutation of Dharmakīrti's *sahopalambhaniyama* argument. (This section is summarized at the beginning of Chapter 3.)

Verses 15–17: 'through cognition' (*bodhena*)

15–17: Proof of Self as known through object of I-cognition. (This section is translated in Chapter 3.)

Verses 18–22b: 'and is the experiencer of the fruits of [that] action' (*pravṛttiphalabhoktā ca*) with regard to other-worldly fruits (*āmutrikaphala*)

18–22b: Refutation of the 'Laukāyatika' view that even if there is a Self that is distinct from the body and stable during life, it comes into being at conception and is destroyed at death.

Verses 22c–48: 'and is the experiencer of the fruits of [that] action' (*pravṛttiphalabhoktā ca*) with regard to this-worldly fruits (*aihikaphala*)

Rāmakaṇṭha tells us that although the last section is of relevance to the refutation of the Buddhist view that the perceiver is momentary, which is the subject of this section, there are two differences. The previous dealt with the perceiver's experience of other-worldly fruits, i.e. its perdurance beyond death; and this section deals with its experience of this-worldly fruits, i.e. its perdurance during life. Secondly, the previous section advanced independent arguments that happen to refute (*bādhakapramāṇa*) the Buddhist idea that the perceiver is momentary (in that they establish a perceiver that, far from being momentary, continues beyond death); and this section shows that the arguments that the Buddhists themselves put forward for their position are not valid (*sādhakapramāṇābhāva*).

22cd: Refutation of Dharmakīrti's inference of momentariness from existence (*sattvānumāna*).

23ab–33: Contention that given the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness liberation would be impossible.

34: Proof of non-momentariness from recognition.

35: Contention that even Bodhisattvas should behave towards objects seen over and over again, such as one's wife or mother, teacher or servant in a way that conforms to them being stable, otherwise there would be mistakes!

36–38b: Defence of the non-momentariness of mountains, including a proof that one thing can produce more than one effect.

38cd–40: Given momentariness, the relation between cause and effect could not be established.

41–43: Defence of the existence of universals.

44–48: Refutation of the Buddhist inference of momentariness from perishability (*vināśitvānumāna*).

Verse 49–51: 'a soul' (*yaḥ pumān*)

49: Refutation of the view that it is the collection of sense-faculties that are conscious.

50: Refutation of the view that it is the material elements that are conscious.

This is distinguished from the earlier refutation of the Lokāyata (v. 18–22b) on the grounds that there what was refuted was that the Self is non-eternal as a result of being an effect of material elements, whereas here it is refuted that it is identical to the elements, even if both are eternal.

51: Refutation of the view of the Sāṅkarṣaṇa-Pāñcarātras that it is the internal organ that is conscious.

Verses 52–57: 'and an agent' (*kartā ca*)

52–53: Proof that the Self is multiple, as against the Vedāntin view.

This is distinguished from the earlier section dealing with Vedānta, verse 4, on the grounds that there it was shown that there are no means of proving that all souls are one, whereas here positive means of proving a multiplicity of souls are put forward.

54–55: Refutation of the transformationist Vedāntins (*pariṇativedāntavids*) and the Saṃhitā-Pāñcarātras, who teach a real plurality of individual souls (*jīvātmans*), but deny that these are all-pervading

and hold them to arise and subsequently dissolve into, respectively, Brahman and Nārāyaṇa.

56–57: Refutation of the Sāṅkhya view that the soul is not an agent.

Verses 58–75: Examination of liberation

Rāmakaṇṭha begins this section by stating that thus far the Self as described in the assertion sūtra has been examined through a refutation of the views of other traditions; and that now liberation will be examined in the same way. The following is a defence, through the refutation of alternative views, of the Saiddhāntika view that our innate omnipotence and omniscience become *manifest* at liberation (*abhivyaktivāda*), owing to the removal of occluding bonds that obscure them until that time.

58–61: Refutation of the view of those Śaivas who hold that becoming equal to Śiva (*śivasamatva*) at liberation consists in omniscience and omnipotence *arising* (*utpattivāda*).

62–65: Refutation of the Pāśupata view that the powers of the Lord are *transferred* (*saṅkrāntivāda*) to the soul, and the [Kāpālika] view that the soul is *possessed* (*āveśavāda*) by them like a person possessed by a spirit (*bhūta*).

66–67ab: Refutation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view that liberation consists in the complete absence of the specific qualities of the soul; and the Sāṅkhya view that it consists in separation from Primal Matter.

67cd: Refutation of the Buddhist view that liberation consists in the cessation of the stream of consciousness; and the Vedāntin and Pāñcarātra view that it consists in the dissolution of the individual selves into, respectively, Brahman and Nārāyaṇa.

68: Justification of the existence of Impurity (*mala*) as that which explains why our powers of cognition and action are not fully manifest prior to liberation.

69–73: Justification of the existence of the extra levels of bondage (evolved from *māyā*) above those recognized by the Sāṅkhya and others.

74: Statement that only if the Self is established do all the Āgamas such as the Vedas have a point.

75: Statement that this examination of the soul has preceded the examination of the Lord that will now follow, because the Lord is the agent of the soul's experience (*bhoga*) and liberation.

CHAPTER 1:
Can We Infer the Existence of the Self?

Background

I begin my translation and exegesis of passages concerning Rāmakaṇṭha's proof of the Self at the point in NPP where the Buddhist opponent enters the discussion for the first time.[1] In order to understand his first sentence we need to know roughly the content of the previous section.[2] In it Rāmakaṇṭha debated with an Advaitavedāntin opponent who claimed that this world of everyday interaction and language (*vyavahāra*), characterized by difference (*bheda*), is unreal, Brahman alone being real. Rāmakaṇṭha (who believes in the independent and real existence of perceivers, perceived objects and God) argues against the Vedāntin on the grounds that there are no means of knowing this non-dual Brahman. Direct perception and inference actually refute, rather than confirm, the oneness of everything in Brahman since, being based on sense-data and inferential marks, they have difference as their object (*bhedaviṣayatva*).[3] Neither can scripture bring about knowledge of Brahman for the following reasoning. The Advaitins themselves assert that Brahman is beyond conceptualization, so how can it be that which is denoted by scripture? If, furthermore, it were, then the scripture would also have to be real,

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[1] 8,17.

[2] 7,6–8,17.

[3] 7,13–14. The opponent responds that the content of perception and inference is actually pure existence. (This is the view of Maṇḍanamiśra, expressed in the *tarkakāṇḍa* of his *Brahmasiddhi.* See BS p. 39–73; and Thrasher 1978. Later on it became standard Vedāntin doctrine that pure non-dual existence is the content of perception.) Rāmakaṇṭha replies that, because in that case there could be no difference between perception and the other means of knowledge, there would in fact be no means of knowledge at all (7,14–15: *tarhi pratyakṣādibhedāsiddheḥ pramāṇābhāvaḥ*).

and to be related to Brahman in a relation of means of knowledge and object of knowledge, which entails duality. Finally, if the Advaitin responds that scripture works through the indirect method of showing that the knowledge of the Self (i.e. Brahman) is 'not this, not this' then that which is denoted by scripture would be non-objects just like 'the son of a barren woman', so how could scripture bring about knowledge of the one real thing?

The Vedāntin ceases to put forward further arguments at this point and instead a Buddhist opponent, seeing Rāmakaṇṭha's refutation of oneness as a step in the direction of Buddhist pluralism, seizes the opportunity to urge Rāmakaṇṭha to go further.

1. The Buddhist Challenge

> *yady evam, bhedasya satyatvāt,*[4] *pratiśarīram iva pratyartham*[5] *pratikṣaṇaṃ ca bāhyasyārthasyānahaṅkārāspadasyāhaṅkārāspadaṃ vijñānaṃ*[6] *bhinnam eva grāhakam anubhavasiddham astu, nānyaḥ kaś cid ātmā* nāma,[7] *tasyo*[8]*palabdhi*[9]*lakṣaṇaprāptasyā*[10]*nupalabdheḥ.*[11] *anupalabhyasvarūpasya ca* [Ked p. 9] *sattā duḥsādhyaiva.*[12]

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[4] *satyatvāt* P, Ked, Ped; *satvatvāt* B.

[5] Interlinear gloss above *pratyarthaṃ* in P: *pratipadārthaṃ.*

[6] *vijñānaṃ* B, P, Ked; *pratikṣaṇaṃ vijñānaṃ* Ped.

[7] *nāma* conj. Goodall; *nāmeti vaibhāṣikāḥ* B, P, Ked, Ped. This labelling of the school of the opponent would be very unlikely to occur halfway through the opponent's assertion. Moreover the very last words of the passage looked at in this chapter, *ity ātmaśūnyavādinaḥ*, seem to refer to the whole of this passage and thus make this speaker label redundant. Most likely then *iti vaibhāṣikāḥ* was originally an interlinear comment in a manuscript that a subsequent scribe took to be part of the text. (B and P abound in such interlinear speaker-labels.)

[8] Interlinear gloss above *tasyo*° in B and P: *ātmanaḥ.*

[9] Interlinear gloss above °*opalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyā*° in P: *upalabhyasyety arthaḥ.*

[10] °*prāptasyā*° P, Ked, Ped; °*prāptasya* B.

[11] See MatV VP ad 6.19c–21b, p. 150,3–4: *te ca sarva eva prāguktajñānavyatirekeṇa nānyaḥ kaś cid ātmābhidhāno 'rtho vidyata ity āhuḥ, jñānavyatirekeṇa tasyopalabdhila-*

[Buddhist:] If that is the case,[13] then because difference is real, cognition—the point of reference for the sense of self[14]—of external objects, which are not

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kṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdheḥ. The words *te sarve* refer to what Rāmakaṇṭha has just listed as the four kinds of Buddhist: Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Mahāyānika and Mādhyamika.

[12] *duḥsādhyaiva* P, B, Ked; *duḥsāddhaiva* Ped.

[13] I.e. if non-duality is not proved by any of the methods claimed by Vedāntins.

[14] What is meant by the word *ahaṅkāra* here? In this Buddhist context it lacks the connotation it would have in a Śaiva context as that which arises out of *buddhitattva* and gives rise to the evolutes below. Neither does it refer, for Buddhism, to a separate faculty or instrument (*karaṇa*) having a separate role, as it does in Śaivism (and Sāṅkhya). (For a Śaiva account of the Ahaṅkāra see PaTa 4.130–133.) Vasubandhu uses the term in a context similar to here in a passage in AKBh(BBS) (1226,8–1227,8) that begins as follows: *ātmany asati kimarthaḥ karmārambhaḥ? 'ahaṃ sukhī syām', 'ahaṃ duḥkhī na syām' ity evamarthaḥ. ko 'sāv ahaṃ nāma yadviṣayo 'yam ahaṅkāraḥ? skandhaviṣayaḥ.* '[But, says the Vaiśeṣika,] if there is no Self, with what purpose [would people] undertake action? [We answer that they do so,] thinking 'May I achieve wellbeing [hereby or at least] avoid suffering.' [The Vaiśeṣika asks:] What is the thing termed 'I' that is the basis of this sense of self [expressed in these aspirations]? [The Buddhist:] [The notion of 'I' is just] based on the psycho-physical constituents.' (I draw on the translation given on p. 31 of Sanderson 1995a.) The word 'basis' here indicates both the cause/support of the sense of self, and that to which it is directed, its object.

Uddyotakara also uses the word *ahaṅkāra* in a similar context in a passage (NVā (NCG) 323,17–324,10) that begins, *atha manyase, asty ayam ahampratyayaḥ, na punar asyātmā viṣayaḥ, hanta tarhi nirdiśyatāṃ viṣayaḥ.* rūpādir viṣaya iti cet. *atha manyase, rūpādaya evāhaṅkārasya viṣayaḥ, tathā coktam ahaṅkārālambanotpattinimittatvād ātmety ucyata iti, tan na pratiṣedhād asattvāc ca.* (Non-italic typeface indicates not text-segments from the *Nyāyabhāṣya* under comment, but *vārttika*s that are then expanded.) 'If you say that this I-cognition (*ahampratyayaḥ*) does occur, but that the Self is not its basis, then [you] must please state what its basis is. *If you say*: '[*its*] *basis is the body and the* [*other psycho-physical constituents*].' If you say: 'it is just the body and the [other psycho-physical constituents] that are the basis of the notion 'I' (*ahaṅkārasya*), and thus it has been said, "the reason [they] are [misleadingly] called the Self is that they are the cause of the rise of cognition[a] of the notion 'I'," that is not correct because [I-cognitions with regard to the body and the other constituents] are contradicted [by the words of the Buddha] and do not exist.' The way that Uddyotakara there begins the passage discussing the *viṣaya* of *ahampratyaya* and after the *vārttika* switches to talk of the *viṣaya* of the Ahaṅkāra, shows that for him the two are synonymous or nearly so.

a) The *Tātparyaṭīkā* glosses *ālambana* as *ālambyate 'nena*, thus as a synonym here of *jñāna*. That is an artificial way of taking an awkward and surprising compound. If

points of reference for the sense of self, should be the perceiver, one which is quite different from object to object and moment to moment, just as it is from body to body,[15] [and one which has the advantage over a Self that it is] established by experience;[16] [it is] not some so-called Self, [an entity] other than

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the author of this quotation, *ahaṅkārālambanotpattinimittatvād ātmety ucyate*, held *ahaṅkāra* to be more or less synonymous with *ahampratyaya*, as Uddyotakara does in introducing his remark, we would expect his compound to read simply *ahaṅkārotpattinimittatvād* without the *ālambana*. What did he mean by it with the *ālambana*? Harunaga Isaacson suggested that he probably indeed intended *ahaṅkārālambana* in the meaning of 'cognition of Ahaṅkāra', as the *Tātparyaṭīkā* construes it, but not through using *ālambana* in the meaning of cognition, rather through intending *ahaṅkārālambana* as a Bahuvrīhi, 'that whose support/object is the Ahaṅkāra'.

To sum up, the contexts of the remarks by Rāmakaṇṭha's Buddhist, Vasubandhu, Uddyotakara, and the author quoted by Uddyotakara are all the same in so far as they are Buddhist denials of the position that the Ahaṅkāra is based on (i.e. directed to and arising from) the Self. Vasubandhu, Uddyotakara and the author he quotes take it to be based on the psycho-physical constituents; Rāmakaṇṭha's Buddhist takes it to be based on cognition. As to what they precisely mean by it, one can discern slightly differing shades of meaning. Vasubandhu seems to use it to refer to the sense of self (with a small 's') that we all have towards that which we call 'I', instinctively wishing it to be happy and to avoid suffering. Uddyotakara uses it as a synonym of I-cognition (*ahampratyaya*). The author he quotes seems to use it to denote the content of an I-cognition. These three thus give us an idea of what Rāmakaṇṭha's Buddhist may precisely mean by it.

15 Śaiva Siddhāntins would accept that cognition in different bodies is different: the Buddhist urges that they should go further and accept that it is different when perceiving different objects and even in every moment.

16 I received detailed comments on this sentence from both Prof. Schmithausen and Prof. Preisendanz. I have followed neither of them completely, but mixed suggestions from both. I take it that the core sentence is *yady evam, bhedasya satyatvāt, vijñānaṃ grāhakam astu, nānyaḥ kaś cid ātmā nāma*: 'if that is the case, then because difference is real, let us accept that cognition, not some other so-called Self, is the perceiver.' Both subject (*vijñānam*) and predicate (*grāhakam*) are then filled out in more than one wave. The latter is specified as something established through experience and as being utterly different, that is to say different from object to object and moment to moment as it is from body to body; the former is specified as being the seat of the sense of self, in contrast to the objects it cognizes, which are not seats of a sense of self. It is true that this is not the sense that is suggested by word-order. More in line with the latter would be to take *bāhyasyārthasyānahaṅkārāspadasyāhaṅkārāspadaṃ vijñānam* as the subject, *anubhavasiddham* as the main predicate, *bhinnam eva grāhakam* as a sub-predicate, predicatively be-

[cognition], [that is the perceiver],[17] because it (i.e. a Self) is not perceived [though] it has the characteristics [required] for perception.[18] And the exis-

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longing to the main predicate, and *pratiśarīram iva pratyartham pratikṣaṇaṃ ca* as adverbial to the main predicate: 'Cognition ... should be established by experience for each object and in every instant, just as for each body, as the surely different perceiver'. I have rejected this for the following reasons. 1) The *yady evam, bhedasya satyatvāt* at the beginning of the sentence makes it unlikely that the main predicate is *anubhavasiddham.* For a contention about what we experience would not depend on the truth of *bheda*, or on any philosophical truth. Given the primacy of *anubhava* for Rāmakaṇṭha and the Buddhist (which will become evident below), it is the wrong way round to say that because plurality is real we experience a plural perceiver. 2) If the words *pratiśarīram iva pratyarthaṃ pratikṣaṇaṃ ca* were adverbial to *anubhavasiddham*, there would be no obvious point to *pratiśarīram iva.* I expect the *iva* to mark something that is accepted by both sides, which it does if we take *pratiśarīram* with *bhinnam* (because both sides accept that cognition is different in different bodies, the contentious point being whether it is different in each moment or with respect to each object). Why the words *pratiśarīram iva pratyarthaṃ pratikṣaṇaṃ ca* are so far removed from *bhinnam* remains mysterious, but I can see nothing else in the sentence with which they unproblematically construe. Perhaps they were placed at the beginning for the sake of emphasis.

[17] Different interpretations of *nānyaḥ kaś cid ātmā nāma* are possible depending on whether we supply as its predicate *asti/vidyate, sidhyati,* or whether we read again, through *anuvṛtti, grāhakam.* As support for the first option one could point to the parallel given in note 11, where we have the word *vidyate* in a very similar sentence; and as support for *sidhyati* one could point to the concluding sentence of 3.1 below, *kuto 'nyaḥ sidhyati,* where *anyaḥ*, like here, means 'something other than cognition' and refers to the Self. But I take it that predicates such as these would, if intended, be expressed explicitly in the present sentence, and hence I prefer to read again *grāhakam.* It is true that the following ablative phrase, *upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdheḥ*, is a well-known reason for *non-existence* (of the Self or other entity), but it can serve equally well here as a reason for the Self not being the perceiver, precisely by implying its non-existence.

[18] I.e. it is such that perception would reveal its existence. The compound *upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta* is common in the works of Dharmakīrti, particularly in passages that discuss *anupalabdhihetu*, the logical reason that consists of the non-perception of an entity (see Kellner 1997 and 1999). Here the point is that if the Self existed it should be perceptible; perhaps the reason the Buddhist would give is its supposed involvement in acts of perception.

The concern of the Buddhist to contrast cognition and the Self, on the grounds that the former is something experienced readily by all of us, and therefore impossible to deny

> tence of something whose nature cannot be perceived is difficult to establish.[19]

The Buddhist sees the postulation of a unitary Self, unchanging throughout all of a person's cognitions, as parallel to the Vedāntic postulation of the unitary Brahman, unchanging despite the appearance to our sense-faculties of a world of finite and transitory objects. Since Rāmakaṇṭha is prepared to reject the latter on the grounds that there is absolutely no evidence for it, why does he not reject the Self, argues the Buddhist, on the grounds that there is no evidence for it? If the perceiver (*grāhaka*) could just as well be cognition as the Self, surely it is less fanciful to opt for the former, given that unlike the Self it is something we all experience. Rāmakaṇṭha does not reply to this by putting forward his own view, but rather he introduces the response of those Naiyāyikas who accept that the Self cannot be perceived.[20]

2. The Naiyāyika Response

> 2.1 *satyam.*[21] *ata evendriyādir iva*[22] *kāryāt so 'pī*[23]*cchātmakād*[24] *anumīyata iti naiyāyikāḥ.*

(see *anubhavasiddham* earlier in the sentence), while the latter is not perceived, runs through this entire chapter. See p. 203.

[19] This final sentence responds to the imagined response to the previous sentence that the reason we do not perceive the Self is not because it does not exist, but because it is by its nature imperceptible. The Buddhist thus presents his opponent with a dilemma: either the Self is perceptible, in which case we can know that it does not exist; or it is imperceptible, in which case we cannot establish its existence.

[20] When Rāmakaṇṭha comes to put his own view, in the section of the text that is translated in the next chapter, we will see that he himself does not agree that the Self is imperceptible.

[21] Interlinear comment in P above *satyam*: *etat iti śeṣaḥ.*

[22] Marginal comment next to °*endriyādir iva* in P: *yathā hy anupalabhyo 'pīndriyādiḥ kāryeṇa kāraṇānumānam iti. anupalabhyasya śravaṇādeś śabdopalabdhikāryeṇa yathā tad anumānaṃ tathety arthaḥ.*

[23] *so 'pī*° P, B, Ked; *ātmāpī*° Ped.

[24] Interlinear gloss above *so 'pīcchātmakād* in B: *kāryāt.*

2.1 The Naiyāyikas [respond as follows]: That is true.[25] It is precisely for that reason that [we] infer the [Self], in the same way as [we do] the sense-

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[25] I.e. we do not and cannot perceive the Self. This was the original Naiyāyika view. At least there is nothing in the sūtras to indicate that their composers regarded the Self as perceptible, and Vātsyāyana, commenting on 1.1.10, is explicit that it is not: *tatrātmā tāvat* [variant without *tāvat*] *pratyakṣato na gṛhyate. sa kim āptopadeśamātrād eva pratipadyata iti? nety ucyate. anumānāc ca pratipattavya iti* (NBhā(NCG) 16,1–2): 'Among these [objects of knowledge], the Self, first of all,[a] is not grasped by direct perception. Is it known through no other way than the teachings of a trustworthy person? No, [we] reply. It can be known also through inference.'[b]

a) The Self comes first in the Nyāya list of the objects of knowledge.

b) Vātsyāyana's remark that the Self cannot be perceived needs to be qualified slightly, for he has earlier stated that it can be perceived through yogic perception: *pratyakṣaṃ yuñjānasya yogasamādhijam, 'ātmany* [variant without *ātmani*] *ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogaviśeṣād ātmā pratyakṣaḥ' iti* (NBhā(NCG) 9,8–11): 'As a result of yogic absorption, direct perception [of the Self] takes place for someone [so] absorbed, [as stated in *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 9.13:] 'the Self is directly perceptible as a result of a particular conjunction in the Self of internal organ and Self'. (For a detailed discussion of this sūtra and its citations—including for example the likely reason that Vātsyāyana includes the word *yuñjānasya*, seemingly superfluous given *yogasamādhijam*, see Isaacson 1993. Isaacson points out that yoga or yogic perception is not mentioned in this or the surrounding Vaiśeṣika sūtras, and hence that it is not to be altogether ruled out that originally it was intended as a description of the perception of ordinary people. Its earliest commentators and quoters, however, all take it as referring to yogic perception.)

But already by the time of Uddyotakara the opposite view was being proposed. Uddyotakara does not show signs of disagreement with Vātsyāyana when commenting on 1.1.10, but in the course of his long introduction to 3.1, he rejects that the Self cannot be perceived: *nāsty ātmā, anupalabdher iti cet, atrāpi pratijñādoṣaḥ* [*pratijñādoṣaḥ* NVā (NCG); *pratijñādidoṣaḥ* NVā(BI)], *dṛṣṭāntadoṣaś ca pūrvavat. yad apy anupalabdher* [*yad apy anupalabdher* NVā(NCG); *yad anupalabdher* NVā(BI)] *iti tad apy ayuktam. sāpy anupalabdhir* [*sāpy anupalabdhir* NVā(NCG); *anupalabdhir* NVā(BI)] *asiddhā pratyakṣādipramāṇaviṣayatvād ātmanaḥ. pratyakṣena tāvad ātmopalabhyate. katham?* [*katham?* NVā(BI); *katham pratyakṣeṇa?* NVā(NCG)] *liṅgaliṅgisambandhasmṛtyanapekṣaṃ viṣayasvabhāvabhedānuvidhāyy aham iti vijñānaṃ rūpādijñānavat* [*rūpādivijñānavat* NVā(NCG); *rūpādijñānavat* NVā(BI)] *pratyakṣam. yac cāpi bhavān muktasaṃśayaṃ pratyakṣaṃ pratipadyate, tasya kutaḥ pratyakṣatvam iti? avaśyaṃ bhavatā jñānam* [*jñānam* NVā(NCG); *vijñānam* NVā(BI)] *eva liṅgādisambandhanirapekṣaṃ svātmasaṃvedyaṃ pratipattavyam* [NVā(NCG) 323,13–17 = NVā(BI) 344,1–7]: 'If you say there is no Self because it is not perceived, in that case too there is a fault in the assertion and in the example, as before. And as for [the logical reason], "because [it] cannot be perceived," that is also incorrect. [For] this non-perception too is unproved because the Self is the ob-

faculties and the like, from [their] effects, namely, [in the case of the Self] desire.

This inference of the Self will have to overcome the difficulty that it claims to infer something that is never perceived directly: we are only able to infer fire on the mountain (on seeing smoke) because we have seen it elsewhere (in conjunction with smoke). This problem is not enough in itself to render this inference invalid, for some inferences of unperceived entities were accepted

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ject of direct perception and the [other] means of knowledge. The Self is perceived, first of all, by perception. How? Cognition of the form 'I' is direct perception, just like a cognition of a colour or such like, not depending on memory of the relation between a mark and that which has that mark, and conforming to the different own-natures of its objects. And why is that which you hold without doubt to be direct perception, direct perception? Necessarily you must maintain [that it is direct perception because it is] just cognition that does not depend on [memory of] the relation between a mark and [that which has that mark], and that is experienced by one's own self [all of which apply equally to I-cognition].'

The next sub-commentator whose work survives, Vācaspati Miśra, does not, like Uddyotakara, avoid commenting on Vātsyāyana's claim *tatrātmā tāvat pratyakṣato na gṛhyate.* He writes the following: *tadavatārārthaṃ bhāṣyaṃ tatrātmeti. aham iti jñānaṃ gaurādyākāraṃ śarīrāvabhāsaṃ na śakyaṃ ghaṭādijñānavad drāg ātmani pramāṇayitum ity abhiprāyaḥ, paradehavartyātmābhiprāyaṃ vā* (NCG(MIS) 391,17–19): 'The *Bhāṣya* [says] '*tatrātmā* ...' in order to introduce the [sūtra]. The intention [of that statement] is that the cognition 'I', having as its form 'fair etc.', has the body as its [objective] appearance, [so] it cannot immediately demonstrate the Self, in the way that a cognition of a pot or such like [can immediately demonstrate the existence of the pot or such like]. Alternatively [the *Bhāṣya*] intends the Selves in other bodies.' Thus first Vācaspati interprets in accordance with Vātsyāyana's intention, but then, in order to accommodate Uddyotakara's views perhaps, puts forward the unlikely suggestion that when Vātsyāyana said the Self can not be perceived, he was talking only of the Selves of other people.

Jayanta follows Vātsyāyana, without feeling the need to leave room for Uddyotakara's opposed view. He argues that the Self cannot be perceived (because one thing cannot be simultaneously perceiver and perceived) but can be inferred. He claims that 'I' refers to the body, so that statements such as 'I am fair' are literally true, whereas statements such as 'I know' are only metaphorically true. See NM(M) Vol. 2, 268,6–284,5.

Udayana follows Uddyotakara and devotes the entire fourth and final chapter of his *Ātmatattvaviveka* to refuting the claim that the Self cannot be perceived.

by almost all the Indian traditions as valid. A standard example is the inference referred to here, that of the sense-faculties.[26]

> *tad ayuktam.*[27] *kāryād dhi kāraṇamātraṃ sadṛśam evānumīyate. tac ca pūrvakaṃ*[28] *vijñānam eva pūrvatarajñānajasaṃskārasahāyam ubhayavādi*[29]*siddhaṃ nīlapītādijñānānām ivāsyāḥ kāraṇam astīti*[30] *kuto visadṛśatarādṛṣṭahetvantara*[31]*siddhiḥ.*
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> [Buddhist:] That is not correct, for from an effect only a cause that is similar [to it] can be inferred.[32] And just that previous cognition [that we referred to above], along with a trace arisen from a yet earlier cognition, being accepted

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[26] The full inference is given by Vasubandhu at AKBh(BBS) 1190,4–1191,2: ... *tadyathā pañcānām indriyāṇām. tatredam anumānam: sati kāraṇe kāraṇāntarasyābhāve kāryasyābhāvo dṛṣṭo bhāve ca punar bhāvaḥ* [*bhāvaḥ* suggested by the Tibetan; *bhavaḥ* AKBh(P), AKBh(BBS)] *tadyathāṅkurasya. saty eva vābhāsaprāpte viṣaye manaskāre ca kāraṇe viṣayagrahaṇasyābhāvo dṛṣṭaḥ punaś ca bhāvaḥ, andhabadhirādīnām anandhābadhirādīnāṃ ca. atas tatrāpi kāraṇāntarasyābhāvo bhāvaś ca niścīyate. yac ca tat kāraṇāntaraṃ tad indriyam ity etad anumānam.* '... just as of the five sense-faculties: in their case the following inference is available. When [most] causes are present [but] one further cause is absent, the effect is found to be absent, and when [that further cause is also] present, [the effect], for example a sprout, is then present. Now when a manifest object and a [second] cause, attention [on the part of a perceiver], are present, perception of the object is found not to occur for the blind or deaf etc., but to occur for the non-blind, non-deaf etc. Therefore in this case too the absence and presence [respectively] of a further cause is determined. And that further cause is the sense-faculty, so this inference [is forthcoming in the case of the sense-faculties].'

[27] Interlinear comment above *tad ayuktam* in B and P: *vaibhāṣikavacanaṃ.*

[28] *tac ca pūrvakaṃ* P, Ked; *ataś ca pūrvaṃ* Ped; *tataś ca pūrvakaṃ* B.

[29] Interlinear gloss above *ubhayavādi°* in P: *vaibhāṣikanaiyāyika.*

[30] Interlinear gloss above *asyāḥ kāraṇam astīti* in B and P: *icchāyāḥ.*

[31] Interlinear gloss above *visadṛśatarādṛṣṭahetvantara°* in B: *ātmākhya.*

[32] I have translated as though the text read *kāraṇaṃ sadṛśamātram anumīyate* or *kāraṇaṃ sadṛśam evānumīyate.* The phrase *kāraṇamātraṃ sadṛśam* is a little odd. One possibility is to assume that two points are being made, *kāraṇamātraṃ* expressing that only a cause, and not an agent, can be inferred, and *sadṛśam* expressing that the inferred cause must be similar to the effect: '... for from an effect a mere cause [and] only one that is similar can be inferred.' The Sanskrit struck Prof. Sanderson as sufficiently odd for him to conjecture *kāraṇaṃ sadṛśam evānumīyate.*

by both disputants, is available *(asti)*[33] as the cause of it (i.e. desire), just as [it, along with a trace, is the cause] of cognitions of blue and yellow etc.[34] So

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[33] *asti* may have this nuance of 'is available' (suggested by Prof. Schmithausen), or it may be used here, and in the parallel sentence (see next note), simply as a copula (suggested by Prof. Preisendanz). Preisendanz wrote, 'The fact that Sanskrit does not *need* a copulative verb in simple third person nominal-predicative sentences should not be turned into a (refutable) dogma that *asti cannot* be used as a copula. There are quite a lot of counter-examples, even in the *Mahābhāṣya.*' Schmithausen wrote, 'Eine Verwendung von *asti* als "emphatische" Kopula in Sonderfällen ist angesichts der Kopula-Funktion anderer Formen von *as* denkbar, scheint mir an den beiden vorliegenden Stellen aber nicht zwingend, da mit einem Ansatz *asti* = "steht (schon) zur Verfügung" ein mindestens ebenso passender Sinn erzielt werden kann.'

[34] This sentence, *tac ca pūrvakaṃ vijñānam eva pūrvatarajñānajasaṃskārasahāyam ubhayavādisiddhaṃ nīlapītādijñānānām ivāsyāḥ kāraṇam astīti kuto visadṛśatarādṛṣṭahetvantarasiddhiḥ,* is somewhat problematic; but is exactly parallel to the concluding sentence of 3.1 below: *tac ca vijñānam eva pravāhātmakaṃ saṃskārādivaśataḥ pūrvoktāśeṣārthakriyānirvartakam ubhayavādisiddham astīti kuto 'nyaḥ sidhyati.* Both also occur in similar contexts, coming as they do after sentences that end 'should be inferred/postulated' *(anumīyate/kalpyaḥ).* One possibility is to take the *tat* to be picking up the subject of the previous sentence, the thing of which it has been said that it should be inferred/postulated. Thus the present sentence would mean, 'And that [similar cause] is [in this case] just the previous cognition, along with a trace arisen from a yet earlier cognition, which is accepted by both disputants, just as [it, along with a trace, is the cause] of cognitions of blue and yellow etc.' But at that point we would have to punctuate and treat *asyāḥ kāraṇam asti* as a separate sentence, 'There is a cause of it, so how ...'. Since the parallel sentence below has no break between *tac ca* and *asti*, and since the parallel structure makes it unlikely that we should interpret the two sentences syntactically differently, I am not satisfied with this solution. Another possibility, the one I have opted for without being certain that it is correct, is to take *tat* in both sentences as qualifying *vijñāna*, thus indicating a reference to a previous mention of the term. This interpretation of *tat* is slightly less smooth for this sentence than for the later one: *tac ca vijñānam* there refers unproblematically back to the mention of *vijñāna* in 2.4; but the fact that we here have *pūrvakam* between *tat* and *vijñānam* makes a reference back to *vijñāna* in 1 a little unsmooth. We have the option for this sentence of adopting a different reading: *ataś ca* or *tataś ca* for *tac ca,* but in the parallel sentence *tac ca* is unanimously transmitted, and there is a simple explanation (pointed out to me by Prof. Schmithausen) for why corruption to *ataś ca* could have occurred here, but not there, namely that the preceding syllable here is *te* (but there it is *aḥ*): *tetacca* > *tetaśca* > *te 'taśca.* Could *tat* function in both sentences in the meaning of *tasmāt*? Only if it linked with the *kutaḥ* question: 'And therefore, because just the pre-

how could a further cause, that is more unlike [the effect][35] and has never been observed, be established [from it]?

Since something readily accepted by both sides—the previous cognition along with a latent trace—is all that is necessary to explain desire, how could one be justified in claiming that desire indicates the existence of some imperceptible and disputed entity such as a Self?

tad uktam[36]

yasmin sati[37] *bhavaty eva yat*[38] *tato 'nyasya*[39] *kalpane* |
taddhetutvena sarvatra hetūnām anavasthitiḥ || *iti.*[40]

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vious cognition ... is / is available as the cause of it, how could a further cause ... ?', which stretches the Sanskrit somewhat. Emending *tac ca* in both sentences to *tatra* (suggested by Harunaga Isaacson for the later sentence, before he was aware of the parallel sentence here) would produce two much smoother sentences (with *tatra* meaning 'in this case', 'with regard to this demand'), but I am reluctant to assume corruption in both places.

[35] Instead of 'more unlike' one could simply translate as 'quite/very unlike', but the *tara* suffix here can easily be taken as indicating a comparative: the previous cognition and the trace are of a slightly different nature from the desire, but a Self is of a yet more different nature.

[36] PVā 2.24.

[37] Interlinear gloss above *yasmin sati* in B: *kāraṇe.*

[38] Interlinear gloss above *yat* in B: *kāryaṃ.*

[39] Interlinear gloss above *'nyasya* in B: *kāraṇād anyasya kāraṇasya.*

[40] All editions of the *Pramāṇavārttika* give this verse with *yeṣu satsu ... tebhyo* in place of *yasmin sati ... tato.* So do the quotations or paraphrases of it that I have seen in non-Śaiva texts: NBhū 481,11–12; and TS(BBS) verse 90 (*yeṣu satsu bhavad dṛṣṭam asatsu na kadācana* | *tasyānyahetutākḷptāv anavasthā kathaṃ na te* ||). Rāmakaṇṭha also quotes it with *yeṣu satsu ... tebhyo* in chapter two of this text (NPP 120,1–2 ad 2.4). But he quotes it with singulars in three other places in addition to here: NPP ad 1.23ab; KV ad 3.9ab; and *Mataṅgavṛtti* ad *vidyāpāda* 6.21ab (MatV VP 152,2–3). The singular is not absolutely required by the present context since more than one factor has been mentioned: the previous cognition and the trace of a yet earlier cognition. Rāmakaṇṭha is not the first author to give the verse with singulars: his father, Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, quotes it with *yasmin sati ... tato* in MTV, ad 1.1.9ab, 23,12–13.

Sanderson commented that the version with the singulars is likely to have been influenced by the prose formula *asmin satīdaṃ bhavati* or *asmin satīdam asti* (Pāli: *imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti*). This would have been well-known to all the disputants as the essence of the Buddhist view of causation.

Thus it has been said:

> When B must (*eva*) arise when A has arisen, if one postulates as the cause of B something other than A, there would be an infinite regress of causes for everything.

This verse asserts the principle that in arriving at explanations one should stick to those factors whose concomitance with the effect to be explained can be observed. A pot can be observed to come into existence on condition that there is a potter, clay, and an action on the part of the potter.[41] If one postulates something else that is not observed as the cause of the pot, then why stop with that? What is it that differentiates this further entity from any other entity in the universe, making it more likely to be a cause than anything else? Though I have translated *anavasthitiḥ* as 'infinite regress', this 'infinite regress', if it can be so called, seems not to mean that each time we postulate a cause we need another one to make the former intelligible and so on ad infinitum. Rather it is simply that if we abandon the principle that observed concomitance with an effect is what determines whether something is a cause or not, we open the floodgates to absolutely anything being allowed as a cause.[42]

The original context of this verse is one of Dharmakīrti's arguments against the view that God can be inferred as the creator (*kartṛ*) of the universe. Dharmakīrti points out that those things of which God is postulated as cause occur concomitantly with observed entities. Wounds are healed following the application of medicinal herbs, the use of surgical instruments and such like

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As noted below, the original Buddhist context of this verse is not a refutation of the *ātman*, but a refutation of the view that the universe is created by God. All the quotations and paraphrases of the verse mentioned in this footnote, with the exception of Rāmakaṇṭha's quotation in the 6th chapter of the *Mataṅgavṛtti* occur in discussions of God. In that part of the *Mataṅgavṛtti* he, like here, has his Buddhist use it to argue against the *ātman*.

[41] The example that Prajñākaragupta gives when commenting on this verse.

[42] Manorathanandin's explanation of *anavasthitiḥ* is *aparāparakalpanā*: thus for him the unwanted consequence here is that one could go on postulating further and further causes. Prajñākaragupta's commentary reads *sarveṣām ekakāryāṇāṃ hetūnām anavasthitiḥ paryavasānaṃ na syāt* (PVBh 49,15): there would be no end of all causes having a single effect.

treatments.[43] Sprouts can be observed to arise when earth, seeds and the like are present, but not when these are not present.[44] Bodies, instruments and worlds can be seen to arise from the elements.[45] In such cases we should take it that the seen entities are the causes of the effects in question, not some unseen entity such as God. If God, whose co-presence with the things he is held to cause cannot be observed, is postulated as their cause, then our very notions of cause and effect will be contaminated.

The use of the verse by the Buddhist in NPP is clear. It can be put to the purpose of undermining arguments which infer the Self as a cause, just as much as arguments which infer God as a cause, since the supposed effect of the Self, desire, already has causes that are accepted by both sides. After the Buddhist opponent's first interjection we deduced that he sees the postulation of a unitary Self as parallel to the Vedāntic postulation of an all-encompassing Brahman. Now, after his second interjection, we can deduce from his use of this quotation that he also regards it as parallel to the postulation of a God who creates the universe. In the context of this parallelism of God and Self from the Buddhist point of view, it could be noted that the example of medicinal herbs that Dharmakīrti uses to introduce this verse in his discussion of God,[46] is also used in a similar fashion in Vasubandhu's discussion of the Self. Vasubandhu's *ātmavādin* opponent there adduces features of cognition that indicate the causal influence of the Self, and Vasubandhu argues that these features can be explained just through cognition depending on specific latent traces.[47] It is just like, writes Vasubandhu, the case of quack doctors who claim that their herbal medicine cures owing to their having enchanted it with mantras (in order to dissuade the patient from simply procuring the herbs themself).[48] To claim that the Self is required to explain cognition is

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[43] PVā 2.22.

[44] The example that Manorathanandin gives when commenting on this verse.

[45] That is the way the Buddhist opponent responds to the Śaiva inference of the existence of God from these three effects, at KV 68,8–9. He then quotes this *Pramāṇavārttika* verse.

[46] Reference given in note 43.

[47] AKBh(BBS) 1224,1–2: *cittād evāstu, saṃskāraviśeṣāpekṣāt.*

[48] See AKBh(BBS) 1224,2–3: *na hi kiṃ cid ātmana upalabhyate sāmarthyam auṣadhakāryasiddhāv iva kuhakavaidyaphuḥsvāhānām*; and Yaśomitra ad loc. (Prof. Sand-

just like claiming that mantras are required to make medicine efficacious. Similarly Dharmakīrti points out the redundancy of adducing God as a factor in healing wounds, when the medicine alone is enough to render the healing comprehensible.

2.2 *na, nīlādijñānānām*[49] *ivāsyāḥ*[50] *kāryatvāsiddheḥ.*

2.2 [Naiyāyika:] No, because it (i.e. desire) is not established to be the same kind of effect as cognitions of blue and the like.[51]

icchā hi[52] *pūrvānubhūtasukhasādhanatvādyanusandhānasāmarthyasiddhatat-samānakartṛtvajñāna*[53]*sahabhāvinī.*[54]

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erson prefers this reading °*phuḥ*° of AKBh(P), instead of AKBh(BBS)'s °*phūḥ*°. His reasons are spelt out in AKBh(S).)

[49] Interlinear comment above *na nīlādijñānānām ivā* in B: *etat na nīlādijñānānām i*[*i* em.; *e* B]*vetyādikaṃ naiyāyikavacanaṃ*; in P: *pūpa, naiyāyikavacanam.* The first word is of course an abbreviation of *pūrvapakṣa.*

[50] Interlinear gloss above °*syāḥ* in B and P: *icchāyāḥ.*

[51] Most literal would be to take this to mean that desire is not proved to be an effect at all, unlike cognitions of blue and the like which *are* established to be effects. I take it in the way I do because of context. It is not the same kind of effect as a cognition of blue, because it, unlike the latter, is accompanied by awareness of same agency, as is about to be explained.

[52] Marginal comment in B on the passage beginning *icchā hi*: *icchā hi ekam anusandhātāraṃ vinā no*[*no* corr.; *na* MS]*papannā, yatprakārasya padārthasya sambandhād ayaṃ sukham anubhūtavān punas tatprakāraṃ padārthaṃ paśyan sukhasādhanatvam anusmṛtya taṃ grahītum icchati*[a] *yataḥ* [*yataḥ* conj. Isaacson; *ya* MS]. *na asiddhatvād ityādi* [*asiddhatvād ityādi* conj. Isaacson; *asiddhatvādi śarīrakād ityādi* MS] *vaibhāṣika āha.* †...† *śarīrakād icchā bhavet* [*śarīrakād icchā bhavet* conj. Isaacson; *icchā bhavet* MS] †...† *tarhi yuvaśarīrasya sukhasādhanatānubhavaḥ vṛddhaśarīrasya tadanusandhānaṃ anyasya tadāditsety eva bhavet. yadi vā ekasya vijñānasya anubhavaḥ dvi*[*dvi* corr.; *dva* MS]*tīyasya smaraṇaṃ ityādy. anekakartṛkam anusandhānapratyayaḥ syāt na tatsamānakartṛkajñānaṃ* [°*jñānaṃ* conj. Isaacson; °*jñātaṃ* MS] *bhavet.* (I have not here applied sandhi where the manuscript has not, or corrected it where it has been applied incorrectly, in case doing so removes clues to corruption.) The composer of this comment was not the person who wrote it in this manuscript, for, as can be seen, it is corrupt in many places. The scribe must have copied it from his source manuscript. 'For desire is not possible without a single synthesizer [of the previous cognitions on which the desire depends]; for (*yataḥ*) owing to connection with a particular kind of object this [synthesizer/person] ex-

For desire occurs together with awareness that [its] agent is the same as the agent of a [previous pleasure]. [This awareness is] established from the ability

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perienced pleasure; later on, seeing the same kind of object, and remembering that it is a means of pleasure, he desires to obtain it.[b] The Vaibhāṣika says, 'no, because it is not proved' etc. ... Desire may arise from the body (*śarīraka*?). ... In that case it could simply occur that the experience that [the object] is a means of pleasure is had by the youth's body, the synthesis of that by the old person's body and the desire to obtain the [object] by another [body]. Or perhaps the experience [of pleasure] is had by one cognition, [and] the memory by a second, and so forth. [Thus] the synthesizing cognition is [cognition] involving more than one agent, not a cognition involving the same agent [as the original experience etc.].' (For the translation of the last sentence I follow the suggestion of Preisendanz/Schmithausen made in their examiners' report, which significantly improves upon my earlier attempt.)

a) Note that the similarity between *yatprakārasya padārthasya sambandhād ayaṃ sukham anubhūtavān punas tatprakāraṃ padārthaṃ paśyan sukhasādhanatvam anusmṛtya taṃ grahītum icchati* and the following in the *Nyāyamañjarī* is too pronounced to be co-incidental: *yajjātīyam artham upayuñjānaḥ puruṣaḥ purā sukham anubhūtavān, punaḥ kālāntare tajjātīyam artham upalabhya sukhasādhanatām anusmṛtya tad ādātum icchati* (NM(M) Vol. 2, 278,7–9).

b) Up to this point, the author of this comment has been commenting on the NPP passage from *icchā hi* to *etad anyatropapadyate yataḥ*. The rest of the comment, as can be seen from the fact that it begins *na asiddhatvād ityādi* and ends *na tatsamānakartṛkajñānaṃ bhavet* explains the Buddhist response in 2.3: *na, asiddhatvāt, na hi tatsamānakartṛtvajñānasahabhāvitvam asyāḥ siddhaṃ* (9,16–17).

53 Marginal gloss above *anusandhānasāmarthyasiddhatatsamānakartṛtvajñāna* in B: *ya evāhaṃ draṣṭā sa eveṣṭetyādi*. Rāmakaṇṭha writes *ya evāhaṃ draṣṭā sa evaiṣṭā* below (with *eveṣṭā* transmitted in B) as his formulation of the awareness of same agency.

54 Note the terminological overlap between Rāmakaṇṭha's formulation of this argument and that of Jayanta: °*anusandhānasāmarthya*° is mirrored by °*anusandhānasamartham* at NM(M) Vol. 2, 278,10; *pūrvānubhūtasukhasādhanatvādyanusandhāna*° by *pūrvānubhūtasukhasādhanatvānusandhāna*° at NM(M) Vol. 2, 278,1b; and °*tatsamānakartṛtvajñāna*° by *tatkāryasamānakartṛkatvāvagamāt* at NM(M) Vol. 2, 279,1. The combined weight of these parallels is, I think, sufficient to demonstrate that Rāmakaṇṭha is not using his own words here but borrowing from an earlier source. The earlier source could be Jayanta directly, or a third author who is the source for both of them, or who borrowed from Jayanta and was borrowed from by Rāmakaṇṭha.

> [of the desiring person] to synthesize (*anusandhāna*) such things as[55] the fact that [the desired object] was a means of previously experienced pleasure.[56]

The word *anusandhāna* will recur several times during this passage, as it denotes the process that is at the heart of this Naiyāyika argument. I do not stick to one translation but use variously combining, co-ordinating, linking, connecting, bringing together, synthesizing or fusing (or instead of the action noun, one referring to the completed process, e.g. combination, synthesis). It denotes the accessing and bringing together of earlier and later cognitions, enabling the interpretation of one's present perception in the light of past experiences. In the present argument what is envisaged is a chain of (at least three) events, which Rāmakaṇṭha does not bother to lay out, but which other versions of the argument do: one experiences pleasure from an object in the past, now one sees the same kind of object, and hence desires it. In this context *anusandhāna* refers to the bringing together of the present seeing with (the memory of) the experience of pleasure it gave one in the past. If no such connection were made between the present seeing and the fact that the object seen caused one pleasure, one would of course not desire it. Hence the mere fact that desire occurs when one sees an object of past pleasure is enough for us to be sure that between the seeing and the desiring, *anusandhāna* must have taken place.

Both in the course of this argument below and in the versions of Naiyāyika authors, the Buddhist opponents do not disagree with the Naiyāyika assertion that this cognitive process of *anusandhāna* must take place, they just disagree over how it arises and what we can deduce from it.

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The Naiyāyika in the sentence under discussion 1) assumes that desire implies this mental process of combining past and present cognitions;[57]

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[55] It can be seen from fuller accounts of this argument that the *ādi* refers most likely to the perception of the object immediately before the desire for it arises.

[56] It is also quite possible that *pūrvānubhūta* should qualify not *sukha* but *sukhasādhana*, the meaning being 'the previously experienced fact that the desired object is a means of pleasure'.

2) claims that this combining entails that the agent of the desire is aware that (s)he is also the agent of the previous pleasure.[58]

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[57] We do not have to assume, I think, that this argument concerns absolutely all instances of desire. Even allowing that occasionally we desire things the like of which we have never experienced (where clearly no synthesis of past experiences is required), the inference can still work through appeal to those occurrences of desire that clearly are directed towards an object of previous pleasure and that clearly arise in dependence on that previous pleasure.

[58] The argument being put forward here from desire and *anusandhāna* is that which Vātsyāyana offered as his interpretation of NS 1.1.10: *icchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥkhajñānāny ātmano liṅgam.* This argument is an unnatural construal of the sūtra, not least because though one can readily see how (most cases of) desire and aversion (*dveṣa*), and possibly effort, are dependent on *anusandhāna*, the other members of the list, pleasure, pain and cognition, would not normally seem to require it. For a stimulating discussion of what the *sūtrakāra's* intention may have been, and what may have caused Vātsyāyana to be disinclined to interpret in that way, see Oetke 1988 254–256 and 258–260.

Uddyotakara also gives this argument as one possibility for the meaning of the sūtra, but his version of it differs from that of Vātsyāyana. Jayanta gives a third version of the argument, and it is his that Rāmakaṇṭha's most closely resembles. 1) For both Jayanta (see NM(M) Vol. 2, 278,11–12; 280,3–4, and 281,5b–4b) and Rāmakaṇṭha (see 2.1 above) this inference of the Self is essentially one from desire *as effect* (*kārya*). The consideration that desire involves *anusandhāna* is supplementary, to show that desire is not like other effects. Neither Vātsyāyana nor Uddyotakara even mention that desire is an effect in the context of this argument. 2) Jayanta introduces the term *anusandhāna* as a synonym of *pratisandhāna*, where Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara use only *pratisandhāna. anusandhāna* is the term that Rāmakaṇṭha uses. 3) For both Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara it is cognitions that are brought together or combined: see for example the phrase repeated throughout Vātsyāyana's argument (3 times on page 16 of NBhā(NCG)) *darśanapratisandhāna*, and Uddyotakara's *pratyayānāṃ pratisandhānam* (NVā(NCG) 60,16). Jayanta, by contrast, has a habit of making forms of the verb *anusandhā* govern the abstract of the noun *sādhana*, i.e. not a cognition but a property of the object: *sukhasādhanatvānusandhāna* (NM(M) Vol. 2, 278,1b); *duḥkhasādhanatām anusandhāya* (NM(M) Vol. 2, 280,8–9). Rāmakaṇṭha adopts this manner of talking. 4) For Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara the argument, crudely summarised, is that *pratisandhāna* would not be able to take place unless there were a single agent of all the cognitions being combined, who performs the act of combining them. But Jayanta's argument is far more complicated. One extra element of it is that he adds a middle stage that *anusandhāna* implies awareness of same agency. This middle stage is taken on by Rāmakaṇṭha. Awareness of same agency is not

What precisely is the relationship between the *anusandhāna* and the awareness of same agency, that enables the claim in 2 that the former entails the latter? The Naiyāyika will state it below: *anyathānupapattiḥ,* 'impossibility otherwise'. In other words he regards the *anusandhāna* as impossible in the absence of awareness of same agency, inconceivable without it. Jayanta explains that when earlier and later cognitions are brought together, the *anusandhāna* contains both an awareness that the cognitions are directed to the same (kind of) object, and an awareness that they have the same agent.[59] To access and bring together present and past cognitions simply *is* to be aware that the past one had, as its agent, the agent of the present one: if one verbalizes the *anusandhāna* it will take some such form as 'previously I experienced that object, and this same I am again experiencing [it] now',[60] in which an awareness of same agency is apparent. I assume that Rāmakaṇṭha has some such idea in mind.

> *iti jñātrantarebhya iva śarīravijñānāntarādibhyo 'pi kāryatvena vyāvartamānā viśiṣṭaṃ jñātāraṃ sthiram anumāpayatīty ātmasiddhiḥ. na hi ya evāhaṃ draṣṭā sa evaiṣṭe*[61]*ty etad anyatropapadyate yataḥ.*[62]
>
> Therefore, being excluded from being an effect of the body, another cognition, and [other generally accepted constituents of a person],[63] just as much as [from being an effect] of other cognizers,[64] [desire] allows us to infer a stable

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mentioned by Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara at all. 5) As pointed out in note 54, Rāmakaṇṭha in some places uses precisely the same wording as Jayanta.

[59] See note 134.

[60] See *pūrvam aham amum artham anubhūtavān, aham evādya punar anubhavāmi* in note 134.

[61] *evaiṣṭe*° P, Ked; *eveṣṭe*° B, Ped.

[62] Interlinear gloss above *anyatra* in P: *ātmani*; in B: *ātmavyatirikte vijñāna*. Perhaps the reason that the author did not write *vijñāne* was that if one inserted this phrase into the text instead of *anyatra*, sandhi would result in *vijñāna*. B's gloss seems appropriate, P's not.

[63] Literally, 'turning away from the body, another cognition and such like as effect ...'.

[64] The talk here of what desire is an *effect* of reminds us that the *anusandhāna* argument occurs as a middle stage of an inference from effect to cause. In this case it is a cause that is both inherence cause / substrate (*samavāyikāraṇa, upādānakāraṇa, āśraya*) and agent (*kartṛ*).

> cognizer, who is separate [from the body and cognition etc.]. Thus the Self is proved. For[65] this [awareness of same agency], 'that "I" who [was] the perceiver am exactly the same as this desirer' is not possible with regard to anything else [other than a Self].[66]

Note 58 gave several parallels between this version of the argument and Jayanta's. This piece of text provides two more. First there is another similarity of wording (possibly coincidental, possibly not): Rāmakaṇṭha writes *viśiṣṭaṃ jñātāraṃ sthiram anumāpayati*; Jayanta *viśiṣṭam āśrayam anumāpayati*.[67] Secondly, rather than proceeding straight from having established awareness of same agency to concluding that the Self is thus established (as that agent), both authors state that the awareness of same agency excludes the possibility that desire is an effect of a substrate such as the body.[68] This is an interesting contrast with the position of Vātsyāyana, who regards the argument from desire and synthesis as only capable of proving a single agent of perceptions who endures from the time of the past pleasure to the subsequent desire.[69] He thinks that one is still left with the possibility that this perceiver is not sepa-

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[65] It will appear strange to many that this sentence contains both a *hi* and a *yataḥ*. However Rāmakaṇṭha not infrequently uses seemingly superfluous *hi*'s in sentences that also contain ablatives or *yataḥ*'s. See for example in section 4.2 of Chapter 2, *tasyāpi hi svataḥ kṣaṇamātrarūpatvenāpratibhāsanāt,* and *tatpratibhāsitve hy āropānupapatteḥ*; and in section 3.3 of Chapter 4.1, *tasya hi pradīpāder ivaikasyānekakāryakartṛtvena bhavadbhir apīṣṭatvāt.*

The same habit is found in Rāmakaṇṭha's predecessor, Sadyojyotis, both in his prose and verse works. See for example SvSūSa p. 36,2b–1b: *kiṃ kāraṇam? yato na hi śuddhasya śivasya bhogaḥ sambhavati.*

On Rāmakaṇṭha's tendency to use sentence-final *yataḥ*, and the mispunctuation to which this has given rise in editions of his texts (Ked punctuates here after *anyatropapadyate*), see Goodall 1998 xxviii.

[66] I.e. in such a cognition 'I' could not refer to anything other than a Self. Alternatively we could translate as, 'is not possible in anything else [other than a Self]', i.e. only a Self could have such a cognition. Or, finally, *anyatra* could be being used in the sense of *anyathā*: 'unless we postulate a Self'.

[67] NM(M) Vol. 2, 279,2.

[68] See NM(M) Vol. 2, 279,1–2: *tatkāryasamānakartṛkatvāvagamāt śarīrādipratiṣedhe sati.*

[69] See Oetke 1988 257–58.

rate from the body, senses, internal organ etc., and thus he presents *Nyāyasūtras* 3.1.1 ff. as turning to that question.[70]

Looking more closely at the piece of text above, the Naiyāyika concludes from the fact that desire is accompanied by awareness of same agency that it cannot be an effect of another cognition, the body etc. In order for this to amount to a proof of the Self, as it purports to be, all recognized constituents of a person must be excluded from being possible substrates, leaving the Self as the only option. Thus the 'etc.' must certainly include the sense-faculties and the internal organ (*manas*). Let us take each of these in turn.

1) The contention that desire cannot be an effect of another cognition refers to the Buddhist position mentioned in his last interjection that desire is simply an effect of the previous cognition plus a trace.[71] That can now be ruled out, for if it were the effect of simply the previous cognition, as opposed to an agent over and above the stream of cognitions and in which they inhere, then it would have no agent in common with the earlier pleasure so the awareness of same agency would be inexplicable.

2) For similar reasoning to rule out the possibility that the body is the substrate of desire, we must be dealing with a notion that between the past pleasure and the desire the body ceases to exist and gives way to a new body. For if the body endured over that timespan, it could indeed be the agent and substrate of both the pleasure and desire, so the awareness of same agency would be explained. The view of the body that came to dominate Nyāya is that one's baby body is not the same thing as one's body during childhood, which is in turn different from that in youth and old age. See for example Vācaspati Miśra's comment, 'and this single [entity] which is the [earlier] experiencer, and the [subsequent] rememberer, inferrer and desirer is the Self. And the body cannot be such (i.e. the single entity spanning that whole time period) because it is [not only qualitatively but also quantitatively] different in accord

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[70] NBhā(NCG) 135,4–12. Vācaspati regards the argument as capable of excluding the possibility that desire inheres in the body (see note 72), but his version contains none of the other parallels with Rāmakaṇṭha's version that Jayanta's does.

[71] We can now see that the relevant trace would be that of the past pleasure.

with the differences between babyhood, childhood, youth and old age.'[72] See also Jayanta's similar remarks: *śarīraṃ tāvan necchāder āśrayaḥ, śaiśava-yauvanavārdhakādidaśābhedena bhinnatvāt*[73] and *śarīraṃ ca bālyādyava-sthābhedena bhinnam.*[74] These remarks cannot be interpreted to mean that the body has four distinct states while itself remaining the same thing, for when an opponent proposes this after the second of these sentences, Jayanta then spends four more pages arguing that plurality in the body is not just on the level of its states but on the level of the body itself.

Even if we were to assume that the body is the same thing throughout each of these four periods, only ceasing to exist at the end of the period, that would still be enough to disqualify the body from being the substrate of desire, given that instances of desire can occur in youth for objects that have not been experienced since childhood, etc. In fact though, Jayanta argues for a much more numerous division of the body. Every time there is a change in its colouration, size, configuration (*sanniveśa*) etc., the body ceases to exist and a new one is reconstructed. The same happens whenever we eat, and food, having been digested, turns into new *dhātu*s, the essential constituents of the body. In fact he goes so far as to say that the body arises and is destroyed in pretty much every instant.[75]

This is a far remove from the view of the *Nyāyasūtra*s, which was that though undergoing changes the body remains the same thing from birth to death and beyond—up to the time of its decomposition or burning.[76] Perhaps that is why Vātsyāyana did not regard this argument as capable of establishing that the agent of our perceptions is separate from the body.

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[72] NCG(MIŚ) 392,4–6 *yaś cāsāv eko 'nubhavitā ca smartā cānumātā caiṣitā ca sa ātmā. na ca śarīram evaṃ bhavitum arhati, tasyāpi bālyakaumārayauvanavārdhakabhe-denānyatvāt.*

[73] NM(M) Vol. 2, 284,8–9.

[74] NM(M) Vol. 2, 284,14.

[75] *śarīre ... prāyeṇa pratikṣaṇam utpādavināśau sambhavataḥ* NM(M) Vol. 2, 287, 5–8.

[76] See note 187 in this chapter.

3 & 4) Vātsyāyana's reluctance to see this argument as establishing the separateness of the agent of our perceptions from the sense faculties and the internal organ is also understandable, for they would seem to last long enough to be the agent of both the past pleasure and the subsequent desire (the internal organ being even eternal). I do not see how either Rāmakaṇṭha or Jayanta could derive from this argument alone, as they have laid it out, the impossibility of desire inhering in one of the sense faculties or internal organ.[77] Vācaspati states in the middle of his exegesis of this argument that desire cannot inhere in them, but he supports that not with considerations deriving from this argument but by mentioning in brief different arguments and stating that he will come to them in the future.[78]

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In the sentence of NPP under discussion, the Naiyāyika likens the possibility that desire is an effect of the body, another cognition and such like to the possibility that it is an effect of another cognizer (through his use of *iva*). That it cannot be the latter is agreed to by all disputants: past pleasure in one cognizer cannot produce a subsequent desire in another, since the latter person does not have access to the former's pleasure. The implication of the comparison is that if, instead of cognitions having as their agent or inherence cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*) the Self, they were produced by different phases of the body or simply by the previous cognition, access to the earlier pleasure for subsequent cognitions would in that case too be impossible. The assumption there is that the reason that pleasure in one person cannot be accessed by a cognition in another is that the pleasure and the cognition do not share the same agent or inherence cause. Since this lack of same agency also holds

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[77] They would at least need to specify that the pleasure from the object came from encountering it with one sense-faculty and the subsequent desire on encountering it with a different sense-faculty. There are certainly arguments involving *prati-/anusandhāna* that are directed to establishing a Self beyond the senses: *darśanasparśanābhyām ekārthagrahaṇāt* (*Nyāyasūtra* 3.1.1), as interpreted by Vātsyayana (see note 129 below) and those who follow him, and *indriyāntaravikārāt* (*Nyāyasūtra* 3.1.12 / one part of *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 3.2.4), as interpreted by, among others, Rāmakaṇṭha's Vaiśeṣika opponent below (section 3.1).

[78] NCG(MIS) 392,6–8.

within one person's stream of cognition on the Buddhist view, a later cognition should not have access to an earlier pleasure. The Buddhist would dispute that assumption. For him the reason that a cognition in one person cannot access (memory of) a pleasure in another is not that the cognition and the pleasure lack the same agent, but rather that there is no chain of cause and effect linking the two (enabling the 'passing' of traces along the chain), whereas there is between cognitions in one person. He will voice this opinion that traces are sufficient to explain desire and *anusandhāna* below.

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I take Rāmakaṇṭha's expression 'that "I" who was the perceiver am exactly the same as this desirer', in the last of the sentences above, to be the awareness of same agency that occurs when one brings together the present desire with an earlier perception. Why is it the present desire and an earlier perception that Rāmakaṇṭha envisages as being brought together here?

The perception that is most commonly mentioned in the lists of events culminating in the desire in other versions of the argument is the seeing of the object that immediately precedes the desire. But that is unlikely to be what is being referred to because, if it were, the argument would only be able to establish continuous agency from the desire back to the immediately preceding perception. The Naiyāyika would not be exploiting its maximum potential.

Desire is not, in most versions of this argument, one of the cognitions included in the *anusandhāna*; it is rather that which arises from the bringing together of such cognitions as the present seeing of the object with (memory of) the past pleasure from the object. Rāmakaṇṭha's text, too, can be seen to be working with this model of desire arising from the *anusandhāna* cognition, because the Buddhist will explicitly say as much below, at the end of 2.3 (*anusandhānajñānata evāsyāḥ samutpatteḥ*). If desire arises from the *anusandhāna* cognition, then presumably it comes into existence after it and so cannot be referred to within it.

There is one sentence in Jayanta's account of the argument, which, if read by Rāmakaṇṭha, would explain why he included a reference to the desire within the awareness of same agency; why a reference to a perception; and what that perception is. That he may have read it has some independent support from

the fact that, given all of the evidence so far adduced, it is clear that his account of this Naiyāyika argument is based on Jayanta's or one very close to Jayanta's. The sentence in question runs:[79] 'Therefore it is established that this desire, being known/cognized as having the same agent as effects such as the first perception of the object, allows us to know a support that is different from the body and the like, because of its being an effect [which logical reason is further] qualified.' If this were read by Rāmakaṇṭha then he could naturally have regarded it as implying the existence of a cognition of the form 'that "I" who was the perceiver am exactly the same as this desirer', where the perceiver means the agent of the first perception of the object prior to the pleasure (not the second perception prior to the desire).

For Rāmakaṇṭha to have included a reference to desire in his formulation of the awareness of same agency is consistent not only with this sentence by Jayanta, but also with Rāmakaṇṭha's earlier sentence that desire occurs together with (°*sahabhāvinī*) awareness that its agent is the same as the agent of the previous pleasure. Perhaps Rāmakaṇṭha chose here, not desire and the previous pleasure, but desire and the first perception of the object because these are the earliest and latest margins of involvement with the object and hence indicate continuous agency for the maximum time. But the problem remains of how Rāmakaṇṭha could have squared the fact that his *anusandhāna* refers to the desire with the fact that it is a necessary requirement of the rise of desire.

Prof. Preisendanz here suggested that we are dealing with more than one synthesis, or with a synthesis that expands to include more elements over time. In order for the desire to arise the present seeing must be synthesized with the earlier pleasure, and there will be an awareness that they share the same agent, but when the desire arises this too will be synthesized with the earlier experiences of the object, and the awareness of same agency will be extended to include the agent of the desire.

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[79] NM(M) Vol. 2, 280,4–6: *tad iyam icchā prathamapadārthadarśanādikāryasamānakartṛkatayāvagamyamānā śarīrādivilakṣaṇam āśrayam avagamayati saviśeṣaṇāt kāryatvād iti sthitam.*

2.3 *na,*[80] *asiddhatvāt. na hi tatsamāna*[81]*kartṛtva*[82]*jñānasahabhāvitvam asyāḥ*[83] *siddham, tatsiddhatve hi jñānaviṣayatvāt pratyakṣa evātmoktaḥ syād iti nityānumeyatvābhyupagamavirodhaḥ.*

2.3 [Buddhist:] [That] is not [the case],[84] because it is unestablished. For it is not established that it (i.e. desire) occurs together with awareness that [it] has the same agent as the [previous pleasure]. For if that were established, the Self would be the content of cognition, so it would be said to be directly perceptible. Therefore there would be an incompatibility with [your] acceptance that [the Self] must be always inferred.[85]

The Buddhist here points to a dilemma that must be confronted by the proponent of this inference of the Self. The inference depends on awareness of same agency, for it is that that shows that the substrate of desire must also be the substrate of the pleasure and therefore continuous over time. But awareness of same agency implies awareness of the agent, something that the Naiyāyika has agreed to be impossible.

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[80] *na* omitted in P. Interlinear comment above *na* in B: *etat.*

[81] Interlinear comment above *asiddhatvāt na hi tatsamāna* in B: *śabdavācye śarīrendriyādau vā*. The intention of the comment is not clear to me. Harunaga Isaacson suggested the following partial explanation. It is intended as a note on *(tatsamāna)kartṛtva-(jñāna)*. With the Buddhist speaking one might find it slightly problematic who the *kartṛ* is thought to be. *śabdavācye* is thus an abbreviation of *kartṛśabdavācye.*

[82] °*kartṛtva*° Ked, B, P; °*kartṛ*° Ped.

[83] Interlinear gloss above *asyāḥ* in P: *icchāyāḥ.*

[84] I.e. it is not the case that desire, since it is accompanied by awareness of same agency, is different from cognitions of blue etc. and is capable of establishing a Self.

[85] This Naiyāyika conceded that the Self can only be inferred, when, in his first interjection (at the beginning of 2.1), he responded to the Buddhist claim that the Self cannot be perceived by saying, 'True, that is exactly why we infer the Self ...'. Most Naiyāyikas did indeed put forward this argument as capable of proving the Self despite its not being perceived. Vātsyāyana says as much when introducing it. Jayanta goes to great length to formulate it in such a way that it does not assume the perceptibility of the Self; in fact the opponent throughout his exposition of the argument is not a Buddhist, but another Naiyāyika (whom he calls a *svayūthya*, 'one of our own fold') who argues that one could not infer the Self if it were not perceived. Even Uddyotakara, who elsewhere claims that the Self is perceptible, when putting forward this argument claims that it can prove an unperceived Self (*anupalabhyamānam ātmānam*).

Here too Rāmakaṇṭha's account is closer to Jayanta's than Vātsyāyana's and Uddyotakara's. Neither of those authors introduces objections that point to this problem, but Jayanta's opponent elaborates it in great detail on more than one occasion. At one point for example he writes:[86] 'You say that these [mental phenomena listed in NS 1.1.10, namely] cognition, desire, pleasure, pain, [aversion and effort] are inferential marks of the Self. [But only] when they are known as having a substrate that is the same [as that of earlier cognitions] do they allow us to infer a bringer together [of the cognitions who is the agent of all of them]. And cognition of them as being thus (i.e. as having a substrate that is the same) depends upon knowledge of the substrate. If [the substrate] is known, the inferential marks are fruitless with regard to it.[87] But if it is not known, [they] cannot be used to infer [the Self].' Elsewhere he writes,[88] 'How do [you] know that without a bringer together [who is the agent of the cognitions that are brought together] these effects like desire etc. are not possible? If [you] say, 'Because [we] find desire etc. [only] when there is a single knower / [only] in a single knower,'[89] then because [you could only know this

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[86] NM(M) Vol. 2, 277,14–17: *jñānecchāsukhaduḥkhādi kiledaṃ liṅgam ātmanaḥ* | *ekāśrayatayā jñātam anusandhātṛbodhakam* || *tathātvena ca tajjñānam āśrayajñānapūrvakam* | *jñāte tatrāphalaṃ liṅgam, ajñāte tu na liṅgatā* ||

[87] There is a small difference between Jayanta and Rāmakaṇṭha's version of this dilemma. If one opts for an appeal to awareness of a same agent/substrate, then, says Rāmakaṇṭha, the Naiyāyika's own admission is contradicted; and says Jayanta, the inference is pointless. Why would one need to infer the Self if it can be perceived? If one admits that an inference of its existence is required, then one cannot adduce perception of it in the course of the proof, for one would then be assuming what one has admitted not to be the case.

[88] 281,7–11: *anusandhātāram antareṇa tad etad icchādi kāryaṃ nāvakalpata iti kathaṃ jñāyate*? *ekatra pramātari* [*pramātari* ed.; *jñātari* C] *taddarśanād iti yady* [*yady* C; *yad* ed.] *ucyate tad idam ekapramātṛgrahaṇād ātmapratyakṣatvam aṅgīkṛtaṃ syād iti vyartham anumānam. agrahaṇe tu pramātur ekasya tatpūrvakatvenecchādeḥ pratibandhāgrahaṇād aśakyam anumānam iti.*

[89] The proponent of the *anusandhāna* argument here tries a slightly different alternative to appealing directly to awareness of same agency, namely pointing out that desire is found to occur only 'in a single knower', that is to say, only in the knower who also experienced the earlier pleasure etc. The plausibility of this claim derives from the fact that desire in one person does not occur as a result of pleasure experienced by someone else. The Buddhist would of course also agree to that. But for the Buddhist one person is not a sin-

to be the case through] grasping a single knower, [you] would have assumed this perceptibility of the Self, so the inference would be without point. But if a single knower is not grasped, then the inference is impossible, because the firm link has not been grasped between desire etc. and dependence on a [single knower].'[90]

> *nanv*[91] *ata*[92] *eva tad api*[93] *sarvātmanāṃ sukhasādhanatvādyanusandhānasāmarthyataḥ sādhyata ity uktam.*
>
> [Naiyāyika:] But that is precisely why the [fact that desire is accompanied by awareness of same agency],[94] for its part,[95] is established for everyone[96] from the ability [of the desiring person] to synthesize such things as the fact that [the object] is a means of pleasure, as [we] have said.

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gle knower but a stream of separate cognitions, so the fact that desire never occurs in one person as a result of pleasure in someone else does not mean that it only occurs 'in single knowers'. If the proponent of the argument wants to claim to know that it only occurs 'in single knowers', he commits himself to the view that he knows, i.e. perceives, that single knower, rendering its inference pointless.

[90] Jayanta puts the problem in a nutshell at another place: 'This is a rope which has a noose at both ends. Either the Self is perceptible or the pervasion cannot be known' (280,2b–1b): *seyam* [*seyam* corr.; *seyas* NM(M)] *ubhayataḥpāśā rajjuḥ. ātmā vā pratyakṣaḥ, vyāptir vā duravagameti.*

[91] Interlinear—incorrect—comment above *nanu* in P: *vaibhāṣikavacanam.*

[92] Marginal comment referring to *nanv ata* in B: *nanv ata naiyāyika.*

[93] Interlinear gloss above *tad api* in B: *tatsamānakartṛtvajñānasahabhāvitvaṃ.* Marginal comment referring to *tad api* in P: *tatsamānakartṛtvajñānasahabhāvatvasya parāmarśas tad apīty anena.*

[94] Like the author of the interlinear gloss in B (see previous note), I take the *tat* here as *tatsamānakartṛtvajñānasahabhāvitvam*, for that is what was said in the opponent's last remark to be *na siddham.*

[95] The *api* could mean: as well as the Self, the principal object of the inference; but that would not be so relevant here, so I take it in its basic function as a focus particle, as suggested by Prof. Preisendanz.

[96] I have avoided translating as 'for all Selves', for the Naiyāyika certainly does not need or want to assume the Self here. The tone is probably simply that no one can deny that synthesis entails awareness of the identity of the agents of the experiences it brings together.

The Naiyāyika attempts to wriggle out of the dilemma by clinging to the awareness of same agency while emphasizing that it is not something known directly but rather inferred from synthesis.

The awareness in question, 'this I who is the perceiver is exactly the same as the desirer' is one that could, in another argument, be put forward to establish the Self on its own, as an instance of perception, or more specifically perhaps as an instance of recognition. Just as similar recognitions such as 'this is that pillar' are used by non-Buddhist schools to establish the stability of their objects, pillars and the like, so this cognition could be used to establish the stability of its object, the 'I' who is the perceiver, and who is (subsequently) a desirer. But it occurs here in the context of an inference of the Self on the part of Naiyāyikas who accept that the Self cannot be perceived. Thus when the argument was laid out above, the awareness featured not as a perceptual demonstration of the existence of its referent—the Self—but as one stage of *an argument* towards that end. It served as a means of eliminating the possibility that its substrate could be any of the recognized constituents of living beings.

In answer to the Buddhist objection that this still involves assuming that the Self is directly perceived, the Naiyāyika claims here that the awareness itself is only inferred. Presumably on this view it is only known to have taken place after the event, when we reflect on what is required for synthesis and desire to take place, and not consciously registered at the time.[97] Hence, on the one hand, it is thus not vivid enough to count as perception of the Self and, on the

[97] Elsewhere I state that I do not use the English term 'awareness' for determinate or conceptual cognition (*adhyavasāya, savikalpakajñāna*), but reserve it for non-conceptual cognition. My usage here could be seen as a counter-instance given that this cognition is verbally formulated ('this 'I' who is the perceiver is exactly the same as the desirer'). I have allowed myself to use the term here, however, on the grounds that this cognition is sufficiently indeterminate to have to be inferred after the event.

other, it is not simply appealed to without being established through argument.[98]

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The Buddhist decides not to push the point that if the awareness is to serve its purpose it must contravene the Naiyāyika's admission that the Self cannot be perceived, and instead shows how we are not justified in postulating it at all.

> *kim idaṃ sāmarthyaṃ*[99] *yena tasya siddhiḥ? anyathānupapattir eva. sā kasya? na tāvad icchāyāḥ, anusandhānajñānata evāsyāḥ samutpatteḥ.*[100] [Ked p. 10] *atha*[101] *tasyaivānupapattir*[102] *iti na, tasyāpi pūrvānubhavasaṃskārata*[103] *eva bhavadbhir apy utpādābhyupagamāt.*
>
> [Buddhist:] What is this ability through which the [awareness of same agency] is established?[104]
>
> [Naiyāyika:] It is simply that [it] is impossible without [that awareness].
>
> [Buddhist:] What is [impossible without it]? Not desire, first of all, for that arises simply from the synthesizing cognition. If [you say] it is precisely that (i.e. the synthesizing cognition) which is impossible [without the awareness of same agency], [that] is not [correct] because that too is accepted even by you to arise simply from a trace of a previous experience.[105]

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[98] I will not here describe Jayanta's long, and rather different, attempt to extricate himself from the dilemma, but will just note in passing that, in formulating the argument, he may have chosen the word *avagama/avagamyamānā* (in the sentences given in notes 54 and 79, governing *samānakartṛkatva/tā*) in the sense of 'knowledge' or 'understanding' rather than 'awareness' or 'perception', precisely in order to avoid the implication that the agent is directly perceived.

[99] Interlinear comment above *kim idaṃ sāmarthyaṃ* in B: *vaibhāṣikavacanaṃ.*

[100] *samutpatteḥ* B, Ked; *samutpādāt* Ped; *samupapatteḥ* P.

[101] Interlinear gloss above *atha* in B and P: *yadi.*

[102] *tasyaivānupapattir* B, Ked, Ped; *tasyaivānupapittir* P.

Interlinear gloss above *tasyaivā°* in B: *anusandhānajñānasyaiva*; in P: *anusandhānasya.*

[103] *°saṃskārata* B, Ked, Ped; *°saṃskāra* P.

[104] I.e. what is it about the synthesis that establishes awareness of same agency?

[105] The Buddhist here asks the Naiyāyika to clarify what precisely would be impossible in the absence of awareness of same agency. He gives two possibilities; first desire and then the synthesizing cognition, showing that both are otherwise explainable. But it

Rāmakaṇṭha's version departs here from that of Jayanta. Whereas Jayanta devotes the remainder of his discussion to elaborating how one can know that desire only occurs in a single knower without perceiving that single knower, Rāmakaṇṭha here allows his Buddhist to begin to get the better of the Naiyāyika by deconstructing the process of the rise of synthesis and desire and revealing the latter as requiring nothing more than the synthesizing cognition; and the synthesizing cognition as requiring nothing more than a trace of the previous pleasure.

The Buddhist points out that the Naiyāyika also admits that a trace is a causal factor in the rise of desire, and he could here have repeated his earlier principle (similar to Ockham's razor) that when one already has a cause for something one cannot be justified in postulating another unseen one.

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Rāmakaṇṭha's text is strikingly similar at this point to a passage in the *Ślokavārttika*, where Kumārila used exactly the structure employed here to dissolve the argument from desire. He is there commenting on a passage in the *Śābarabhāṣya*, occurring in the middle of an extended quotation of the Vṛttikāra, that gives this very argument from desire, the main difference being that the Vṛttikāra's argument does not mention synthesis (*anusandhāna, pratisandhāna*) but appeals in the corresponding places simply to memory (*smṛti*). The presentation is also different in that the Vṛttikāra first argues on the basis that one does not desire something that one has not perceived before, and when the Buddhist has combatted that, strengthens his argument by asserting that one does not desire something one does not remember, and by turning to what is involved in memory. Kumārila asks rhetorically why memory, resembling the case of desire, is brought forward by the Vṛttikāra as

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was in fact unambiguous in the preceding discussion that the Naiyāyika intends the synthesizing to be that which is impossible without awareness of same agency. See *anusandhānasāmarthya* at 9,11 (section 2.2) and 9,19–20 (section 2.3). Thus Rāmakaṇṭha employs this device of a request for clarification, not in order to highlight a previous lack of clarity, but simply to give his Buddhist the opportunity to show how even starting from the very end of the chain of events with desire, each is explainable through merely the previous cognition plus a latent trace.

something different. For they are alike in that neither occurs when their object has not been seen before, and both can be explained as resulting from traces of experience.[106] He answers his question by differentiating them on the grounds that desire is produced from the memory alone without depending on the perception, so its agent is not definitely the same as that of the perception; whereas memory accords with the perception, so its agent is the same. That is why memory is brought forward by the Vṛttikāra even after the refutation of the argument from desire.[107] But ultimately memory too, even though it is a stronger argument, is not up to proving same agency: memory can be explained despite the stream being differentiated, because the trace that causes memory is in its stream.[108]

Rāmakaṇṭha's wording does not echo the wording of this text, but in its structure it contains four exactly parallel steps. In both cases the proponent of the argument tries to establish a line of continuous agency stretching back from desire to the original experience. In both cases the Buddhist first shows that desire only depends on the previous cognition (*anusandhānajñāna* in the case of Rāmakaṇṭha and memory in the case of Kumārila). In both cases the proponent of the argument then urges that this cognition would be impossible in the absence of same agency. And in both cases the Buddhist then adduces traces.

These exchanges occur in the *Ślokavārttika* as a natural explanation of the course of the Vṛttikāra's discussion, but do not fit so neatly into Rāmakaṇṭha's text. As pointed out above (note 105), to include them Rāmakaṇṭha has to introduce them with the question 'What is impossible without that awareness? Not desire, first of all ...', despite the Naiyāyika having previously stated with clarity what he held to be impossible without that awareness; and it was not desire but synthesis. This slight lack of continuity in

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106 ŚV(P_2) *ātmavāda* 103: *bhedena kim upanyastā tulyanyāyecchayā smṛtiḥ | ubhayaṃ na hy adṛṣṭe 'rthe vāsanātaś ca sidhyati ||*

107 ŚV(P_2) *ātmavāda* 104–105: *upalabdhim anāśritya smṛtyaivecchopajāyate | upalabdhisamāno 'syāḥ kartā naikāntato bhavet || upalabdhyanusāreṇa smṛtyātmā punar iṣyate | samānas tena kartāsti tadarthaṃ punar ucyate ||*

108 ŚV(P_2) *ātmavāda* 106: *tatrāpi tu samānāyāṃ santatau vāsanā yataḥ | tasmāt saty api bhinnatve smaraṇaṃ vyavatiṣṭhate ||*

Rāmakaṇṭha's text reinforces the possibility that he is taking these exchanges from an earlier source, and not from the same source he has been drawing on for the exposition of the argument up to that point.[109]

The possibility that Kumārila is his source, in spite of there being no overlap in wording, is increased by the fact that the two texts parallel each other not just in this set of exchanges but in the surrounding passages too. This set of exchanges is in both cases embedded in a wider context that consists of a distinctive strategy for arriving at the reality of the Self. Both Kumārila and Rāmakaṇṭha adopt the strategy of allowing the Buddhist opponent to overturn all of the Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika inferences of the Self, before securing its existence by saying that it is directly perceivable.

In the *Ślokavārttika*, a Vaiśeṣika begins this section[110] by arguing that we can infer the existence of the Self through such acts as breathing, which cannot be properties of the body because they cease before the body ceases. After a few exchanges it seems to be conceded that this argument is inconclusive owing to the fact that breathing and the like, existing externally and being perceivable by other people's senses, could be properties of an external substance.[111] The Vaiśeṣika tries a new argument that at least internal properties such as pleasure must inhere in the Self. The Buddhist replies by simply refusing to accept that pleasure and the like are properties, depending for their existence on some other substrate.[112] Rather than allowing the Vaiśeṣika to reply, Kumārila lets the Buddhist have the final say on the point. Then comes the set of exchanges already looked at, from which it emerged that although memory was considered a stronger argument than desire, it too is explainable through traces.

So for the third time in a row Kumārila has the Buddhist win a confrontation with *ātmavāda*. Then he finally introduces his own view: 'The arguments

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[109] If Jayanta was his main source up to these exchanges then it is natural that he would cease drawing on him at this point, for Jayanta holds that the argument can establish the Self, whereas Rāmakaṇṭha's text, from here on, shows that it cannot.

[110] Verse 93.

[111] Verse 98.

[112] Verse 101d–102.

thus adduced by others (i.e. Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas) having been rejected, now the *ātman* is ascertained as that which is known through I-cognition by itself.'[113]

This outline of Kumārila's strategy is also the strategy of Rāmakaṇṭha in a nutshell. We will see that in this chapter Rāmakaṇṭha takes a series of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya inferences of the Self in turn and has his Buddhist refute every one of them, without feeling the need to state his own views at all. Although it is his and Kumārila's principal aim in these chapters to overturn the Buddhist doctrine of no-Self, they both seem to agree with Buddhism that the standard arguments of their fellow *ātmavādin* traditions are incapable of doing so and can be overcome by Buddhist considerations. Like Kumārila, Rāmakaṇṭha, when he introduces his own voice, will rely not on inference but on direct perception. As we will see in Chapter 2 and 3, his view is that the Self can be known both through self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) and I-cognition (*ahampratyaya*).

Returning to the passage in question: the Naiyāyika now tries to undermine the Buddhist attempt to replace single agency with traces by arguing that the role of traces would be incoherent if there were no Self.

> 2.4 *tarhi sa eva*[114] *saṃskāro nityena dharmiṇā vinā nopapadyata iti tatas tatsiddhiḥ.*
>
> 2.4 [Naiyāyika:] In that case [we respond that] that latent trace itself [would] be impossible in the absence of an eternal substrate[115] [in which it could reside]. So a [Self as eternal substrate] is proved from that [latent trace].

If cognition ceases in every moment and does not inhere in a permanent substrate, the latent traces contained in cognitions must also cease in every mo-

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[113] Verse 107: *hetuṣv evaṃ parokteṣu pratiṣiddheṣu samprati* | *ahampratyayavijñeyaḥ svayam ātmopapādyate* ||

[114] Interlinear comment above *tarhi sa eva* in B and P: *naiyāyikavacanam.*

[115] In some contexts *dharmin* and *āśraya* are consciously distinguished by an author, the former renderable as 'property-possessor' and the latter as 'substrate', for example discussions by late Buddhist authors in the *pramāṇa* school in the context of rescuing the *sattvānumāna* from the fault of *āśrayāsiddhatā.* In the current context no such distinction is relevant however.

ment. For a latent trace to produce its effect at some time subsequent to its origination, it must continue to exist uninterrupted over that period. Therefore its locus must exist uninterrupted over that period. Thus its locus cannot be cognition but must be the Self.

> *na, anityānām*[116] *evonmatta*[117]*bījānāṃ lākṣādisaṃskāras*[118] *tatpuṣpāruṇimādinā siddha*[119] *iti vijñānasantatāv eva kramavatyāṃ sa*[120] *sidhyati nānyatrātyantāsiddhe.*[121]
>
> [Buddhist:] That is not [correct]: [when datura seeds are dyed with lac or another coloured dye and then planted], a trace of the datura seeds' lac or [other dye] is established [to exist] by the redness or [other colour] in the flower of a [dyed seed], [even though the seeds are] clearly non-eternal.[122] So a [trace] is established in just a stream of cognitions existing in a sequence, not in something else (i.e. an *ātman*) which is completely unestablished.

The salient feature of the example is that, even after the seeds have ceased to exist, they leave traces of their redness in subsequent flowers. Thus a cognition that is 'coloured' in a certain way may leave a trace that outlives it, coming to fruition long after it has ceased in something other than it.[123] Applying

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[116] Interlinear comment above *na anityānām* in B and P: *vaibhāṣikavacanaṃ.*

[117] °*vonmatta*° B, P, Ked; °*votpanna*° Ped. Interlinear comment above °*onmatta*° in P: *dhatūra.* The word is spelt in that way here, but as *datūra* in the marginal comment reported in note 119.

[118] Marginal gloss of *lākṣādisaṃskāras* in P: *lākṣādinā rañjanaṃ nāma saṃskāraḥ.*

[119] Marginal comment in P referring to this sentence: *datūrabījānāṃ rañjitānāṃ vāpenāruṇāny eva datūrapuṣpāni jāyante, na tu śvetāni, iti loke prasiddham.*

[120] Interlinear gloss above *sa* in B and P: *saṃskāraḥ.*

[121] Interlinear gloss above *nānyatrātyantāsiddhe* in B and P: *khapuṣpatulye ātmākhye dharmiṇi.*

[122] A similar example is given at AKBh(BBS) 1231,5–6: ... *yathā lākṣārasarañjitān mātuluṅgapuṣpāt santatipariṇāmaviśeṣajaḥ phale raktaḥ keśara upajāyate.* '..., in the same way that from a flower of a citron tree that was dyed with lac, red pips, produced from a particular transformation of the series, arise in the fruit.' The example is there used to illustrate a slightly different point, which is why it mentions transference of colour from flower to pips, not seed to flower.

[123] This kind of explanation features in the AKBh(BBS) where the process through which a trace of a past action or cognition can affect the future is described as a particular transformation of the series to which that action or cognition belongs (*tatsantatipariṇāmaviśeṣa*), on the model of a seed leading to a transformation of its own series culminating in

this more specifically: because a trace of the past pleasure can resurface later (when the object is re-encountered), the pleasure can be accessed by a synthesizing cognition, which in turn gives rise to the desire.

> 2.5 *iti na vidmaḥ prayoga*[124]*ḍambaravyatirekeṇa kasyānyasya*[125] *siddhir yena tad api hetuviśeṣaṇabhūtaṃ jñānaṃ sādhyate.*
>
> 2.5 Thus we do not see what else—apart from a host of pointless arguments—is established, as a result of which this awareness [of same agency], for its part (*api*), which is a qualifier of the logical reason (i.e. desire), is established.

The main logical reason of the argument is desire. Its qualifier is awareness of same agency, for it is the supposed fact that it is accompanied by this awareness that gives the logical reason its power to prove a Self. But nothing has been brought forward that has convinced the Buddhist that this awareness occurs. Rāmakaṇṭha does not have his Naiyāyika come back at the Buddhist but leaves the latter as the victor in this confrontation.

Brief Remarks about the History of the Argument

A thorough history of the Naiyāyika argument from desire and synthesis has not, to my knowledge, been written. The two earliest versions are, as far as I know, that of Vātsyāyana and that of the Vṛttikāra. According to Kei Kataoka's unpublished doctoral thesis the Vṛttikāra must have written after Dignāga, since he clearly responds to the latter's critique of Mīmāṃsā. This

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its fruit. This type of explanation occurs there as a Sautrāntika one, opposing itself to the view of the Vaibhāṣikas who held that karmic results arise directly from the past actions (which according to their doctrine of *sarvāstivāda* still exist in some sense), without the need to postulate any gradual transformation of the series. See AKBh(BBS) 1229,11–1230,5, which begins: *naiva tu vayaṃ vinaṣṭāt karmaṇa āyatyāṃ phalotpattiṃ brūmaḥ, kiṃ tarhi tatsantatipariṇāmaviśeṣāt, bījaphalavat.*

[124] *prayoga*° B, P, Ked; *prayogā*° Ped.

[125] *kasyānyasya* Ked[pc], Ped; *kasyā* B, Ked[ac]; *kasya* P. In deciding whether to regard the inclusion of the *anyasya* as original, I have been influenced by the following sentence that occurs shortly: *rūparasādisamudāyavyatirekeṇānyasya kasya cid āmraphalāder dharmiṇo 'nupalambhāt.*

would place the Vṛttikāra's terminus post quem around 500. Vātsyāyana on the other hand did not know Dignāga and is placed by Oberhammer in the second half of the fifth century.[126] This dating is corroborated in Franco and Preisendanz 1995. Thus it appears likely that Vātsyāyana was writing before the Vṛttikāra. I would suggest as a hypothesis for further study however that the Vṛttikāra reproduces or draws on an earlier, Naiyāyika most likely, version of the argument than Vātsyāyana's, for the Vṛttikāra's appears to be slightly more primitive. It mentions only a previous perception (*upalabdhi*) of the object, memory (*smṛti*) of that, and desire; not synthesis (*prati-/anusandhāna*). And it is sufficiently different to seem unlike a simplified summary of Vātsyāyana's argument.

As we move from the Vṛttikāra's argument to Vātsyāyana's to Uddyotakara's and to Vācaspati's, the number of things necessary for the rise of desire increases. The Vṛttikāra mentions a previous perception of the object and memory of that; Vātsyāyana, previous contact with an object, pleasure as a result of that, subsequent seeing of that kind of object and *pratisandhāna*; Uddyotakara, all of those plus memory. Vācaspati likens the process to the carrying out of an inference. First there is the contact with an object leading to pleasure (= the pervasion), then, on subsequently encountering the same kind of object, there is memory of the pervasion (*vyāptismaraṇa*) and the seeing of the new object as being of the same kind as the earlier one (*upanaya/pakṣadharmatāgrahaṇa*), then the inference, 'this [object in front of me will be] a cause of pleasure', culminating in the desire. This desire is said to be impossible if there is not a single agent, because in that case *pratisandhāna* would be impossible.[127]

Vātsyāyana introduces the term *pratisandhāna*, for which, as we have seen, later authors use the synonym *anusandhāna* also. There is variation among the different versions of the argument in its regard in (at least) three ways:

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[126] Mentioned in Franco and Preisendanz 1995 86.

[127] 392,1–4: *yajjātīyasyeti vyāptismṛtikathanam. tajjātīyaṃ paśyann iti pakṣadharmopanayaḥ. tasmād ayaṃ sukhahetur ity anumāyādātum icchati. seyam icchedṛśī vyāptigrahaṇatatsmaraṇapakṣadharmatāgrahaṇānumānecchādīnām ekakartṛtvaṃ sūcayati, bhede pratisandhānābhāvena tadanupapatteḥ.*

whether it is clearly distinguished from memory; whether it is a cognition; and what is 'brought together' by it.

On the question of its relation to memory it is to be noted that in Vātsyāyana's argument it occupies the place that memory does in the Vṛttikāra's argument. Oetke, who gives detailed analyses of the other arguments looked at in his book, devotes only one paragraph[128] to expounding Vātsyāyana's *pratisandhāna* argument stating that it is hard to gather what Vātsyāyana intended. It is striking that he regards Vātsyāyana's argument as based not on 'Verknüpfung' (his translation of *pratisandhāna*) but on memory. There is more to *pratisandhāna*, for Vātsyāyana, than memory. His usage of the term both in this argument and in his commentary on 3.1.1[129] indicates that there is, at the very least, the difference that whereas memory usually has as its object only one cognition or thing, *pratisandhāna* has more than one. I interpret the *pratisandhāna* in Vātsyāyana's argument to mean that on seeing the object a connection is made between that seeing and the earlier pleasure. Memory of the previous pleasure is therefore certainly involved, and is not something separate from the *pratisandhāna*; but it is only part of it. If one saw the object, and then remembered the previous pleasure, without co-ordinating the previous pleasure with the present seeing, desire would still not arise.

Perhaps it is for that reason that in Uddyotakara's version of the argument, unlike in Vātsyāyana's, memory and *pratisandhāna* have become separated, both being mentioned as factors involved in desire,[130] and it is implied that memory is one of the cognitions that are brought together.[131] For Vācaspati[132]

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[128] Oetke 1988 256–257.

[129] He there argues that since we have such cognitions as 'I'm touching what I saw', where cognitions from two different senses are brought together (*pratisandhīyete*), the agent of the cognitions who brings them together (*pratisandadhāti*) must exist beyond the sense-faculties. On this sūtra see Oetke 1988 260–269, Preisendanz 1994 183–187, Taber 1990 and Laine 1993.

[130] See for example *tasmād yasmin pakṣe smṛtiḥ sambhavati tatra pratisandhānam iti nyāyam* (NVā(NCG) 62,10).

[131] See *viśeṣitaṃ caitat pratisandhānaṃ smṛtyā saha pūrvāparapratyayaikaviṣayatvena pratisandhānam* (62,6–7). Again Oetke regards Uddyotakara's argument as based on

and Udayana,[133] who follow Uddyotakara on this point, memory is explicitly said to be one of the things that are brought together. So too for Jayanta,[134] but elsewhere Jayanta's version shows traces of the view that memory and *anusandhāna* are not separate things: when first describing the sequence of events leading up to desire he writes ... *sukhasādhanatām anusmṛtya* (*tad ādātum icchati*),[135] but further down the same page[136] °*sukhasādhanatvānusandhāna*°.

Thus if it is correct that the Vṛttikāra's argument draws on an earlier version than that of Vātsyāyana's (a suggestion that certainly requires more evidence), it seems plausible that initially the argument was based on memory; then memory was replaced by *pratisandhāna*, as in Vātsyāyana; then the two were distinguished and both included separately, as in Uddyotakara and others after him.

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memory, not *pratisandhāna*. This seems to be an unnecessarily one-sided description of the argument. It entails that Uddyotakara himself is mistaken about the nature of his own argument, given his encapsulation of it at the outset with the words *icchādīnāṃ pratisandhānam ātmāstitvapratipādakam* NCG(MIS) 388,7–8.

[132] NCG(MIS) 395,27–396,1: *smṛtiḥ pūrvāparapratyayābhyām ekakartṛkā, tābhyāṃ sahaikaviṣayatvena pratisandhīyamānatvāt.*

[133] See note 140.

[134] NM(M) 277,9–13: *sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ ca smaraṇānubhavādiṣu | anusandhīyamānaṃ yad dṛśyate tat kathaṃ bhavet || pūrvam aham amum artham anubhūtavān, aham evādya punar anubhavāmīti tulyaviṣayatāvat*[a] *tulyakartṛkatāpi tatra prakāśate, itarathā tv anumātum apy ātmā na śakyeta.*

a) I thank Prof. Preisendanz for bringing this reading *tulyaviṣayatāvat* to my attention. It is the reading of NM(K) and, she informs me, of the Gaurinath Shastri edition and the Allahabad manuscript. NM(M), in general the most reliable edition, has here the clearly inferior *tulyaviṣayaṃ tāvat*.

'And as for what we observe to happen, namely that the co-referentiality of memory and experience etc. is brought together, how does that occur? In the [*anusandhāna* cognition] (*tatra*) "previously I experienced that object, and this same I am again experiencing [it] now," just as the fact that [the past experience that is remembered and the present experience] have the same object is manifest, so too is the fact that they have the same agent. Otherwise the Self would not be able to be inferred either (i.e. in addition to not being able to be perceived).'

[135] NM(M) Vol. 2, 278,8–9.

[136] 278,17.

Is *pratisandhāna* considered to be a cognition or not? For Vātsyāyana desire requires that a single seer brings together cognitions, but he does not state or imply that the bringing together is a separate cognition. Neither does Uddyotakara. Jayanta[137] and Vācaspati[138] could be seen to imply that it is a separate cognition in that they give verbal formulations of it. But it is noteworthy that Vācaspati does not include it in the list of the elements of his inference culminating in desire, only stating afterwards that desire would not be possible without it.[139] In Rāmakaṇṭha's version of the argument it is definitely a separate cognition as he refers to it as *anusandhānajñāna*. For Udayana too it is a cognition, being carried out by *anuvyavasāya*.[140]

On the third question, namely what precisely is brought together, there is variation over whether it is cognitions or properties of the object, and whether memory is included. The second of these has been discussed. For the first see note 58.

Philosophical Summary

I follow these preliminary and tentative remarks about the history of the argument with some brief observations that are more philosophical than philological. Both the Vṛttikāra's and Vātsyāyana's arguments draw attention to the readily observable pair of facts that one does not desire something that

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[137] See note 134.

[138] NCG(MIS) 393,6–7: *yajjātīyaṃ candanavanitādi sukhahetuṃ pratītaṃ smarāmi tajjātīyam imaṃ pratyemīti pratisandhānam.*

[139] See note 127.

[140] Udayana defines *pratisandhāna* in the following way: *pūrvānubhūtitatkāryasmṛtitatkāryānubhūtīnām ekenānuvyavasāyenaikakartṛkatayā saṅkalanam ity arthaḥ* (NCG (MIS) 398,21–22). It is the fusion, through a subsequent determinative cognition, of three things as having the same agent. Those three are the earlier pleasure (*pūrvānubhūti*), a memory that is caused by that (*tatkāryasmṛti*), and an experience of the present object that is influenced by that memory (*tatkāryānubhūti*). Perhaps the last of these three involves seeing the object as the same as the cause of the previous pleasure, or as likely to produce pleasure.

has never been perceived (fruits that grow to the north of the Meru mountains is the Vṛttikāra's example); and that one does not desire something that has been perceived by someone else but not oneself. Extrapolating from this, they conclude that if we consisted of a series of discrete cognitions we would not desire anything, for even if an object has been perceived by a cognition in the same stream, it will have been perceived by something different from any potential subsequent desiring cognition.

This lays itself open to the Buddhist objection that it assumes the reason for desire not arising in one person for an object perceived by another to be that the perceiver and the (potential) desirer are different things. The Buddhist rejects this assumption, explaining the reason for the non-arising of desire in such cases to be that there is no chain of cause and effect linking the perceiving cognition with cognitions in the other person. Because there is such a causal relationship between cognitions within the same stream, traces can be 'passed' from one cognition to the next allowing desire to arise for an object perceived by what is indeed something else on the Buddhist view.

There is a plausibility in the argument that the cognition 'this is that object' / 'I desire this object that I saw earlier' could only occur in a cognizer who was also the cognizer of the object on the previous occasion. But this plausibility rests on equating two situations that the Buddhist can distinguish: 1) an object is experienced in one person and re-experienced subsequently by another; 2) an object is experienced by a cognition, which ceases to exist but causes another, which causes another ... which causes another that experiences the same object. Since the Buddhist can distinguish these in that in the latter information can be passed from one cognition to the next through the vehicle of *saṃskāra*s, the impossibility of desire arising in 1 does not mean that it could not arise in 2.

The problem for the proponents of the argument was to establish that the non-occurrence of memory/synthesis/desire in 1 results from an absence of same agency, not from an absence of a chain of cause and effect. Vātsyāyana had simply asserted that the synthesizing of different perceptions would be impossible without them having the same agent, but more than that was required to deal with the Buddhist counter-argument. Jayanta claims that we can know synthesis only to take place in single cognizers because we can observe that it

never takes place between different cognizers. But his opponent easily counters this by saying that since a single stream of cognition consists of different cognizers we cannot know that it never takes place between different cognizers. Uddyotakara points out that at least in cases where both sides agree that there are different cognizers no synthesis takes place. But predictably this does not convince his Buddhist that the absence of synthesis results from the plurality of cognizers rather than the lack of a cause-effect link.

Sometimes proponents of the argument try to tackle this problem by pointing to some special feature of synthesis that mere chains of momentary cognitions would not be capable of explaining. Thus, as we saw, Rāmakaṇṭha's version of the argument claimed that the act of synthesis necessarily involves an awareness of the single agent. This move is countered on the grounds that it assumes what the argument sets out to prove. Uddyotakara claims that even if some kinds of synthesis may arise from a sequence of causally related but distinct entities, desire involves a specific kind of synthesis.[141]

Some non-Naiyāyika *ātmavādins* regard the argument as a failure, as we saw, and so indeed do some Naiyāyikas.[142] But it is noteworthy that even Uddyotakara and Jayanta, proponents of it, are prepared to allow their Buddhists to overcome the strategies mentioned thus far. They both predicate its efficacity ultimately on a demonstration of the incoherence of certain aspects of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness. Uddyotakara allows his opponent to answer each of his points until at the end he argues that a momentary entity would not be able to leave a trace on another momentary entity that did not exist at the same time as it. Similarly, throughout Jayanta's long discussion the opponent is able to answer all of Jayanta's assertions and the debate is only closed when Jayanta asserts that he will explain later in the chapter that there can be no relation of cause and effect between momentary cognitions and no activity based on that.[143]

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141 *viśeṣitaṃ caitat pratisandhānaṃ smṛtyā saha pūrvāparapratyayaikaviṣayatvena pratisandhānam* (NVā(NCG) 62,6–7).

142 Those that Jayanta refers to as *svayūthya*, 'those of our own fold'.

143 NM(M) Vol. 2, 284,3–4: *yathā jñānānāṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvo nāsti yathā ca na tatkṛto 'yaṃ vyavahāras tathānantaram eva savistaraṃ vakṣyāmaḥ.*

3. Vaiśeṣika

3.1. The Philosophy of Nature Arguments

etena vaiśeṣikoktam api prāṇāpānanimeṣonmeṣajīvanamanogatīndriyāntara-vikāraiḥ[144] *smṛtyādibhiś cātmānumānaṃ pratyuktam.*

By this [argument], the inference of the Self that the Vaiśeṣikas teach—from the outgoing and ingoing movements of the breath, the closing and opening of the eyes, life, the movement of the internal organ, the fact that a sense other than [that directly involved is sometimes also] affected, and from memory and the like—is also refuted.[145]

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[144] VS(C) 3.2.4: *prāṇāpānanimeṣonmeṣajīvanamanogatīndriyāntaravikārāḥ sukha-duḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnaś cety ātmaliṅgāni.* On this sūtra, and the very similar lists of *liṅga*s of the Self in the *Carakasaṃhitā*, see Preisendanz 1994 263–274.

[145] Rāmakaṇṭha presents the Vaiśeṣika argument in two compounds. The first compound occurs in *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 3.2.4. The version of this sūtra commented on by Candrānanda is given in note 144. The *Vaiśeṣikasūtrapāṭha*s commented on by Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra and Śaṅkara Miśra are both different from that of Candrānanda. As a result of his investigation of manuscripts containing only the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*s without one of these three commentaries, Isaacson has also uncovered two more separate recensions of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*s. This particular sūtra happens to be one that is slightly different in all five recensions. (For all of the variants see Isaacson 1995 293.) All five however include the compound *prāṇāpānanimeṣonmeṣajīvanamanogatīndriyāntaravikārāḥ*, identical to that found in this sentence except for the case ending; but none of the five mention memory (*smṛti*). Where, then, in Vaiśeṣika literature are we to look to find the argument for the Self from memory that Rāmakaṇṭha mentions in this sentence? Here are some possibilites. 1) VS 9.22 (in the numbering of VS(C)) reads: *ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogaviśeṣāt saṃskārāc ca smṛtiḥ.* This could easily be taken to represent an argument for the Self's existence on the grounds that it would be impossible to account for memory without a conjunction of Self and internal organ. 2) Memory is an instance of cognition and Praśastapāda argues that cognition implies an agent of cognition: *śabdādiṣu prasiddhyā ca prasādhako 'numīyate* (PrBhā(Br) 15,1–2). (Śrīdhara sees this as an argument for the Self as support or ground (*āśrayaḥ*) of cognitions: *śabdādiṣu viṣayeṣu prasiddhir jñānam. tatrāpi prasādhako jñātānumīyate. jñānaṃ kvacid āśritam, kriyātvāc chidikriyāvat. yatredam āśritaṃ sa ātmā* (NK 169,8–10). But it may not have been intended as such: see Oetke 1988 282–283.) 3) Next

It is still the Buddhist talking here. Before explaining how the argumentation he has used against the Naiyāyikas is also capable of refuting these Vaiśeṣika inferences he first expands on them:

> *tathā hi tiryaggatisvabhāvasya vāyor ūrdhvādhaḥpreraṇaṃ nopapadyate, bhastrādhmāteva kaś cit kalpyaḥ. evaṃ nimeṣonmeṣādīnāṃ dehāvayavāśritānām api yantrapuruṣavat prayatnayukto 'dhiṣṭhātā, jīvanasyāpi dharmādharmakāryatayā tadguṇāśrayabhūtaḥ, manaso 'py ācaitanyād*[146] *rathāder iva prayatnavān prerakaḥ, dāḍimādyambla*[147]*tararasaphaladarśanena dantodakātmakarasanendriya*vikārasya darśanād a[148]*nekagavākṣa*[149]*vat sarvendriyārthānusandhātā kaś cit kalpyaḥ.*

Praśastapāda argues that cognition cannot belong to the body, the sense-faculties or the internal organ. In arguing against the second of these possibilities he adduces the case of memory specifically: *nendriyāṇām, karaṇatvād, upahateṣu viṣayāsānnidhye cānusmṛtidarśanāt* (PrBhā(Br) 15,4–5). Since it (sometimes) occurs when the sense-faculties have been destroyed and when no sense-object is near, it cannot be a quality of the sense-faculties. 4) The latent traces (*saṃskāra*) that cause memories are included among the qualities of the Self by Praśastapāda: *tasya (=ātmanaḥ) guṇā buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnadharmādharmasaṃskārasaṅkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgāḥ* (PrBhā (Br) 16,7–9); and he argues that the Self can be inferred from qualities as the substance that possesses them (*sukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnaiś ca guṇair guṇy anumīyate* (PrBh (Br) 16,3–4). This is the least likely to be intended by Rāmakaṇṭha because he turns after this to the argument from qualities to possessor of those qualities (*guṇin*). 5) When Candrānanda comments on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 3.2.4, he interprets *indriyāntaravikāra* as implying an inference of the Self from memory.

Prof. Preisendanz pointed out to me that the *Carakasaṃhitā*, in its continuation of the list of marks of the Self given in *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 3.2.4, includes memory: see CaSa, *śārīrasthāna* 1.72c.

146 *ācaitanyād* Ked, P^{ac}; *acaitanyād* B, P^{pc}, Ped.

147 The more usual form is *amla*.

148 °*vikārasya darśanād a*° conj. Sanderson; *vikārasyā*° B, P, Ked, Ped. I follow this diagnostic conjecture—as support for which Sanderson pointed to *rasanavikriyādarśanād* in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, given on page 170—because I do not see anything that °*vikārasya* can be construed with in the transmitted text. Since the genitives that parallel *vikārasya* in the other phrases in this sentence (*nimeṣonmeṣādīnām, jīvanasya* and *manasaḥ*) are all qualified by an *api*, we could conjecture the loss of one more syllable here: °*vikārasyāpi darśanād a*°.

149 °*gavākṣa*° P, Ked, Ped : °*gavākṣi*° B.

To explain further, the impelling of the wind upwards and downwards, [given that] its nature is to move horizontally, is not possible [unless one assumes a further entity that is doing the impelling]: some [entity] parallel to a person blowing bellows must be assumed.[150] Likewise some controller also of the opening and closing of the eyes—as of a puppet—and other [similar unconsciously controlled functions] located in the parts of the body who possesses volition;[151] [and] who—because life, for its part, is the effect of *dharma* and *adharma*—is the support of those qualities;[152] [and] who—because the internal

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[150] See PrBhā(Br) 15,10–12: *prāṇādibhiś ceti* [variant without the *iti*]. *katham. śarīraparigṛhīte vāyau vikṛtakarmadarśanād bhastrādhmāpayiteva.* '[One can infer a controller who possesses volition] also through the outgoing and [ingoing] breaths, the [closing and opening of the eyes etc.]. How? [One can infer an entity] parallel to a blower of bellows, because in the case of the air that is enclosed within the body we observe an altered movement.' See also the relevant part of Candrānanda's commentary on 3.2.4: *tiryakpavanasya vāyor dehasthitasya yat prāṇāpānakarma tat prayatnakāryam, śarīraparigṛhītavāyuviṣayatve sati vikṛtatvāt, bhastrāparigṛhītavāyukarmavat* (VS(C) 28,16–18).

[151] See *nimeṣonmeṣakarmaṇā* [variant *nimeṣonmeṣaṇakarmaṇā*] *niyatena dāruyantraprayokteva* [variant *prayoktreva*] (PrBhā(Br) 15,12); and *nimeṣonmeṣakriyāpi prayatnakāryā, nimeṣonmeṣakriyāśabdavācyatvāt, dāruyantranimeṣonmeṣakriyāvat* (VS(C) 28, 18–19).

[152] Praśastapāda's explanation of how *jīvana* in *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 3.2.4 is an inferential mark of the Self differs from Rāmakaṇṭha's here that it is an effect of *dharma* and *adharma* and so implies a support of those qualities. Praśastapāda gives instead the argument that the Self must be inferred as the cause of such bodily phenomena as growth and the healing of wounds and breaks, paralleling a builder and repairer of a house: *dehasya vṛddhikṣatabhagnasaṃrohaṇādinimittatvād* [variant *nimittāt*] *gṛhapatir iva* (PrBhā(Br) 15,13–14). That he intends this as an explanation of *jīvana* in 3.2.4 is highly likely given that the two arguments he gives before it definitely correlate with the two items in the sūtra-list before *jīvana* and the two arguments he gives after it definitely correlate with the two items in the sūtra-list after *jīvana* (see Oetke 1988 300–301). It thus appears that there were two different traditions of interpretation with regard to this element of the list.

Candrānanda gives at the beginning of his commentary on this sūtra a brief general outline of what kind of arguments it contains, before turning to each of them in detail: *prāṇāpānanimeṣonmeṣā manogatiś ca prayatnakāryatvād ātmano liṅgam, jīvanam adṛṣṭakāryatvāt* ... (VS(C) 28,15–16). When he comes to treat this argument in detail he writes, *manasā saṃyoga ātmano 'dṛṣṭāpekṣo jīvanam, śarīravṛddhyādi tatkāryam api jīvanam, śarīraṃ prayatnavatādhiṣṭhitam, vṛddhikṣatabhagnasaṃrohaṇanimittatvāt, jīrṇagṛhavat* (VS(C) 28,19–21): 'Life is the conjunction of Self and internal organ depending on the Unseen. [Or] it is such [processes] as the growing old of the body, which

organ, for its part, is not conscious—directs it, like a chariot or other [vehicle], with effort;[153] [and] who co-ordinates the objects of all the sense-faculties, like [objects seen through] many windows,[154] because we observe, as a result of seeing a very sour-tasting fruit, such as a pomegranate, a modification of the taste-faculty in the form of saliva,[155] must be assumed.

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is also an effect of the [Unseen]. The body, like an old house, is presided over by someone who possesses volition, because [the latter] is the cause of [the body's] growth and the healing of [its] wounds and breaks.' I take *manasā saṃyoga ātmano 'dṛṣṭāpekṣo jīvanam* to indicate an argument resembling Rāmakaṇṭha's; and *śarīravṛddhyādi tatkāryam api jīvanam, śarīraṃ prayatnavatādhiṣṭhitam, vṛddhikṣatabhagnasaṃrohaṇanimittatvāt, jīrṇagṛhavat* to give the argument used by Praśastapāda. Candrānanda gives the impression that the two arguments are in fact one, namely that life is an effect of *adṛṣṭa*, but that one can define life in two ways. His attempt to bring the two arguments together is not convincing however, since it is not clear how the body's growth and healing depend on being an effect of *adṛṣṭa* for their logical power. His own explanation that they imply someone who possesses volition to preside over the body seems self-sufficient. It is to be noted that Praśastapāda feels no need to mention *adṛṣṭa*.

Candrānanda does not make clear how being an effect of *adṛṣṭa*, by which I take him to mean *dharma* and *adharma*, implies the existence of the Self. The implication of Rāmakaṇṭha's Vaiśeṣika that it must be their support is one option but not the only conceivable one, and not stated explicitly by Candrānanda. On definitions of *jīvana* see Preisendanz 1994 238–239.

[153] Praśastapāda (see *abhimataviṣayagrāhakakaraṇasambandhanimittena manaḥkarmaṇā gṛhakoṇeṣu pelakapreraka iva dārakaḥ* PrBhā(Br) 15,14–15) and Candrānanda (see *indriyāntaraṃ prati manaso gamanaṃ manogatiḥ prayatnakāryā, abhimatapradeśasambandhanimittatvāt, pelakakriyāvat, sā hi dārakaprayatnakṛtā* (VS(C) 28,21–22)), both appeal to the comparison of the internal organ's movement with that of a ball being thrown by a young boy. The fact that Rāmakaṇṭha does not do so, when combined with the distinctiveness of his explanation also of *jīvana* and *indriyāntaravikāra*, suggests the possibility that the source for his elucidation of the sūtra-list is neither of those two authors. On different interpretations of *manogati* see Preisendanz 1994 263–267.

[154] Or perhaps 'like [someone who co-ordinates objects seen through] many windows'. *anekagavākṣavat* is slightly awkward: it does not fit easily with the syntax of the rest of the sentence. B's reading, *anekagavākṣivat*, is no better and can be explained as a corruption of *anekagavākṣavat* resulting from Kashmiri ioticisation. Praśastapāda's corresponding compound is unproblematic: see *anekagavākṣāntargataprekṣakavat* in the second footnote after this.

[155] The modification of the taste-faculty is described in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* not just as *dantodakātma*, but as *dantodakasaṃplavabhūta* (see next note). Preisendanz (1994 274)

Praśastapāda lays out the argument based on *indriyāntaravikāra* (the excitation of a different sense-faculty) as follows: *nayanaviṣayālocanānantaraṃ rasānusmṛtikrameṇa rasanavikriyādarśanād anekagavākṣāntargatapreksaka-vad ubhayadarśī kaś cid eko* [variant without *eko*] *vijñāyate* (PrBhā(Br) 15, 2b–16,2). 'Because we observe a modification of the taste-faculty immediately after seeing an object of the eye, through the mediation of remembering the taste [of the object], we come to know that there is some single entity who perceives both [taste-objects and visual objects], analogous to someone looking out from inside several windows.' Candrānanda, before giving his version of the argument in full, informs us that instances of 'the modification of another sense-faculty' are inferential marks of the Self because they arise owing to memory. (See ... *ātmano liṅgam ... indriyāntaravikārāḥ smṛtiprabhavatvāt* (VS(C) 28,15–16)). As well as this phenomenon of *indriyāntaravikāra* forming one item among many in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* under comment, it also makes up one whole *Nyāyasūtra* on its own (NS 3.1.12: *indriyāntaravikārāt*). Vātsyāyana comments: *kasya cid amlasya phalasya gṛhītatadrasasāhacarye rūpe gandhe vā kena cid indriyeṇa gṛhyamāṇe rasanasyendriyāntarasya vikāraḥ rasānusmṛtau rasagardhipravartito dantodakasamplavabhūto gṛhyate. tasyendriyacaitanye 'nupapattiḥ, nānyadṛṣṭam anyaḥ smaratīti* (NBhā(NCG) 142,4–6). 'When some sour fruit's appearance or smell, whose co-occurrence with its taste has been grasped [on a previous occasion], is perceived by a certain sense-faculty (i.e. that of sight or smell), [we sometimes] observe a modification of a different sense-faculty, namely taste, [this modification consisting of] the flowing together [of the taste-faculty] with saliva, as a result of, on remembering [the fruit's] taste, desiring that taste. This [modification of a different sense-faculty] would not be possible if it were the sense-faculties [rather than the Self] that are conscious, [for] one thing does not remember something seen [only] by another (i.e. the faculty of sight would not be able

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explains that *dantodakasaṃplava* does not just mean the flowing together of saliva, for that would not be a modification of the taste-faculty, but just of the water in the mouth. Rather it means, as explained by Uddyotakara, 'flowing together [of the taste-faculty] with saliva'; since the taste-faculty consists of water it too can flow. Rāmakaṇṭha, however, does not include the word *saṃplava* in his compound; he seems to use *vikāra* to refer to the product, not the action, of modification.

to remember the earlier taste of the fruit, which was experienced by the faculty of taste).'

Oetke (1988) distinguishes between two kinds of argument for the Self, those that rely on the metaphysical/logical principle that one entity cannot remember something experienced by another (or, as in the Nyāya argument above, that one entity cannot synthesize cognitions had by another), and philosophy of nature arguments in which the Self is argued for as the best possible hypothesis to account for an empirical phenomenon. The first kind of argument seeks to prove a Self that is also the subject of memory and cognition; but the latter may not. Indeed the phenomena in this list, breathing in and out, the movement of the eyelids, the movement of the *manas* and so on, have in common that they are not (usually) consciously controlled, which leads Oetke to propose, quite plausibly, that they may have been intended to prove an *ātman* existing beyond our consciousness. If it were some conscious controller of the body that were intended to be argued for, surely examples of more consciously controlled processes, such as the movement of the limbs, could have been put forward.

Praśastapāda, Candrānanda and Vātsyāyana all take *indriyāntaravikāra* as referring to an argument in which memory of a previous taste of the object is relevant. But Oetke (pp. 273–4) suggests the following alternative possibility. The fact that the stimulation of the faculty of sight leads to the stimulation of the taste-faculty suggests the existence of an entity that receives information through one sense-faculty and transmits that information to another sense-faculty. Such an entity does not necessarily play any role in memory. The phenomenon of the taste-faculty being modified when an object is looked at may by itself have formed the basis of the argument for an *atman*, without an earlier taste-experience of the object having been part of the picture. And even if it was, and the Self argued for is thus that which stores the earlier taste experience and then later, on seeing the object again, stimulates the taste-faculty, it follows only that such a Self carries out functions necessary for memory, not that it is the subject of memory and experience.

The appeal to memory is the central part of the argument put forward by Candrānanda and Vātsyāyana: they employ the principle that one thing (in this case a sense-faculty) does not remember something seen (not by them

but) by another, and the Self that is proved for them is the rememberer. The way that neither Praśastapāda nor Rāmakaṇṭha mention this principle, both appealing rather to the example of one person looking out of more than one window, indicates that their arguments belong more to a philosophy of nature that advances the Self as the best explanation of the observed phenomenon in question. Praśastapāda's, however, contains a feature of the argument from memory: he mentions memory of the taste of the object as one of the stages in the process, between the present seeing and salivation. Oetke (p. 284) suggests that this double-nature of his argument may be due to him reproducing an old argument that did not originate with him. Rāmakaṇṭha's argument does not mention memory at all. It does, however, seek to prove an *anusandhātṛ*, which is certainly not an entity beyond our consciousness, but the subject of synthesis, and hence of memory and cognition.

The fact that Rāmakaṇṭha, when he writes *sarvendriyārthānusandhātā* in this sentence, appeals to the same notion—*anusandhāna*—as that on which the Naiyāyika argument in the previous section was based, illustrates that *anusandhāna* can be used in two different kinds of argument for the Self. In one it is used to illustrate how perceptions at different points of time are accessed by a single entity, who must therefore exist continually over that timespan. In the other it is used to illustrate how perceptions from different sense-faculties can be accessed by a single entity, who must therefore exist over and above the individual sense-faculties, which are themselves restricted to only one type of object each. The perceptions through the different sense-faculties must inevitably take place at slightly different times (because the Self cannot simultaneously experience two different perceptions from two different senses), but the argument would go through even if the perceptions were simultaneous. What is aimed to be proved is not necessarily an entity that endures over time, but one that exists above and beyond the plural sense-faculties. The example used of a person looking out of several windows does not rely on the fact that the windows are looked through at different times, but simply that more than one window (i.e. sense-faculty) is looked through.

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Having expanded on each of the items in the list (except memory) the Buddhist now explains how the same consideration used to dispose of the Naiyāyika argument can dispose of these Vaiśeṣika arguments.

> *tac ca vijñānam eva pravāhātmakaṃ saṃskārādivaśataḥ pūrvoktāśeṣārtha-kriyānirvartakam ubhayavādisiddham astīti kuto 'nyaḥ sidhya*[156]*ti.*
>
> And just that cognition [that we advanced in our argument against the Naiyāyikas] is available [as the required controller of bodily functions and co-ordinator of sense-data], [since it,] as a stream, produces all of the above-mentioned purposeful actions through latent traces etc.,[157] and is established for both disputants.[158] So how is anything beyond that[159] established?

What was said about desire in the earlier argument with Nyāya is here said about bodily functions such as breathing, eyelid-control, salivation on seeing certain foods etc.: all that is required to account for them is cognition.[160] What these Vaiśeṣika arguments claimed to require is some controller of bodily processes (*adhiṣṭhātṛ, preraka*), that has volition (*prayatna*), and that is able to carry out *anusandhāna*. The Buddhist has shown against the Naiyāyika how cognition, aided by traces, can do the latter, and similar considerations could show how it, rather than some *adhiṣṭhātṛ* standing outside the stream of cognition, is capable of bringing about the bodily processes in question here. These philosophy of nature arguments, as Oetke terms them, indicate, anyway, the existence not so much of an eternally extended Self, but of an intel-

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[156] *kuto 'nyaḥ sidhya*° P, Ked, Ped; not readable in the photocopy I have of B. It has been inadvertently covered up by a scrap of paper on which is written '*dravyaguṇakarma-samavā* ...' (breaks off there).

[157] The *ādi* could be referring to effort (*prayatna*).

[158] For a defence of the translation of this sentence, see note 34.

[159] Such as a Self.

[160] This is precisely the response to these Vaiśeṣika arguments of the author, said by Chinese tradition to be Nāgārjuna, of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra.* An opponent puts forward *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 3.2.4, to which the response is (quoted at Kapstein 1989 52), 'Mais tous ces caractères sont des caractères de la connaissance (*vijñānalakṣaṇa*)! C'est parce qu'il y a connaissance, qu'il y a respiration, regard droit ou oblique, vie, etc. Et quand la connaissance quite le corps tout cela disparaît.' 'Regard droit ou oblique' is not a good translation of °*nimeṣonmeṣa*°: the mistake could either have occurred in the translation from Sanskrit to Chinese, or Chinese to French.

ligent entity within the body that is not found in insentient matter.[161] Hence the Buddhist here simply puts forward cognition to fulfill that role without providing further argumentation.[162]

3.2. The Argument from Qualities to Quality-Possessor

yad apīcchādīnām acākṣuṣapratyakṣatvād rasādivad guṇatve saty ayāvad-dravyabhāvitvāc charīrādiviśeṣaguṇatvapratiṣedhena[163] *pāriśeṣyād ātmano*[164] *guṇino 'numānam,*[165] *tad api dṛṣṭā*[Ked p. 11]*ntāsiddher vyāptyabhāvād anaikāntikam.*[166]

And as for the inference of the Self, [as] a possessor of qualities, [namely] —

desire and the like are invisible [but] perceptible, like taste, [sound, touch and smell], therefore they are qualities; [but] while being [qualities], they cannot be specific qualities of the body or the [sense-organs] because they do not last as long as [those] substances. Therefore, because there is no alternative, [we infer a further entity, a Self, as the substrate of these qualities] —

that too is inconclusive because of a lack of pervasion, because the example is not proved.

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[161] See Oetke 1988 285–286.

[162] One wonders whether these arguments arose in the context not of debate with Buddhists, but of debate with Cārvākas, although see the early Buddhist sources collected by Preisendanz (1994 263–265) that report and respond to this argument.

[163] °*guṇatvapratiṣedhena* Ped; °*guṇapratiṣedhena* B, P, Ked.

[164] *ātmano* P, Ked, Ped; *ātmaṇo* B.

[165] See the parallel in MatV VP (where he attributes the argument to Naiyāyikas, not Vaiśeṣikas): *nanu jñānasyotpattimattve sati niyamenācākṣuṣapratyakṣatvato rasādivad guṇatvāt, ayāvaddravyabhāvitvena ca śarīrādiguṇatvāsiddheḥ, avaśyaṃ guṇinā bhavitavyam* [*bhavitavyam* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *bhavitavyam ity* ed.]. *yatra* [*yatra* ū, ṛ; *atra* ed.] *ca guṇatayāvasthitaṃ tat, sa* [*guṇatayāvasthitaṃ tat, sa* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *guṇitayāvasthitas tatra* ed.] *ātmeti naiyāyikāḥ* (153,5–7).

[166] See the parallel passage in KV ad 2.25ab, p. 53: *nanu jñānaṃ tāvad asmadādipratyakṣatve saty acākṣuṣapratyakṣatvād rasādivad guṇaḥ. guṇena ca dravyāśritena bhavitavyam iti. yas tasyāśrayaḥ sa tadvilakṣaṇatvād ajñānarūpa evātmā sidhyati ... so 'py ayuktaḥ dṛṣṭāntasyāsmān prati sādhyadharmāsiddhatvāt.*

I) The first stage of this argument, that if something is invisible to the eye, but nevertheless perceptible by some other means, it must be a quality, is also put by Uddyotakara,[167] Jayanta[168] and Candrānanda.[169] This argument is not elaborated in any detail by these authors nor by Rāmakaṇṭha, but clearly one can discern in it the implication that none of the things grouped under any of the other Vaiśeṣika categories beside that of qualities are both invisible to the eye and perceptible by some other means. How is that borne out by classical Vaiśeṣika as expounded in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*?

All of the substances are either perceptible through sight, for example earth (*pṛthivī*), or imperceptible, for example the mental organ (*manas*).[170] Movements are perceptible by sight and touch because they inhere in perceptible substances.[171] Universals are perceptible through the sense faculty that per-

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[167] NVā(NCG) ad 3.2.18: *anityatve sati niyamenācākṣuṣapratyakṣatvāt rasavat siddho guṇabhāvaḥ.* 'The fact that something is a quality is established from the fact that, like taste, it is, while not being eternal, necessarily both invisible and perceptible.'

[168] NM(M) Vol. 2, 278,14–15: *guṇatvaṃ cecchādīnām acākṣuṣapratyakṣatvādinā rasādivad darśitam ācāryaiḥ.* 'The Master has shown that desire and the like must be qualities, for such reasons as that they are perceptible, but not through the visual-faculty, like taste and the other [qualities].' It is interesting that Uddyotakara adds the qualification, 'while not being eternal', and Jayanta does not. The reason must be that Uddyotakara holds the Self to be perceptible while Jayanta does not. Thus if Uddyotakara had not included that qualification, it would follow from his argument that the Self, since it is invisible but perceptible, is a quality.

[169] When commenting on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 2.2.28, *acākṣusatvāt na karma*, he writes: *dravyaṃ karma vā yad indriyāntarapratyakṣaṃ, tac cākṣuṣam api dṛṣṭam. ayaṃ tu śabdaḥ, śrotrapratyakṣo 'pi san, na cākṣuṣaḥ. evaṁ sthito guṇaḥ.* 'Whatever substance or movement that is perceptible to other sense-faculties is also found to be visible. But as for sound, although it is perceptible to the faculty of hearing, it is not visible. Thus it exists as a quality.'

[170] Three of them are perceptible through touch, but those three are also visible.

[171] *saṅkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvasnehadravatvavegakarmaṇāṃ pratyakṣadravyasamavāyāc cakṣuḥsparśanābhyāṃ grahaṇam* (PrBhā(Br) 44, 15–45,1).

ceives the substrate in which they inhere.[172] Particulars are perceptible only to Yogins.[173] Inherence is imperceptible.[174]

Excursus on *Acākṣuṣapratyakṣatva* in Vaiśeṣika

The compound *acākṣuṣapratyakṣatva*[175] occurs in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, but what is puzzling is that it is there given as an example of a false *hetu*. Praśastapāda is at that point of the text dealing with statements containing inferential marks (*liṅgavacana*) that are false proofs (*anapadeśa*). He divides such statements into four: those which are unestablished (*asiddha*), contradictory (*viruddha*), doubtful (*sandigdha*) and unsure (*anadhyavasita*). The difference between the last of these two is that doubtful inferential marks occur both in the *sapakṣa* and the *vipakṣa*, whereas unsure ones occur in neither. *acākṣuṣatvapratyakṣatva* is mentioned by Praśastapāda as an example of the last. He writes: *nanv ayam asādhāraṇa evācākṣuṣatva*[variant: *evācākṣuṣa*]-*pratyakṣatvavat saṃhatayor anyatarapakṣāsambhavāt, tataś cānadhyavasita iti vakṣyāmaḥ* (PrBhā(Br) 52,1–3). 'Actually (*nanu*) this is in fact (*eva*) un-

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[172] *bhāvadravyatvaguṇatvakarmatvādīnām upalabhyādhārasamavetānām āśrayagrāhakair indriyair grahaṇam ity etad asmadādīnāṃ pratyakṣam* (PrBhā(Br) 45,3–4).

[173] Presumably that is why the version of the argument reported in note 166 includes the qualification *asmadādipratyakṣatve.*

tathāsmadviśiṣṭānāṃ yogināṃ nityeṣu tulyākṛtiguṇakriyeṣu paramāṇuṣu muktātmamanaḥsu cānyanimittāsambhavād yebhyo nimittebhyaḥ pratyādhāraṃ vilakṣaṇo 'yaṃ vilakṣaṇo 'yam iti pratyayavyāvṛttiḥ, deśakālaviprakarṣe ca paramāṇau sa evāyam iti pratyabhijñānaṃ ca bhavati, te 'ntyā viśeṣāḥ (PrBhā(Br) 84,7–12).

[174] *ata evātīndriyaḥ, sattādīnām iva pratyakṣeṣu vṛttyabhāvāt svātmagatasaṃvedanābhāvāc ca. tasmād iha buddhyanumeyaḥ samavāya iti* (PrBhā(Br) 88,8–10). In fact this seems only to apply to people like us, for elsewhere Praśastapāda includes Inherence in a list of things perceivable by Yogins: *asmadviśiṣṭānāṃ tu yogināṃ yuktānāṃ yogajadharmānugṛhītena manasā svātmāntarākāśadikkālaparamāṇuvāyumanaḥsu tatsamavetaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣeṣu samavāye cāvitathaṃ svarūpadarśanam utpadyate* (PrBhā (Br) 45,5–9).

[175] The reading of some editions is *acākṣuṣatvapratyakṣatva.* See PrBhā(Br) 52,2 and the variants given in the footnote.

common, because like invisibility and perceptibility, the two [parts of the reason] taken together are not possible in either of the *pakṣa*s (i.e. in either the *sapakṣa* or the *vipakṣa*), and therefore we term it unsure.' What the *ayam* refers to need not concern us here. What is quite clear from this sentence is that for Praśastapāda the logical reason *acākṣuṣatvapratyakṣatva* is an invalid reason, occurring neither in the *sapakṣa* nor *vipakṣa*. Praśastapāda does not say what *sādhya* this reason would be used to prove, but Śrīdhara implies that it is *guṇatva*[176] and Vyomaśiva identifies it as *guṇavyavahāra* (which Nenninger[177] translates as 'daß es sich um Eigenschaft handelt').[178]

Nenninger suggests that this sentence in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* became corrupted before the time of Śrīdhara and Vyomaśiva's commentaries, arguing that it would make more sense if we read *cākṣuṣatvāpratyakṣatva* in place of *acākṣuṣatvapratyakṣatva.*[179] Thus we are left with the possibility that *acākṣuṣapratyakṣatva* as an argument for the fact that something is a quality may have arisen in Vaiśeṣika only through corruption; and with the puzzle that it seems to have been regarded by Vaiśeṣika authors as an invalid reason. On the first of these two points it should be said that even if Nenninger is cor-

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176 ... *yathā acākṣuṣatvapratyakṣatvayoḥ pratyekaṃ guṇavyabhicāre 'pi samuditayor guṇavyatirekeṇānyatrāsambhavaḥ* (NK 585,1–2). 'Even though invisibility and perceptibility taken individually deviate from the qualities, taken together they do not occur anywhere apart from the qualities.' The point there is that though there are non-qualities that are invisible (e.g. the *manas*) and non-qualities that are perceptible (e.g. earth), there are none that are both invisible and perceptible.

177 Nenninger 1992 100.

178 *yathā hi rūpātīndriyaguṇavyatirekeṇānyaguṇānāṃ guṇavyavahāre sādhye* [*sādhye* conj. Nenninger; *sādhya* ed.] *sāmānyavattvād pratyakṣe* (*pratyakṣe* conj. Nenninger; *dravyatve* ed.) *sati niyamenācākṣuṣatvaṃ hetur na sapakṣe rūpādāv asti, nāpi vipakṣe ghaṭādāv ity asādhāraṇaḥ* (VyV Vol. 2, 198,15–17). 'Because the qualities other than colour and the imperceptible ones have a universal, it is to be proved whether it is appropriate to call them qualities. The logical reason for this *sādhya*—being invisible with the restriction that they are perceptible—does not exist in the *sapakṣa*, for example in colour, and neither in the *vipakṣa*, for example in pots, so it is uncommon.' Dr. Ferenc Ruzsa, of the University of Budapest, informed me that the sole manuscript of this text (not its transcript on which both editions were based) reads—in the part where Nenninger felt compelled to conjecture alternative readings—*sādhyasāmānyavattvādravyatve* [210 r 1–2].

179 Nenninger 1992 100.

rect in his suggestion that the reading *acākṣuṣa(tva)pratyakṣatva* is a corruption, we are not justified in deducing from that that the Vaiśeṣika argument from *acākṣuṣa(tva)pratyakṣatva* to something being a quality arose through this corruption. For the argument could have occurred already in other Vaiśeṣika texts before the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* became corrupt. Indeed if such were the case then the substitution of this word for the original reading could be explained through it being known to the substitutor.

On the second point, I propose the following as a possible solution. Although both Śrīdhara and Vyomaśiva state *acākṣuṣa(tva)pratyakṣatva* to be an invalid reason for something being a quality, the validity of an argument depends (at least according to Praśastapāda's *trairūpya* theory) not only on *hetu* and *sādhya* but also on the *pakṣa*. For Śrīdhara the *pakṣa* is all qualities. Thus there is no *sapakṣa*; therefore the argument is invalid on the grounds that the reason does not occur in the *sapakṣa*. For Vyomaśiva the *pakṣa* is only those qualities which are both invisible and perceptible. Thus nowhere in the *sapakṣa*—which comprises colour and imperceptible qualities such as heaviness—does the reason occur; hence the argument is invalid. But Jayanta's argument and that of Rāmakaṇṭha's Vaiśeṣika have as their *pakṣa* desire, aversion, pleasure, pain and the other mental qualities; and Uddyotakara's has as its *pakṣa* cognition (*buddhi*). Since in those cases taste, sound, smell and tangibility fall within the *sapakṣa*, the reason occurs in the *sapakṣa* and so the arguments would be valid. The same is the case for Candrānanda's argument, for which the *pakṣa* is sound; hence taste, smell and tangibility fall within the *sapakṣa*. It seems quite possible that Śrīdhara and Vyomaśiva were aware of this valid application of the argument, but, since they were commenting on a text that appeared to give it as an example of an invalid argument, construed it in that particular context as applying to *pakṣa*s that would render it invalid.

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II) Turning now to the second stage of the NPP argument: why does it follow from desire and the like not lasting as long as the body etc., that they cannot be qualities of the body etc.? Early examples of this argument are the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* and the *Nyāyasūtra*. In the former *ayāvaddravyabhāvi-*

tvāt occurs as one reason out of four for the contention that pleasure etc. are not qualities of the body or sense-faculties.[180] Whereas it states that [pleasure and the like] do not last as long as those substances (i.e. body and sense-faculties), the *Nyāyasūtra* states that colour and the like *do* last as long as the body [in which they inhere].[181] Thus it can be seen that the argument that these two texts and NPP put forward rests on the contrast between those qualities which are generally accepted to be qualities of the body (colour and the like) and the mental phenomena in question, in that the former last as long as the body, but the latter do not. This contrast is deemed sufficient to rule out the possibility that the mental phenomena are qualities of the body.

We will examine the argument in more detail by looking at its occurrence in the two above mentioned early sources. It is easy to understand the contention that the colour of a body lasts as long as the body itself: right up to the time that any material object ceases to exist it will have a colour.[182] But how about

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[180] *sukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnaiś ca guṇair guṇy anumīyate. te ca na śarīrendriyaguṇāḥ* [variant: *ete na ca śarīrendriyaviśeṣaguṇāḥ*]. *kasmāt? ahaṅkāreṇaikavākyatābhāvāt* [variants: *ahaṅkāreṇaikyavākyatābhāvāt*; *ahaṅkāreṇaikavākyatvabhāvāt*] *pradeśavṛttitvād ayāvaddravyabhāvitvād* [variant: *yāvaddravyabhāvitvāt*] *bāhyendriyāpratyakṣatvāc ca* [variants: *bāhyendriyapratyakṣatvāc ca*; *bāhyendriyāpratyakṣatvād*] (PrBhā (Br) 16,3–6). 'And from the qualities pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort, a possessor of those qualities can be inferred. And these are not qualities of the body or the sense-organs. Why? Because of the fact that the [words for them] can make a single sentence with [the word for] our sense of self [in such cases as *ahaṃ duḥkhī*, I am in pain]; because they occur in a [single] part [of the body]; because they do not last as long as [the body and sense-organs]; and because they are not perceived by the external sense-organs.' Praśastapāda is there explaining the second half of VS 3.2.4: ... *sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnaś cety ātmaliṅgāni* (the reading of VS(C).

[181] NS 3.2.47: *yāvaccharīrabhāvitvād rūpādīnām.*

[182] In fact not all of the qualities recognized by Praśastapāda as capable of inhering in the body last as long as it. Its colour, taste, smell and touch (all of which are *viśeṣaguṇas*) last as long as it, but many of its common qualities (*sāmānyaguṇas*), for example number (*saṅkhyā*), connection (*saṃyoga*), disjunction (*vibhāga*), dispositions (*saṃskāra*) do not. This draws attention to the fact that in the NPP version of this argument, the conclusion is not that the mental phenomena are not qualities of the body, but more narrow—that they are not specific qualities of the body. For the inference of the Self to follow it must be established that the mental phenomena cannot be any kind of quality of the body. But all

the claim that pleasure, desire and the like do not last as long as the body? Both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika hold individual instances of cognition, pleasure, pain and the like to last only for a moment, so perhaps the contrast is between their momentariness and the body's longer perdurance. Oetke (1988 295–296) has pointed out that, in fact, that is very unlikely to be the contrast that underlies this argument, at least in the *Nyāyasūtra*, given the evidence of the following two *sūtra*s. The next *sūtra* objects by introducing the example of the change in colour of a clay pot, as it cooks, from brown to red.[183] If the brown colour inhering in a pot's earth atoms can cease despite the earth atoms continuing, why can it be ruled out that cognition, pleasure etc. inhere in a body just because they cease despite the body continuing? The response to this objection in the next *sūtra* involves showing how the example of the earth atoms and their changing colour differs from the case of the body and cognition.[184] In the example, the old brown colour is replaced by a new colour that is incompatible with it (in the sense that they cannot both exist at the same time in the same earth atoms). The implication is that cognition, by contrast, is not replaced by new cognition that is incompatible with the previous. But if it were particular, momentary instances of cognition that were being borne in mind, there would be no contrast between the body and them, on the one hand, and the earth atoms and their changing colour, on the other. For in-

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that seems justifiably to follow from *ayāvaddravyabhāvitva* is that they are not specific qualities of the body. This suggests the possibility that this argument goes back to a time when the body/earth was considered to have only four qualities: smell, taste, colour and touch. By the time of Vātsyāyana and Praśastapāda more qualities of the body/earth had been added, but Frauwallner reconstructs the history of Vaiśeṣika as containing a stage when it had only those four. If the argument originated in that period then it would have successfully differentiated all bodily qualities from the mental phenomena in question. If later, then it must always have been accompanied by supplementary arguments to differentiate those qualities that can inhere in the body but that do not last as long as it from the mental phenomena in question. Such arguments are used to respond to opponents of the *ayāvaddravyabhāvitva* argument in Nyāya texts that post-date the *Nyāyasūtra*s and Vaiśeṣika texts that post-date the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. (See for example Vātsyāyana ad NS 3.2.47 (NBhā(NCG) 203,13–204,5) and NM(M) Vol. 2, 289,5–6.)

[183] NBhā(NCG) 3.2.48: *na, pākajaguṇāntarotpatteḥ*

[184] NBhā(NCG) 3.2.49: *pratidvandvisiddheḥ pākajānām* [variant: *pākajātānām*] *apratiṣedhaḥ*

dividual momentary instances of cognition do give way to new, incompatible instances.[185] Thus it is clear that what is being envisaged by these *sūtra*s is a phase of the body's existence when it has no cognition or other mental phenomena at all, i.e. after death. The opponent's example of earth atoms changing their colour shows nothing because those earth atoms at least have *some* colour (inhering in them) throughout their whole existence. But dead bodies exist without any of the mental phenomena whatsoever. Therefore although the mental phenomena manifest in the body during life they cannot be intrinsic to it, cannot inhere in it.

The *Nyāyasūtra* argument, therefore, seems to be based on the consideration that at death cognition and the other mental phenomena cease, whereas the body continues (for a while). But if we assume that this is also what Praśastapāda had in mind when he wrote *ayāvaddravyabhāvitvāt*, then we are forced to interpret him as stating the same argument twice. For, as Oetke points out, two paragraphs earlier he wrote, 'cognition does not [belong to] the body, because [the body], like a pot, is a product of material elements (i.e. earth atoms), and *because* [*cognition*] *does not occur in dead bodies*.'[186] Although the overall context, spanning both places, is the proof of the existence of the Self, the *ayāvaddravyabhāvitvāt* argument occurs in the more particular context of establishing that pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort cannot be qualities of the body or sense-faculties; and the just quoted sentence occurs in the context of establishing that cognition cannot belong to, or be an effect of, the body. Perhaps the slight differences between these contexts allow for the possibility that Praśastapāda would have introduced the same argument twice. If not, then we could interpret Praśastapāda's *ayāvaddravyabhāvitvāt* argument as based on the fact that an individual instance of pleas-

[185] Just over twenty sūtras ago it has been stated that individual cognitions are destroyed by immediately following cognitions, just like in the case of sound: *anityatvagrahaṇād* [variant: *grahād*] *buddher buddhyantarād vināśaḥ* [variant: *hi nāśaḥ*] *śabdavat* (NBhā(NCG) 3.2.24). According to Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika sound travels across space in rows of sound-moments, each one being destroyed by the subsequent and spatially neighbouring one, except for the last one in a row.

[186] PrBhā(Br) 15,3–4: *na śarīrasya caitanyam, ghaṭādivad bhūtakāryatvān* [variant: *bhūtatvāt kāryatvāc ca*] *mṛte cāsambhavāt.*

ure etc. does not last as long as the body. The onus would then be on Praśastapāda to show how that differs from a particular colour of an earth atom not lasting as long as an earth atom, but he may have been capable of distinguishing the two.[187]

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Regarding the philosophical worth of these arguments, are they viciously circular, devoid of argumentative power as a result of assuming what they aim to prove? To claim that bodily qualities all last as long as the body is to as-

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[187] Śrīdhara points out that the fact that pleasure and the like do not last as long as the sense-faculties cannot be used to exclude them from inhering in the sense-faculties, because sound inheres in the faculty of hearing but does not last as long as it. (NK 206,2–4: *ito 'pi na śarīrendriyaguṇāḥ sukhādayo bhavanti, ayāvaddravyabhāvitvāt, vyatirekeṇa rūpādaya eva nidarśanam. indriyaguṇapratiṣedhe tu nāyaṃ hetuḥ, śrotraguṇena śabdenānaikāntikatvāt.*) Whether Praśastapāda intended the word *ayāvaddravyabhāvitvāt* to denote an argument for the exclusion of the sense-faculties as well as the body is not certain. It is true that it follows the proposition *te ca na śarīrendriyaguṇāḥ*, but it is only one out of four reasons for that, and he could have regarded the sense-faculties as excluded by others of the four, not this one. The *Nyāyasūtras*, the commentaries thereon, and the *Nyāyamañjarī* use the argument only to exclude the body as a possible substrate of the mental qualities. NPP uses it to exclude also the sense-faculties, in so far as there is no other plausible referent of the *ādi* in the compound *śarīrādi.*

The *Nyāyasūtra* interpretation of the argument requires a view of the body as something that continues to exist, numerically identical, throughout life and beyond death up to the time of its decomposition or burning, despite the changes in its appearance. Oetke (1988 296, note 39) identifies this as the 'old view' of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. It was certainly not the standard view in later Nyāya. See for example the remarks of Vācaspati Miśra and Jayanta given on page 144. Jayanta's view, mentioned there, that the body arises and is destroyed in almost every instant is clearly very different from the 'old Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view' and is not really compatible with either interpretation of the *ayāvaddravyabhāvitvāt* argument. While Oetke may be right that the notion of the body as remaining always the same thing despite undergoing changes is older than the view of a plurality of bodies belonging to one and the same person, the former does not disappear completely when the latter has become orthodoxy. Jayanta, for example, immediately after arguing for the latter, gives the *ayāvaddravyabhāvitvāt* argument, thus presupposing the notion of a more enduring body than he has just argued for. It seems that he allowed himself some flexibility on the nature of the body in accordance with whatever was demanded by the particular argument he is employing.

sume that pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort and cognition are not bodily qualities, precisely what is in question. And to claim that anything which is perceived, but not by the visual organ, must be a quality, is to presuppose the whole Vaiśeṣika framework of the categories and the lists of individual entries that come under those categories. Nevertheless, one can state the *ayāvaddravyabhāvitvāt* argument in a way that stresses empirical principles more than prior commitment to a classificatory scheme.

One could point out that in the case of the smell, taste, touch and colour associated with a particular body, no one claims them to inhere in anything other than the body. But in the case of the pleasure etc. that manifest in a particular body, there is disagreement over whether they actually inhere in the body or not. One way to decide the problem is to look at what characterizes those qualities that uncontroversially inhere in the body. One thing that characterizes such qualities is that they stay with the body until it ceases.

Alternatively one could argue that in deciding that smell, taste, touch and colour inhere in the body, one at that stage, knowingly or unknowingly, took the fact that they last as long as the body as important evidence.

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The NPP argument could be divided into three stages, the conclusions of each stage being: 1) desire and the like are qualities; 2) they cannot be specific qualities of the body or sense-faculties; 3) they must be qualities of the Self.[188] There are thus different ways that it could be rejected. One frequently attested view is acceptance of the first stage that they are qualities requiring some support, coupled with the assertion that their support is the body. In this vein the Cārvākas claimed that desire and other cognitions arise from the body, or are a power of it, in the same way that the power of intoxication arises in material elements when certain of them are combined in particular proportions. In response to the Vaiśeṣika argument that if cognition is a power of the body it should be present in the dead body also, they maintain that it is not innate to the elements of the body, but emerges there owing to

[188] For more on the logical structure of this argument (as presented in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika sources), see Chakrabarti 1982 and Kano 2001.

specific configurations and transformations of the bodily elements, as the intoxicating power of an alcoholic drink was not present before fermentation. When these specific configurations and transformations are abandoned at death the power of cognition ceases. Their motivation in grounding cognition in the body was to underpin their view of the impossibility of life after death. Buddhists and Vaiśeṣikas were united against them in that regard.

What divided Buddhists and Vaiśeṣikas on this question was the manner in which they explained the possibility of the continuation of cognition after the body with which it is currently associated ceases. Cognition is not restricted to one particular body, for the Vaiśeṣikas, because it inheres not in the body but in the immaterial, eternal and all-pervasive Self; and for the Buddhists, because it does not need to inhere in anything at all.[189] Thus, returning to NPP, it is the very first stage of the three listed above (that desire and cognition etc. are qualities at all) that the Buddhist opposes, by claiming that the example used to establish it, that of taste and the like, is unproved. The first stage proceeded through showing that desire and the like must fall within the same ontological category as taste and the like. The upshot of the Buddhist objection is that even if they do, that does not entail that they are qualities, for, as the Buddhist is about to state, he does not accept that even taste and the like are qualities.

> *na hi rasādīnāṃ guṇatvam asmākaṃ*[190] *sāṅkhyānām api vā prasiddham, rūparasādisamudāyavyatirekeṇānyasya kasya cid āmraphalāder dharmiṇo 'nupalambhāt.*[191]
>
> For it is not proved that taste and the like are qualities, for us or for the Sāṅkhyas either. For we do not perceive any separate property-possessor,

[189] Vaiśeṣikas and Cārvākas thus stood together against Buddhists in that they both denied that cognition could exist without a support. See Chapter 4 of Franco 1997.

[190] Interlinear gloss above *asmākaṃ* in B: *ātmaśūnyavādinā*; in P: *ātmaśūnyavādināṃ*.

[191] See KV ad 2.25ab, lines 4–8: *nanu jñānasya rasāder iva guṇatve hetur ukta eva. so 'py ayuktaḥ dṛṣṭāntasyāsmān prati sādhyadharmāsiddhatvāt. rasādayo hi bhāvāḥ saṃhatā eva jāyamānāḥ saṃhatā eva niruddhāś ca, sāṅkhyasaugatādibhir ivāsmābhir api pramāṇasiddhatvād arthakriyākaraṇāḥ kathyante, na tv anyaḥ kaś cit teṣām āśrayabhūtas tadvyatirekeṇa tasyānupalambhanād iti.* See also MatV VP 153,8–11.

such as a mango fruit, over and above the conglomeration of colour, taste and the rest.

As well as this being a Buddhist and a Sāṅkhya view it is also Rāmakaṇṭha's own (as can be seen not only from his silent agreement here, but also from other of his texts), perhaps part of Śaiva Siddhānta's inheritance from Sāṅkhya, or perhaps a result of the close connection between Buddhism and Śaivism in Kashmir. It continues to be put forward in later South Indian Śaiva Siddhānta after other core Saiddhāntika doctrines have disappeared under the influence of Vedānta and devotionalism.[192]

It is well-known that the denial of any substrate or property-possessor over and above conglomerations of qualities is a Buddhist view. In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, for example, Vasubandhu advances this position in a context very similar to the present discussion. In response to an opponent's claim that the Self is required as the support (*āśraya*) of consciousness (*citta*) and traces (*saṃskāra*), he questions what kind of notion of 'support' could hold between the Self, and consciousness and traces. He first voices and dismisses the possibility that these two could be supported by the Self in the way that a mural is supported by a wall, or some fruits by a bowl. Next he brings up and answers the possibility that the Self could support them in the way that earth supports its qualities such as smell: *yathā gandhādīnāṃ pṛthivīti cet, atiparitoṣitāḥ smaḥ. idam eva hi naḥ pratyāyakaṃ nāsty ātmeti, yathā na gandhādibhyo 'nyā pṛthivīti. ko hi sa*[193] *gandhādibhyo 'nyāṃ pṛthivīṃ nir-*

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[192] Sastri (1934) mentions that the view of substance as a substrate or possessor of qualities is denied by the Tamil commentator on the *Śivajñānabodha*, Śivajñānayogin, and by Umāpati Śivācārya on p. 455–460 of the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya*. As to whether this was the same Umāpati as the 14th century author of several Tamil works, or the author of the *Kuñcitāṅghristava* and the *Śataratnasaṅgraha* see Goodall 1998 xliv, note 99 and Goodall 2000 211, note 20.

[193] AKBh(P) reads *ko hi sa,* AKBh(BBS) *ko hi satpuriso*, and Yaśomitra's commentary *ko hi satpuruṣo.* Sanderson, noting that there is no evidence of *satpuruṣaḥ* in de la Vallée Poussin's translation of Xuanzang's translation of the text, tentatively suggested that it entered the text between the time of Xuanzang and Yaśomitra, and hence conjectured here just *ko hi.* Schmithausen looked into this matter further, giving me the following information. Xuanzang's Chinese indeed has no equivalent for *satpuruṣaḥ* or *sa.* Paramārtha's (meaning 'for what person') is difficult to judge, reflecting possibly just *ko*

dhārayati? (AKBh(BBS) 1225,2–4), 'If [he replies] that [the Self is the support of impressions and consciousness] in the way that earth [is the support] of odour [, taste, form] and [tactility]), [then] we are delighted beyond measure. For this is exactly what proves to us that the Self does not exist, namely the analogous non-existence of earth over and above the odour and other [entities which they take to be its qualities]. For who is there that perceives earth as something discrete over and above [a certain combination of] odours and the like?'[194] For Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla's refutation of the view that desire and the like require a support, see Hulin 1978 100–101.

But that it is a Sāṅkhya view is less well-known. Wezler drew attention to it in 1985. He argued that both Mallavādin and his commentator Siṃhasūri regarded the phrase *guṇasandrāvo dravyam,* found in the *Mahābhāṣya,* as representing a Sāṅkhya doctrine (Wezler 1985 3–9); and that both Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa regarded the phrase *guṇasamudāyo dravyam* at another part of the *Mahābhāṣya* as a Sāṅkhya definition (p. 11). Nāgeśa, he reports (p. 14), took this to imply that there is no difference between the *samūha* (= *dravya*) and the *samūhin* (= *guṇa*). Wezler also quotes the following passage from Kaiyaṭa's commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya—sattvarajastamāṃsi guṇāḥ, tatpariṇāmarūpāś ca tadātmakā eva śabdādayaḥ pañca guṇāḥ. tatsaṅghātarūpaṃ ca ghaṭādi, na tu tadvyatiriktam avayavi dravyam astīti sāṅkhyānāṃ siddhāntaḥ*—which attributes to Sāṅkhya the view that pots and the like are simply conglomerations of qualities, not some independently existing substance.

Bronkhorst produced a further study focussed on this Sāṅkhya doctrine in 1994.[195] To the passages adduced by Wezler, he added the following.

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hi or possibly *ko hi puruṣaḥ*. The Tibetan has no equivalent for *satpuruṣaḥ*, but does reflect the *sa* (with *de*). The Tibetan translation of Yaśomitra's commentary confirms *ko hi satpuruṣo*. Schmithausen concludes that *satpuruṣo* there is an old corruption for *sa puruṣo*, where *sa* is a *pratīka* and *puruṣo* a gloss. The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* manuscript clearly supports *sa*. Schmithausen therefore wonders if *kaḥ sa* + verb is used like *ko 'yam* + verb, where the person asked for is not somebody present but remote (or not found).

[194] I am there following the translation given at Sanderson 1995a 29.

[195] I e-mailed Prof. Bronkhorst several questions about his article, and he kindly replied by addressing my queries directly and by sending me two more draft documents that

Bhartṛhari's commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* attributes to Sāṅkhya the view that a pot is a collection of colours and so on (*rūpādisamavāyo ghaṭaḥ*). The *Vākyapadīya*, in the context of describing a Sāṅkhya view, qualifies the word *śabdādīnām* (sound and the like) with *sarvamūrtyātmabhūtānām* ('which constitute all corporeal objects'). Puṇyarāja, commenting on a different part of the *Vākyapadīya* writes, *ghaṭaśabdaḥ ... sāṅkhyair guṇasamāhāramātram abhimanyate*. And Dharmapāla, commenting on *Catuḥśataka* 301, writes (in the translation of Tillemans): '[The Sāṅkhya philosopher] Kapila asserts [the following]: Things such as vases and cloths are established simply as [visual] forms (the word thus translated is the Chinese equivalent of *rūpa*) ... and other such [properties]' (Bronkhorst 1994 309–310).

Despite all these references in the texts of other schools, neither Wezler nor Bronkhorst were able to find a statement of this view in a surviving Sāṅkhya source.[196] It is a measure of how much that was central to this tradition is lost; and how arbitrary is what survives.

It seems quite safe to assume that the denial of a substance over and above conglomerates of colour, taste etc. that Rāmakaṇṭha attributes to the Sāṅkhyas is the same view that is referred to by such phrases as *rūpādisamavāyo ghaṭaḥ* or *guṇasamudāyo dravyam*. There is some evidence though that the Sāṅkhya view, though opposed to the Vaiśeṣika model of a separately existing substrate in which qualities inhere, was still quite a way away from the Buddhist reductionist elimination of substance altogether. For Wezler argues (1985 18) that the following passage in the *Mahābhāṣya* outlines the Sāṅkhya view: *athavā yasya guṇāntareṣv api prādurbhavatsu tattvaṃ na vihanyate tad dravyam. kim punas tattvam. tadbhāvas tattvam. tadyathā, āmalakādīnāṃ phalānāṃ raktādayaḥ pītādayaś ca guṇāḥ prādurbhavanty āmalakaṃ badaram ity eva bhavati* (II 200,23–25). According to this, substance is that which

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he has written since, 'The qualities of Sāṅkhya: some supplementary observations' and 'On the nature of *Pradhāna*'.

[196] Dr. Ruzsa, however, sent me, among others, the following references. SK 12: *anyonyāśrayāḥ guṇāḥ*; *Jayamaṅgalā* ad loc.: *nāśrayāntaram eṣām*. *Sāṅkhyasūtra* 6.39: *sattvādīnām ataddharmatvaṁ, tadrūpatvāt* (*tat* = *pradhāna*). YD ad SK 16c (p. 163) *na hi vo dharmebhyo 'nyo dharmī* (*vo* = *sāṁkhyānām*).

does not cease despite different qualities manifesting, just as a fruit remains the same fruit despite changing colour as it ripens. It thus seems that despite opposing the Vaiśeṣika model, this Sāṅkhya view did hold there to be some difference between substance (the conglomerate) and qualities (the constituents).

Wezler concentrates on identifying areas of doctrinal resonance between this view of substance as a conglomerate of qualities and the Sāṅkhya of the *Yuktidīpikā* that is more familiar to us. Bronkhorst, on the other hand, finds it hard to reconcile the two. He points out that, according to the *Yuktidīpikā*, material objects consist not of qualities but of the five elements: earth, water, fire, wind and ether. Each of these *possesses* qualities: ether has sound, wind has sound and touch, fire has sound, touch and colour etc. Not only do the five elements have qualities, but so do the *tanmātra*s out of which the elements evolve. He shows (1994 313–314) that the attempt to interpret Mallavādin through superimposing on to him this classical model of Sāṅkhya as opposed to the model of a world constituted of qualities has led both Mallavādin's commentator Siṃhasūri and Wezler to misinterpret him. This leads him to claim that Siṃhasūri, unlike Mallavādin, was aware of the ideas of classical Sāṅkhya just outlined; and that 'a major change took place in Sāṅkhya doctrine, perhaps some time in the 5th century of our era.' Before this change material objects were looked upon as collections of qualities, afterwards not.

Assuming that to be the case, it is striking that an author as late as Rāmakaṇṭha refers to this as a Sāṅkhya view centuries after it had been abandoned by Sāṅkhyas.

> *ata evāmrasya rasa iti bhedavyapadeśaḥ samudāyaikadeśatva*[197]*khyāpanāya vanasya dhavaḥ śobhana iti*[198]*vad upapadyata eva.*

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[197] Goodall conjectures °*deśa* in place of °*deśatva* (see note 281 on page 252 of Goodall 1998), perhaps prompted by the parallel in KV (see *viśiṣṭasamudāyaikadeśapratipādanāya* in note 205). The transmitted reading seems to me to construe naturally however. Furthermore, when the Buddhist, in a few sentences, comes to extrapolate this remark about expressions such as *āmrasya rasaḥ* to expressions such as *devadattasyecchā* he describes the latter as *viśiṣṭajñānapravāhasambandhitāpradarśanārthaḥ*. The fact that

> That is precisely why the expression, 'the taste of the mango', [that exhibits in its formulation] difference, serves [in fact] to designate [simply] that [the taste] is a single part of a conglomerate, just like [the expression] 'the Dhava tree[199] of the forest is beautiful'.

Everyday phrases such as 'the Dhava tree of the forest' are not intended by the speaker, or understood by the hearer, to indicate that the forest exists separately from the individual trees in it, but rather that the tree in question is a part of the forest in question. Similarly, when we talk of the taste, smell etc. of something, we are specifying not a quality of a substance, but a part of a whole, the whole being no more than the conglomerate of the parts.

> *kasya tarhīyam icchā? iṣyamāṇasya karmaṇo grāmāder eva. atha hetoḥ kasyeti, ucyate yato 'nantaraṃ dṛśyate tasya viśiṣṭasyaiva jñānasya pūrvatarajñānajasaṃskāraparipākātmanaḥ.*
>
> [Vaiśeṣika:] What in that case is this desire of?[200] [Buddhist:] Just the desired object—a village[201] or the like. [Or] if [you mean], '[desire arises] from what cause?'[202] we reply: [it arises] from that particular cognition immediately after which it is seen, whose nature is the maturation of a trace produced by an earlier cognition.

The Buddhist rejected that taste is a quality inhering in a substance, which was the example on which the Vaiśeṣika inference rested. He asserted instead that in phrases where taste is used with a word in the genitive such as

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he uses an abstract suffix in this corresponding compound, makes the conjecture hard to defend.

[198] *śobhana iti* Ked, B, P; *śobhata iti* Ped.

[199] According to Meulenbeld the Dhava tree is *Anogeissus Latifolia* Wall (see Das 1988 442).

[200] The questioner means, 'to what does desire belong?', but the respondent exploits an ambiguity in the use of the genitive, and takes it to be asking, 'what is the desire for?', i.e. what is it directed to.

[201] When one has a desire to go to that village.

[202] These sentences do not translate easily into English, for 'who/what does desire belong to', 'what is desire of', and 'what is the cause of desire' are not phrases that overlap in meaning in English. But the Sanskrit phrase *kasyecchā* can mean all three of them, which accounts for the course of the dialogue from *kasya tarhīyam icchā?* to *atha hetoḥ kasyeti*. The questioner intended the first meaning, but the Buddhist replies to the second and then rephrases the question in the third meaning.

āmrasya (of the mango), what is implied is that the taste is one part of the conglomerate that we refer to by the word 'mango'. The Vaiśeṣika returns here from the example, taste, to the proof-subject itself (*pakṣa*), desire. What kind of word goes in the genitive with the word 'desire', if not a substance in which it inheres? The Buddhist gives two answers: the object desired and that from which desire arises. But the kind of case that the Vaiśeṣika is really concerned with is, of course, that in which a word for the agent of the desire occurs in the genitive. So next he forces the Buddhist to address this kind of case.

> *kathaṃ tarhi devadattasyecchetyādiko 'tra kartṛtvavyavahāro laukikaḥ? kutarkadarśanābhyāsa*mūla upahata *eva,*[203] *vitastāyāḥ pravāha itivad vā*[204] *viśiṣṭajñānapravāhasambandhitāpradarśanārtho yukta eva.*[205]
>
> [Vaiśeṣika:] How in that case do we have everyday expressions of agency with regard to [desire], such as 'Devadatta's desire'? [Buddhist:] Being rooted in the inculcation of traditions that possess bad logic, [expressions like that are] just wrong; or they are for the sake of indicating that [the desire] is connected with a particular stream of cognition,[206] like [such expressions as] 'the flow of the Vitastā [river]', [in which case they are] appropriate.

If 'Devadatta's desire' is used to express that the desire belongs to something other than itself, it is wrong. But if it is used to express that the desire is connected with one particular stream of cognition, Devadatta's, as opposed to another stream, it is acceptable. Being 'connected with a stream' should not be taken to mean that at the time of the desire there is any other entity with

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[203] °*mūla upahata eva* em. Goodall; °*mūlopahata eva* Ked, Ped, B, P (See *mūlo bhrānta eva* in note 205.)

[204] *itivad vā* Ked, B, P; *itivac cā* Ped.

[205] See KV ad 2.25ab, lines 8–10: *kathaṃ tarhi pṛthivyāṃ gandha ityādivyavahāraḥ. kudarśanābhyāsamūlo bhrānta eva. yadi vā viśiṣṭasamudāyaikadeśapratipādanāya vanasya dhavaḥ śobhana itivad yukta eveti.* Note that in this parallel section in KV (the beginning of which is given in note 191 and the continuation here) *asmābhiḥ* (in note 191) refers to Śaivas, whereas the corresponding *asmākam* in this text refers to Buddhists. It is Rāmakaṇṭha himself who is arguing against the Vaiśeṣika there, not a Buddhist, despite the close mirroring of wording. See also MatV VP 153,12–13.

[206] Goodall quotes this sentence and translates it in a footnote to the parallel passage in KV. He interprets *viśiṣṭajñānapravāha*° differently as 'stream of particular cognitions' (p. 253, note 285).

which it is connected. Rather the point is that it is connected with previous cognitions and subsequent cognitions. These are linked to it because they form a chain, each one causing the next. Even Buddhists who believe only in these chains of mental events and not in any substrate beyond them still need of course to specify, when they talk of an individual 'link' such as a desire, which chain that desire falls in. Expressions such as 'Devadatta's desire' for this purpose are therefore acceptable to the Buddhist.[207] That expression is likened to 'the flow of the river' because it underlines that 'Devadatta' is nothing more than a chain or stream of events by comparing him to a river. And by comparing 'desire' to 'flow' what is highlighted is that just as the flow *is* the river at one time and place, desire *is* Devadatta at one time.

> *ātmavādinām api vā devadattasya svātmaivātra pramāṇam iti katham asau vyavahāraḥ. pramāṇenānupapadyamānaḥ kalpita eveti cet, kṛtaṃ vyavahāreṇa. pramāṇam eva hi satyetaratvavyavasthāpanāyānusaraṇīyam, tac cetaratrāpi samānam, iti jñānam eva viśiṣṭam icchā, na tu guṇaḥ kasya cit.*
>
> Alternatively [we could reply]: how do even [you] who postulate a Self [explain] the everyday expression, 'Devadatta's own Self alone is the authority in this matter'.[208] If [you] say, '[that expression] is artificial, [since it is] not justified by valid means of knowledge,' then enough of everyday linguistic usage, for it is [therefore] valid means of knowledge alone that should be followed in order to establish whether something is true or false. And the same

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[207] Vasubandhu gives the same explanation of the use of such expressions: *vyapadeśas tu pṛthivyā gandhādaya iti viśeṣaṇārtham, te hy eva tadākhyā gandhādayo yathā pratīyeran*[a] *nānya iti, kāṣṭhapratimāyāḥ śarīravyapadeśavat* (AKBh(BBS) 1225,5–6), 'We do speak of the odour etc. of earth, but [only] to be specific, so that only those odours etc. that are referred to by that [expression] be understood and no others, just as we speak of the body of the wooden image'. I.e. we say, 'the body of this wooden image' to show that we are not talking of any other body, but we do not thereby imply that the wooden image exists over and above its body.

a) *pratīyeran* AKBh(P), MS; *vijñāyeran* AKBh(BBS).

[208] I am not certain in what context this expression would have been used. Possibly the sense would have been: in deciding how to act Devadatta should follow his own instincts alone. In any case the point of the Buddhist citing it here is clear, namely, that it seems to imply that Devadatta is something separate from his Self, in the way that 'the mango's taste' seems to imply that the mango is something separate from its taste.

goes for the other [everyday linguistic usage, 'Devadatta's desire'].[209] So desire is just a particular cognition, not a quality of anything.

4. Sāṅkhya

4.1. The Sāṅkhya Argument

yad api sāṅkhyaiḥ saṃhatānāṃ pārārthyaṃ śayanādīnām iva kāryakaraṇānāṃ parasiddhāv anumānam upanyastam, tad apy ubhayavādisiddhaṃ vijñānam eva sādhayatīti siddhasādhanam.

And as for the inference put forward by the Sāṅkhyas in order to prove [the existence of] a further [entity] (i.e. a soul)—namely the fact that the body and sense faculties [that comprise the material human being], being compounded, are for the sake of something else, just like beds etc. [are compounded and are for the sake of something else]—that too proves only cognition, which is established for both disputants, so [this argument] proves [only] what is already established.[210]

The argument referred to is mentioned in the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*.[211] The three principal commentators on that text reconstruct it slightly differently. Accor-

[209] I.e. that too is not justified by valid means of knowledge, so it must be artificial. I am taking *tat* as *pramāṇenānupapadyamānatvam.*

[210] It does not prove the existence of anything disputed (*vipratipanna*) or unseen (*adṛṣṭa*), such as a Self.

[211] SK 17: *saṅghātaparārthatvāt triguṇādiviparyayād adhiṣṭhānāt | puruṣo 'sti bhoktṛbhāvāt kaivalyārthaṃ pravṛtteś ca* || The commentators disagree as to whether *saṅghātaparārthatvāt* stands by itself as an independent reason, or whether it is explained and completed by *triguṇādiviparyayād.* (Gauḍapāda thinks the former (GBhā 20,16–18), Vācaspati the latter (TK 120,9–27). The redactor of the *Sāṅkhyasūtra*s gives two separate sūtras: *saṃhataparārthatvāt* and *triguṇādiviparyayāt* (SS 140 and 141)).

Rāmakaṇṭha treats this argument at MatV VP ad 6.18c–20 (148,1b–149,6b). It is also expounded and defended by Uddyotakara in the *Nyāyavārttika* (NVā(NCG) 326,7–327,5), and mentioned in the *Ślokavārttika*: *saṅghātasanniveśau ca na staḥ pārārthyavarjitau,* 'And composites and arrangements do not exist without the property of being for the sake of something else.' (ŚV(P_2), *ātmavāda* 114ab). It is discussed in many Buddhist texts, including the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (ad *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 3.22 and 26: mentioned by

ding to Gauḍapāda its formal structure is:[212] 'It is inferred that this very [body], which is a composite of the Great and the other [evolutes][213] is for the sake of the soul, because it is insentient like a bed.' The author of the *Yukti-dīpikā*, by contrast, writes:[214] 'In this [world], compounded things, like beds, chairs, chariots, houses etc., can be observed to be for the sake of something else. And there exists this compounded thing, namely the body. Therefore this too must be for the sake of something else. That something else is the soul. Therefore the soul exists.' Vācaspati Miśra, finally, also gives a slightly different version of the argument:[215] 'The Unmanifest (*avyakta*), the Great (*mahat*), the Ego (*ahaṅkāra*) and the other [twenty-one evolutes][216] exist for the sake of another, because they are compounded, like a bed, a chair and other means [of enjoyment].' He then reminds us why they are all compounded: because they are composed of the three *guṇa*s.

Tillemans 1992 445–446); *Nyāyapraveśa* (NyPr 5,7–11); *Pramāṇavārttika* (PVā 4.29–33); *Nyāyabindu* (NyBi 3.87), *Tattvasaṅgraha* (TS(GOS) 307–310) and their commentaries. This tradition of response on the Buddhist side stretches back at least as far as Vasubandhu, since Dharmakīrti quotes him on the subject at PVā 4.32. (Although the quotation is unattributed by Dharmakīrti, the commentaries identify its author. See for example PVV 426,10–11: *yathoditam ācāryavasubandhunā parārthāś cakṣurādaya ity atra paraś ced ātmā vivakṣitaḥ so 'siddho dṛṣṭānta iti.* Tillemans (1992 445) comments that the quotation is most likely from the *Vādavidhi.*)

[212] GBhā 20,10: *yo 'yaṃ mahadādisaṅghātaḥ sa puruṣārthaḥ, ity anumīyate, acetanatvāt paryaṅkavat.*

[213] *mahadādisaṅghātaḥ* could be referring not to the body but to the whole manifest universe. I take it as referring to the body because after this sentence, Gauḍapāda explains the example and then, returning to and summing up the main argument that he stated in this sentence, writes: *tat parārtham idaṃ śarīraṃ pañcānāṃ mahābhūtānāṃ saṅghāto vartate. asti puruṣo yasyedaṃ bhogyaṃ śarīraṃ bhogyamahadādisaṅghātarūpaṃ samutpannam iti* (GBhā 20,13–15).

[214] *iha saṅghātāḥ parārthā dṛṣṭās tadyathā śayanāsanarathaśaraṇādayaḥ* [variant *caraṇādayaḥ*]. *asti cāyaṃ śarīralakṣaṇaḥ saṅghātaḥ. tasmād anenāpi parārthena bhavitavyam. yo 'sau paraḥ sa puruṣaḥ. tasmād asti puruṣaḥ* (YD 168,5–7).

[215] TK 120,10–11: *avyaktamahadahaṅkāraprabhṛtayaḥ parārthāḥ, saṅghātatvāt, śayanāsanādyaṅgavat.*

[216] I.e. everything in the Sāṅkhya universe except the soul.

Rāmakaṇṭha does not give the argument in its formal structure but it seems safe to say that in his version the logical reason is being compounded, the property to be proved is being for the sake of something else, and the proof-subject is that denoted by his compound *kāryakaraṇānām.*

The three Sāṅkhya commentators differ with regard to their proof-subject in that Vācaspati gives it as the Unmanifest (= *prakṛti, pradhāna*) and its evolutes, and the other two as the body.[217] In translating Rāmakaṇṭha's *kārya-karaṇānām* as 'the body and sense faculties' I align him with Gauḍapāda and the YD (taking all three's proof-subject to be 'body' in the wide sense as including the faculties of sense and action and the three mental faculties) and against Vācaspati.[218]

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[217] The proof-subject in the *Nyāyavārttika, Nyāyapraveśa, Nyāyabindu, Tattvasaṅgraha* and *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* is 'the eyes and the [other sense-faculties]': *parārthāś cakṣurādayaḥ saṅghātatvāc chayanāsanādyaṅgaviśeṣavat* NyPr 5,8–9; *parārthāś cakṣur-ādayaḥ saṅghātatvāc chayanāsanādyaṅgavat* NB 82,16–17; *pārārthyaṃ cakṣurādīnāṃ yat punaḥ pratipādyate | śayyāsanādivat*[a] *tena saṅghātatvena hetunā* || TS(GOS) 307; *parārthāś cakṣurādayaḥ saṅghātatvāt śayanāsa*[*sa* conj. Sāṅkṛtyāyana; *śa* MS]*nādyaṅgavat* PVV, 425,7. The Yuktidīpikā also uses this formulation, *cakṣurādayaḥ*, subsequent to its initial *śarīralakṣaṇaḥ saṅghātaḥ*: *tasmād ayuktaṃ saṃhatārthāḥ śayanādivac cakṣurādayaḥ* (YD 168,17).

a) Both editions read *śayyāśanādivat. śayyāsanādivat* is the reading of the Patan manuscript, as kindly conveyed to me by Kei Kataoka.

[218] *kāryakaraṇānām* has two senses. It refers to the twenty-three Sāṅkhya *tattva*s below *prakṛti*: see SK 32, and YD ad loc., where these twenty-three are divided into the thirteen *karaṇa*s and their ten *kārya*s (five *tanmātra*s and five *mahābhūta*s); and it refers to the body composed of those ten *kārya*s and the sense-faculties corresponding to those thirteen *tattva*s. (The compound *kāryakaraṇa* is frequently used in the *Pañcārthabhāṣya.* As evidence that it sometimes intends by *kārya* the body, see for example *kāryapiṇḍaḥ śarīrākhyaḥ* PaBhā 26,4.) I prefer to see Rāmakaṇṭha as primarily denoting by it the body and senses for two reasons. 1) Vācaspati's proof-subject is eccentric. As pointed out in note 217, the proof-subjects in the versions of the argument appearing in Buddhist texts and in the *Nyāyavārttika* are all *cakṣurādi*, i.e. the faculties that make up human organisms. Moreover, in the five remaining early commentaries on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā—Sāṅkhyavṛtti, Sāṅkhyasaptativṛtti, Jayamaṅgalā, Māṭharavṛtti* and (Paramārtha's Chinese translation of) the *Suvarṇasaptati*—the proof-subjects are either the body (*śarīra*) or the conglomerate of faculties (*cakṣurādisaṅghāta*). 2) Rāmakaṇṭha's compound echoes the

The property to be proved in Gauḍapāda's argument is being for the sake of the soul. This leaves him open to the following charge. Either he intends his example of a bed as being for the sake of the soul or not. If not, then pervasion with being for the sake of the soul is not established; if so, then he is assuming in his example precisely what the argument seeks to prove.[219] Perhaps for this reason, the other three divide the argument into two. First they prove being for the sake of another from being compounded. It is the pervasion between these two that the examples of beds and the like instantiate. Then they identify this other with the soul as another step. It is the step that Rāmakaṇṭha's Buddhist (and the opponents in Vācaspati's commentary and the *Yuktidīpikā*)[220] decides to challenge.

Turning lastly to the logical reason, the YD, Vācaspati and, as I construe him, Rāmakaṇṭha give it as 'being compounded'. Gauḍapāda by contrast holds that compounded things are for the sake of the soul, not by virtue of being compounded, but by virtue of being insentient.

Some modern scholars have construed the claim that compounded things are for the sake of another as indicating that compounded things are assembled by this other.[221] It is presumably this idea which has led others to characterize

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terminology that the YD uses, where it is clearly not the *tattvas*, but the material human organism that is being referred to. Thus we read *janmalakṣaṇaṃ ca maraṇalakṣaṇaṃ ca kāryakaraṇasya* (YD 175,4–5); and *kāryakaraṇasaṅghātaḥ devadattaśabdavācyaḥ* (YD 169,1). 3) Rāmakaṇṭha deals with this argument in MatV VP (ad 6.18b–19c), where the fact that he gives the proof-subject as *cakṣurādīndriyavarga* makes it likely that the proof-subject here too is the human conglomeration of faculties. I have greatly benefited from detailed discussion on this point with Dr. Ferenc Ruzsa, who gave me the information contained in 1 and 2. I do not accept his suggestion, however, that *kāryakaraṇa* should be translated 'instruments for an effect'.

[219] It could be that Gauḍapāda deliberately equivocates between the two shades of meaning of *puruṣa*, man and soul.

[220] There are no objections in Gauḍapāda's commentary.

[221] See Phukan 1960 93: 'When we find that they [= inanimate things] are so arranged that they can serve an useful purpose, we know that an intelligent person must have arranged them for himself or for another'; and on the following page: 'There can be no order, law, symmetry or co-operation in an assemblage of inanimate objects unless some intelligent being had skillfully arranged them ...'

the argument as from design.[222] But no version of this argument that I have read in a primary source attributes the logical power of the argument to compounded things requiring a maker. It would in fact be highly 'un-Sāṅkhya' to do so, since the Sāṅkhya's soul (for whose sake they exist) is not their maker, not being an agent. Existing for another's sake in this argument means not having been constructed by the other, but being an object of experience for that other. Thus, when Gauḍapāda is explaining his example he writes, 'There is a man who lies on the bed, for whose purpose it is.'[223] He does not say that there is a man who made it.

In the NPP sentence under discussion the Buddhist dismisses the argument on the grounds that the other, for whose sake compounded things exist, could be cognition, and hence the argument proves what is already established (*siddhasādhana*). The opponents in Vācaspati's commentary and in the *Yuktidīpikā* also deny that the other, for whose sake compounded things exist, is the Self; but they propose that it is something different from cognition. The reason for this difference is that the context of the argument in the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* is different from the context in which it occurs in NPP. In the latter it is being used to argue for a Self beyond cognition. In the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* it is being used to argue for a soul above the twenty-three manifest evolutes of the material world and their unmanifest source. Thus the opponents in Vācaspati's commentary and in the *Yuktidīpikā* begin by arguing that the other, for whose sake compounded things exist, could be another composite of these material evolutes.

When the Sāṅkhya argument is discussed in Buddhist texts, both of the points that Rāmakaṇṭha puts into the mouth of his Buddhist, that it proves only cognition, and is thus a case of *siddhasādhana*, are found. Regarding the first, the argument is said at various places to prove *jñāna*,[224] *vijñāna*[225] or *citta*.[226] Re-

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[222] See Davies 1957 30: 'The first argument is from design.' Mainkar, writing more recently, takes on this idea from Davies: 'This is the argument of design' (Mainkar 1972 93).

[223] GBhā 20,13: *asti puruṣo yaḥ paryaṅke śete yasyārthaṃ paryaṅkaḥ.*

[224] See note 231.

[225] See TSP(GOS) 117,12.

[226] See, for example, TSP(GOS) 117,8b.

garding the second, see for example Śāntarakṣita's *iṣṭasiddhir* ('proving of what is accepted')[227] and Kamalaśīla's *siddhasādhyatā* ('the having as one's property to be proved something that is already established').[228] When Dharmakīrti claims that *vaiphalyam* ('pointlessness')[229] would accrue, and when Śāntarakṣita writes *sādhanaṃ vyarthaṃ* ('the proof is without point'),[230] they are there also making the same point: the reason they term the argument pointless is because of it establishing only cognition.[231]

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[227] See note 231.

[228] At TSP(GOS) 117,12 and 117,19.

[229] At PVā 4.33c'd: *anyathāniṣṭaṃ bhaved vaiphalyam eva vā* || 'Otherwise (i.e. if the property to be proved is simply being for the sake of another and not being for the sake of the soul), then either [the property to be proved] would be something unintended, or [the proof] would be completely superfluous.' I owe my understanding of the verse to Tillemans 2000 57.

[230] See note 231.

[231] The general Buddhist strategy is to ask for clarification about the precise property to be proved: if it is 'being for the sake of the soul', then it is not instantiated in the example; if it is being for the sake of cognition or simply being for the sake of another, then it proves only what is established / is pointless. See for example TS(GOS) 308–310: *ādheyātiśayārthatvaṃ yady eṣām upapādyate* | *iṣṭasiddhir yad iṣṭās te 'smābhir jñānopakāriṇaḥ* || *avikāryupakāritvasādhane sādhyaśūnyatā* | *dṛṣṭāntasya calasyaiva yuktās te 'py upakāriṇaḥ* || *sāmānyena tu pārārthyaṃ yady eṣāṃ samprasādhyate* | *tathāpi sādhanaṃ vyarthaṃ siddhāś cittopayoginaḥ* || 'If these [eyes and the like] are argued to be for the sake of something that can be assisted (and thus modified), then [all that is] proved is something accepted [by us], for we accept that they are factors which aid cognition. [But] if [the argument is held to] prove that [they] are factors which aid something unmodifiable, the example lacks the property to be proved; [for] the [beds and seats cited in the example], for their part, should be appropriately regarded as factors which aid only something in flux (*calasya*). If, on the other hand, they are proved to be for the sake of another in general [without the nature of that other being specified], even then the argument is pointless since [for us] they are established to be factors aiding the mind.'

Buddhists can undermine the argument's proof of the Self without disputing the pervasion it claims between compounded things and being for the sake of another. But do they in fact accept this pervasion, or do they just agree to it for the sake of the argument? According to Dharmakīrti, they do indeed agree to it. He says in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*: 'They [i.e. the Buddhists] accept that composites accomplish the benefit of another, and thus the *sādhana* is superfluous.' (Quoted at Tillemans 1992 447. I use his translation of

nanu[232] *tasya*[233] *anityatvāt kramena saṃhatatvam iti tato 'py anyo 'saṃhataḥ paro*[234] *'numeyaḥ.*

[Sāṅkhya:] Since that (i.e. cognition) is impermanent it is compounded sequentially, so surely we should infer something else uncompounded beyond even that.

The Sāṅkhya gets around the problem by re-applying the argument, this time with cognition as the proof-subject.

satyam, yadi tathābhūtena vyāptiḥ siddhā [Ked p. 12] *bhavet. saṃhatānāṃ hi dṛṣṭānte saṃhataśarīrādiviṣayam eva pārārthyaṃ siddham, iti jñānam eva tathābhūtaṃ sidhyati.*

[Buddhist:] That [would be] true if concomitance [of the logical reason, being compounded,] were established with something of that nature (i.e. being for the sake of something uncompounded). In fact (*hi*), in the example, the fact that compounded things are for the sake of another is established [with the 'other' there] referring to nothing other than things like bodies, which are compounded. So [the argument] proves only cognition of that nature (i.e. compounded).

The Buddhist here appeals to an analysis of the bed example that is maintained by the opponents in the Sāṅkhya commentaries, namely that it is for the sake of a body. Since this is a compounded entity, the Sāṅkhya proponents of the argument are hardly on firm footing to claim that cognition, as a result of being compounded, can be disqualified from being (ultimately) the other.

In order to understand the next sentence of NPP we will look in some detail at how one of the Sāṅkhya commentators, Vācaspati, attempts to overcome this objection. Vācaspati's opponent states that since beds and the like are for the sake of compounded bodies the argument allows us to know another com-

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the Tibetan: *de dag 'dus pa gźan gyi don byed par ni khas blaṅs pa'i phyir. sgrub par byed pa 'bras bu med pa yin no.* P 289a 7, D 191a 6–7.)

[232] *nanu* Kedpc, B; omitted in Ped, Kedac; *vakra* P.

[233] *tasya* B, P; *vijñānasya* Ked, Ped.

Marginal gloss above *tasya* in B and P: *vijñānasya.*

[234] Marginal gloss above *paro* in B: *puruṣaḥ.*

pounded thing, not an uncompounded *ātman.*[235] Vācaspati replies that if compounded things were for the sake of another compounded thing then that too would be for the sake of another compounded thing, which would also be for the sake of another compounded thing ad infinitum. If an infinite regress can be avoided then it should be, because otherwise one is committing the logical fault of being unnecessarily heavy on postulation. In this case the infinite regress can be avoided by somewhere along the line assuming that a compounded entity is for the sake of something uncompounded. Thus rather than assuming that there are only compounded entities in the universe, Vācaspati claims that an uncompounded, unperceivable soul can be proved through, ironically, the principle of economy of postulation.

He imagines an opponent stating that if there are valid means of knowledge for an option involving more postulation, then heaviness of postulation is not a logical fallacy, and should be endured. What the valid means of knowledge is in this case is not stated, but probably it is the fact that in the inference's example what is observed is being for the sake of something compounded. Since this is observable, is it not better to accept an infinite number of these than one case of being for the sake of something uncompounded, which is not observed? Vācaspati answers that the argument's pervasion is simply between being compounded and being for the sake of another, nothing more specific than that, so it provides no evidence for the proof-subject, the evolutes, being for the sake of something compounded.

Thus in Vācaspati's argument we have two clearly delimited stages. He requires no more of the first stage than that it establishes that the evolutes are for the sake of another.[236] He is not afraid to acknowledge that it cannot lend any weight to whether they are for the sake of something compounded or un-

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[235] TK 120,12–14: *syād etat—śayanāsanādayaḥ saṅghātāḥ saṃhataśarīrādyarthā dṛṣṭāḥ, na tv ātmānaṃ prati parārthāḥ. tasmāt saṅghātāntaram eva paraṃ gamayeyuḥ, na tv asaṃhatam ātmānam iti.*

[236] This contrasts strongly with the argument of Gauḍapāda where the property to be proved is not just being for the sake of another, but being for the sake of the soul/person (*puruṣa*).

compounded.[237] What clinches it for the latter is the independent consideration that such a choice enables avoidance of the threat of infinite regress.

It is noteworthy that Vācaspati clearly takes the example as being for the sake of something compounded. He differs here from the author of the *Yuktidīpikā*, who responds to the problem of the beds etc. in the example being for the sake of something compounded in the following way.[238] It is commonly accepted (*prasiddha*) in the world, he says, that beds and the like are for the sake of the material human being, thus the example is formulated according to that. But it is later refuted by the overall conclusion, at which point it can be seen that they are for the sake of the soul. There is no suggestion in Vācaspati's commentary that the example must be corrected. Rather he accepts that beds are for the sake of something compounded, bodies. Bodies, in turn, are for the sake of the uncompounded soul. In the *Yuktidīpikā*, once the soul has been established we can assume that all compounded things are for the sake of it. For Vācaspati, rather than all material entities being on the same level—for the sake of the soul—there is a hierarchy in which although all compounded things are for the sake of something else, some are for the sake of another compounded thing, which is itself for the sake of the soul.

> *ante 'py anavasthāparihārārthaṃ kasya cit tathābhūtasyaivābhyupagamān nānyo 'tathābhūtaḥ.*
>
> Because, in order to avoid an infinite regress, [we] accept something simply of that nature (i.e. compounded) even at the end, there is no further [entity] not of that nature (i.e. there is no uncompounded entity).

Rāmakaṇṭha's Buddhist here imagines that the Sāṅkhya might use the argument we have just observed Vācaspati to use, namely, that the Self is needed to avert an infinite regress. He asserts that to postulate an uncompounded en-

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[237] In fact he uses it to his advantage: by admitting that the example does not support that the other is uncompounded, but merely illustrates *pārārthya*, he can then assert that equally it does not support that the other is compounded.

[238] YD 169,5–7: *ucyate: na prasiddhyanurodhāt. satyaṃ kāryakaraṇasaṅghātasya pārārthyaṃ bhoktṛtvaṃ ca* [*ca* omitted in MSS] *nopapadyate. loke tu devadattārthatvaṃ śayanādīnāṃ prasiddham. atas tad anugacchanto vayam apy evaṃ brūmah.*

tity is not the only way of averting it, for the chain can simply end with something compounded.

Rāmakaṇṭha does not have his Sāṅkhya come back at this. But it does not seem like an entirely satisfactory solution, for if something compounded exists that is not for the sake of something else then the pervasion between *hetu* and *sādhya* is broken. Thus far the Buddhist had been arguing as though he accepted the pervasion.[239]

> *na hi yad dṛṣṭāntāparidṛṣṭam asiddhavyāptikaṃ vastu, tad dhetuḥ*[240] *svaśaktyaiva*[241] *sādhayituṃ śaknoti, jñāpako 'yaṃ na kārako yataḥ.*
>
> For a logical reason cannot establish through its own power alone something[242] which does not feature in the example and whose concomitance is not established. For it is something which [passively and disinterestedly] reveals, not an active performer.

Smoke does not cause fire but merely reveals knowledge of it. In the same way this logical reason cannot somehow bring about *asaṃhataviṣayapārārthyam* when all that it can be observed to be concomitant with is *saṃhataviṣayapārārthyam.*

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[239] Uddyotakara, as well as Vācaspati, appeals to something uncompounded as the only way of averting infinite regress, in the course of his defence of this Sāṅkhya *pārārthya* argument. Oetke (1988 381) discusses the philosophical validity of Uddyotakara's argument and is unconvinced by it, claiming that the Buddhist can avoid the regress in the following way. 'Er kann bestreiten, daß der Regreß nur durch Annahme eines nichtzusammengesetzten Gegenstandes zum Stehen gebracht werden kann.—Warum nicht durch die Annahme eines aus Bestandteilen bestehenden Gegenstandes einer speziellen Art oder einer besonderen Kategorie?' But whether or not the entity at the end is 'of a special kind or particular category', if it is compounded then I do not see that the infinite regress has been successfully averted. Only if one rejects the pervasion can the chain come to an end with something compounded. But if one rejects the pervasion then there is no problem of infinite regress anyway. Thus I regard Oetke's other three critiques (p. 381) of Uddyotakara's argument as more incisive than this one.

[240] Above *taddhetuḥ* in B is a marginal gloss: *tasyānumāna*. This implies that its author takes *taddhetuḥ* to be a compound. I have not done so.

[241] *svaśaktyaiva* B, P, Ped; *svaśaktyā* Ked.

[242] In this case *asaṃhataviṣayapārārthyam.*

Rāmakaṇṭha's giving of the final word in this argument to the Buddhist, from which we can infer a silent agreement on his part that the Sāṅkhya argument cannot refute the Buddhist doctrine of no-Self, is particularly noteworthy given that two of the scriptures of Rāmakaṇṭha's own tradition, the *Mṛgendra* and the *Mataṅga,* put this argument into the mouth of Śiva, advancing it as a valid proof.[243]

What is Rāmakaṇṭha's reason for distancing himself from a Sāṅkhya argument that was accepted by the earlier texts of his own tradition? My impression is that he wants to forge a more separate identity for his tradition; and that he wants his own version of *ātmavāda* to be firmly distinguishable from those of the Brāhmaṇical traditions so that the Buddhist arguments against the latter, which he recognized to be strong, would be irrelevant to his own position.

4.2. Cognition is Self-Illuminating

> *na ca jñānam asmākam asiddham iti vācyam. arthaprakāśo hy ayaṃ sakalalokaprasiddho 'nubhūyata eva.*
>
> And [you] cannot say, 'cognition is not established for us,' for this shining forth / illumination of objects (i.e. cognition) is actually experienced, being well-known to everyone in the world.

The Buddhist has just denied that the argument proves compounded things to be for the sake of an uncompounded *ātman*, since nothing of that nature can be shown to occur in the example and therefore to be concomitant with the

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[243] See MatV VP 6.18c–19b and MT 6.2–3. In the *Mṛgendra* the argument is 'Śaivised': it is stated that earth and other effects are created by the Lord; that they are however of no use to him; that nor do they exist for each other, since they are insentient; and that nor are they without purpose in view of the importance of their author. It follows that they exist for the sake of something different from both the Lord and each other, namely the soul (*kṣetrajña*). Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha adds two details: that effects are created by the Lord to enable sentient beings to attain the four aims of man beginning with Dharma; and that strictly speaking they are not created by Śiva, but by Brahmā and others prompted by Śiva.

logical reason. He here imagines that the Sāṅkhya will respond in a parallel fashion, by claiming that what the Buddhist takes compounded things to be for the sake of, cognition, is also completely unestablished. That response would amount to a second attempt by the Sāṅkhya to overcome the Buddhist position that compounded things are for the sake of cognition. The first was to point out that cognition is itself compounded and so must in turn be for the sake of the soul. This second response would entail that compounded things must be directly for the sake of the soul, cognition not being an option owing to its existence being rejected.

But this imagined objection is not only brought up here because it is a way of overcoming the Buddhist refutation of the Sāṅkhya inference. It is also brought up because it is a way of overcoming all of the Buddhist refutations of the various inferences of the Self in this chapter. As we are drawing to a close of this chapter, the Buddhist has to justify the assumption common to all of his arguments, that, unlike the Self, cognition is perceivable and readily accepted by all disputants. In each case the Buddhist has shown that that which is supposed to force us to infer the existence of the Self, being impossible if a Self did not exist, is in fact perfectly explainable given the existence of cognition. But if the Self could explain these phenomena just as well as cognition, why should we accept cognition rather than the Self? The answer is that the former is already accepted by both disputants, *ubhayavādisiddham*. It is experienced by everyone and not something imperceptible (*adṛṣṭa*) like an eternal unchanging soul. It is this insistence on the part of the Buddhist that cognition is just what each of us experiences that gave him the edge in each confrontation; for why postulate an unperceived and disputed entity to explain something, when a perceived and already accepted one will explain it just as well? The necessity of inferring something *asiddha* and *adṛṣṭa* was removed in each case by the Buddhist providing a *siddha* and *dṛṣṭa* category, namely cognition, to do the explaining. In every Buddhist argument this contrast between an unperceivable Self and readily accepted cognition has been expressed through stating that cognition is *anubhavasiddham/ubhayavādisiddham*, or signalled through the use of *eva*: ... *vijñānaṃ bhinnam eva grāhakam anubhavasiddham* ... (8,19–20); *ataś ca pūrvaṃ vijñānam eva pūrvatarajñānajasaṃskārasahāyam ubhayavādisiddhaṃ* ... (9,3–5); *vijñānasantatāv eva kramavatyāṃ sa sidhyati nānyatrātyantāsiddhe* (10,5–6); *tatra*

vijñānam eva pravāhātmakaṃ saṃskārādivaśataḥ pūrvoktāśeṣārtha-kriyānirvartakam ubhayavādisiddham asti (10,17–19); *jñānam eva viśiṣṭam icchā na tu guṇaḥ kasya cit* (11,16–17); *yad api sāṅkhyaiḥ ... pārārthyaṃ ... anumānam upanyastam, tad apy ubhayavādisiddhaṃ vijñānam eva sādhayati* (11,17–20). Since so much weight is placed on this contrast, the Buddhist does not finish before formally justifying it. So I insert a sub-section break here to bring out that this question of whether cognition is experienced, which occupies the rest of the chapter, is not only a product of the Sāṅkhya argument, but addresses itself to the core of the Buddhist's strategy since the beginning of the chapter.

> *na cāsāv arthadharmaḥ,*[244] *arthavailakṣaṇyenādhyātmam anubhavāt, arthasya sarvān praty aviśeṣāt sarvapratyakṣatā*[245]*prasaṅgāc ca.*
>
> And it is not a property of objects, because we experience it internally as something distinct from objects; and because [if it were] it would undesirably follow that an object, since it is the same with everyone, [on being perceived by one person] would be perceivable for all.

This imagined objection (from a Kaumārila point of view) that cognition is a property of objects has the same double edge to it as the last one in that it responds both to the Buddhist distinction that runs through the chapter, and specifically to the Buddhist refutation of the Sāṅkhya argument. It threatens the claim that the Buddhist has just made that cognition is directly experienced (because according to this tradition cognition is not known directly but, for Śabara, by inference, and, for Kumārila, by *arthāpatti*) and hence it threatens the distinction crucial to the Buddhist throughout the chapter between an unperceivable Self and directly perceived cognition. But at the same time, although it is a Mīmāṃsaka, not a Sāṅkhya idea, it could be seen as a further attempt to undermine the Buddhist refutation of the Sāṅkhya argument: for if cognition were a property of objects it would not be a good candidate for the other (*para*), leaving the Self to fill that role.

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[244] Marginal gloss under *na cāsāv arthadharmo*: *kaumārilamataṃ dūṣayati na cāsāv arthadharma.*

[245] *sarvapratyakṣatā°* P, Ked, Ped; *sarvāpratyakṣatā°* B.

The point of the Buddhist's second response to this objection is as follows. Objects and their properties, not being mentally created, have no special relation to any particular person. Thus if, when an object is cognized, that manifestness becomes a property of the object, the object should be manifest to everyone.[246] Therefore all the objects in the world that are being cognized should be being cognized by everyone else in the world.[247] Only if cognition attaches to perceivers rather than public objects will the cognition of an object be private to an individual perceiver.[248]

> *nāpi puṃsvabhāvas, tasyāsiddheḥ.*[249] *siddhau cāprakāśātmano vyatirekābhāvāt tasyāpy aprakāśarūpatvam ity āyātam āndhyam aśeṣasya jagataḥ.*
>
> And neither is [cognition] the own nature of a soul,[250] because that (i.e. a soul) remains to be proven. And if it were proven, then because [cognition] would not be different from the non-illuminating Self,[251] it too would be non-illuminating, so the whole world would become blind.

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[246] See *sarvātmaprakaṭatā syāt* in the next footnote.

[247] See two parallels elsewhere in the text: *na bodhyadharmas tadbodho jaiminīyabhedānām iva, tasya sarvān praty aviśeṣāt sarvaboddhṛbodhyatāprasaṅgāt* (5,3–5); and *tad apy ayuktam, arthasya sarvān praty aviśeṣāt sarvātmaprakaṭatā syāt, iti sarvasya sarvajñatāprasaṅgaḥ* (18,1b–19,2).

[248] Prof. Schmithausen pointed out to me that Rāmakaṇṭha simplifies the view of the Kaumārilas here in representing them as claiming that *jñāna* is a property of objects. For they distinguished between 'manifestness'/'cognizedness' (*prākaṭya, jñātatā*), and cognition as an action (a distinction not accepted to be real by the Buddhists), the former alone being a property of objects. The former they held to be directly perceived, the latter inferred.

[249] *tasyāsiddheḥ* B, Ked, Ped; *tasyāḥ siddheḥ* P.

[250] If it were, then the Sāṅkhya could claim that the Buddhist, by admitting that compounded things are for the sake of cognition, is effectively admitting that they are for the sake of the soul.

[251] Why would the Self not illuminate? Because whether we are talking of a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika or a Sāṅkhya Self it is non-illuminating—for the Sāṅkhyas *prakāśa* is a property of the *buddhi* not the *puruṣa*. Either the Self is different from or the same as cognition. If the same, then it is just cognition. But if different then it would not illuminate, for it would be strange to assume two conscious entities within the same person. But at the same time, if cognition is the own nature of the Self, as is imagined here, it would not be different from the Self because a thing and its nature are not different. So it too would be non-illuminating.

tad uktam[252]

apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadṛṣṭiḥ prasidhyati || *iti.*

Thus [Dharmakīrti] has said:

For someone [according to whose view] the perception [itself] is not perceived, [even] the perception of the object is not possible.[253]

The Buddhist seems to cite this not as support for either of his two previous points but for the one before: 'this shining forth of objects (i.e. cognition) is actually experienced, being well-known to everyone in the world.'

pradīpavat svaparaprakāśaikasvabhāvatvena viśiṣṭārthaprakāśakaṃ vijñānam anubhavasiddhaṃ nāpahnotuṃ śakyam iti.

[Since] cognition, which reveals particular objects, is like a lamp in that its sole nature is to illuminate itself and other things, it is established by experience; [thus] it cannot be denied.

tad idam uktam[254]

jñānārthau saha rūpadīpa[255]*tulayā jātau vibhāṣāmate* |

Therefore this has been said:

Cognition and object, according to the doctrine of the *Vibhāṣā,* are similar to[256] light and form.

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[252] PVin 1.55cd. Also quoted at NPP 61,1; NVV Vol. 1, 209,27–28; TSP(BBS) Vol. 1, 490,5b–4b and Vol. 2, 705,17; NM(M) Vol. 2, 490,10 and 498,7; and by Jayaratha ad *Tantrāloka* 10.96c–97b.

[253] I follow Vetter in taking *apratyakṣopalambhasya* as a Bahuvrīhi: (1966 106, note 61). A Karmadhāraya interpretation is possible ('A perception that is not perceived could not perceive an object'), but less likely given that Karmadhārayas consisting of adjective followed by noun are rare unless resulting in some sense transcending that of the same two words with the adjective inflected. The Tibetan translates as though the Sanskrit contained a locative absolute or a *yadi*: *dmigs pa mṅon sum ma yin na* (PVin 96,10).

[254] Source unknown.

[255] *rūpadīpa*° Ked, B; *bhāvarūpa*° Ped.

[256] The expression *saha* °*tulayā jāta* is not familiar to me.

ātmanā bhoktrā[257]*dirūpeṇānyena śūnyāḥ skandhā ity ātmaśūnyavādinaḥ.*

Thus the constituents of a person are devoid of any other Self that is an experiencer and [agent]. So say the [Buddhists] who hold that [everything] is devoid of Self (Ātmaśūnyavādins).

[257] *bhoktrā* Ked, Ped ; *bhoktā* B

CHAPTER 2:
Can We Know the Self Through Self-Awareness (*Svasaṃvedana*)?

1. Sadyojyotis' Verse and its Context

atrācārya āha [Ked p. 13]

1.5) *nābhāvaḥ śakyate vaktuṃ pratyaye sarvasākṣiṇi*[1] |
śūnyatā tena sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ bodhabādhitā ||

To this [Buddhist view] the master says:

1.5) The non-existence [of the Self] cannot be proclaimed, given [the existence of] cognition that is the witness of all [objects]. Therefore [the Buddhist doctrine] that all things are empty [of Self] is refuted by experience.

The text here continues straight on from the last sentence translated in Chapter 1. I have translated the verse according to Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary. In order that the reader can see the context in which it occurs in Sadyojyotis' verses, I will here give the verses up to and immediately after this point:

atha meyābdhiṛatnasya śaṅkarasyāmitadyuteḥ |
parīkṣāṃ[2] *leśato vacmi puṃs*[3]*parīkṣāpuraḥsaram*[4] ||1.1||

jñātā kartā ca bodhena buddhvā bodhyaṃ pravartate |
pravṛttiphalabhoktā ca yaḥ pumān ucyate 'tra saḥ ||1.2||

kartrādinā catuṣkeṇa vyavahāraḥ samāpyate |
vyavasthāpayituṃ śakyo nāyam ekāntavādibhiḥ ||1.3||

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[1] *sarvasākṣiṇi* Ked, Ped, B, P; *sarvasākṣiṇaḥ* M.
[2] *parīkṣāṃ* Ped, B, P, M; *parīkṣā* Ked.
[3] *puṃs*° Ked; *puṃ*° Ped, B, P, M.
[4] °*saram* Ked, Ped, P, M; *sarām* B, v.l. in Ked.

sarvaikatvaprasiddhau tu[5] *pramāṇaṃ nāsti kiñcana* |
āmnāyaś cen na yenāsau vāsanāsamprakāśakaḥ ||1.4||
nābhāvaḥ śakyate vaktuṃ pratyaye sarvasākṣiṇi |
śūnyatā tena sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ bodhabādhitā ||1.5||
arthasyāpi na cābhāvo yato 'yam anubhūyate |

In 1.1 Sadyojyotis introduces the whole text by stating that he will teach an examination of the Lord preceded by an examination of the soul. 1.2 begins the examination of the soul (that will occupy the whole of the first *kāṇḍa*) by defining it as that knower and doer that acts having cognized objects of cognition through cognition, and that subsequently experiences the fruits of those actions. 1.3 states that everyday activity is enabled by four distinct things: an agent and three others. It cannot be explained by one-sided philosophers (*ekāntavādin*s). Precisely what this group of four things is, and who the *ekāntavādin*s are, is not completely certain.[6] But if we want to see close continuity between this verse and the ones before and after, then we could as-

[5] *tu* Ked, Ped, B, P; *ca* M.

[6] Rāmakaṇṭha's identification of the four is not entirely convincing. He claims that the group referred to is that of the causal factors involved in an action (*kāraka*), sometimes one, two, three or up to six. (NPP 6,2–5: *sa* (*=lokavyavahāraḥ*) *ca sarva eva* [*sarva eva* B, Ked; *sarvo* Ped] *lavanapacanādyātmakaḥ kartrādinā catuṣkeṇety upalakṣaṇam, kriyānibandhanena kārakabhedena yathāsambhavaṃ kvacid ekena dvābhyāṃ tribhir vā ṣaṭparyantair niṣpādyamāno dṛśyate.*) It seems unlikely that Sadyojyotis would explicitly designate the group as fourfold if he were referring to the *kāraka*s.

Rāmakaṇṭha identifies the *ekāntavādin*s as 'Jains' (*jaināḥ*) who deny that the *kāraka*s have distinct functions, seeing them rather as equivalent to a seed, moisture etc., which together constitute a causal complex (*sāmagrī*) and produce their effect when they enter a certain state. They at that point become a cause merely by existing immediately before their effect. (NPP 6,8–11: *atha kim anena kriyākārakaviśeṣavādena, sāmagrīlakṣaṇā hi bījādayo 'rthās tattadavasthāyuktā eva viśiṣṭam aṅkurādikāryaṃ prāgbhāvamātreṇa kāraṇatayā kariṣyanti, iti kāraṇaikāntavādino jaināḥ.*) *ekāntavādinaḥ* would be a surprising label for the Jains given that they are more commonly known as *anekāntavādin*s; indeed it seems that Rāmakaṇṭha may be using the word *jaināḥ* there to refer to Buddhists rather than Jains because on p. 171 of MatV VP he attributes this same view to his Buddhist opponent. Prof. Sanderson provided me with another instance of this usage at *Haravijaya* 47.51: ... *jainair abhīkṣṇam uditā bhavabhaṅgahetuḥ.*

sume that the group of four is intimated in the previous verse[7] and that those referred to as one-sided philosophers are those he is about to attack: Vedān-

[7] From the previous verse's mention of *kartā, bodhena, bodhyam* and *buddhvā* we could see references to, respectively, *kartṛ, karaṇa, karma* and *kriyā*; or since the last three of those words from the previous verse pertain to cognition rather than action, and *jñātā* is also mentioned as well as *kartā*, we could see a reference to the group of four that is mentioned by Vātsyāyana in a similar context at the beginning of the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, namely, *pramātṛ, pramāṇa, prameya* and *pramiti*: *tatra yasyepsājihāsāprayuktasya pravṛttiḥ sa pramātā, sa yenārthaṃ pramiṇoti tatpramāṇam, yo 'rthaḥ pramīyate tat prameyam, yad arthavijñānaṃ sā pramitiḥ, catasṛṣu caivaṃvidhāsu tattvaṃ* [variant: *arthatattvaṃ*] *parisamāpyate* (NBhā(NCG) 1,13–15).

A similar verse to Sadyojyotis' occurs in the *Mṛgendratantra* (1.2.13) in the context of refuting Vedānta: *atha pramāṇaṃ tatrātmā prameyatvaṃ prapadyate | yatraitad ubhayaṃ tatra catuṣṭayam api sthitam* || 'If there is a means of knowing that, then the Self becomes an object of knowledge. Where this pair (i.e. means of knowing and object of knowledge) [occur], all four exist.' (Hulin's translation of this verse does not seem correct. Rather than seeing the first three words of the verse as a suggestion for how the Vedāntin may defend his doctrine that there is only one Self in the universe, and the rest as giving a consequence of that that undermines the Vedāntin, he takes *tatra* to mean 'here', *atha* to mean 'in sum' (despite Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha's gloss of it as *yadi*), and *pramāṇam* to be in apposition with *ātmā*: 'Ici, en somme, le Soi—qui est le moyen de connaissance droite—devient (en plus) l'objet à connaître' (Hulin 1980 70).) Rāmakaṇṭha's father, Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, in commenting on this, quite naturally takes the four to be *pramātṛ, pramāṇa, prameya* and *pramiti*, which he explains as *kartṛ, karaṇa, karma* and *kriyā*. He concludes with, *yad āha ākṣapādaḥ, 'catasṛṣu caivaṃvidhāsu sarvo 'pi vyavahāraḥ parisamāpyate'*, which must be a citation of a slightly different version of the last sentence of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* passage given above. That Jayanta also knew a version of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* passage that contained the words *vyavahāraḥ parisamāpyate* is plausible given his commentary on the passage: *tad ayam iha pramāṇaṃ pramātā prameyaṃ pramitir iti caturvargeṇaiva* [*caturvargeṇaiva* NM(K); *caturvarga eva* NM(M)] *vyavahāraḥ parisamāpyate* (NM(M) Vol. 1, 38,8–9). Thus when Sadyojyotis writes *kartrādinā catuṣkeṇa vyavahāraḥ samāpyate* it is likely that he had (such a version of) the *Nyāyabhāṣya* passage in mind. Since Rāmakaṇṭha would certainly have read his father's commentary on the *Mṛgendra*, and thus been familiar with the *Nyāyabhāṣya*'s group of four and the claim that they are all needed for *vyavahāra*, it is strange that he does not interpret Sadyojyotis as intending that group (or at least the closely related *kartṛ, karaṇa, karma* and *kriyā*). I can only think that he deliberately distorted the meaning of the verse because he wanted to bring up in his commentary the Buddhist (/Jain?) view that the *kāraka*s are of the na-

tins.[8] 1.4 criticizes the Vedāntin doctrine of the oneness of everything on the grounds that there are no means of knowing that oneness, scripture included. 1.5 is the verse under discussion and 1.6ab says that the non-existence of objects is also incorrect, because they are experienced.

Returning to 1.5, we may ask how accurate Rāmakaṇṭha's interpretation is. One might wonder if he is correct to assume that the non-existence mentioned in the first half of the verse refers to the non-existence of the Self, given that the Self is not mentioned. But the way that Sadyojyotis turns in the next verse to 'the non-existence of the object too' means that objects are not the focus of the present verse, making the Self quite plausible. Hence Rāmakaṇṭha is probably also correct that in the phrase *pratyaye sarvasākṣini* the emphasis is on the witness (*sākṣin*) rather than all the objects that it witnesses (*sarva*°). And it is thus natural for him to take *śūnyatā* to mean 'emptiness [of Self]'.[9] That leaves just one possible discrepancy between the two authors. *sarvasākṣini* may not be agreeing with *pratyaye*: its locative ending may be indicating the object of the cognition denoted by *pratyaye* ('given that there is a cognition of the witness of all objects'). Rāmakaṇṭha takes the two words as

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ture of a causal complex without each member of the complex having its own defined and separate role.

[8] That it is Vedāntins, and not Buddhists (or Jains), that Sadyojyotis has in mind in this verse is perhaps made yet more likely by the fact that in the *Mṛgendra* verse quoted in the last footnote it is Vedāntins that are the target. Possibly the label *ekāntavādin* did not so much connote 'one-sided' as refer to the Vedāntin teaching that all is one, in which case one could translate it as 'absolutist' or 'monist'.

[9] That Rāmakaṇṭha does take *śūnyatā* in that way can be inferred both from the last sentence of the last chapter and the one at the very end of this chapter: *tad evaṃ sarvadaikarūpasthiragrāhakaprakāśātmānāropita eva sarvārthasākṣitayā yena pratipuruṣaṃ svasaṃvedanasiddhaḥ, tena kāraṇenātmaśūnyāḥ skandhā iti pakṣaḥ pratyakṣanirākṛta eva.* The word *tena* from the verse is clearly being glossed there by *sarvadaikarūpasthiragrāhakaprakāśātmānāropita eva sarvārthasākṣitayā yena pratipuruṣaṃ svasaṃvedanasiddhaḥ, tena kāraṇena*; and *bodhabādhitā* by *pratyakṣanirākṛta.* Thus *śūnyatā ... sarveṣām bhāvānāṃ* is very likely being glossed with *ātmaśūnyāḥ skandhā iti pakṣaḥ.* I translate *sarveṣām bhāvānāṃ* as 'of all things' and not as 'of the psycho-physical constituents', because I take it that Rāmakaṇṭha must have held this to be its meaning, even if he regarded its most relevant connotation in the context as the psycho-physical constituents.

in agreement for doctrinal reasons: for him *pratyaya* (cognition) is the Self. The two may not have been identified so strongly for Sadyojyotis.

2. Rāmakaṇṭha's Own View. Is It Different from the Buddhist View?

yady evaṃ sarvārthasākṣātkaraṇapravṛtte jñānātmani grāhakasvarūpe pratyakṣasiddhe saty abhāvo nātmanaḥ śakyaḥ pratipādayitum, anubhavasiddhatvāt. bhoktṛtvaṃ hi jñātṛtvam ucyate tad eva ca pāramārthikam ātmano rūpam. tac ca bhavadbhir apy anubhavasiddham ity uktam. ataḥ kim anyat sādhyam iti.

[Siddhāntin:] In that case, since something of the nature of cognition that is engaged in *witnessing all* objects and is by nature a perceiver is proved by direct perception, the *non-existence* of the Self *cannot* be demonstrated, because it is established by experience. For being a perceiver is said to be [the same as] being an experiencer; and it is simply that (i.e. being a perceiver) that is the ultimate form of the Self.[10] And even you have said that that (i.e. being a perceiver) is proved by experience. So what else is there to prove?

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[10] Rāmakaṇṭha's claim in the previous sentence that 'the non-existence of the Self cannot be demonstrated, because it is established by experience' follows because 1) as just stated, cognition (*jñānātman*) is proved by direct experience, and 2) cognition is not different from the Self. 2 is what is argued for in this sentence in two ways: first by equating *jñātṛtva* and *bhoktṛtva*; and then by equating *jñātṛtva* and the Self (or, strictly speaking, identifying the fomer as the ultimate form of the latter). In both equations *jñātṛtva,* which Rāmakaṇṭha is using synonymously with *jnāna*, features as that which is accepted by the Buddhist, and that with which it is equated is what Rāmakaṇṭha holds they should also accept.

That Rāmakaṇṭha is using *jñātṛtva* synonymously with *jñāna* is evidenced not only by the flow of the argument here, where 2 would only be established if that were the case, but also in what follows. For in the next sentence Rāmakaṇṭha claims that the Buddhist has said that *jñātṛtva* is proved by experience, when what he actually said in the last chapter was that *jñana* was proved by experience. Then when the Buddhist responds to these sentences he uses the words *vijñānam asmābhiḥ pratipāditam.* That is to say he talks of the *vijñāna* that is taught by him, not of the *jñātṛtva* that is taught by him—which would

Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary on this verse does not begin here. The entire passage translated in the last chapter was his introduction to this verse, coming as it did after he had finished with Vedānta, the topic of the last verse. Because he interprets the verse to mean that acceptance of cognition engaged in perceiving objects precludes the possibility of holding that there is no Self, he decides that before he comes to the verse his Buddhist will have argued for the existence of cognition.[11] What is clever and distinctive about Rāmakaṇṭha's strategy is that he has his Buddhist achieve that aim through refuting all of the other principal Ātmavādin traditions in a manner that opposes an uncontroversial and universally experienced cognition with the invisible and fanciful chimera of a soul that serves no explanatory function whatsoever. Thus he signals that his own version of *ātmavāda* and his arguments for it will not contain the shortcomings that the Buddhist has correctly, in his opinion, identified in those of the Brāhmaṇical realist schools. And when he now turns to what is wrong with the Buddhist view, his sympathy with and understanding of it, evidenced in the previous portion of the text, will make his critique seem all the more convincing. The way that the Buddhist is so clearly on top in the previous pages, being invested with a false sense of security before being brought down to earth in the present chapter, is akin to a reversal of fortune in story-literature, when nemesis finally strikes.

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be a natural response to *tac ca (= jñātṛtvaṃ ca) bhavadbhir apy anubhavasiddham ity uktam.*

Any implication of identity between *jñātṛ* and *jñāna* would be anathema to a Naiyāyika or a Vaiśeṣika; and it goes against the grain of Sanskrit usage in that *jñātṛ* is an agent noun and *jñāna* is an action noun. But for both Buddhism and for Rāmakaṇṭha, there is no agent of cognition separate from cognition. The word *grāhaka* can naturally be used both as a synonym of the agent noun *jñātṛ* and to refer to the nature of cognition. Hence it is not surprising that in this context where it is held that the *jñātṛ* is nothing other than *jñāna*, Rāmakaṇṭha inserts *grāhakasvarūpa* as a synonym of *jñānātma,* and in the Buddhist response, qualifies *vijñānam* with *grāhakarūpam.*

Though it is true that in both the Buddhist and the Śaiva view *jñātṛ* is nothing other than *jñāna*, one could state the difference between them as being that whereas for Buddhism there is no agent of cognition (*jñātṛ*), only the action of cognition (*jñāna*), for Rāmakaṇṭha there is an agent of cognition but it is cognition.

[11] The whole of the passage looked at in the last chapter was thus in effect a commentary on the phrase *pratyaye sarvasākṣiṇi.*

We will now look closely at these sentences. Rāmakaṇṭha says that given the existence of cognition which is 1) engaged in perceiving objects, 2) a perceiver by nature, and 3) established through direct experience, the Self cannot be denied. If we look back at the very first sentence spoken by the Buddhist,[12] and one from the very end of the last chapter,[13] we can see that these three qualifiers of cognition are all picking up on claims that the Buddhist has made. Thus Rāmakaṇṭha is effectively claiming that the Buddhist, in the course of refuting the Self of the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas and the Sāṅkhyas was inadvertently arguing for a Śaiva one. Of course he is being disingenuous, but what enables him to pretend to such a claim is that, whereas for Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas the Self exists as a further entity beyond cognition, for Rāmakaṇṭha the Self is cognition itself. He stands with Buddhism against the Brāhmaṇical realist traditions in denying a Self beyond cognition. That is the point of his finishing his opening sentences with, 'So what else is there to prove?'

It is not true, obviously, that there is no more to the Śaiva view than the Buddhist one; but equally the correspondence between the two is real, and not something that Rāmakaṇṭha propagates here merely as a sophistical device. 1) Rāmakaṇṭha has no quibble with any of the arguments that the Buddhist used in the last chapter to argue against Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, for they concerned a Self beyond cognition, which is, in Rāmakaṇṭha's view, just as much as in the view of Buddhism, both unperceivable and uninferrable. 2) Whereas for Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika cognition is a quality that adventitiously rises in the perceiver caused by, among other things, the presence of an object, for Buddhism and for Rāmakaṇṭha the perceiver just is cognition. 3) For Buddhism and for Rāmakaṇṭha, cognition, in revealing objects, reveals itself as well. Both employ the metaphor of light to convey this idea. It is opposed to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika idea that a cognition is known, not by itself, but by a subsequent cognition. 4) In the *Kiraṇavṛtti* ad 2.25ab Rāmakaṇṭha argues that cog-

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[12] *yady evam, bhedasya satyatvāt pratiśarīram iva pratyartham pratikṣaṇaṃ ca bāhyasyārthasyānahaṅkārāspadasyāhaṅkārāspadaṃ vijñānaṃ bhinnam eva grāhakam anubhavasiddham astu* (8,17–20).

[13] *pradīpavat svaparaprakāśaikasvabhāvatvena viśiṣṭārthaprakāśakaṃ vijñānam anubhavasiddhaṃ nāpahnotuṃ śakyam iti* (12,14–15).

nition does not reside in any substrate (*āśraya*) other than itself and supports this by claiming that nor do other qualities such as taste. He defends this with almost identically worded arguments as the Buddhist used in the last chapter to argue for the same view. In KV the view is attributed to 'us', Buddhists and Sāṅkhyas; whereas in NPP to 'us' and Sāṅkhyas. It is striking that Rāmakaṇṭha is prepared to vary so little the wording of the view and the supporting arguments and yet have 'us' in NPP referring to Buddhists, and in KV to Śaivas.

One can discern a hierarchy in Rāmakaṇṭha's view of his opponents (or at least of their theories of Self) in which (ironically, given that they, like Rāmakaṇṭha, are Ātmavādins) the Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas and Sāṅkhyas come beneath the Buddhists; and it is as though he delegates to the Buddhist the task of dismissing the views of those three traditions, before turning to the more difficult task of refuting the Buddhist, for which he himself will finally have to open his mouth.[14]

> *nanu ca pratyartham pratikṣaṇaṃ ca bhinnam evedaṃ grāhakarūpaṃ vijñānam asmābhiḥ pratipāditam, na tv ātmābhidhānaḥ kaś cit sarvārthasākṣibhūto 'rthaḥ. yadi ca tad evāsāv ity ucyate, bhavatu nāmabhedaḥ param, sarveṇa tv ātmavādinā sthirarūpo 'sau darśanīyaḥ*
>
> [Buddhist:] But what I was teaching was this perceiving cognition that is completely different with respect to every object and in every moment. [I

[14] In a text of Rāmakaṇṭha's only citations of which survive (the *Sarvāgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa*) he details the level of liberation attained by thinkers of rival systems. Naiyāyikas are there in fact placed slightly higher than Buddhists: the former are said to reach *buddhitattva* and the latter are placed 'in the products of *buddhi*' (*buddhivṛttau*) (see Goodall 1998 xxii–xxiv). Thus it seems that the hierarchy implicit in NPP's treatment of Nyāya and Buddhist opponents (where what is being judged could be said to be superiority of argumentation) does not correlate with his hierarchy in the different context of the highest level of the universe attainable by those opponents (where the conclusions they hold could be said to be more important). The second hierarchy is scriptural so probably he would not have felt free to change it even if he had wanted to. (Elsewhere, for example in MatV VP ad 6.21cd, p. 154,15, Rāmakaṇṭha states that the Buddhist view of no-Self (*nairātmyadarśana*) has as its result the attaining of *buddhitattva*, i.e. he does not differentiate the level attainable by the Buddhists from that attainable by the Naiyāyikas.)

was] not [teaching] some thing by the name 'Self', a witness of all objects.[15] And if [you] say 'the [Self] is simply that (i.e. perceiving cognition)', let there be just (*param*) a difference of name,[16] but all Ātmavādins should present[17] the [Self] as enduring.

Throughout the whole of the last chapter the Buddhist addressed himself to non-Śaivas. Rāmakaṇṭha did not state his own view at all, allowing the Buddhist to win all confrontations, thereby giving the impression that he concurred with Buddhist arguments. Now that Rāmakaṇṭha has, in the previous sentences, finally used his own voice, the differences between the Śaiva view and the Buddhist view can be examined.

Rāmakaṇṭha tried in the previous sentences to subsume the Buddhist view within the Śaiva, and predictably the Buddhist pulls away here, not wishing to be ensnared in a Śaiva net. Both sides agree that there is no further entity beyond cognition; but for the Buddhist cognition is momentary, whereas for Rāmakaṇṭha it is a stable Self. It is not so much a dispute over the existence or non-existence of an entity, but rather over the nature of an entity they both agree to exist.

iti cet, ucyate nātra bhavadabhyupagamo 'ṅgatvenāsmābhir uktaḥ. na hi pratidarśanaṃ vyavasthāpakānāṃ sarvapramātṝṇām[18] *anubhavabhedaḥ sambhavati, tasya svabhāvasiddhatvāt. yad āhuḥ*[19]

jñānaṃ praty abhilāpaṃ ca sadṛśau bālapaṇḍitau || *iti.*

tat sa evāyaṃ sakalalokaprasiddhaḥ svānubhavo nirūpyatām.

[Siddhāntin:] If you say that,[20] then [we] reply that we did not say that acceptance by you was needed for [our conclusion]. For the direct experience[21] of

[15] For the Buddhist, cognition witnesses only one object. By the time another object is witnessed it is another cognition doing the witnessing.

[16] The Buddhist would not have a problem with the idea that there is a difference of name only, if this meant acceptance of the Self as something different in every moment.

[17] Or 'should see'.

[18] *vyavasthāpakānāṃ sarvapramātṝṇām* Ked, Ped; *pramātṝṇām vyavasthāpakānām* B; *vyavasthāpakānāṃ pramātṝṇām* P.

[19] VāPa III *sambandhasamuddeśa* 55cd.

[20] The Buddhist's speech began with a *nanu* and ended with an *iti cet.* There is another example of this in the text: *nanv adṛṣṭaṃ karmaivāsmābhir iṣyata iti cet* (120,9).

> all knowers who set out [views] in the different philosophical traditions cannot differ, because it (i.e. direct experience) is established [entirely] by [its] own nature [not at all by the mental conditioning of knowers]. As they say:
>
> > With respect to cognition and language, children and the wise are alike.
>
> Therefore this very experience of oneself, which is readily known by the whole world, must be examined.

Rāmakaṇṭha jokes here that he never said Buddhist acceptance was a necessary requirement of his position. Rāmakaṇṭha has claimed that the Self is established by direct experience (*anubhavasiddha*); and the Buddhist has claimed that momentary cognition is established by direct experience. So the urgent task is to focus on that language-defying, pre-conceptual experience (*anubhava*) which is the same for everyone, whether Śaiva, Buddhist, wise person or fool. The point behind Rāmakaṇṭha's joke is that he can go straight to an examination of *anubhava* to test his conclusion without the Buddhist way-laying him. Refuting Buddhist arguments or convincing Buddhists of Śaiva arguments are insignificant compared to that examination.

In the last chapter the Buddhist repeated in each of his arguments that his concept, cognition, unlike the Self of his opponents, was *anubhavasiddha*. The unchallenged assumption throughout the chapter was that the Buddhist concept of momentary cognition was indeed an accurate reflection of the way we experience the perceiver of objects, i.e. the way we experience ourselves. All of the arguments were therefore ones that only the Buddhist could win, since they were contests between an established (*siddha*), visible (*dṛṣṭa*) entity and an unestablished, invisible one. But Rāmakaṇṭha's Self, since it is simply the cognition that we all experience, is not *adṛṣṭa*. Hence he attempts to reverse the status quo of the last chapter, and claims that *anubhava* actually

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Schmithausen pointed out that in such cases we need not view one as redundant, for the *nanu* can be seen as part of the contents of the objection and the *iti cet* as a genuine frame element.

[21] Rāmakaṇṭha sometimes uses the word *anubhava* as a general word for experience (for example in the phrase *anubhavavirodha*), but he also uses it in a more restricted sense, as here, to denote the kind of experience which is identical in all knowers, namely direct, pre-conceptual experience of things, unmediated by our interpretative categories.

supports the concept of a Self, not that of momentary cognition. This *anubhava*, then, as Rāmakaṇṭha says in his last sentence, must be examined.

This sets the parameters for the ensuing discussion. The enquiry has become less metaphysical and logical, and more experiential and empirical. Inferences and refutations will recede into the background for a while and direct experience of ourselves, *svānubhava*, which is the same for all of us, appearing to us before we impose our own culturally conditioned concepts on to it, will be examined. For the build-up so far (the first chapter and this chapter up to here) has established that it is on this point and this point only that Rāmakaṇṭha disagrees with Buddhism, namely whether this pre-conceptual cognition is stable (*sthira*) or momentary (*kṣaṇika*).

When cognition features in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika arguments for the existence of the Self, it is used as the starting point from which to prove the *ātman*. This is done in a variety of ways: cognition is said to be an action that therefore requires an agent (*jñātṛ*); or to be a process (*bhāva*) that therefore requires a bearer of that process (*bhavitṛ*); or to be a quality (*guṇa*) that therefore requires a substrate or possessor of that quality (*āśraya, guṇin*); or the linguistic usage of the word cognition is seen as pointing to a further entity that is its subject ('X cognizes Y', 'The thing which cognizes ...'); or the Self is postulated as some kind of cause of cognition.[22] Rāmakaṇṭha's discussion is thus unusual in that once cognition has been proved, he does not have to prove anything beyond it: rather he simply has to prove that it is non-momentary.[23]

The text is reaching a climax. Rāmakaṇṭha articulates precisely what needs to be determined.

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[22] This could be either inherence cause (which would make this argument essentially the same as that from cognition as quality); or empirical cause, which would make this more of a 'philosophy of nature' argument along the lines that in order to explain the coming into existence of cognition, the Self is required as a causal factor. (This is Oetke's (1988 282–283) judgement of one of Praśastapāda's arguments, where he terms cognition *prasiddhi* and the Self its *prasādhaka*.)

[23] I say 'simply' there, not wanting to suggest that this will be an easy task for Rāmakaṇṭha (far from it), but to bring out that in terms of ontology this constitutes a major difference.

kiṃ pratyarthaṃ pratikṣaṇaṃ cāpūrvo 'pūrvaḥ pūrvottarābhyām [Ked p. 14] *anubhavābhyāṃ bhinnaḥ*[24] *kṣaṇamātrarūpāvabhāso grāhakaḥ prakāśata uta sarvadaivābhinna*[25] *iti.*

Does the perceiver shine forth as different from the earlier and subsequent experience, ever new with regard to every object and in every moment, its form appearing only for a moment, or does it shine forth as always the same?

3. Does the Perceiver Shine Forth as Stable or Momentary (*Sthiragrāhakaprakāśa* or *Bhinnagrāhakaprakāśa*)?

After that build up, in which there was a gradual homing in on the crucial issue that separates the two sides, Rāmakaṇṭha now attempts to answer the question he has set himself by giving in one long sentence a rhetorical description of the way we experience ourselves.

3.1 *tatrāyaṃ sthirarūpaḥ prakāśaḥ sarvadaiva grāhyopādhi*[26]*bhede 'py* anāsvādita[27]*svātmabhedaḥ, kālatraye 'pi tiraskṛtasvagataprāgabhāvapradhvaṃsābhāvaḥ, nānāvidhapramāṇādyanekacittavṛttyudayavyayasaṃvedane 'py akampitatadgrāhaka*[28]*sthairyavedanaḥ, vṛttyantarāleṣv apy*[29] *aviluptajyotiḥ, suṣuptādāv apy akhaṇḍitasvasaṃvit, satatam eva svaprakāśatvena gamyatvād*

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[24] *bhinnaḥ* Ped; omitted in Ked[ac]; *bhinna*° Ked[pc], B; *bhinnala*° P. *bhinnaḥ* makes best sense, and is supported by the parallel sentence in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* (see note 30).

[25] °*aivābhinna* B, P, Ped, Ked[pc]; °*aiva bhinna* Ked[ac].

[26] *grāhyopādhi*° P, Ked, Ped; *grāhyopādi*° B.

[27] *anāsvādita* em. Sanderson; *anāsādita* Ked, Ped, B, P. See *Mataṅgavṛtti* p. 172: ... *sarvadaiva grāhyopādhibhede 'py anāsvāditasvātmabhedaḥ kālatraye 'pi* ... attention to which is drawn in note 116 on page 197 of Goodall 1998 in the context of this emendation by Prof. Sanderson. See also *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* ad 43: ... *sarvadaiva grāhyopādhibhede 'py anāsvāditasvātmabhedaḥ kālatraye 'pi* ... (AP 294,28).

[28] *akampitatadgrāhaka*° Ked, B, P; *akampitatattadgrāhaka*° Ped.

[29] *vṛttyantarāleṣv apy* Ked[pc], Ped, B, P; *vṛttyantarāle pi* Ked[ac].

ātmapadapratipādyaḥ pratipuruṣaṃ svasaṃvedanasiddhaḥ, iti kim atrānyena sādhanena.[30]

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[30] Goodall (1998 xxiv) points out that a distinctive feature of Rāmakaṇṭha's writing is his consistency of expression when treating the same topic in different texts. The fact that occasionally large sections of text are repeated almost word-for-word in other of his texts is a great help for an editor, meaning that corruptions can sometimes be easily spotted and removed. This passage, for example, occurs almost unchanged in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* and the *Mataṅgavṛtti*. The most recent edition of the former reads: ... *nāma tat. sa* [correct to: ... *nāma. tat sa*] *evānapahnavanīyasvabhāvo nirūpyatām. kiṃ pratikṣaṇaṃ pūrvaḥ pūrvaḥ* [correct to: *apūrvo 'pūrvaḥ,* also the reading of MSS] *pūrvottarakṣaṇābhyāṃ bhinnaḥ kṣaṇamātrarūpāvabhāso grāhakaḥ prakāśata atha* [correct, perhaps, to: *uta*] *sarvadaiva. bhinna iti tatrāyaṃ* [correct to: *sarvadaivābhinna iti. tatrāyaṃ*] *sthirarūpaḥ prakāśaḥ sarvadaiva grāhyopādhibhede 'py anāsvāditātmabhedaḥ kālatraye 'pi tiraskṛtasvaprāgabhāvapradhvaṃsābhāvaḥ, nānāvidhapramāṇād* [correct to: *pramāṇādy*°, also the reading of MSS] *anekacittavṛttyudayavyayasaṃvedane 'py ekam api* [correct *ekam api* to: *akampita,* also the reading of MSS]*tadgrāhakasthairyavedanaḥ, vṛttyantareṣv* [correct to: *vṛttyantarāleṣv,* also the reading of MSS] *apy aviluptajyotiḥ, suṣuptādāv apy akhaṇḍitasvasaṃvit, satatam eva svaprakāśatvena gamyatvād ātmapadapratipādyaḥ pratipuruṣaṃ svasaṃvedanasiddhaḥ, iti kim atrānyena sādhanena* (AP 294, 25–32). Thus putting these two texts side-by-side enables, in the space of three sentences, improvement of NPP in two places and of PMNKV in six or seven places. The MSS referred to in this note, and subsequent notes giving passages from PMNKV, are all from South India. One was collated by me during my doctoral research, and the rest, since then, by Dominic Goodall as part of our project to critically edit and translate the text for the first time.

The parallel passage in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* reads, *na grāhyabhede 'pi grāhakātmā yugapad iva krameṇāpi bhinno 'vabhāsate. api tu sarvadaiva grāhyopādhibhede 'py anāsvāditasvātmabhedaḥ, kālatraye 'pi tiraskṛtasvagataprāgabhāvapradhvaṃsābhāvaḥ, nānāvidhapramāṇādyanekacittavṛttyudayasaṃvedane 'py akampitatadgrāhakasthairyavedanaḥ, vṛttyantarāle 'py aviluptajyotiḥ, suṣuptādāv apy akhaṇḍitasvasaṃvit, satatam evārthāvagamakatvena bhāsanād ātmapadapratipādyaḥ pratipuruṣaṃ svasaṃvedanasiddhaḥ sthira eva* [*sthira eva* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *sthirabhāva* ed.], *iti kim atrānyena sādhanena* (MatV VP 172,16–21).

KV ad 2.25ab, 53,2–3 reads: *ātmā svasaṃvedanena svaparātmaprakāśatayā pratipuruṣaṃ sidhyati, kim anyena sādhanena.* Goodall translates the first part of this as 'A soul is proved to exist in every man by one's own experience as being manifest both to itself and to other souls.' I cannot see any other way of taking it, but it does not seem satisfactory. How could I know through self-awareness that I was manifest to another soul? I would suggest that we emend °*prakāśatayā* to °*prakāśakatayā*. It might be objected that

3.1 With regard to that question (*tatra*), this[31] stable shining forth,[32] which is ever-present (*sarvadaiva*), is established for every person through self-

this is not much of an improvement: in what sense do I know my Self through self-awareness to be the revealer of other selves? But Rāmakaṇṭha makes this claim elsewhere. See, for example, *Mataṅgavṛtti* 6.35b–d, p. 175,8–9: *evaṃ svaparātmaprakāśakatayā jñānaśaktirūpeṇa parāmarśāc cātmā pratyakṣa uktaḥ.* The answer seems to be that I can know my Self as the inferrer (*anumātṛ*) of other Selves. See for example MatV VP ad 2.1, p. 22,8–9: *sa ca sarvārthaprakāśakatayā parātmānumātṛtvena* [*parātmānumātṛtvena* ed.; *paramātmāṇumātratvena* a; *parānumātratvena* ā, e; *parātmānumātratvena* ī, u, ḷ] *ca pratyātmānaṃ svasaṃvedanasiddho bhinna eva nityo vyāpakaś ca.* The point of Rāmakaṇṭha mentioning in such passages that the Self is the revealer of other people's Selves is to counter the Vedāntin rejection of a plurality of Selves.

[31] The force of *ayaṃ* is probably: this shining forth which is immediately present for all of us.

[32] The question to which this sentence responds asks whether the perceiver (*grāhaka*) shines forth (*prakāśate*) as divided or undivided. Thus it might be best to assume an understood *grāhakasya* in this sentence to go with *prakāśa*. (It would be both a subjective and an objective genitive, for in the constant act of *prakāśa* that this sentence describes, the perceiver is both that which illuminates and that which is thereby illuminated.) As further support for understanding a *grāhakasya* it could also be pointed out that in a couple of sentences, at the end of this speech, he refers to that which he has been arguing for as *sthiragrāhakaprakāśa*. But the various compounds in this sentence agreeing with *prakāśaḥ* attribute mental functions to it such as sensing, experiencing and self-consciousness; and it is said to be 'denoted by the word Self' *ātmapadapratipādyaḥ*. Would we not expect these to be qualifications of the perceiver itself, rather than of the way it appears to us, its shining forth? This shows that for Rāmakaṇṭha there is no important difference between the perceiver (*grāhaka*) and the shining forth of the perceiver (*grāhakaprakāśa*). We do not really need to understand a *grāhakasya* because the word *prakāśa* itself refers to the Self in this sentence: it is the light of consciousness that illuminates objects and itself. (Thus we could even analyse the compound *grāhakaprakāśa*, when Rāmakaṇṭha uses it, not as a Tatpuruṣa but as a Karmadhāraya: 'illumination [i.e. the Self] that perceives'.)

It might appear strange to some that *prakāśa*, which here, picking up on *prakāśate* in the previous sentence, denotes not a thing but an action, refers nevertheless to the perceiver. This takes us back to the point that for Śaivism in general and Rāmakaṇṭha in particular the Self is envisaged not (only) as a static entity but (also) as a process: it is not different from *jñāna/vijñāna* ('cognition'), which are action nouns. How the Self can be both an unchanging thing and a process or action will be further examined in Chapter 4,

> experience,[33] not sensing a division of its own nature even though its delimiters, namely objects, do differ; having no sense of its non-existence before it [comes into being] or non-existence after it is destroyed[34] even in all three times;[35] even though experiencing the rise and fall of many mental events of various kinds such as means of knowledge,[36] its experience of the stability of the perceiver of those unshaken;[37] its radiance uninterrupted even between thoughts; its self-consciousness unbroken even in deep sleep etc. (= fainting, coma); being conveyed by the word 'Self' because it is constantly perceived as the shining forth of oneself/itself. So what is the need of any other means of proving it?

He has not given an argument here; he has just described the way we appear to ourselves, assuming that it will ring true, and he says there is no need of any other means of proof. In what follows he moves from description to argument, claiming that familiar features of the world would not occur at all if we did not experience ourselves in the way he has just described. But that does not contradict his last comment that we do not need means of proof to

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but it can be noted in passing that one Śaiva doctrine that facilitates it is that of the non-difference between a thing and its powers or properties.

[33] There are several other possible ways of construing the general structure of this sentence depending on what one takes as predicate, what as adjectives to the subject, and whether one takes some of the qualifiers as dependent on *svasaṃvedanasiddha.*

[34] Literally 'non-existence in it before [it comes into being] and non-existence in it after it is destroyed being hidden from it'. The parallel sentence in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* actually reads just ... *tiraskṛtasvaprāgabhāvapradhvaṃsābhāvo* ... (see note 30). Perhaps the °*gata*° was not in the original. Its entry could almost be explained by dittography given that there is a *ta* only one syllable away and a *ga* only one syllable away. The °*gata*° does appear in the parallel passage in the MatV VP however.

[35] I.e. we never have been nor will we ever be aware of a moment in which our consciousness is yet to exist or has ceased to exist. Yet if, as the Buddhist claims, consciousness not only is, but also appears to us as, momentary, we would expect some awareness of these two kinds of non-existence. We would feel constantly new, as though what we were in the last moment had just ceased to exist.

[36] Rāmakaṇṭha perhaps has in mind here the list of the five kinds of *cittavṛtti* beginning with *pramāṇa* in YS 1.6: *pramāṇa, viparyaya, vikalpa, nidrā, smṛti.* He quotes this sūtra elsewhere in this text (ad 1.66).

[37] However varied my thoughts and perceptions etc., I never lose a sense that it is me doing the thinking and perceiving.

establish the Self: the following is not an inference of the stability of Self, but a consideration that implies we must experience ourselves as stable.[38]

> *tām eva cābhinnām anapāyinīṃ cātmasaṃvidam āśritya sarvaiḥ kālāntaraphalāni karmāṇy ārabhyante. kṣaṇikatve tu tasyāḥ sarvavyavahārapratyastamayaḥ, sarvānubhavānāṃ kṣaṇamātravedanottarakālaṃ dhvaṃsatāṃ kṣaṇāntare*[39] *sambhavābhāvāt kaḥ pravarteta*[40] *kutra kimarthaṃ vā yataḥ. na hi kṣaṇātmavedinaḥ kṣaṇāntare*[41] *'nāhaṃ na*[42] *mama' iti paśyataḥ pravṛttir ghaṭate.*

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[38] For the point that the Self being established by self-awareness renders proofs pointless, see KV ad 1.15: *yadi vānubhavasiddhatvam anenātmanaḥ pratipādyate, anubhavasiddhau hetūnām anupayogāt. yathā ghaṭo 'yaṃ lohitaḥ parivartula ity atrānubhavasiddhatvān nāsya hetuḥ sambhavati, tathā grāhakātmany api parātmaprakāśakatayānubhavasiddheḥ sthairyam anubhavasiddham eva tathāvagamāt, iti kim atra hetunā kāryam* (17,15–19). Rāmakaṇṭha is there offering an explanation of why the verse under comment simply states various facts about the Self, such as that it is eternal, instead of arguing for them. Goodall translates, 'Alternatively the fact that the soul is established by experience is expressed by this [speech of the Lord, in which the various arguments are not related], since arguments are useless when something is established by experience. An argument cannot apply, for example, to the assertion 'This pot is round and made of iron', because in this case this fact is established by experience. And so, because the soul as an agent of perception is also established by experience as something which makes manifest other things and itself, its permanence is established by experience, because that is how it is perceived. And so what could be done with [i.e. what would be the point of] reasons here?' (I take it that the *tathā* correlates with the *yathā*; it is not clear whether Goodall does. He punctuates with just a comma after *anupayogāt* and may be linking the *yathā* clause more closely with what precedes it than what follows it.)

The same point had earlier been made by Utpaladeva (reference supplied by Prof. Sanderson): *kartari jñātari svātmany ādisiddhe maheśvare | ajaḍātmā niṣedhaṃ vā siddhiṃ vā vidadhīta kaḥ* || (ĪśPraKā 1.2). Torella translates, 'What intelligent being could ever deny or establish the cognizer and agent, the Self, Maheśvara, established from the beginning?'

[39] *kṣaṇāntare* Ked, Ped, B; *rakṣaṇāntare* P.

[40] *pravarteta* Ped; *pravartate* Ked, B, P. B's reading looks slightly more like *pravartate* than *pravarteta* since the right-hand side of the interlinear horizontal line that represents *e* falls above the second of the *t*'s. But it is not impossible that the scribe wrote *pravarteta*, as in some cases his interlinear markings extend to the right of the sign that they modify.

[41] *kṣaṇāntare* Ked, B, P; *kṣaṇāntare 'pi* Ped.

> And everyone undertakes actions that have results at a subsequent time relying on this same undivided and unceasing self-awareness. But if it were momentary then all action would cease, since who would act, in what circumstances (*kutra*), or for what purpose, because no experience could exist in another moment, perishing [as it would] after the momentary awareness [of it] (*kṣaṇamātravedanottarakālam*)?[43] For action is not appropriate for someone who knows their self / themself for [only] an instant, thinking with respect to another moment 'that is not me [and] it doesn't belong to me.'[44]

The mere fact that we act indicates that our self-experience is stable. If we felt disconnected from adjacent moments we would not bother to do anything because it would not be us that would benefit from the fruit.

> *iti nirīhaṃ svarūpamātraprakāśaniṣṭhaṃ heyopādeyabuddhivikalam amithyājñānaṃ vicārabodhādyanekajñānaśūnyaṃ jagad etad bhavet, iti sarvānubhavavirodhaḥ, sthiragrāhakaprakāśapūrvakatvād evamāder iti.*[45]

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[42] *nāhaṃ na* Ked, B, P; *nāhaṃ* Ped.

[43] Alternatively, 'after [being] a sensation for just an instant.'

[44] We could take *kṣaṇāntare* as inside the *iti* clause: 'thinking "in another moment, there will be no I and no mine"'.

[45] Again, if the editors of PMNKV had located this parallel passage in NPP they would have enabled improvement of their texts. The latest edition of PMNKV reads: *tām evātmasaṃvidam abhinnām anapāyinīṃ cāśritya sarvaiḥ kālāntaraphalāni karmāṇy ārabhyante. kṣaṇikatve tu tasyāḥ sarvavyavahārapratyastamayam* [correct to: °*pratyastamayaḥ*] *sarvajñānānāṃ kṣaṇamātravedanottaradhvaṃsataḥ kṣaṇāntare sambhavābhāvāt kaḥ pravarteta kutra kimarthaṃ vā? yataḥ* [the editions of both texts wrongly punctuate after the *vā*, instead of after the *yataḥ*] *na hi kṣaṇātmavādinaḥ* [perhaps correct to: *kṣaṇātmavedinaḥ*, and probably include NPP's *kṣaṇāntare*] *'nāhaṃ na mama' iti paśyataḥ pravṛttir ghaṭate. iti nirīhaṃ svarūpaniṣṭhaṃ prakāśamātraṃ heyopādeyabuddhivikalaṃ mithyājñānavicārabodhādy*[MSS read °*bādhādy*°a]*anekajñānaśūnyaṃ jagad bhavet.* [remove punctuation] *sthiragrāhakaprakāśapūrvatvād* [correct to: °*pūrvakatvād*] *evamādeḥ sarvasyety anapahnavanīyo 'yaṃ prakāśo vyavahārahetubhūtaḥ kālāntarabhāviphalapravṛttikāraṇaṃ sarvadaiva* [correct to the reading of the MSS: *sarvair eva*] *syāt* (PMNKV 294,32–295,2).

a) If °*bodhādy*° is the correct reading, then the corruption °*bādhādy*° has entered the transmission of both MatV VP and PMNKV. If °*bādhādy*° is the correct reading then the corruption °*bodhādy*° has entered the transmission of NPP and PMNKV. This assumes of course that Rāmakaṇṭha wrote the same word in all three texts. The reason I point this out is given in note 82.

Therefore creatures would become desireless/inactive, established in the shining forth of nothing but their own inner nature, without any idea of things to be abandoned and things to be appropriated, without false knowledge, [and] devoid of many [other, positive] kinds of cognition such as deliberation and realization. Therefore [, if we take your view that the perceiver appears as momentary,] there is an incompatibility with all experience, because things like this (*evamāder*) (i.e. desire, action, deliberation etc.) depend upon the shining forth of a steadfast perceiver.

As we have seen, for Rāmakaṇṭha the perceiver is simply cognition (*jñāna, vijñāna*), not some further entity in which cognition inheres. Since, as he has just described, the perceiver appears to us pre-conceptually as, and therefore is, stable and undivided over time, so too must cognition be. It was the norm in Indian Philosophy to view cognition as momentary; not only was that the

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A parallel passage in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* (ad 6.23) runs: *tām eva hi sthiratarām ātmasaṃvidam āśritya sarvaiḥ kālāntaraphalāni karmāṇy ārabhyante. kṣaṇikatve tu tasyāḥ sarvavyavahārapratyastamayāt sarvajñānānāṃ kṣaṇamātravedanottaradhvaṃsataḥ kṣaṇāntare sambhavābhāvataḥ kaḥ pravarteta* [*pravarteta* ū, ṝ; *pravartate* ed.] *kutra* [*kutra* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *tatra* ed.] *kimarthaṃ vā. iti nirīhaṃ heyopādeyabuddhivikalaṃ mithyājñānavicārabādhādyanekajñānaśūnyaṃ jagad bhavet. iti sarvavyavahārābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ* [*sarvavyavahārābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ* corr.; *sarvavyavahārā bhāvaprasaṅgaḥ* ed.] *sthirabodhapūrvakatvād evamādeḥ sarvasyeti ātmasiddhiḥ, sthirasyaiva saṃvedanasyātmatvād ity uktam* (MatV VP 158,5–10). In NPP, in PMNKV (according to my corrections), and in the passage given in the next paragraph, *kaḥ pravarteta kutra kimarthaṃ vā yataḥ* gives a reason for *sarvavyavahārapratyastamayaḥ* (and is itself justified by *abhāvāt* in the first two cases and *dhvastatvāt* in the third), whereas in the just quoted passage *sarvavyavahārapratyastamayāt* gives a reason for *kaḥ pravarteta kutra kimarthaṃ vā* (and is itself justified by *abhāvataḥ*). Each way seems possible.

A second parallel passage in the *Mataṅgavṛtti,* fifteen pages after the one given in the previous note, reads: *tām eva cā*[*eva cā* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *evā* ed.]*tmasaṃvidam abhinnām anapāyinīṃ cāśritya sarvaiḥ kālāntaraphalāni karmāṇy ārabhyante. kṣaṇikatve hi* [*kṣaṇikatve hi* conj. Sanderson; *kṣaṇikatvavad anityatve 'pi* ed.; *anityatve 'pi* a; *kṣaṇikatvavedinityatve 'pi* ū, ṛ, ṝ] *tasyāḥ sarvavyavahārapratyastamayaḥ, sarvajñānānāṃ* [°*pratyastamayaḥ, sarvajñānānāṃ* ed.; °*pratyastamayasarvajñānānāṃ* ai] *jñānāntarotpattikāla eva dhvastatvāt* [°*kāla eva dhvastatvāt* ed.; *kāle 'stamayatvāt* 5 MSS; *kālāstamayasthatvār* ai] *kaḥ pravarteta* [*pravarteta* ed.; *pravartate* 4 MSS] *kutra* [*kutra* ed. *ataḥ* a] *kimarthaṃ vā yataḥ. na ca tato 'nyat saṃvidrūpaṃ paśyāma ity uktam. tad ayam anapahnavanīya eva grāhakātmano jñānasya sarvadā sthirarūpaḥ prakāśo vyavahārahetubhūtaḥ kālāntarabhāviphalapravṛttikāraṇaṃ sarvair eva* (MatV VP 173,1–7).

view of Buddhists, but also of their Naiyāyika opponents. For the scholar who is used to reading the works of these schools, it is thus hard not to regard Rāmakaṇṭha's assertion that cognition is one and undivided as bizarre.

This feature of his philosophy will be further examined in Chapter 4. Here it will just be remarked in passing that his acceptance of the Buddhist picture of cognition as light, but rejection of the Dharmakīrtian idea that perceiver (*grāhaka*) and perceived (*grāhya*) are non-different, were both relevant. 1) The metaphor of light was regarded by Rāmakaṇṭha as a suitable one to illustrate how cognition can be unchanging. When a light illuminates a series of objects in turn, we do not think that the light flashes off between each object. Rather we think of it as stable in its illumination despite the changing illuminated objects. 2) If one accepts that perceiver and perceived are not different, then since it is clearly the case that the objects we perceive change over time, it will be harder to maintain that the cognition that perceives them remains stable.

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The text given in this section (3.1), supplemented by Rāmakaṇṭha's response to Buddhist objections to it given in the following discussion, is really the core of Rāmakaṇṭha's account of the way in which the Self's existence is established. I say this for several reasons. First, because it comes after the climactic build-up in which Rāmakaṇṭha gave the reader a sense that he was homing in on the crux of the matter. Secondly, because he repeats the passage almost verbatim on several other occasions in other of his texts (see the footnotes to the text). When the question of whether the perceiver is momentary or enduring comes up and he wants to address the problem in some detail, this passage usually occurs. Thirdly, because when it comes up and he does not want to address it in detail, for example in the *Kiraṇavṛtti*, he refers to this passage. He says there that he has shown in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* how the soul is established by experience to be always undivided (*abhinna*) despite being the perceiver of many objects,[46] by which I take him

[46] *sarvadaiva hi krameṇa yugapad vānekagrāhyaviṣayagrāhakarūpam apy abhinnam evātmatattvam anubhavasiddham iti darśitam asmābhir nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśe* (KV ad 1.15, p. 18,35–37).

to be referring to this passage.[47] And finally because of the huge number of occurrences of the terms *anubhavasiddha* or *svasaṃvedanasiddha*, throughout his writing, especially in NPP and the *Mataṅgavṛtti*, as adjectives to the Self. If one wanted to explain what he meant by describing the Self as 'proved by experience/self-awareness', and why he held it to be so, one would point to the passage in this section.

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It should be made clear that when Rāmakaṇṭha talks of and describes our self-awareness, he is not talking of anything separate from object cognition. This comes across more strongly in the parallel discussion in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* than in this NPP passage. See for example the following three sentences. 1) 'For there are not two cognitions, one of the object and one of the Self. Rather it is this very object-awareness that, being established through self-awareness, is the form of the Self.'[48] Thus one and the same cognition, in the

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[47] Goodall (KV p. 18 and 198) takes him to be referring to NPP ad 1.22, pp. 52–56, part of a refutation of Dharmakīrti's inference of momentariness from existence (*sattvānumāna*). But that seems less likely than this passage. It does not refer to the Self as *anubhavasiddha*; it does not talk in terms of *bhinnatva/abhinnatva* but *kṣaṇikatva/akṣaṇikatva*; and it does not state that the Self is a single perceiver of many objects. This passage, by contrast, is the longest explanation in NPP of the way that the Self is *anubhavasiddha*; the sentence which introduces it—*kiṃ pratyarthaṃ pratikṣaṇaṃ cāpūrvo 'pūrvaḥ pūrvottarābhyām anubhavābhyāṃ bhinnaḥ kṣaṇamātrarūpāvabhāso grāhakaḥ prakāśata uta sarvadaivābhinna iti*—uses in its second, and correct, option—*sarvadaivābhinna*—the same wording as the KV sentence (*sarvadaiva ... abhinnam*); and it begins by making the precise point that despite its objects changing, it never senses a difference in its nature. Furthermore, to understand Rāmakaṇṭha as referring there to pp. 52–56 would make him repetitive, for, as Goodall correctly identified, he has referred the reader to those pages earlier in his commentary on the same verse.

There is one feature of the KV sentence that is not covered explicitly in the passage of NPP we have just read: its mention of the Self perceiving its several objects *sequentially or simultaneously*. That is a passing reference to another passage, which we will discuss in Chapter 4.1, where he argues that since cognition is regarded as single when perceiving several objects simultaneously, there is no reason why we should not regard it as single when perceiving several objects over a sequence of time (27,6–15).

[48] *na hi dvāv upalambhau* [*upalambhau* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *upalambhau staḥ* ed.], *eko 'rthasya, aparaś cātmanaḥ, kiṃ tu tad eva viṣayasaṃvedanaṃ* [*viṣayasaṃvedanaṃ* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *viṣaya-*

same action, both perceives an object and is aware of itself doing so (just as a lamp in one and the same flash illuminates both the objects around it and itself); and it is nothing other than that cognition that is the form of the Self.

2) 'And this awareness of objects shines forth as stable.'[49] Thus whereas in the parallel passage of NPP that which is claimed to shine forth as stable is the perceiver, here that is replaced by 'awareness of objects'. The two are not different for Rāmakaṇṭha.

3) 'Because[50] this cognition, which is of the nature of (*tallakṣaṇam*) both knowing (*pratyaya*)[51] and—because it is constantly engaged in perceiving objects—the Self, is established through self-experience as certainly stable, as it is always[52] revealing objects.' Again we see that Rāmakaṇṭha is not claiming our awareness of cognition / the Self to be anything different from our awareness of objects; for here he claims that cognition's stability consists in its constant perception of objects.

I have presented these sentences as throwing light on the passage we have just read in NPP, but I leave open the possibility that they represent an additional aspect of Rāmakaṇṭha's thinking on this matter that was not part of it at the time that he wrote NPP. Now that Goodall has arranged almost all of his texts into a chronological order on the basis of cross-references within them,[53] we can begin to look for signs of his thinking developing when he came to

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saṃvedanaṃ svasaṃvedanaṃ sat ed.] *svasaṃvitsiddham ātmano rūpam, nānyat* (MatV VP 157,7–8, ad 6.22cd).

[49] *sthirarūpaṃ* [*sthirarūpaṃ* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *sthirasaṃvedanarūpaṃ* ed.] *cedam arthasaṃvedanam avabhāsate* (MatV VP 158,2–3 ad 6.23ab).

[50] *yata etad* [*yata etad* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *yata eva* ed.] *vijñānaṃ pratyayaś cāsau satatam artham avagamayatīty ātmā ca tallakṣaṇaṃ sarvadaivārtha*[*sarvadaivārtha* ed.; *sarvapadārtha* ū, ṛ, ṝ]*prakāśakatayā sthiratayaiva svasaṃvedanasiddham* (MatV VP 158,4–5, ad 6.23ab).

[51] *pratyayaś cāsau satatam artham avagamayatīty ātmā ca tallakṣaṇam* is glossing *pratyayātmakam* in the half-verse under comment: *nirudhyate nāvasthānād vijñānaṃ pratyayātmakam.*

[52] This is one of the rare occasions where I have opted for the reading of the edition against that of the Kashmirian manuscripts.

[53] MatV VP is likely to have been written after NPP since it cites it five times. See Goodall 1998 xviii.

consider the same matter in a subsequent text, and should not always assume that earlier texts can be interpreted in the light of parallel passages in subsequent texts.

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After Rāmakaṇṭha's triumphant assertion of our continuous and unbroken self-awareness, the Buddhist changes his ground slightly and admits that the perceiver does appear as stable. He claims, however, that this appearance is not trustworthy, being based on our own superimpositon of stability.

3.2 *syād etat. asty ayam ekarūpasthiragrāhakaprakāśaḥ, anapahnavanīya*[54] *eva. sa punar na svasaṃvedyaḥ, api tu grāhakakṣaṇapravāha evānubhūyamāne tatsādṛśyadarśanabhrāntair vikalpair adhyāropito 'mbhaḥpravāhasyevaikyam iti*[55] *bhrānta eva. ata evāsyātmagrahatvāt sarvānarthamūlatvenopaśamāya bhagavatā* [Ked p. 15] *sugatena nairātmyaviṣayaḥ pratipakṣabhāvanākhyo yatnaḥ*[56] *prārabdhaḥ.*

3.2 [Buddhist:] The following may be so. There is this appearance of a stable perceiver that is of uniform character.[57] That indeed cannot be denied, but that [appearance] is not experienced by itself.[58] Rather, although all that is actually experienced is a stream of momentary perceivers, [the appearance of a stable and uniform perceiver] is superimposed [on to those momentary perceivers] by conceptual cognitions[59] that are mistaken owing to perceiving the resemblance of the [momentary perceivers], just as the oneness of a stream of water

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[54] *'napahnavanīya* Ked, Ped, P; *'napahnavīya* B.

[55] °*vāhasyevaikyam iti* Ked, B, P; °*vāhasyavaikyam iti* Ped.

[56] *yatnaḥ* B, Ked^{pc}; *yatna*° P; *viṣayaḥ* Ked^{ac}, Ped.

[57] The Buddhist acceptance here of *sthiragrāhakaprakāśa* shows that the term *prakāśa* does not always imply that that which shines forth appears thereby as it objectively is. There is a parallel ambiguity in the English word 'appear', between its objective sense (e.g. 'He appeared at the door') and its subjective sense (e.g. 'It appears to be the case but it is not so').

[58] If it were self-experienced it would be infallible, as there would be no gap between experiencer and experienced for distorting factors to enter. But it is not, because, as explained in the next sentence, on the one hand, it is not so much experienced (*saṃvedyate, anubhūyate*) as superimposed, and, on the other, that which 'experiences' it is not a stable and uniform perceiver but a series of distinct perceivers.

[59] According to the Buddhist epistemological school, conceptual cognitions are of the nature of superimposition.

> [is superimposed]. So [this appearance] is nothing but [an] erroneous [cognition of disparate momentary perceivers]. It is for this very reason that the Lord Buddha, in order to quell this [appearance], which is the root of everything that is bad, because it is clinging to a Self, undertook effort directed towards Selflessness, in the form of counteracting meditation.[60]

The Buddhist admits that we do not experience ourselves as distinct momentary perceivers but as continuous. Is Rāmakaṇṭha here misrepresenting his opponents, having them concur with something to which they would not agree? Not really, for the Buddhist meditation practice designed to overcome *satkāyadṛṣṭi* (see note 60) presupposes that the perception it attempts to overcome does indeed exist. Otherwise there would be no need of a Buddhist path at all.

Thus it appears that Rāmakaṇṭha, having narrowed down the decisive (and only) issue that separates Buddhism and Śaivism on the question of the Self to whether the perceiver appears to us as divided or undivided,[61] has now settled that question in Śaivism's favour.

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[60] Vasubandhu also describes imagined perception of or belief in a Self as 'clinging to a Self' and sees it as necessarily leading to vices (*kleśa*). *kiṃ khalv ato 'nyatra mokṣo nāsti. nāsti. kiṃ kāraṇam. vitathātmadṛṣṭiniviṣṭatvāt. na hi te skandhasantāna evātmaprajñaptiṃ vyavasyanti, kiṃ tarhi dravyāntaram evātmānaṃ parikalpayanti. ātmagrāhaprabhavāś ca kleśā iti* (AKBh(BBS) 1189,1–4, quoted at Sanderson 1994 36). 'Is there indeed no liberation outside of this [Buddhist religion]? There is not. Why? Because [non-Buddhists] are immersed in a false view of the Self. For they do not understand that that to which they apply the term 'self' is nothing more than a series of constituents. Rather, they imagine themself to be actually a separately existing substance [over and above this series]. And from [this] clinging to a Self, vices arise.'

For Rāmakaṇṭha's Buddhist's point that mistaken perception of a Self is the root of all that is bad, see PVā 2.219, quoted in footnote 65; and Candrakīrti's remark: *satkāyadṛṣṭiprabhavān aśeṣān kleśāṃś ca doṣāṃś ca dhiyā vipaśyan | ātmānam asyā viṣayaṃ ca buddhvā yogī karoty ātmaniṣedham eva ||* (*Madhyamakāvatāra* VI, 120, cited at Pr 340,8–11.) 'When the Yogin intuits that all vices and faults arise from the concept 'I' (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*), and realizes that the object of this [concept] is the Self, he should [in order to eliminate the concept of 'I' and therefore all vices and faults] negate the [existence of] the Self.' This is the practice of *pratipakṣabhāvanā* that Rāmakaṇṭha's Buddhist attributes to the Buddha.

[61] See the final sentence of section 2.

Not so, for we have to bear in mind the distinction between infallible, non-conceptual perception, of which self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) is an example, and conceptual cognition. The Buddhist here accepts Rāmakaṇṭha's compelling rhetorical description of our seemingly unbroken cognition of a stable perceiver, but he does not regard that as self-awareness. Rather it is a case of superimposition of permanence on to separate momentary perceivers by conceptual cognitions which are fooled by the similarity of those perceivers. The fact that we are seemingly aware of a stable Self is simply a symptom of our attachment and clinging to our selves.

yad āhuḥ[62]

mithyādhyāropa[63]*hānārthaṃ yatno 'saty api moktari*[64] | *iti.*[65]

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[62] PVā 2.192ab.

[63] *mithyādhyāropa*° Ked^{pc}, supported by PVā; *mithyādhyānopa*° Ked^{ac}, Ped, B, P.

[64] *moktari* B, P, PVā; *bhoktari* Ked, Ped. Since *mo* in Śāradā is virtually indistinguishable from *bho* in Devanāgarī it is possible that the reading *bhoktari* arose through editors used to reading Devanāgarī misreading their Śāradā manuscript(s).

[65] The parallel passage in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* runs: *satyam, asty eveyam ātmasaṃvittir ā saṃsārād nairātmyapratipakṣabhūtā. sā tu na saṃvedanātmikā, api tu* [*api tu* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *catuḥ* ed.] *kṣaṇātmavijñānapravāha eva saṃvedyamāne sadṛśāparāparrotpattivipralambhād vikalpena sa evāyam ity aikyam adhyāropya prakāśyate* [*prakāśyate* 7 of ed.'s MSS including ū and ṛ; *prakāśate* ed.]. *yad uktam, 'mithyādhyāropahānārthaṃ yatno 'saty api moktari' iti* (MatV VP 158,11–159,1). The Dharmakīrti half-verse is also quoted at MatV VP ad 6.19c–21b (154,9).

Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *satyam* [*satyam* conj. Isaacson; *satyaṃ grāhako 'py* ed., MSS] *ayam ekarūpasthira*[*ekarūpasthira*° MSS; *ekarūpaḥ sthira*° ed.]*grāhakaprakāśaḥ sarvavyavahārasampādanakṣamo 'napahnavanīya eva, sa punar na svasaṃvedyo 'pi tu grāhakakṣaṇapravāha evānubhūyamāne tatsādṛśyadarśanabhrāntair vikalpair āropya* [*vikalpair āropya* MSS; *vikalpenāropya* ed.][a] *prakāśyate* [*prakāśyate* 1 MS; *prakāśyaḥ* ed.; *prakāśyeta* MSS] *ambhaḥ*[*ambhaḥ* conj. Isaacson; *ataḥ* MSS; *tataḥ* ed.] *pravāhasyevaikyam* [°*syevaikyam* em.; °*syaivaikyam* ed., MSS] *iti* (295,3–5). In PMNKV, written before NPP and MatV VP, Rāmakaṇṭha does not give the Dharmakīrti quotation.

a) If *vikalpair* is the correct reading (as is likely because of the °*bhrāntair*), then *vikalpena*, the reading of the parallel passage in MatV VP, has entered the transmission of this text, PMNKV, from there (unless it arose here independently). If *vikalpena* is the correct reading, then *vikalpair*, the reading of the NPP, has entered the transmission of this text from there (again, unless it arose here independently). The reason I point this out is given in note 82.

As [Dharmakīrti] says:

> [The Buddha] strove to destroy false superimpositions even though there is no [being] that is liberated.

Part of the reason that Rāmakaṇṭha has his Buddhist quote this verse here is that it responds to his query above as to why we would act if we experienced ourselves as a separate entity from the adjacent momentary phases of our stream. Surely only if we appear to ourselves as continuously existing would we undertake actions that have effects in the future. This verse, as can clearly be seen from the sentences with which Rāmakaṇṭha introduces it, means for him that the Buddha acted precisely in order to bring an end to his interpretation of himself as one thing over time. He was able to intuit that this imagined perception of a stable subject of our cognition is merely a facet of our attachment to our 'Self', and the root of our faults, and so acted in order to bring it, and therefore our faults and vices, to an end.

Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin, Dharmakīrti's commentators, interpret this verse slightly differently. They do not see it as speaking of the Buddha's actions, but of unenlightened action that does not accord with reality.

It is noteworthy that, in this PMNKV version of the sentence, Rāmakaṇṭha puts into the mouth of the Buddhist the additional detail that the superimposed perceiver is capable of action (*vyavahāra*). This is a view specifically held by the Mādhyamikas, distinguishing them from the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas. For the former, our construction of the concept of a Self is so deep-seated that it itself is able to act, despite being merely notional (*prajñaptisat*) (see Tillemans 1996). It is not necessarily the case though that Rāmakaṇṭha knew that—primarily Tibetan—Mādhyamika doctrine: he may have been imagining for himself a way that the Buddhist could explain action given absence of Self.

Rāmakaṇṭha's father, Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, can be seen to be the source of this NPP passage and its parallels in other of Rāmakaṇṭha's texts. He writes ad MT 1.2.24: *saṃvedana eva kṣaṇike jaladhārāpravāhavat sadṛśaparāparotpattibhramād vikalpena sthairyam adhyāropyata ity avidyājanitā seyam ātmadṛṣṭiḥ. tad uktaṃ*

mithyādhyāropahānārthaṃ yatno 'saty api moktari [*moktari* em. *bhoktari* ed.] |

iti. ātmagrahe hi sati tadanyatra paratvābhimānāt svaparabhedaḥ, tataś ca rāgadveṣādyanarthodbhavād ātmagraho bandha iti bhagavatā sugatena nairātmyabhāvanopadiṣṭā. yad uktam

ātmani sati parasañjñā svaparavibhāgāt parigrahadveṣau |
anayoḥ sampratibaddhāḥ sarve doṣāḥ prajāyante || (PVā 2.219)

iti (MTV 85,7–18).

Manorathanandin[66] explains that even though there is nothing that is liberated,[67] we act prompted by the thought that there is, thinking 'it is me that is bound and me that will be liberated'. He sees the verse as addressing itself to the contradiction between these two facts by implying that action proceeds not only in accordance with reality, but also in accordance with how reality is judged[68] (*na hi yathāvastv eva vyavahāraḥ, kin tu yathāvasāyaṃ ca*). To illustrate that action is based on our illusory judgements of reality he gives the example of acting to avoid a rope when we mistake it for a snake. In each of these points he is following Prajñākaragupta's commentary. The latter also adds the remark that those who realize the truth do not undertake any action or effort.[69] These two commentators do not, as Rāmakaṇṭha does, see the verse as describing action resulting from a realization of the falsity of the notion of a continuously existing 'I', but rather action based on acceptance of

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[66] *mithyādhyāropasya saṃsāritvādhyavasāyasya hānārthaṃ yatno 'saty api kasmiṃś cid ātmādau moktari. na hi yathāvastv eva vyavahāraḥ, kin tu yathāvasāyañ ca. tathā hi rajjur api sarpādhyavasāyaviṣayatvāt parihāraviṣayaḥ. evam aham eva baddho 'ham eva mokṣyāmīty adhyāropān muktyarthaṃ vyāyāmaḥ* (PVā(M) 77,9–12).

[67] Why this is so is clearer from Prajñākaragupta's commentary. To be liberated implies that one was first bound. But whatever is bound cannot be liberated because to be bound is its nature. What can happen is that a mind-stream first exists in an unpurified state but a subsequent momentary phase of it arises in a purified state out of a specific complex of causes. The mind-stream is not 'liberated' however, because a stream composed of phases does not exist apart from those phases.

[68] *avasāya*, if the reading is correct, is being used, unusually, in the meaning of *vyavasāya* or *adhyavasāya*.

[69] PVBh 137,9–16: *kim iti hetor abhiyogaḥ prekṣāvataḥ. atra samādhiḥ. yasmāt* ... [verses 191 and 192 (which include *mithyādhyāropahānārthaṃ yatno 'saty api moktari*)]. *atrāyam abhiprāyaḥ. yadi tāvat tattvadarśinaḥ praty etad ucyate tadā siddhasādhyataiva. na hi te kvacit pravartante yatnaṃ vā kurvanti.* 'What is the use of causal [actions] for wise people?[a] [Response:] The answer to this [is as follows]. Because ... [verses 191 and 192]. This is the intention of [these verses.] If firstly [your objection] is stated with regard to those who see correctly, then [it puts forward] merely something already established as that which is to be established (i.e. its point is accepted by both of us). For such people do not act or undertake effort for anything.'

a) My translation resorts to taking *hetu* in a strange sense. Another, also not perfect, construal would be to take *kim iti hetor* to mean 'for what reason?' and *abhiyogaḥ* as 'striving'.

the reality of this notion. In Rāmakaṇṭha's interpretation the verse is upholding a kind of action that should be followed; in Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin's it simply describes our usual unenlightened motivations for acting.

Rāmakaṇṭha may or may not have known Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin's interpretation. It would have served the purpose of his Buddhist in the context of NPP perfectly well. It would answer the charge that if we appeared to ourselves as ceasing in every moment there would be no action in the world, by responding that although in reality we do cease in every moment, we judge that reality differently. Because of our attachment to our 'Self' we superimpose the notion of continuous 'I', and it is that that prompts us to action. It is simply the case that action accords with the way we judge reality and not only with the reality itself.[70]

But Rāmakaṇṭha did not choose to interpret the verse this way, and there seem to me to be philological indications that Rāmakaṇṭha's interpretation may be closer to Dharmakīrti's intentions. The immediately preceding verse in PVā runs,[71] 'As long as attachment to the Self is not abandoned, the [stream][72] continues to suffer,[73] superimposing suffering [on to itself], and it does not abide in its authentic state.' Given that the context of this verse (as accepted by both Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin) is the question of why we act for liberation when we will not be around for the result, it could be seen to imply that if we did not act to rid ourselves of attachment to the Self our streams would be doomed permanently to suffer. If so, then the very

[70] We can see here how radical the Buddhist theory of no-Self (or at least its instantiation in the Buddhist Epistemological School) is: all worldly action (*vyavahāra*), being prompted by the thought that 'I' will benefit from it, is seen to be the product of a massive delusion. Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin both seem to accept Rāmakaṇṭha's claim that the only reason we act is because we think of ourselves as continuously existing entities, and thus all action becomes for Buddhism, grounded in illusion.

[71] *yāvac cātmani na premṇo hāniḥ sa paritasyati* | *tāvad duḥkhitam āropya na ca svastho 'vatiṣṭhate* || Harunaga Isaacson did not like the reading *duḥkhitam*, wondering if it may be a corruption of *duḥkhitvam*.

[72] Manorathanandin glosses *sa* with *prāṇyabhimato duḥkhasantānaḥ*.

[73] Manorathanandin glosses *paritasyati* with *duḥkham āste*.

next half verse, *mithyādhyāropahānārthaṃ yatno 'saty api moktari* looks like a description of action that is recommended, not a description of action based on selfish motives. Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin's interpretation that it serves to illustrate that we act not only in accordance with reality but also in accordance with our judgement of reality may be a red herring. Furthermore, their precise interpretation of *mithyādhyāropahānārthaṃ* does not seem quite as natural as Rāmakaṇṭha's. Manorathanandin glosses this as *saṃsāritvādhyavasāyasya hānārtham.* By thus stating that we act 'for the sake of abandoning the judgement that we transmigrate' he must mean that we are alarmed by the prospect of transmigrating endlessly and so act to bring that transmigration to an end.[74] But would one really express that as acting in order to 'abandon the judgement that we transmigrate'? He is here following Prajñākaragupta's interpretation. But Rāmakaṇṭha's idea that the verse refers to action specifically directed at undermining our notion of a permanent Self is very naturally expressed by the compound *mithyādhyāropahānārtham.*[75]

4. Is the Idea of Superimposition of a Permanent Perceiver Coherent?

In section 3 the issue being examined was whether the perceiver appears to us as undivided or divided, one or many, stable or momentary. But now the issue has shifted slightly, which is why I begin a new section here. Both sides now agree that the perceiver appears to us as stable, and the question has become whether this appearance is self-awareness or conceptual cognition.

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[74] Understanding him in that way makes his gloss here consistent with his final remark *evam aham eva baddho 'ham eva mokṣyāmīty adhyāropān muktyarthaṃ vyāyāmaḥ.*

[75] It should be pointed out that in the parallel passage in the *Mataṅgavṛtti*, given in note 65, Rāmakaṇṭha's Buddhist does not present this verse as speaking of the Buddha's action.

4.1. *Sthiragrāhakaprakāśa* is Internal, not External

tad ayuktam, viṣayavailakṣaṇyenākarmatayā[76]*dhyātmam asya saṃvedanāt. yadi hy ayam āropitaḥ syāt, tadāropakād*[77] *grāhakarūpād bhedena viṣayavad bhāseta devadattabodhaḥ sthira itivat. na caivam ayam anubhavaḥ,*[78] *api tu viṣayaprakāśaka*[79]*tvenāntargrāhakasvabhāvaḥ.*

[Siddhāntin:] That is incorrect,[80] because in contrast to the [external] object we experience the [shining forth of a stable Self][81] internally, without it becoming an object [of perception].[82] For[83] if it were superimposed, it would ap-

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[76] *viṣayavailakṣaṇyenākarmatayā* conj.; *viṣayavailakṣaṇyena karmatayā* Ked, Ped, B, P. I discuss this conjecture in note 82.

[77] *tadāropakād* B, P, Ked^{pc}; *āropakād* Ked^{ac}, Ped.

[78] *ayam anubhavaḥ* Ked, Ped; *ayam anabhavaḥ* P; *anubhavaḥ* B.

[79] *viṣayaprakāśaka*° Ked^{pc}, B, P; *viṣayaprakāśa*° Ked^{ac}, Ped.

[80] I.e. the shining forth of a stable perceiver is not superimposed.

[81] *asya* refers to *sthiragrāhakaprakāśa,* which both sides agree to exist, but which the Buddhist claimed in his last speech to be merely superimposed.

[82] I was not at all happy with the reading *viṣayavailakṣaṇyena karmatayā. karmatayā* seems very surprising here, given that, as can be seen from the next sentence, the main point he wants this sentence to make is that the perceiver does not appear like an object (*viṣayavat*). See also in 4.3 below *na ca grāhakātmā grāhyīkartuṃ śakyate ...*; and his acceptance later in the text (38,9–42,1) that the Self does not appear as the *object* of knowledge (*bodhya*), both of which run counter to the idea that it is experienced *karmatayā.* I was hesitant to emend given that the parallel passage in the edition of PMNKV also reads *viṣayavailakṣaṇyena karmatayā*; but this has turned out not to be the reading of any of the four manuscripts of that text that we have collated so far. Three of them read *viṣayavavailakṣaṇyenākarmatayā*, and the fourth *karmavailakṣaṇyenākarmatayā.* Thus my conjecture here is not as bold as it might seem. *viṣayavavailakṣaṇyenākarmatayā* is not tautologous, since there are examples of things distinct from external objects which are nevertheless objects of perception (for Rāmakaṇṭha), for example concepts (*vikalpas*), objects of determinative cognition (*adhyavaseyas*), pleasure and pain.

If *viṣayavailakṣaṇyena karmatayā* is indeed wrong here, it is not the only example of the same corruption being shared by two of Rāmakaṇṭha's texts, indicating perhaps that a scribe/editor of one of the texts had parallel passages in others in front of him at the time of transmission. To render this idea more plausible I have drawn attention in footnotes 45, 65 and 105 to other possible instances of cross-contamination between Rāmakaṇṭha's texts. If this, as opposed to the more common cross-contamination between manuscripts of the same text, can be shown to have happened, then we should not necessarily be afraid

pear like an [external] object, as separate from its superimposer,[84] the perceiver,[85] like [Devadatta's consciousness does when we say] 'Devadatta's consciousness is steadfast';[86] and this experience is not like that. Rather, since it is the illuminator of [external] objects,[87] its nature is the inner[88] perceiver.[89]

4.2. Superimposition Cannot Be Carried Out by Something Momentary

*tatsamāropakābhimatagrahītṛ*rūpatve ca[90] *tadāpi sthira eva saṃvedyate, tasyāpi hi svataḥ kṣaṇamātrarūpatvenāpratibhāsanāt, tatpratibhāsitve*[91] *hy āropānupapatteḥ,*[92] *āropasya pūrvāparaparāmarśarūpatvena sthirabodhanirvartyatvāt.*[93]

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to emend against the agreement of two texts. In a passage shared by PMNKV and NPP, but not looked at in this book (PMNKV ad v. 46, NPP ad 1.46), there are three occasions on which the two texts share a reading that seems to need to be emended (see forthcoming critical edition and translation of PMNKV being prepared by Goodall, Sarma and Watson).

[83] What follows this 'for' gives a reason not for why we experience the shining forth of a stable Self internally, but for why the fact that we experience it internally means that it is not superimposed.

[84] The presupposition behind this point seems to be that superimposition implies a separation between superimposer and superimposed.

[85] In order to prevent the English sentences from becoming unnecessarily convoluted, I sometimes translate *grāhakarūpa* (literally, 'that whose nature is the perceiver') simply as 'perceiver'.

[86] To indicate, perhaps, his firm-mindedness.

[87] Note that *sthiragrāhakaprakāśa* is here described as *viṣayaprakāśaka*, re-illustrating 1) that perception of the Self is not a separate action from perception of objects; and 2) that Rāmakaṇṭha uses *grāhakaprakāśa* to refer to simply the *grāhaka* (because *viṣayaprakāśaka* is clearly synonymous with *viṣayagrāhaka*).

[88] Contrasting with *viṣayavat*.

[89] Alternatively, 'it is the nature of the inner perceiver.'

[90] °*rūpatve ca* conj.; °*rūpatvena* Ked, Ped, B; °*rūpatvenā* P.

[91] *tatpratibhāsitve* B, P, Ked^{ac}, Ped; *tadapratibhāsitve* Ked^{pc}.

[92] We could consider emending *āropānupapatteḥ* to *āropānupapattiḥ*: Kashmirian transmissions of texts often confuse *e* and *i* owing to non-difference of pronunciation between the two in that region. But Rāmakaṇṭha quite often uses tautologous combinations

And if it[94] has the character of being the perceiver that [you] hold to carry out a superimposition of this [stable appearance],[95] then even in that case (*tadā-pi*)[96] it is certainly (*eva*) sensed as stable, for nor does that (i.e. the supposedly

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of *hi* and an ablative. See the previous sentence for example: *tasyāpi hi svataḥ kṣaṇamātrarūpatvenāpratibhāsanāt.*

93 °*nirvartyatvāt* B, P; °*nivartyatvāt* Ked, Ped, parallel sentence in PMNKV.

Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *sa* [*sa* conj. Sanderson; *na* ed., MSS] *punar bhrama eva, viṣayavailakṣaṇyenākarmatayā* [*viṣayavailakṣaṇyenākarmatayā* MSS; *viṣayavailakṣaṇyena karmatayā* ed.; *karmavailakṣaṇyenākarmatayā* 1 MS] *tadaikyasya saṃvedanāt. yadi hy etad āropitaṃ syāt, tadāropakā*[looks, from comparison with NPP, as though text has dropped out here]*bhimatasya* [*tadāropakābhimatasya* MSS; *tadāropikābhimatasya* ed.] *svataḥ kṣaṇamātradhvaṃsitvenāpratibhāsanāt, tatpratibhāsitve hy āropānupapatteḥ* [*tatpratibhāsitve hy āropānupapatteḥ* conj.; *tatpratibhāsitve hy ātmatvopapatteḥ* ed., MSS; *tatpratibhāsitve 'py ātmatvāpatteḥ* 1 MS], *āropasya pūrvāparaparāmarśarūpatvena sthirabodhanirvartyatvāt* [°*nirvartyatvāt* MSS; °*nivartyatvāt* ed.; °*nirvatyatvāt* 1 MS] (295,5–8).

94 We have to take 'it' here, not as *sthiragrāhakaprakāśa* (for the Buddhist does not hold of course that that which does the superimposing is stable), but simply as *grāhakaprakāśa.*

95 I have emended the text here against the evidence of the editions and the manuscript. Unfortunately there is no parallel sentence in MatV VP, and in both the edition and the manuscripts of PMNKV, text has dropped out at precisely this point (see note 93). I find the transmitted reading, °*rūpatvena*, unsatisfactory for two reasons: it makes the *tadā* impossible to construe; and it means we cannot break up this string of text, *api tu viṣayaprakāśakatvenāntargrāhakasvabhāvaḥ tatsamāropakābhimatagrahītṛrūpatvena tadāpi sthira eva saṃvedyate.* I see that string as making two separate points, of which the move from one to the other would most likely be marked by a sentence break.

I take the first point to be that it (the stable perceiver that shines forth) must be something *internal* because it illuminates *external* objects. This would be a natural point to follow the immediately preceding contention that if it were superimposed it would appear as something external. The second point I take to be that if we are talking of this inner perceiver rather than what is superimposed, then for precisely the reason that the Buddhist holds this to be a superimposer, it must be sensed as stable. Why that follows is explained next.

96 I take the *tadāpi* to mark the change from talking about that which the Buddhist holds to be superimposed (of which it has been said that it cannot be superimposed because it is internal) to that which the Buddhist holds to be the superimposer. The Buddhist has no problem with the former being stable, but Rāmakaṇṭha says here that even if we

> superimposing perceiver) shine forth in a merely momentary form of itself,[97] for if [it] did shine forth in such a way,[98] superimposition would be impossible, since superimposition must be performed by an enduring cognition in that it consists of determinate cognition that synthesizes[99] earlier and later [phases of a phenomenon].

For the Buddhist the perceiver is, and appears in pre-conceptual experience as,[100] momentary, but it superimposes stability on to itself. This superimposed appearance of a steadfast Self is what fools the Śaiva or other Ātmavādin into thinking that the real perceiver is steadfast. Rāmakaṇṭha here contends that the supposedly superimposing perceiver, that to which we have access in pre-conceptual experience, also appears as steadfast. Another way of stating this is that it is not only the object of experience of the Self (/ the perceiver) that is steadfast; the experience itself (*anubhava*) is steadfast. The reason is that something momentary would be incapable of superimposition. That is the theme of this whole sub-section (4.2).

> *na ca kṣaṇātmano 'pi yugapatpūrvāparakālayuktadīrghaviṣayatvataḥ samāropakatvam, ayojanātmakatvenāvikalpakatvāt*[101] *alātacakrādipratibhāsavat.*[102]

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are talking of that internal perceiver which does the superimposing, that too is sensed as stable.

[97] *svataḥ* emphasizes that we are talking of the thing itself, not the distorted picture that we get of it after *adhyāropa*.

[98] *tatpratibhāsitve* seems here to mean *tathāpratibhāsitve*.

[99] *parāmarśa* is used here in the same sense as *anusandhāna/pratisandhāna* in Chapter 1. Rāmakaṇṭha's argument is similar to that used by the Naiyāyika there. Rāmakaṇṭha was not impressed by that argument, for he did not think it was capable of proving a Self or perceiver beyond cognition. We can now see that Rāmakaṇṭha agrees with the Naiyāyika that there must be some stable entity whose existence spans the gap between the earlier and later phenomena that are synthesized; but for him cognition itself is stable, and thus capable of carrying out synthesis and superimposition.

For *pūrvāparaparāmarśa* see PVā 3.174 (=PVin 1.8): *saṅketasmaraṇopāyaṃ dṛṣṭasaṅkalanātmakam | pūrvāparaparāmarśaśūnye tac cākṣuṣe katham* ||; NM(M) Vol. 1, 243, 3–14 ; and NM(M) Vol. 2, 5,9–6,10.

[100] Cf. *grāhakakṣaṇapravāha evānubhūyamāne* in 3.2.

[101] *vikalpakatvāt* Ked, Ped; *vikalpatvāt* B, P.

> And [you can]not [say] that [the perceiver / *anubhava*], though momentary, [can] superimpose through having a long range[103] that is simultaneously linked with an earlier and later time, as [such a momentary perceiver] would be incapable of conceptualization, since it would not [be able to] join [things together],[104] in the way that [cognition of], for example, the image of a circle [caused by a swinging] firebrand [can join together the momentary instants of the firebrand's trajectory].

Rāmakaṇṭha tries to envisage how it would be possible for a single momentary perceiver to carry out superimposition. Surely for superimposition to take place the superimposer must exist for long enough to perceive a succession of phases of an object and spot their similarity. He imagines a Buddhist trying to get around this problem by explaining that even though a perceiver lasts only for a moment, it can perceive earlier and later phases of an object. Even so,

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[102] Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *na ca kṣaṇātmano 'pi yugapatpūrvāparayuktadīrghaviṣayatvataḥ samāropakatvam ayojanātmakatvenāvikalpakatvāt, alātacakrādipratibhāsavat* (295,8–10).

Parallel passage in MatV VP runs: *na ca kṣaṇātmano 'pi* [6 MSS, not including the Kashmirian ones, lack the *'pi*] *sa evāyam iti pūrvāparakālayuktadīrghārthaprakāśakatvena vikalpakatvam iti vācyam ayojanātmakatvāt, alātacakrādipratibhāsavat, yojanā hi kalpanā* [*kalpanā* ṛ, ṝ; *vikalpanā* ed.] *yataḥ* (160,10–11). The reason I prefer the reading of those two Kashmirian manuscripts is that, as stated in note 104, Dignāga wrote *yojanā kalpanā* in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, and Rāmakaṇṭha quotes this later in this text (ad 1.22cd, p. 49,2b–1b).

[103] I prefer not to translate this as 'long object', as the Buddhist opponent would not accept the existence of a long (non-momentary) object. (I do not think Rāmakaṇṭha is here thinking of how a Sarvāstivādin would explain superimposition: his opponent is a Dharmakīrtian.) It is probable that a Buddhist opponent would also not accept this idea of a single momentary perceiver having a long range, but it seems a much more likely internal objection than one involving long objects. The problem to be explained is how *momentary* objects (=phases of an object) can be joined into a unity by a momentary perceiver who is fooled by their similarity.

That having been said it should be pointed out that the parallel passage in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* reads *pūrvāparakālayuktadīrghārtha*° (see previous note). In that case I think we have to interpret the long object as the stream of several momentary phases of an object.

[104] Dignāga indeed defines conceptual cognition as joining: *yojanā kalpanā* (PrSa 1.3). For Dignāga this joining refers to the process through which an individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) becomes associated with a name, genus etc.

Rāmakaṇṭha says, this momentary perceiver would not be capable of joining up these different phases. Quite why that would be the case is not obvious. Perhaps Rāmakaṇṭha thinks that one moment would be needed to perceive these different phases and another to join them up.

The example of the illusory cognition of a circle of fire just seems to be given as a case of a conceptual cognition where it is particularly obvious that the joining of separate but similar phases is necessary to produce it. From Rāmakaṇṭha's point of view, this joining of different points on the firebrand's circular trajectory cannot take place unless one and the same perceiver perceives those points.

If the example were intended more specifically, then the point would be that even if a momentary perceiver could perceive several of the point-instants of light on the firebrand's path, it would not be able to join them together. It does not illustrate that point, which means it unfortunately does not give us any clues as to why Rāmakaṇṭha would have held superimposition to be impossible even on the presupposition that the momentary perceiver can grasp several sequential phases.

> *ata eva yugapacchabdārthaviṣayatve 'pi yogijñānam avikalpakam ity uktaṃ bhavadbhiḥ.*[105]
>
> That is precisely why[106] you have said that Yogic perception is free of concepts even though it simultaneously takes in word and object.

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[105] *ity uktaṃ bhavadbhiḥ* Ked, Ped, P; *bhavadbhir ity uktaṃ* B.

Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *ata eva yugapat sarvārthaviṣayatve 'pi yogijñānam avikalpakakalpam ity uktam* (295,10–11).

Parallel passage in MatV VP continues: *ata eva yogijñānam yugapac chabdārthaviṣayatve* [*chabdārthaviṣayatve* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *sarvārthaviṣayatve* ed.] *'py avikalpakam bhavadbhir iṣyate* (160,12). The inclusion of both *chabdārthaviṣayatve*, the reading of NPP, and *sarvārthaviṣayatve*, the reading of PMNKV, in the manuscripts of this text, indicates that the manuscripts of two different texts contain the same corruption. That would be the case whichever reading is correct, assuming Rāmakaṇṭha wrote the same in NPP and PMNKV. Even if he wrote *chabdārthaviṣayatve* in NPP, and *sarvārthaviṣayatve* in PMNKV, then we would still be able to say at least that readings from other of his texts have entered the transmission of MatV VP. See note 82.

For Rāmakaṇṭha, the Buddhist claim that Yogic perception is non-conceptual even though it simultaneously perceives both word and object neatly illustrates the claim he has just made that simultaneous perception of different phases would still not be sufficient to enable conceptualisation. *yugapacchabdārthaviṣayatve* in this sentence is mirroring *yugapatpūrvāparakālayuktadīrghaviṣayatvataḥ* in the last. The Yogin's perception in one moment of word and object is equivalent to the hypothetical perception by one moment of earlier and later objects. In both cases, according to Rāmakaṇṭha, conceptualization could not take place because joining is impossible. If the Buddhist thinks that mere simultaneous perception of two things on the part of a momentary perceiver would be sufficient for the fusion of those two things in a conceptual cognition, why does he not hold that the Yogin's simultaneous perception of word and object is conceptual? The fact that he does not shows that conceptual cognition requires something more, namely joining; and this joining, so the implication seems to be, cannot be carried out in the same moment as the pre-conceptual cognition on which it is based.

The implication of Rāmakaṇṭha's remark, 'that is precisely why you have said' is that the Buddhists, in their view of Yogic perception, have intuited the truth that something momentary, even if it can perceive in that one moment several things, is incapable of joining them (though they ignore this in their view of non-yogic conceptual perception).

> *yojitaviṣayaṃ tad iti cet,*
>
> [Buddhist:] [Yogic perception] has as its content [things, i.e. word and object] which are already joined.

One of the implications of the previous statement by Rāmakaṇṭha was: if you Buddhists are really convinced that something momentary could simultaneously perceive different objects and join them, then why do you hold the case of Yogic perception to be any different from non-Yogic conceptual cognition? What reason do you have for holding Yogic perception to be non-conceptual other than a recognition of the truth that it would be quite impossible for something to both perceive and join up several things in one moment?

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106 'That is precisely why' means 'because something momentary would be incapable of joining even if it could simultaneously perceive the things to be joined'.

Hence your doctrine of momentariness should compel you to admit the impossibility of conceptual cognition for non-Yogins as well as Yogins.

The Buddhist responds here by distinguishing Yogic perception from non-Yogic conceptual cognition along the lines that in the case of Yogic perception that which it perceives, word and object, are already joined. That is why Yogic perception is free of concepts, not because[107] it is incapable of joining as a result of being momentary.

> *sarveṣāṃ kṣaṇikatvena*[108] *yojanānupapatter na kiṃ cid etat.*[109]
>
> [Siddhāntin:] That [response] is not worth considering, because, since [for you] everything is momentary, nothing could do the joining.

It is all very well for the Buddhist to take the responsibility for the joining away from the Yogic perception itself, by claiming that it has already been done. But done by what? There is nothing in a Buddhist universe that, being non-momentary, would be capable of such action.

> *ata evānekasyāpi kramabhāvino vikalpakṣaṇasyānāropakatvam*[110]
>
> That is precisely why even several momentary conceptual cognitions in sequence could not superimpose.

Buddhism would explain this problem of superimposition on the part of something momentary through a sequence of cognitions, each passing on information to the next, such that although it is one cognition that perceives phase 1 of an object and another that perceives phase 2, the second cognition has access to memory of the cognition of phase 1 of the object, can thus spot the similarity between the two phases, and can thus superimpose unity on to the object. But if, argues Rāmakaṇṭha, individual moments can be shown to be incapable of joining, how can a sequence help? If every single member of the sequence is incapable of joining then the sequence too would be incapable of superimposition.

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[107] Cf. *ata eva* in Rāmakaṇṭha's assertion. It is that that the Buddhist challenges here.

[108] *kṣaṇikatvena* Ked, Ped, P; *kṣaṇikatve* B.

[109] Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *yojitaviṣayaṃ tad iti cet, sarveṣāṃ kṣaṇikatvena yojanānupapatter na kiṃ cid etat* (295,11–12).

[110] Parallel passage in MatV VP continues: *nāpi ca bahūnāṃ kramabhāvināṃ jñānānāṃ vikalpakatvaṃ yuktam* (160,12–13).

ity āropāsambhavād astaṅgatā vikalpāḥ.[111]

Thus because superimposition is impossible [on the Buddhist presupposition of momentariness] conceptual cognitions are doomed.

4.3. Cognition Cannot Fool Itself

na ca grāhakātmā grāhyīkartuṃ śakyate yena svātmany adhyāropeṇa sthairyam āropitam ity ucyeta,[112] *svātmany avikalpako vikalpo yataḥ.*[113]

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[111] °*staṅgatā vikalpāḥ* Ked^{pc}, B; °*staṅgatā vikalpaḥ* P; °*staṃgatatāvikalpaḥ* Ked^{ac}; °*staṃgatas tava vikalpaḥ* Ped.

Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *ata evānekeṣām api kramabhāvinām vikalpakṣaṇānāṃ nāropakatvam, ity āropāsambhavāt astaṅgatā vikalpāḥ* [*astaṅgatā vikalpāḥ* conj.; *tadaṅgatāvikalpanāt* ed.; *asaṃgatā vikalpā* (with following *na*—see continuation of this passage below—so we can probably assume a pre-sandhi form of *vikalpāḥ*) 1 MS] (295,12–13).

[112] *ucyeta* P; *ucyate* Ked, Ped, B.

[113] Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *na ca grāhakātmāpy evaṃ gṛhyeteti* [*grāhakātmāpy evaṃ gṛhyeteti* 1 MS; *grāhakātmany eva* ed., MSS] *vaktuṃ śakyate, yena svātmany avikalpako vikalpaḥ* (295,13–14). Comparison with NPP reveals that text may have dropped out in PMNKV owing to a scribe's eye skipping from one *svātmani* to the next. Perhaps it is possible to make sense of the PMNKV sentence as constituted above however: 'And it cannot be said that the perceiver, for its part, could be grasped [by itself] in this way (i.e. as stable, by conceptual cognition), for conceptual cognition is non-conceptual with regard to itself.'

Parallel sentence in MatV VP: *svātmany avikalpako vikalpa* [*avikalpako vikalpa* ṛ, ṝ; *avikalpiko vikalpa* ū; *na vikalpa* ed.] *iti ca* (161,2).

Marginal comment in B:

{ } = hard to read *akṣaras*.

_ = 1 *akṣara* missing owing to the end of the line not showing on my copy.

{*sv*}*ātmany avikalpako vikalpa iti* || *atrāyam arthaḥ svātmani svarūpe sthire ātmani nirvikalpe brahmaṇi yo vikalpaḥ āropitam ātmani* [*āropitam ātmani* corr; *āropita* | *mātmani* MS] *sthairyam na tu tāttvikam ity evaṃrūpo bauddhābhyupagamaḥ* [*bauddhābhyupagamaḥ* em.; *baudhābabhyupagamaḥ* MS]. *sa*(then probably 4 *akṣaras* missing)*avidyamānaḥ vikalpakaḥ vikalpakārī yasya saḥ avikalpakaḥ vikalpasyāpi nirvikalpakaḥ vikalpakārī* (°*kaḥ vikalpakārī* is circled, possibly to indicate that it should be deleted) *brahmarūpatvāt* | *sa ca vikalpaḥ nirvikalpād* [*nirvikalpād* corr; *nirvilpād* MS] *bhinna ivāvabhāsate na tu tasmād* [*tasmād* conj.; *tasm_* MS] *bhedakasyāpi bhedasya nirvikalpasva-*

rūpatvāt | *punar api bhedakābhāvāt* | *vikalpasya yat sahajaṃ vikalpamātrarūpaṃ tatra niḥsandhiḥ pratyayaḥ anyathāvikalpasyaivā 'sa{ttv}āt* | *iti pratyayāveśa eva nirvikalpakaṃ brahmastutaṃ ca vikalpo 'satyaviṣayaḥ svarūpanirvikalpaka iti* | *yathā śrīvatso py āha* | *yad ya{d ā}vṛtikaraṃ praka{l}pyate tena tena kila* [*kila* conj. Sanderson; *ki_* MS] *jājvalīti* [*jājvalīti* corr. Isaacson; *jājvatīti* MS] *ya_*(looks as though the cut off *akṣara* may end in a *viRāma*) | *bhairavīyam i_m astu vastuvaḥ {p}rastutādvayana{y}aprathaṃ vapur iti* | *utpaladevo py āha* | *yat kiñ cid eva bhūtānāṃ bhavadāvaraṇaṃ prati* | *na kiñ cid eva bhaktānām bhavadāvaraṇam pratīti* ||

Like the last extensive marginal comment, given in Chapter 1, note 52, this is considerably corrupt. The mentions of Brahman indicate that its author is superimposing a Vedāntic slant on to the text. Until the two verses at the end, the first attributed to Śrīvatsa and the second to Utpaladeva, I am unable to attempt a translation.

The metre of Śrīvatsa's verse is Rathoddhatā. Prof. Sanderson found it cited (together with Utpaladeva's) in the Sanskrit commentary on the Old Kashmiri *Mahānayaprakāśa* (ad MaPra 1.5, p. 12), in the form: *yad yad āvṛtikaraṃ prakalpyate tena tena vata jājvalīti yat* | *bhairavīyam idam astu vastutaḥ prastutādvayanayaprathaṃ vapuḥ* || 'Ah (*vata*) this, which is inflamed by whatever is assumed to restrict it, is the true form of Bhairava, displaying the non-dualism being expounded.' The author is there unidentified (*kaścic ca vipaścid āha*). Prof. Sanderson informed me that a Śrīvatsa wrote the Krama's *Cidgaganacandrikā*, which is mostly in the Rathoddhatā metre, but that this verse is not in the Tantrik Texts edition.

The verse by Utpaladeva, which is *Śivastotrāvalī* 16.1, is cited in the MaPra in exactly the same form as in B: 'Anything conceals you from creatures; nothing conceals you from devotees.' Kṣemarāja's commentary, however (see ŚiStĀ 118,3–7), supports *lokānām* for *bhūtānām*; and *na kiñ cid eva* at the beginning of the first line in place of *yat kiñ cid eva*. (These two readings are also found in all four editions of the *Śivastotrāvalī* available to me.) *lokānām*, in the meaning of 'worldly people', provides a better contrast with 'devotees' than creatures in general (*bhūtānām*) does. *na kiñ cid eva* at the beginning of the first, as well as the second, half-verse seems not so good as B's reading, but Kṣemarāja certainly read it: he explains that through *kāku* (a change of voice indicating that a negative word indicates an affirmative) *na kiñ cid eva* in the first half-verse connotes everything (*viśvam*).

What is the connection between these two verses and the claim in NPP that conceptual cognition is non-conceptual with regard to itself? The point is that any awareness, whatever its object, is awareness of Śiva for the illuminated, since every *vikalpa* is *nirvikalpaka* in its immediate essence, when pointed inwards. Both verses are from a non-dual context of course, where non-conceptual cognition is nothing other than Śiva—something that is certainly not the case for Rāmakaṇṭha and Śaiva Siddhānta, for whom Selves and Śiva are eternally separate.

> And the perceiver[114] cannot be made into the perceived,[115] as a result of which one might be able to say that stability is superimposed through superimposition [by the perceiver] on to itself, for conceptual cognition is non-conceptual with regard to itself.

I begin a new sub-section here, for, having argued for the impossibility of something momentary being capable of carrying out superimposition, Rāmakaṇṭha now moves to the different point that it is impossible for something to superimpose on to itself. This is related to his first objection to *sthiragrāhakaprakāśa* being superimposed, given in 4.1, in that that was based on the presupposition of a duality between superimposer and superimposed, which could also be seen to be in the background here too. While it was held there that the superimposed cannot be the superimposer (and must therefore appear as external to it), the point here could be said to be that the superimposer cannot become the superimposed.

The specific contention here is that a superimposing cognition's view of itself must be non-conceptual, and therefore accurate (*svātmany avikalpako vikalpaḥ*). This view is shared by, and probably derived from, the Buddhist Epistemological School. See Dignāga's remark, '[We] hold even conceptual cog-

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[114] Rāmakaṇṭha frequently uses the compounds *grāhakātman* and *jñānātman*. They are ambiguous. The first, for example, could be a Karmadhāraya meaning 'perceiving Self' or 'Self that is the perceiver'; or it could be a Bahuvrīhi meaning 'that whose nature is the perceiver'. It is my impression that in the great majority of cases it is as Bahuvrīhis that they are being used. For he uses them in discussions with a Buddhist opponent where he does not want or need to presuppose an *ātman*, where his argument will be just as valid whether he is talking of an *ātman* or of something the Buddhist would not object to: the perceiver / cognition. Furthermore he occasionally puts these compounds into the mouth of the Buddhist as well (see the first sentence of Chapter 4.2; and NPP 17,3 quoted on page 355). Thus I tend to translate them simply as 'perceiver' and 'cognition'. I should warn the reader though that Rāmakaṇṭha may sometimes have used these compounds partly because of their ambiguity, in order to remind the reader that for him the perceiver / cognition is the Self, and that, if so, this sense will be lost in my translation.

[115] Rāmakaṇṭha makes the same claim later in the text in a different context: *na cātmā svātmana eva grāhyībhavati svātmani kriyāvirodhāt, sa hi grāhakatvenaiva pratyagrūpatayā sarvadā bhāsata ity uktam.* 'And the Self cannot become the object of itself, because action directed to oneself is impossible. For as [I] have said, it always shines forth internally as the perceiver alone.' This sentence is paralleled at PMNKV ad v. 48 (299,2b–1b).

nition [to be non-conceptual perception] in its self-awareness, [but] not with regard to its object, because it conceptualizes that.'[116] There are two aspects of every cognitive act for the Buddhist Epistemological School (and for Rāmakaṇṭha): that directed towards the cognition itself, the perceiver, and that directed towards its object. In non-conceptual cognition both of these are non-conceptual, but in conceptual cognition, although the object-'perception' is conceptual (and therefore for Buddhism not genuine perception), the self-awareness is, even there, non-conceptual, and therefore a valid case of perception.

Thus it is not possible for the Buddhist to claim that our appearance to ourselves as stable (*sthiragrāhakaprakāśa*), which he accepts, is a case of superimposition on the part of a conceptual cognition (*vikalpa*); for self-cognition is, even on the part of a *vikalpa*, according to his own tradition always valid. It may or may not be the case that we are fooled by the similarity and rapid succession of momentary *object*-phases into thinking that we are looking at one long object, but momentary *cognitions* should not be able to fool themselves, given Dignāga's doctrine that, even when engaged in conceptual cognition, they appear accurately to themselves.

> *ata evāsyāhampratyayaviṣayatāpi*[117] [Ked p. 16] *na sambhavati, api tv ahampratyayaprakāśarūpataiva tadāpi tena rūpeṇa sthiratayaiva bhāsanāt.*[118]
>
> It is for precisely that reason[119] that the [perceiver] cannot even be the content of the I-cognition: rather it is the very shining forth of I-cognition, because it appears as stable indeed then too[120] in that form.[121]

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[116] PrSa 1.7ab (Sanskrit given at Hattori 1968 95, note 51): *kalpanāpi svasaṃvittāv iṣṭā nārthe vikalpanāt.*

[117] Interlinear comment above *ata eva* in P: *ahaṃpratyayagamyo hy ātmeti mānasapratyakṣa ātmā jaiminīyānām.*

[118] Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *ata evāsyāhampratyayaviṣayatāpi na sambhavati, api tv ahampratyayaprakāśarūpataiva, tadāpi tena rūpeṇa sthiratayaivāhambhāsanāt* [°*āhambhāsanāt* MSS; °*āhamavabhāsanāt* ed., MSS] (295,14–15). I am tempted to delete the *ahaṃ* in the final compound. The argument flows more smoothly if the object of *bhāsanāt/avabhāsanāt* is that which is referred to by *asya* at the beginning of the sentence, i.e. *grāhakātmā,* the perceiver. If it were not that but *aham,* then the contention that the perceiver is the shining forth of I-cognition would not follow.

[119] I.e. because it cannot be made into an object.

I-cognition does not present the perceiver as its stable content. Rather the perceiver's stability is given as the constant shining forth of the I-cognition itself. If Rāmakaṇṭha's claims about the stable appearance of the perceiver to itself (= the stable appearance of ourselves to ourselves) were based on it being the unchanging object or content of I-cognition, then the Buddhist might have a case for saying that the stability is superimposed. For I-cognition is conceptual cognition. But Rāmakaṇṭha is talking of the stable shining forth of cognition itself.

> *na hi kālatraye 'pi grāhakātmano dhvaṃsaḥ saṃvedyata ity uktam.*[122] *yasya hi prāgabhāvaḥ sa utpanna ucyate, yasya tu pradhvaṃsaḥ sa naṣṭaḥ. yasya punaḥ*[123] *pūrvottarayoḥ koṭyor nāsty abhāvasaṃvit sa pratikṣaṇam utpanno*[124] *niruddho veti na śakyate vaktum.*[125]

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[120] 'Too' here means even in I-cognition, which is conceptual cognition, as well as in self-awareness, which he described in detail in 3.1.

[121] I.e. in the form of the shining forth of I-cognition.

[122] *ity uktam* Ked, B, P; *iti yuktam* Ped.

[123] *yasya punaḥ* Ked, B, P; *yasya* Ped.

[124] *pratikṣaṇam utpanno* Ked, B, P; *pratikṣaṇaṃ sa samutpanno* Ped.

[125] Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *na hi kālatraye 'pi grāhakātmano dhvaṃsaḥ saṃvedyata ity uktam. yasya hi prāgabhāvaḥ sa utpannaḥ, yasya tu* [*tu* MSS; *hi* ed.] *dhvaṃsaḥ* [*dhvaṃsaḥ* MSS; *puṃsa utpattiḥ* ed., 1 MS] *sa naṣṭaḥ. ahampratyayasya* [*ahaṃpratyayasya* ed., MSS; *pratyayasya* MSS] *punaḥ pūrvottarayoḥ koṭyor nāsty abhāvasaṃvit* [*abhāvasaṃvit* 1 MS; *abhāvaḥ. saṃvit* ed., MSS]. *pratikṣaṇam utpanno niruddho* [*utpanno niruddho* 1 MS; *utpannā niruddhā* ed., MSS] *bhaved iti na śakyate vaktum* (295,15–18). The majority of witnesses point to a sentence break before *saṃvit*, and feminine endings on *utpannā* and *niruddhā*. But the readings I have proposed are those of what is consistently the best manuscript, in Nandināgarī from Mysore, and are supported by the NPP parallel.

We still have to break what in NPP is one sentence, into two here: 'But there is no consciousness of the absence of I-cognition at some previous or subsequent extremity. It cannot be said to arise and cease in every moment.' Thus some may want to adjust PMNKV further to bring it in line with NPP. To do so would involve emending *ahampratyayasya/pratyayasya* to *yasya* and inserting a *sa* before *pratikṣaṇam.*

If Rāmakaṇṭha did indeed write *ahampratyayasya* in PMNKV then it is a sign of his thinking changing between the writing of PMNKV and NPP. For he would be using the word equivalently to *svasaṃvedana*, whereas in NPP, as we will see in the next chapter, the two are firmly distinguished.

For I have said[126] that the ceasing of the perceiver is not sensed in any of the three times. For something which had prior non-existence is said to have arisen; something which undergoes cessation is [said to] be destroyed; but when there is no consciousness of something at some previous or subsequent extremity of it, it cannot be said to arise and cease in every moment.

Rāmakaṇṭha shows here how thoroughly at odds with the way we experience ourselves the Buddhist doctrine of the momentariness of the perceiver is. In the previous chapter the Buddhist was portrayed as a model of down-to-earth common sense against the background of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya ontology and their imperceptible and eternal Self. The rift that he here describes between the way we experience ourselves and the Buddhist doctrine of production and cessation in every moment is not enough in itself to discredit the Buddhist theory, but it places the burden on the Buddhist to come up with a satisfactory explanation of why our self-perception is so mistaken. The Buddhist no longer has common sense on his side.

na cāsvasaṃvedyaḥ saṃviddharmo bhavatīti[127] *vakṣyāmaḥ.*[128]

And we will teach[129] that something that is not self-cognized cannot be a property of consciousness.

The implication here is that if arising and destruction were properties of consciousness, that consciousness would be aware of them.

tat sthūlasūkṣmayor iva sthirakṣaṇikayoḥ parasparaviruddharūpatvād[130] *yathā vidyudādau kṣaṇikatvaṃ pramāṇasiddhaṃ sad akṣaṇikatvaṃ vyāvartayati, evaṃ grāhakātmany apy āropāsambhavāt sthairyam avabhāsamānam asaṃśayaṃ kṣaṇikatvaṃ vyāvartayatīti yuktam.*[131]

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[126] See his remark in 3.1: *kālatraye 'pi tiraskṛtasvagataprāgabhāvapradhvaṃsābhāvo* (14,3–4).

[127] *bhavatīti* Ked, Ped, P; *bhavabhavatīti* B.

[128] Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *na cāsvasaṃvedyaḥ* [*cāsvasaṃvedyaḥ* 1 MS; *vā svasaṃvedyaḥ* ed.] *saṃviddharmo bhavatīti vakṣyāmaḥ* (295,18).

[129] I find no passage to which he may be referring. The parallel passage in PMNKV also ends with *iti vakṣyāmaḥ* (see note 128), and there too (a much shorter text the whole of which I have read several times) I am unable to locate a plausible passage.

[130] *parasparaviruddha°* Ked, B; *paraspaviruddha°* P; *paraspara°* Ped.

[131] Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *tat sthūlasūkṣmayor iva sthirakṣaṇikayoḥ parasparaviruddharūpatvād vidyudādau kṣaṇikatvaṃ pramāṇasiddhaṃ sad akṣaṇikatvaṃ*

> Therefore it is correct to say that just as the momentariness of lightning for example, being established by a means of knowledge,[132] excludes non-momentariness, because the momentary and the stable, like the gross and the subtle, have natures that are mutually contradictory, so because of the impossibility of superimposition on to the *perceiver*,[133] [its] stability, shining forth, undoubtedly excludes momentariness.

Rāmakaṇṭha first gives an example where he would be quite prepared to accept momentariness over stability. He implies that the same reasoning that leads us to momentariness in that case leads us to stability in the current case.

4.4. Refutation of Self-Awareness?

> *na ca svasaṃvedanasya tathātve bādhaḥ sambhavati bādhakābhimatasyāpi tenaiva sthirātmanā saṃvedanād*[134] *anyathā bādhakatvāyogād. bhrāntyabhā-*

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vyāvartayati yathā, evam atra svātmāropāsambhavena sthairyam avabhāsamānam asaṃśayaṃ kṣaṇikatvaṃ vyavacchinattīti yuktam (295,18–21). We could conjecture *svātmany āropāsambhavena* for *svātmāropāsambhavena* on the basis of *svātmany āropāsambhavāt* in one MatV VP parallel, *svātmany āropāsambhavena* in the other (see below) and *grāhakātmany apy āropāsambhavāt* in NPP. If we retain *svātmāropāsambhavena*, we certainly have to interpret it as *svātmany āropāsambhavena.*

A parallel sentence in MatV VP reads: *tasmāt svātmany āropāsambhavād grāhakātmanaḥ sthairyam avabhāsamānam svasaṃvedanasiddham* [*svasaṃvedanasiddham* ed.; *saṃvedanam* ū, ṛ, ṝ] *evābhyupagantavyam* (161,2–3).

Later on in the same chapter (173,7–10) there is an even more similar sentence: *tat sthūlasūkṣmayor iva sthiratvāsthiratvayoḥ parasparaviruddharūpatvād vidyudādāv asthairyaṃ* [*asthairyaṃ* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *asthairyatvaṃ* ed.] *siddhaṃ sat* [*sat* ed.; om. in ṛ, ṝ; *sa*° ā, ū] *sthairyaṃ vyāvartayati yathā, tadvad atra svātmany āropāsambhavena sthairyam avabhāsamānam asaṃśayaṃ asthairyaṃ vyavacchinatti, tṛtīyaprakārāsambhavād iti.*

[132] In this case visual perception.

[133] To add here 'for its part' would probably be to overtranslate the *api*, which functions here as a focus-particle, and would clutter this already lengthy sentence, so I render it simply by italicizing the word it qualifies.

[134] *saṃvedanāt* Ped; *svasaṃvedanāt* Ked, B, P.

vāc ca. bhrāntam api hi vijñānaṃ sarvam ālambane bhrāntaṃ na svātmanīti darśayiṣyāmaḥ.[135]

And it is not possible to refute that self-awareness is thus[136] [for two reasons:] 1) because that which would be held to be the reason for the refutation would also be experienced by just that stable thing,[137] since it would not be possible [to see it] as a reason for a refutation otherwise;[138] and 2) because of the impossibility of error [in self-awareness], for even mistaken cognitions are all mistaken with regard to some object, not with regard to themselves.[139] We will show as much.[140]

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[135] Parallel sentence in MatV VP: *nāpi bādhaḥ* [*nāpi bādhaḥ* ū, ṛ, ṝ; omitted in the other MSS and in ed.] *sarvam ālambane* [*ālambane* 4 (non-Kashmirian) MSS; *ālambanaṃ* ed.] *bhrāntaṃ* [*bhrāntaṃ* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *bhrāntir* ed.] *na svātmani yataḥ* [*yataḥ* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *kadācana iti* ed.] (173,6).

Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *na ca svasaṃvedanasya bādhaḥ sambhavati, yena bhrāntatā bhaved iti vakṣyāmaḥ* (295,21–22). Unlike NPP and MatV VP, PMNKV does not give reasons for this claim but just points forward, either to 297,10 (ad v. 46): ... *svasaṃvittau bhramābhāvāt*; or 302,8–12 (ad v. 49), the text of which is given in note 140.

[136] I.e. stable.

[137] I do not translate as 'stable Self', but take the compound as a Bahuvrīhi, because a Karmadhāraya consisting of adjective followed by noun would be unlikely to be formed unless resulting in some sense transcending that of the same two words with the adjective inflected.

[138] 'Otherwise' = if it were not experienced by something stable.

[139] The object of a cognition may be wrong, but the shining forth of the subject in that cognition is never wrong. This principle is related to that of *svātmany avikalpako vikalpaḥ* above.

[140] NPP 90,2b–91,3: *bhrāntaṃ hi vijñānaṃ sarvam ālambane bhrāntam, na svātmani. ālambanaṃ hy anyathā bahiḥsthitam anyathā pratīyamānaṃ bhramaviṣayatām āpadyate. yat punar bodhaikasvabhāvaṃ vastu tad yathaiva cakāsti tathaiva sad, atatsvabhāvasyāsvasaṃvedyatvāt* [^{o}*āsvasaṃvedyatvāt* em.; ^{o}*āsaṃvedyatvāt* Ked]. *svasaṃvedyatve ca tatsvabhāvatvam.* 'For all mistaken cognition is mistaken with respect to some object, not with regard to itself. For an object becomes the object of a mistake when it exists externally in one way and is cognized in a different way. But an object whose single nature is consciousness exists in precisely the way that it appears, because something not of that nature is not self-cognized, and if something is self-cognized, then it has that (i.e. consciousness) as its nature.'

This sentence is paralleled at PMNKV 302,8–12 (ad v. 49): *na ca* [*na ca* MSS; *na* ed.] *tatra bhrāntiḥ sambhavati. bhrāntam api hi* [*api hi* MSS; *api* ed.] *svapnādivijñānaṃ*

The first reason is perhaps based on the idea that if a potential reason for a refutation were the content simply of a momentary cognition it would remain as something isolated, without any bearing on anything else. Only if cognized

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sarvam [*sarvam* ed., 1 MS; *satyam* MSS] *ālambane* [*ālambane* MSS; *ālambate* ed., MSS] *bhrāntam, na svātmani. ālambanaṃ ca bahiḥsthitam anyathā pratīyamānaṃ bhramaviṣayatām āpatati* [*āpatati* MSS; *āpādayati* ed.]. *yat punar bodhaikasvabhāvaṃ vastu tad yathaiva cakāsti tathaiva sad* [*sad* MSS; *tataḥ* ed.] *asvasaṃvedyasya* [*asvasaṃvedyasya* MSS; *svasaṃvedyasya* ed.] *tatsvabhāvatvāyogāt. tatsvabhāvatve vā* [*tatsvabhāvatve vā* ed., MSS; *atatsvabhāvatve na* 1 MS] *svasaṃvedyam eva. iti svasaṃvedane bhrāntyasambhavād ātmabhedaḥ pratyekaṃ parātmānumātṛtayā svasaṃvedanasiddhaḥ* [*svasaṃvedanasiddhaḥ* MSS; *svasaṃvedanena siddhaḥ* ed., MSS] *satya eva.*

1) The emendation to °*āsvasaṃvedyatvāt* in NPP has partial support from the PMNKV parallel.

2) It is slightly strange that in both versions we have to take *sat* in the sense of *asti.*

3) It is quite possible that PMNKV should read *ālambanaṃ hy anyathā bahiḥsthitam anyathā pratīyamānaṃ* like NPP, instead of *ālambanaṃ ca bahiḥsthitam anyathā pratīyamānaṃ*. The *hi* makes good sense, because we want this to be an explanation of what precedes; as does the double *anyathā*, the loss of one of which could be due to the rarity of having two *anyathā*s so close to each other.

4) In NPP the reason given for something of the nature of consciousness existing as it appears is: a) if something is not of the nature of consciousness it is not self-cognized; and b) the contrapositive of that, namely that if something is self-cognized it must be of the nature of consciousness. PMNKV's first reason we can assume to be: if something is not self-cognized it is not of the nature of consciousness—because its edition is clearly corrupt. But for the second reason we could accept either that given in the edition and some of the manuscripts, that if something is of the nature of consciousness it is self-cognized; or that given in one manuscript, (M_1 in the critical edition being prepared by Goodall, Sarma and Watson), that if something is not of the nature of consciousness it is not self-cognized (*atatsvabhāvatve na svasaṃvedyam*). Thus we have three different pairs of reasons: 1) those given in NPP; 2) those in PMNKV taking the second from the edition; 3) those in PMNKV taking the second from M_1. I am uncertain which is best. NPP has against it that it leaves open the possibility that something could be of the nature of consciousness and yet not self-cognized, which could be seen to leave open the possibility that it could appear differently to the way it exists. M_1's second reason is not redundant. The second reason in the other two does not state anything that is not entailed by the first.

I take the general point to be that if something exists external to consciousness then it can exist in one way and be perceived in another, but if something is of the nature of consciousness then there is no room for distortion to occur for there is no gap between the thing and its (self-) cognition.

by a stable perceiver could it be related to that which it purports to refute and thus viewed as a reason for a refutation.[141]

> *na ca pramāṇasiddhasya bādhakam antareṇānyathābhyupagamo matim āvarjayati vipaścitām.*[142]
>
> And if something is proved by a valid means of knowledge, acceptance of it as otherwise does not win over the mind of wise people without a reason for a refutation.

He has just said of course that refutations are impossible in the case in hand. By adding here that the only thing that could potentially stand a chance of overthrowing our notion of the stability of ourselves is a refutation, he reinforces the conclusion that we really are stuck with that stability.

> *sthirasyārthakriyānupapattir*[143] *eva bādhakam iti cet,*[144] *na, tatraiva tasyāḥ samutpatter*[145] *iti vakṣyāmaḥ.*[146]
>
> If [you say], 'the reason for the refutation is just that a stable [entity] could not have efficacity,' [we reply, that is] not [correct] for as we will show,[147] that (i.e. efficacity) can *only* arise in a [stable thing].

> *tad evaṃ sarvadaikarūpasthiragrāhakaprakāśātmānāropita*[148] *eva sarvārthasākṣitayā yena pratipuruṣaṃ svasaṃvedanasiddhaḥ, tena kāraṇenā*[149]*tma-*

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[141] This was suggested by Harunaga Isaacson.

[142] Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *na ca pramāṇasiddhasya bādhakam vinānyathābhyupagamo matim āvarjayati vipaścitām* (295,22–23).

[143] °*nupapattir* Ked[ac], Ped, P; °*nupattir* B, °*nutpattir* Ked[pc].

[144] Interlinear note below *iti cet* in P: *sthiro hy ekasvabhāvaḥ, arthakriyā hi anekasvabhāvavastuniṣpādyā, anekasvabhāvaṃ hi kṣaṇikaṃ eva, na tv akṣaṇikam ity artha*[*ity artha*° em.; *ityatirtha*° MS]*kriyānupapattir eva bādhakaṃ pramāṇam iti nanasvabhāvo hi kṣaṇikaḥ, sthiro hy ekasvabhāva iti bauddhāḥ.*

[145] *samutpatter* Ked, Ped; *samutpattir* B; *samupapatter* P.

[146] Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *sthirasyārthakriyānupapattir eva bādhiketi cet, na, tadanupapattes tatra niṣetsyamānatvenābādhakatvāt* (295,23–24). He is pointing forward there to his commentary on verse 46.

[147] 73,9–74,2; and 81,11–83,3.

[148] °*ātmānāropita* Ked[pc], Ped, B, P; °*ātmā nāropita* Ked[ac].

[149] *kāraṇenā*° Ked[pc], B, P; *kāraṇā*° Ked[ac], Ped.

> *śūnyāḥ skandhā iti pakṣaḥ pratyakṣanirākṛta eva.* [Ked p. 17] *tad iyatā pratijñāsūtrāj*[150] *jñāteti padaṃ vyākhyātam.* ||1.5||
>
> So because the Self, which is the shining forth of a stable perceiver that is always of uniform nature, and certainly not superimposed, is thus established for all people through self-awareness as the *witness of all objects*, the position that the psycho-physical constituents are *empty* of Self is *therefore* certainly refuted by direct perception.[151] Thus with what we have had up to here, the word 'knower' from the assertion sūtra has been explained.

In marked contrast to Chapter 1, almost the entire passage looked at in this chapter has parallels, which have been given in the footnotes, in other of Rāmakaṇṭha's texts, most prominently the *Mataṅgavṛtti* and the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*. Almost every sentence of those parallels has been judged by me to require departure from the versions of the most recent (and best) editions. This improvement of the texts, if it is such, has been enabled principally through simple comparison with the NPP passage; but also through considering the readings of manuscripts of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*, and through re-evaluating the variants reported by Bhatt in his edition of the *Mataṅgavṛtti*. I suspect that anyone who reads parts of the *Mataṅgavṛtti* at all carefully will come to the conclusion, amply evidenced here, that Bhatt should have given more weight to the readings of ū, ṛ and ṝ, the three Kashmirian manuscripts. I have favoured their readings not only when they are clearly superior, as is often, but also on occasions when they are equally as plausible as the alternatives.

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[150] *pratijñāsūtrāj* Ked, B; *pratijñāsūtrāntaṃ* Ped.

[151] As pointed out in note 9, this sentence is glossing the second half of the verse. The word *tena* from the verse is being glossed by *sarvadaikarūpasthiragrāhakaprakāśātmānāropita eva sarvārthasākṣitayā yena pratipuruṣaṃ svasaṃvedanasiddhaḥ, tena kāraṇena*; *bodhabādhitā* by *pratyakṣanirākṛta*; and *śūnyatā sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ* by *ātmaśūnyāḥ skandhā iti pakṣaḥ*.

CHAPTER 3: Can We Perceive the Self Through I-Cognition (*Ahampratyaya*)?

Background

The last chapter dealt with Rāmakaṇṭha's account of our apprehension of the Self through pre-linguistic self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*). Later in the text he turns to another kind of perception of the Self (*ātmapratyakṣa*), namely 'I-cognition' (*ahampratyaya*). This is the kind claimed by Uddyotakara[1] and Kumārila,[2] for example. It is explicitly brought up by Sadyojyotis in the verses of NP, unlike self-awareness:

> 1.15ab) *ātmany asattvaṃ no yuktam ahampratyayagocare* |
>
> 1.15ab) That the Self does not exist is certainly[3] incorrect [since] it is accessible to I-cognitions.[4]

These I-cognitions (*ahampratyaya*) are any verbal cognition, such as 'I see a pot', which includes 'I' as one of its elements. Or the word is also used to refer not to the whole cognition, 'I see a pot', but to the cognition of 'I' within it. How do they differ from the self-awareness (*svānubhava/svasaṃvedana*) with which the previous chapter was concerned?

1) Self-awareness is pre-linguistic, pre-conceptual (*avikalpaka*). I-cognitions, by contrast, are constituted by concepts and permeated by language. They are

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[1] NVā(NCG) 323,12–324,10.

[2] ŚV(P_2) *ātmavāda* 107–139.

[3] I translate the *no* as emphatic, but it is possibly used instead of *na* simply to create a metrically-required long syllable.

[4] Translated as I take Sadyojyotis to have intended it. For a slightly different translation, representing Rāmakaṇṭha's construal, see page 272.

instances of 'verbal cognition' (*parāmarśa/vimarśa*), and of 'determinative cognition' (*adhyavasāya*),[5] terms which, though having different resonances, are co-extensive and are opposed to non-conceptual awareness (*nirvikalpaka-jñāna*), of which self-awareness is an example.[6]

2) Rāmakaṇṭha said in the passage discussed in the last chapter that cognition's unmediated experience of itself (*svānubhava*) does not differ between different knowers, because it is established by cognition's own nature alone (*svabhāvasiddha*).[7] It occurs prior to any application of concepts to it by the knowing subject. This highlights a further difference between I-cognition and self-awareness. I-cognition, being the result of conceptualization, is not the same for everyone. On encountering a pot, one person may have the cognition, 'I see a pot'; someone else who speaks the same language but is from a culture that does not use such pots may have the cognition 'I see rounded baked clay.' So these cognitions, unlike self-awareness, are not established solely by the nature of their objects. They conform to the nature of the object that confronts one's senses (according to Rāmakaṇṭha), but they are not determined entirely by it.

3) In the case of self-awareness the directness of the experience is a guarantee of its validity. But in cognitions of 'I', what we experience is a concept, not the referent of that concept directly. How then can we be sure that the referent of the concept is real? Since all we access directly is the concept 'I',

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[5] For *adhyavasāya* I avoid the common translation 'judgement', which though fine for the Buddhist understanding of the term, would not be so good for Rāmakaṇṭha's. It is too suggestive of subjectivity (as when one says in English, 'that is a question of judgement' to indicate that there is no fact of the matter). For Rāmakaṇṭha, *adhyavasāya* represents reality faithfully and is not dependent primarily on the mental conditioning of the cognizing subject. Thus I use 'determinative cognition', conveying simply that what is taken in by this kind of apprehension is clearly specifiable.

[6] In my exegesis, when I wish to use a word to cover both the non-conceptual and conceptual modes of apprehending objects I use 'cognition'. This corresponds to the Sanskrit word *jñāna*. But when *jñāna* is being used to refer specifically to non-conceptual cognition, as in for example *nirvikalpakajñāna*, I often use the word 'awareness'. I never use 'awareness' to refer to conceptual cognition. I alternate freely between the English 'pre-conceptual' and 'non-conceptual' without intending any difference of meaning.

[7] 13,15–17.

how can we know that there exists anything corresponding to it outside the cognition? In order to show that I-cognition provides reliable evidence of the Self's existence, Rāmakaṇṭha has to answer questions of this kind.

4) Self-awareness, as claimed by Rāmakaṇṭha above,[8] occurs all the time, even in deep sleep, whereas he would not claim that we have I-cognitions in deep sleep.

What role do these I-cognitions play in his establishing of the Self? As one can see from the verse, Sadyojyotis' use of them is quite simple. They show that the Self exists since it is their referent. In other words it is none other than the Self that we perceive through this kind of cognition, so it must exist. What Rāmakaṇṭha does with this verse is more complicated. In order to understand the meaning that he reads into it we have to know the content of the preceding section of the text.

We have just had a long section that is not primarily about the Self, but about the existence or non-existence of objects external to cognition. The opponent arguing for their non-existence is identified by Rāmakaṇṭha as a Śūnyavādin.[9] At one point this Buddhist put forward a Dharmakīrtian argument that is

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[8] 15,2–9.

[9] 31,1b. It may seem strange to some that Rāmakaṇṭha uses this title to refer to the proponents not of Mādhyamika arguments, but of Yogācāra/Vijñānavādin ones. He does so consistently throughout the text, for example at 4,1b; 26,1; 28,1b–29,1; 31,1b; 34,8. The third of these four references makes it clear that he understands *śūnyavāda* to be the view that 'absolutely all cognition is devoid of objects,' *arthaśūnyaṃ sarvam eva vijñānam.* A better-known philosopher with whom Rāmakaṇṭha's usage of the label Śūnyavādin accords is Kumārila: the *śūnyavāda* chapter of the *Ślokavārttika* covers *vijñānavāda.* Kumārila's label derives from the Vṛttikāra's remark in ŚBh(F) ad 1.1.4a: *śūnyas tu* [i.e. *pratyayaḥ*]. *katham? arthajñānayor ākārabhedaṃ nopalabhāmahe.*

The rule, *saugataḥ śūnyavādini*, is quoted in Mallinātha's commentary on verse 6cd of the Brahmavarga (2.6) of AK(AL). This has actually entered the text of *Amarakośa* in at least one edition. It thus appears that *śūnyavādin* was also used simply as a synonym of Buddhist. But Rāmakaṇṭha's usage is certainly more specific as he frequently opposes the Śūnyavādins to Bāhyārthavādins (i.e. Sautrāntikas), who hold objects to exist outside cognition, for example at 21,1b–22,3; 22,11–14; 35,1b–36,3; 38,20–22. (Thus in my exegesis I frequently use the label 'Yogācāra' to refer to those that Rāmakaṇṭha refers to as Śūnyavādin.)

based on 'the necessity of co-perception', *sahopalambhaniyama*, between two things: that is to say, the fact that two things are only ever perceived with each other and never alone. We will have to understand this argument in order to understand Rāmakaṇṭha's discussion of I-cognition. Rāmakaṇṭha's Buddhist laid out the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument as an exposition of the following verse-segment by Sadyojyotis:

> 1.10a–c *vastu vijñānato bhinnaṃ naiva vijñānajanmanaḥ* |
> *pūrvatrāgṛhyamāṇatvāt.*[10]
>
> [Opponent:] An object is not in fact separate from cognition, because it is not grasped prior to the rise of cognition.

Rāmakaṇṭha explains this as follows:[11]

> [Ked p. 32] *yasya yena sahopalambho niyataḥ, tasya tato nārthāntaratvam,*[12] *yathā dvicandrajñānapratibhāsamānād*[13] *ekasmāc candramaso dvitīyasya. nīlajñānena sahopalambhaniyamaś ca nīlādeḥ, tena vinā tataḥ*[14] *pūrvāparayoḥ saṃvedanābhāvāt. atas tasyāpi tato nārthāntaratvam. iti nīlādeḥ saṃvidrūpatva*[15]*siddhito 'rthād bāhyatvanirāsaḥ sidhyati. yad āhuḥ:*[16]
>
> *sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo*[17] *nīlataddhiyoḥ* | *iti.*
>
> [Śūnyavādin:] When the co-perception (*sahopalambhaḥ*) of A with B is firmly fixed (*niyataḥ*),[18] then A is not a separate entity from B, just like the second moon [in a cognition of two moons] [is not a separate entity] from the [first] one appearing in [that] cognition of two moons.[19] And blue and

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[10] °*āgṛhyamāṇatvāt* Ked; °*āgṛhyamāṇatvā* L; °*āgṛhyamānatvāt* B, P; °*āgrāhyamāṇatvāt* Ped; *agrāhyamānatvāt* M.

[11] NPP 32,4–12.

[12] *nārthāntaratvaṃ* Ked, Ped, B, L; *nārthāntaratāratvaṃ* P.

[13] Schmithausen wondered if *dvicandrajñānapratibhāsamānād* may be a corruption of *dvicandrajñāne pratibhāsamānād*. I put this forward for consideration, but have not emended, not regarding the transmitted sentence to be quite problematic enough.

[14] *tataḥ* omitted in L.

[15] °*rūpatva*° Ked^{pc}, B, P; °*rūpa*° Ked^{ac}, Ped, L.

[16] PVin 94, note 4.

[17] *niyamād abhedo* Ked, B, L, P, PVin; *niyamān na bhedo* Ped.

[18] I.e. when A is only ever perceived with B and never alone.

[19] This second moon is seen, for example, by people suffering from an eye disease. It serves as an example for this argument because 1) it never occurs except in cognitions of

other [objects that are taken to exist external to cognition] are necessarily perceived together with cognition of blue,[20] because we do not experience [them] without the [cognition of blue], before or after that [cognition].[21] Therefore that (i.e. blue) too is not a separate entity from [cognition of blue].[22] Therefore the refutation of externality is achieved indirectly (*arthāt*) through proving that blue etc. have consciousness[23] as their nature.[24] As [Dharmakīrti] has said:

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the first moon, and 2) it is not an entity existing independently (*arthāntara*) of the first moon.

[20] Strictly speaking, he should have written *nīlādijñānena* for *nīlajñānena*.

[21] The phrase 'before or after that [cognition]' appears a little redundant here. All that is needed for the conclusion to be secured is that blue is not perceived without cognition of blue. But Rāmakaṇṭha adds in 'before or after that [cognition]', *tataḥ pūrvāparayoḥ*, because he is glossing the verse's 'prior to the rise of cognition'. He takes 'prior to', quite reasonably, as shorthand (*upalakṣaṇa*) for 'prior to or after'.

[22] The argument has been given in logical form: first the concomitance of logical reason (*hetu*) and property to be proved (*sādhya*) (i.e. the invariable co-perception between two things and their not being separate entities); followed by an example which illustrates that (*dṛṣṭānta*); followed by the application of the logical reason (invariable co-perception) to the subject (*pakṣa*) of the argument (a supposedly externally existing object such as blue, and cognition of blue) (the *upanaya* stage); followed by the conclusion (*nigamana*).

[23] For formal reasons I translate *jñāna* and *vijñāna* as 'cognition', and *saṃvit* and *saṃvitti* as 'consciousness'. The way that Rāmakaṇṭha here establishes that blue is not separate from *cognition* (*jñāna*) of blue and then describes this as proving that blue has *consciousness* (*saṃvit*) as its nature seems to suggest, however, that these two concepts are either identical or very close to each other for him. I certainly have not been able to find any firm differences between Rāmakaṇṭha's usage of these words. That he does not for example use *jñāna/vijñāna* for object-orientated awareness and reserve *saṃvit/saṃvitti* for inward or reflexive awareness is evidenced by his use of *nīlādisaṃvitti/nīlādisaṃvit* etc. (e.g. 17,3–4; 28,3b–2b; 29,10). Those cases also illustrate that he does not always use the first two for a transitory mental act and reserve the latter two for something more enduring, for example the potential or capacity to illuminate objects. Thirdly, that he does not always use the latter two for stating the nature of the Self (according to his own view) and the nature of objects (according to the view of his Yogācāra opponent) is seen through the many instances of *(vi)jñānarūpa/jñānātma* in those roles: 13,5; 21,2b; 33,9; 35,1; 59,3; 89,2.

[24] In fact Dharmakīrti did not use this argument to prove the 'refutation of externality'. He intended it to prove that the appearance of blue and the cognition of blue are not

> Because they are necessarily perceived together, blue and cognition of blue are not different.

Slight differences can be discerned between: 1) the argument put forward by Sadyojyotis' *pūrvapakṣin* in the verse of NP, 2) the argument that Rāmakaṇṭha lays out by way of exposition of Sadyojyotis' verse, and 3) the argument stated by Dharmakīrti in the PVin half-verse that Rāmakaṇṭha quotes here as though it encapsulated 2. Rāmakaṇṭha presents all three as though they are the same argument, first stated succinctly by Sadyojyotis, then expanded by himself and then summarized in the Dharmakīrti quote. But the very next sentences, where Rāmakaṇṭha gives his first response to the argument, illustrate that there is a difference between 1 and 3, in that they are responses applicable to 3 but not to 1. Rāmakaṇṭha writes there that cognition of blue (*nīlajñāna*), i.e. the illuminator of blue (*nīlaprakāśaka*) exists even when blue is not there.[25] If the Buddhist means by cognition of blue not the illuminator of blue, but the determinative cognition (*adhyavasāya*) 'blue', then that too exists when no blue object is there, for example in daydreaming.[26] It is clear that neither of these contradict Sadyojyotis' point that we do not perceive an object prior to the rise of its cognition. They give examples not of the object without the cognition but of 'cognition' (interpreted in two different ways) without the object. Thus they are relevant as responses to the invariable co-perception of blue and cognition of blue as stated in 3, but not at all to the argument of Sadyojyotis' *pūrvapakṣin*. The difference between 1 and 3 can be represented pictorially for purposes of further clarification. In the Venn diagrams below, 'o' stands for an object such as a patch of blue, and 'c' stands for its cognition. The left-hand diagram illustrates that 'o' is never found without 'c', though there may be cases of 'c' without 'o'. This represents Sadyojyotis' argument (1). The right-hand diagram illustrates that 'o' is

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different *even if there are external objects*, i.e. to be acceptable both to Vijñānavādins and Sautrāntikas. The argument was taken, however, by both Buddhist and non-Buddhist authors to be an inference of *vijñaptimātratā* (cognition-only). See Matsumoto 1980 26, note 3.

[25] 32,13–14.

[26] 32,14–16.

never found without 'c' and 'c' is never found without 'o'. This represents Dharmakīrti's argument (3).



Why is 2 different from 3? Did that not also claim that blue and cognition of blue are invariably co-perceived? In fact it seemed to mean by that only that blue is always perceived with cognition of blue (one-sided co-perception, as illustrated by the left-hand diagram), not also that cognition of blue is always perceived with blue (symmetrical co-perception, as illustrated by the right-hand diagram).[27] Whereas 3 talks of the co-perception and non-difference of blue *and* cognition of blue, lumping the two of them together in a dual compound, 2 talks of the co-perception of blue *with* cognition of blue, and blue not being a separate thing *from* cognition of blue. On four occasions Rāmakaṇṭha could have given an unambiguously symmetrical formulation, as in 3, but each time he talks from a one-sided point of view.[28] That he means by 'co-perception of blue with cognition of blue' simply that blue is always perceived with cognition of blue is also suggested by the fact that he backs this up with just 'because we do not experience blue without [cognition of blue].' His phrasing of the two moons example is also strong evidence that a one-

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[27] Udayana, in the *Ātmatattvaviveka*, makes explicit that claims of *sahopalambhaniyama* can either be symmetrical or one-sided. He terms the former *samasahopalambhaniyama* (see e.g. ĀTV 326,3); and the latter *asamasahopalambhaniyama* (see e.g. ĀTV 328,3).

[28] *yasya yena sahopalambho niyatas ... tasya tato nārthāntaratvaṃ ... nīlajñānena sahopalambhaniyamaś ca nīlādeḥ ... atas tasyāpi tato nārthāntaratvam.*

sided co-perception is intended. He does not say that both/either are non-different from the other (and necessarily perceived with each other), but he singles out, rather, specifically the second of the two.[29] Thus 2 claims only that the second moon—the illusory double image of the real one—is never perceived without the first, real one. Since an example instantiates both the logical reason and the property to be proved, we can see that 2 claims only that blue is always perceived with cognition of blue and that blue is not a separate thing (*arthāntara*) from cognition of blue, while allowing that cognition of blue may be perceived without blue and may in some sense be independent from it, as the real moon does not depend on its occasional illusory double image.

That Dharmakīrti himself intended the logical reason of the argument to be symmetrical, if not beyond doubt from the isolated half-verse quoted here, is so from both PVin and PVā. For in PVin, immediately after the half-verse that Rāmakaṇṭha quotes, Dharmakīrti continues, 'Even if blue appears to be different from [its] cognition (*anubhava*), it is not a separate entity from it, because they are necessarily perceived together, like two moons and the like. For if one out of these two is not perceived, neither is the other.'[30] Thus, although his opening assertion is not symmetrically expressed, he is then explicit that if either blue or cognition of blue, or either of the two moons, is not perceived, neither is the other. Similarly in PVā he writes, 'We do not find that any object is experienced without cognition, nor that a cognition is experienced without an object.'[31]

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[29] This is not the way Dharmakīrti himself gives the example: see *dvicandrādivat* in note 30, and *indāv ivādvaye* in note 31.

[30] *na hi bhinnāvabhāsitve 'py arthāntararūpatvaṃ* [*arthāntararūpatvaṃ* Kāś; *arthāntaram eva rūpaṃ* TBV 364,14; *arthāntaram evaṃ rūpaṃ* NBhū] *nīlasyānubhavāt, tayoḥ sahopalambhaniyamād dvicandrādivat. na hy anayor ekā*[*ekā* NBhū; *ekasyā* BSBhā]*nupalambhe 'nyo*[*'nyo* NBhū; *'nyasyo* BSBhā]*palambho 'sti.* (The Tibetan translation of this is given at PVin I p. 94,20–24. The Sanskrit is supplied from fragments reported at PVin I p. 94, note 5; Steinkellner 1972 206,6–8; and Stern 1991 160,7.)

[31] The whole passage runs as follows (PVā 3.387–389): *sakṛt saṃvedyamānasya niyamena dhiyā saha | viṣayasya tato 'nyatvaṃ kenākāreṇa sidhyati || bhedaś ca bhrāntivijñānair*[a] *dṛśyetendāv ivādvaye | saṃvittiniyamo nāsti bhinnayor nīlapītayoḥ || nārtho*

How, last of all, does 2 differ from 1? A) It introduces the Dharmakīrtian idea of *sahopalambhaniyama* that was not mentioned by Sadyojyotis. This terminological difference is not as significant as it could be though, since, as explained, Rāmakaṇṭha's notion of what is meant by *sahopalambhaniyama* is closer to Sadyojyotis' claim in 1 than to what Dharmakīrti uses the term to mean. B) It is more detailed, specifying the general principle that if two things are invariably co-perceived they are not different, and adducing Dharmakīrti's example of the two moons. It is thus a compromise between the arguments of Sadyojyotis and Dharmakīrti.

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Rāmakaṇṭha outlines a one-sided co-perception argument because the Sadyojyotis verse that he is expounding makes only the one-sided claim. But such an understanding of *sahopalambhaniyama* is not unattested in Buddhist sources. It is found in Śāntarakṣita's account of the argument. He too singles out the second of the two moons specifically rather than treating them both as interchangeable:[32]

'saṃvedanaḥ kaś cid anarthaṃ vāpi (*anarthasyāpi* PVBh) *vedanam* | *dṛṣṭaṃ saṃvedyamānaṃ tat tayor nāsti vivekitā* || 'In what way can an object, [since] it is experienced simultaneously [and] exclusively with cognition, be proved to be different from this [cognition]? And those whose perception is in error see a difference [between object and cognition], like [those with an eye disease see double when looking] at the single moon. Things which *are* different, [such as] blue and yellow, are not necessarily experienced [together]. We do not find any object experienced without cognition, or a cognition experienced without an object. Therefore [object and cognition] are not separate.'

a) PVā(M) reads *bhrāntavijñānair* but Iwata 1991a prefers *bhrāntivijñānair* on the basis of the distribution of readings in nine other editions, commentaries and quotations of the verse (given in Teil II, p. 149, note 72).

Rāmakaṇṭha must have been aware that Dharmakīrti's co-perception claim, unlike his, was symmetrical, for why else would he have begun his response to the co-perception argument with what are counter-examples to a symmetrical co-perception of blue and cognition of blue, but which do not contradict at all the co-perception that he himself has laid out?

[32] TS(BBS) 2029–2030 *yatsaṃvedanam eva syād yasya saṃvedanaṃ dhruvam* | *tasmād avyatiriktaṃ tat tato vā na vibhidyate* || *yathā nīladhiyaḥ svātmā dvitīyo vā yathoḍu-*

> When the experience of A is necessarily the experience of B, then A is not different from B, or cannot be separated from it, just like the own nature of a cognition of blue [from that cognition of blue] or just like the second moon [from the first]. And this experience of the image of blue is the experience of the cognition of blue.

Śāntarakṣita's interpretation of A being co-perceived with B is that the perception of A is also necessarily the perception of B. This holds in two different kinds of case, which is why he gives two different examples. In the first kind, exemplified by A equalling the own nature of a cognition of blue, and B equalling the cognition of blue, it is also true that the perception of B is the perception of A (symmetrical co-perception). In the second kind, exemplified by A equalling the illusory second moon and B the first, real moon, it is not also true that the perception of B is the perception of A. The conclusion that follows in these two kinds of case is not the same, since in the first case neither A nor B are different from each other, whereas in the second case though A is not different from B, B is, in a sense, different from A. Śāntarakṣita chooses two different expressions, *avyatiriktaṃ* and *na vibhidyate,* to express this difference.[33]

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It was mentioned that Rāmakaṇṭha responds to the opponent's *sahopalambhaniyama* argument by claiming that cognition of blue, interpreted in two

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paḥ | *nīladhīvedanaṃ cedaṃ nīlākārasya vedanam* [*vedanam* TS(BBS), Tib. *he* 89a7; *vedanāt* TS(GOS)] ||

[33] Note that though Dharmakīrti, the originator of the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument, explains it as based on a symmetrical co-perception between blue and cognition of blue, his follower Śāntarakṣita feels the need to include the possibility of a one-sided co-perception. One reason for this was perhaps a desire to accommodate the view (found even in Vijñānavāda contexts) that the object or form (*ākāra*) of a cognition is not identical with the cognition itself. (For more on this see page 276 and note 64.) Another was probably deliberation on the exact implications of the two moons example. Dharmakīrti seems to have intended cognition of two moons as an example of a false cognition since one is in fact looking at something single, in the same way that seeing an object as separate from cognition is false since one is in fact looking at something single. But as soon as one of the two moons is regarded as the real one and the other as its illusory double-image, then a one-sided co-perception is exemplified, not a symmetrical one.

different ways, does occur without blue. He thus rejects the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument on the grounds that its logical reason, the invariable co-perception of blue and cognition of blue, is unestablished (*asiddha*). This is only the first level of Rāmakaṇṭha's response to the argument. He continues to discuss it for the next eight pages.[34]

Next he argues that even if the logical reason is established, the non-difference of the two co-perceived entities is not entailed, i.e. the argument is inconclusive (*anaikāntika*). His explanation of why that is the case is his exegesis of the next Sadyojyotis verse.[35] Sadyojyotis there responds to his opponent's claim in the previous verse that objects are not different from cognition because we do not grasp them prior to the rise of the cognition,[36] with the point that colour is not grasped prior to the opening[37] of the eye or to light, yet colour is not held to be non-different from the opening of the eye or from light. Rāmakaṇṭha restates this in his commentary as a co-perception claim: 'colour is necessarily co-perceived with the [opening of the eye] and light'[38] followed by a reiteration of the verse's point that in this case there is clearly no non-difference, colour not being of the nature of the opening of the eye or of light.[39]

The co-perception of colour with light despite their difference is a pertinent example to bring up in response to Dharmakīrti's *sahopalambhaniyama* argument. But the case of colour and the opening of the eye is not. It illustrates a further difference between the discusssion in Sadyojyotis' verses and Dharmakīrti's *sahopalambhaniyama* argument (in addition to the issue of the symmetry of the co-perception). The fact that we do not perceive colour prior to the opening of the eye is an apt response to Sadyojyotis' Buddhist, paral-

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[34] 32,16–40,17.

[35] 1.11: *cakṣurvyāpārataḥ pūrvaṃ prakāśāc ca na gṛhyate | rūpaṃ loke na tat tābhyām abhinnaṃ sampratīyate ||*

[36] In 1.10 a–c given on page 260.

[37] I am assuming that Rāmakaṇṭha's gloss of *vyāpāra* ('activity') in the verse's *cakṣurvyāpāra* ('activity of the eye') as *visphārāvasthā* 'the state of being open / opening' is correct.

[38] 33,6–7: *tena* (=*cakṣurvyāpārena*) *ālokena ca sahopalambhaniyamo rūpasya.*

[39] 33,7: *na ca cakṣurvyāpārarūpatvam ālokarūpatvaṃ vā.*

leling exactly his claim about cognition and object[40] without sharing its conclusion of non-difference; but it is not a case of invariable co-perception in the sense intended by Dharmakīrti and his followers. The opening of the eye (or the eye being open) is not something that we perceive. Dharmakīrti's argument concerns two things that are always co-*perceived*. He contends (in PVin and PVā) that cognitions perceive themselves as well as their object. The co-perception of object and cognition means for him that whenever we perceive an object we also perceive the cognition that is perceiving it. If cognition of blue always occurred together with blue but was not itself simultaneously perceived, Dharmakīrti would not consider that co-perception, and would hence not regard his conclusion of non-difference as following.

But Rāmakaṇṭha understands co-perception slightly more loosely, as meaning simply that the two things occur together (or that one occurs always with the other). That he does so is evidenced by 1) the fact that in the following discussion he uses *sahabhāva* (co-existence/co-occurrence) synonymously with *sahopalambhaniyama*;[41] 2) the way he stated his first level of response to the argument. He did not say that we perceive the illuminator of blue or the determinative cognition 'blue' without blue, but rather that these two exist/occur when a blue object does not exist / is not there;[42] 3) the way that he describes the opening of the eye as being co-perceived with light.

It is not clear whether the reason for this difference in usage is simply that Rāmakaṇṭha is trying to adapt the Dharmakīrtian argument to fit the Sadyojyotis verses, or whether he was not fully aware of the expressly perceptual requirement of the two candidates for co-perception.[43] The fact that the two

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[40] In his last verse-segment, 1.10 a–c given on page 260.

[41] E.g. 38,19–20; 39,1; 39,3.

[42] 33,13–17: *nīlābhāve 'pi nīlaprakāśakasadbhāvasya pratipāditatvāt ... asaty arthe ... tasya (=adhyavasāyasya) bhāvāt.*

[43] Once it is understood that both blue and cognition of blue are claimed to be *perceived*, an extra dimension to the two moons example becomes apparent. In Rāmakaṇṭha's version of the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument, where co-perception simply means occurring together, the salient feature of the example is simply that the second moon is never found without the first. For Dharmakīrti though, the point is also that just as those

must be simultaneously perceived for Dharmakīrti's *sahopalambhaniyama* argument to go through means that the argument is more potent against Rāmakaṇṭha than it would be against a Naiyāyika,[44] a Vaiśeṣika[45] or a Kaumārila Mīmāṃsaka.[46] Since cognition is not simultaneously aware of itself

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with correct vision see only a single moon, so those with correct understanding see only cognition of blue and not also a blue object as separate from that.

As stated in the introduction, although Rāmakaṇṭha interprets Sadyojyotis' verses that articulate and attack Buddhist positions as directed at Dharmakīrti, the verses are invariably more primitive than the Dharmakīrtian arguments that Rāmakaṇṭha uses to elucidate them. They betray no knowledge of Dharmakīrti. How about the fact that Sadyojyotis recounts and then argues against something resembling Dharmakīrti's *sahopalambhaniyama* argument? Does this provide firm evidence that he was writing after Dharmakīrti? Weighing in favour of a negative answer to this question is the fact that he does not even mention the term *sahopalambhaniyama*, or its characteristic example, the two moons; that in his argument the co-existence between object and cognition is one-sided; and that in his argument it is merely co-existence and not co-perception that is claimed. The last two of these reasons are perhaps not significant given that in PVā, having stated the co-perception argument (text given in note 31), Dharmakīrti concludes it as follows: 'therefore, [since] the object appears at the [same] time as [its] cognition, its non-difference from cognition is hard to oppose'. (PVā 3.390abc *tasmād arthasya durvāraṃ jñānakālāvabhāsinaḥ | jñānād avyatirekitvaṃ*.) Thus he summarises his *sahopalambhaniyama* argument in a way that is one-sided, that makes no reference to the fact that the cognition, like the object, is itself cognized, and that stresses, as Sadyojyotis does, that object and cognition appear at the same time. A yet more striking parallel is that Dharmakīrti's opponent in PVin (ad 1.55ab) uses the counter-example of colour and light to illustrate that the argument is inconclusive, as Sadyojyotis does. Whether this implies that Sadyojyotis knew Dharmakīrti obviously depends on whether or not Dharmakīrti was drawing on earlier Buddhist arguments resembling *sahopalambhaniyama* that had already elicited this example as a response, either in *pūrvapakṣa*s in Buddhist texts or in non-Buddhist texts.

[44] For Naiyāyikas cognition is cognized by an independent subsequent cognition. See for example NBhū 139,20–21: *jñānaṃ svavyatiriktavedanavedyaṃ vedyatvāt, rūpādivat.*

[45] Similarly, for Vaiśeṣika philosophers cognition is not cognized by itself but is grouped together with pleasure, pain and the like in being cognized by the internal organ. See for example NK 232,4: *buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnās tv antaḥkaraṇagrāhyāḥ* (and we know that *buddhi* is used in the sense of cognition/perception by the author: *buddhir upalabdhir jñānaṃ pratyaya iti paryāyāḥ* [410,7]).

[46] For Śabara perceiver and perceived cannot be perceived simultaneously. See ŚBh (F) 30,2–3: *tatra yaugapadyam anupapannam.* After the object is cognized the cognition is known, according to Śabara through inference, and according to Kumārila through

for these three, the co-perception of object and cognition does not hold for them in the way that Dharmakīrti intends it. Blue is cognized for them *without* a simultaneous awareness of the cognition of blue. This way out is not open to Rāmakaṇṭha, for whom cognition is self-illuminating.

Returning to NPP: Rāmakaṇṭha uses the two examples in the verse to argue that even if the logical reason (invariable co-perception) were to hold of blue and cognition of blue, it would be inconclusive (*anaikāntika*). Thus he concludes this second level of response with the words:[47] '[Light, eye-activity and colour] are indeed necessarily co-perceived,[48] and yet they are not non-different so the argument is indeed inconclusive.'[49]

He then ceases to mention the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument explicitly for a few pages and expounds some verses that give a general argument for the difference of objects and consciousness. But Dharmakīrti's argument seems to have a certain hold over him for he keeps returning to it. He presents the few pages just mentioned, and the verses on which they commented, as a further refutation of it, even though they have made no mention of it, by concluding them with: 'Therefore [object] and [consciousness] are not, merely through

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arthāpatti. But for the Prābhākaras, or for Śālikanātha at least, cognition is self-illuminating. See, for example, PPañc 189,1–3: *na cārthajñānasya jñānā*[*ā* corr.; *a* ed.]*ntarādhīnam avabhāsanam, ... tasmād arthajñānaṃ svayamprakāśam evābhyupetavyam.*

[47] 34,6–7: *eṣāṃ sahopalambhaniyamo 'sty eva na cābheda ity anaikāntika eva.*

[48] By which he means, 'light and eye-activity are both necessarily co-perceived with colour'. He is not of course claiming that light and eye-activity are co-perceived.

[49] Rāmakaṇṭha first responded to the co-perception of blue and cognition of blue by adducing instances of cognition without object. A parallel move here on the part of the Buddhist opponent would have been to respond to these supposed examples of co-perception by pointing out that the opening of the eye does occur (in the dark) without the perception of colour. Perhaps Rāmakaṇṭha did not regard that as a relevant objection since these co-perceptions (of colour with light and the opening of the eye) are, following Sadyojyotis' verse, only one-sided co-perceptions, claiming only that colour occurs always with light and the opening of the eye but not vice versa. But that would not be consistent with his response to the Buddhist co-perception, since even though he seemed to present that one-sidedly he did not refrain from pointing to instances of the cognition without the object as refutation.

being co-perceived, non-different.'[50] Thus it becomes clear that he intended the arguments of these pages for the separateness of consciousness and object as a third level of response to the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument: given that objects and consciousness can independently be shown to be separate, the mere fact of their being co-perceived indicates nothing. This is similar to the second level of response in that they both demonstrate that the argument is inconclusive (*anaikāntika*). But the former does so through citing examples other than the proof subjects (blue and cognition of blue), and this one through the example of the proof subjects themselves. Furthermore the tone of the previous level of response was, 'even if the proof subjects were invariably co-perceived', they would not be non-different; and the tone of his conclusion to this level is 'merely through the fact that they are co-perceived' (*sahopalambhamātreṇa*) their non-difference does not follow.

Next follows his exegesis of the half-verse (1.15ab) quoted at the beginning of this chapter (page 257) about I-cognitions. Instead of seeing it as simply stating that the Self exists because it is the referent of I-cognitions, he wants to build into it a continuation of the theme of necessary co-perception.

1. The Co-Perception of Self and I-Cognition

> 1.0 [Ked p. 38] *kiṃ ca sahopalambhaniyamād abhede 'pi nātmābhāvaḥ.*
>
> 1.0 Moreover even if non-difference did follow from necessary co-perception, there would be no lack of a Self.

This is his fourth and final level of response: even if the non-difference of two things does validly follow from their being invariably co-perceived, the Self's existence is not negated. But Dharmakīrti did not argue (either as he has been presented in this text, or in his own texts) that the Self's existence is negated owing to invariable co-perception. What does the Self have to do with this argument? The answer is that Rāmakaṇṭha envisages the argument from necessary co-perception being applied, instead of to cognition and blue,

[50] 38,6–7: *tan na sahopalambhamātreṇāsyāsmād abhedaḥ.*

to cognition (specifically I-cognitions) and Self; and argues that the result is actually the Self's reality. He presents Sadyojyotis as making this point.

> *ity āha*
>
> 1.15ab) *ātmany asattvaṃ*[51] *no yuktam ahampratyayagocare* |
>
> *ahampratyayasya sthiragrāhakaparāmarśarūpatvenātmaviṣayatvād asty evādhyavaseyenātmanā sahopalambhaniyamaḥ, iti dvayor api saṃvidrūpatvasiddheḥ satyatvam iti nairātmyābhāvaḥ.*
>
> This [Sadyojyotis] states:
>
> 1.15ab) Because the Self is accessible to I-cognition, the non-existence [of Self and I-cognition] is incorrect.[52]
>
> Because I-cognition, in that it is a verbal cognition of an enduring perceiver, has the Self as its referent,[53] [I-cognition] is in fact (*eva*) invariably perceived together with the Self, the referent of the determinative cognition (*adhyavaseyena*).[54] Therefore because both are established to be of the nature of consciousness, both are real, so there is no absence of Self.

This is the argument that forms the subject matter of the whole present section (Section 1) so it needs to be looked at in detail. It can be presented as containing four stages. 1) I-cognitions have the Self as their referent in that they consist of verbal cognition of a stable perceiver (*sthiragrāhakaparāmarśa*). This would seem to be enough in itself to prove the Self, but he is putting forward a *sahopalambhaniyama* argument of which this is only the first stage. On the basis of this first stage he asserts 2) that Self and I-cognition are necessarily perceived together; from which it follows 3) that they are both of the nature of consciousness; from which it follows 4) that they are both real.

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[51] *asattvaṃ* Ked, Ped, B, L, P; *asatyatvan* M.

[52] Translated as I understand Rāmakaṇṭha to have taken the verse.

[53] I tend to translate *viṣaya* as 'referent' or 'content' in order to distinguish it from *karma*, which I translate as 'object'. Thus in the cognition 'I see a pot', its referents are the Self (according to Sadyojyotis and Rāmakaṇṭha), the action of seeing and the pot; but its object is only the pot. The pot could also be referred to as its *artha*, which I also translate as 'object'.

[54] This sentence illustrates what was mentioned above on page 257, namely that I-cognitions are instances of 'determinative cognition' (*adhyavasāya*) and 'verbal cognition' (*parāmarśa*).

Why does he bother with the last three stages? They make his commentary on this verse far more complicated and unwieldly than it need be. Why does he not simply conclude the reality of the Self from stage 1, which would seem to be a more accurate portrayal of the half-verse's intention? The answer to this question does not become evident until close to the end of this section[55] (Section 1). At that point the Buddhist points out that the application of the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument to Self and I-cognition entails a consequence[56] contrary to Rāmakaṇṭha's doctrines. Rāmakaṇṭha responds that he himself does not accept the presupposition of *sahopalambhaniyama*; the whole point of his using it was simply to show what should follow for the Buddhist if one accepts it. Thus although in the intervening section the reader could be forgiven for interpreting Rāmakaṇṭha to be himself adopting this modified version of the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument, in order to put forward a positive line of reasoning (that analysed in the four stages above) that he accepts, it turns out that the line of reasoning is intended simply as an unwanted consequence for the Buddhist. It becomes clear that he has only been arguing from co-perception to the reality of the Self in order to show that Buddhists who use the logic of the co-perception argument in other contexts should be committed to the consequence here of the reality of the Self. Thus one answer to the question posed above is that he wants to show not only that the Self is real, but also that the Buddhist's own presupposition should commit him to accepting it as such.

After the end of this section Rāmakaṇṭha continues to discuss I-cognitions, and the evidence they present for the Self's existence, for two more sections (2 and 3), but makes no further mention of the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument. Thus its inclusion in this section can be considered partly as a transitional device. The beginning of this section marked the end of a long discussion about the status of supposedly external objects, and the beginning of a discussion about I-cognitions. As a bridge over this change in subject matter, Rāmakaṇṭha continues the subject of *sahopalambhaniyama* for the first part of the new discussion. The reason he does so is because even though *sahopalambhaniyama* normally has nothing to do with I-cognitions and the Self, he

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[55] 40,5b–4b.

[56] The non-dualist conclusion that everything is of the nature of the Self.

sees a way of adding one more nail to its coffin by so applying it. How can it be of any use to the Buddhist, the implication seems to be, if, when applied to the Self, it commits him to accepting the Self's reality?

Looking more closely now at the four stages: why does each of them follow? The first one, that the referent of I-cognitions is the Self, will be defended by Rāmakaṇṭha in the course of the ensuing discussion. The second one, that Self and I-cognition are co-perceived, does not mean for him that each time we perceive the Self we also perceive the I-cognition that perceives it. Rather it means not much more than that I-cognition always occurs along with the Self as its referent.[57] It is only these first two stages that are challenged by objections in the following discussion. The opponent takes the remaining two for granted.

Skipping now to the fourth stage: why does the Self's reality follow from it being of the nature of consciousness? Rāmakaṇṭha would regard it as following both on Yogācāra presuppositions and on his own. He frequently argues that, unlike Bāhyārthavādins, Yogācāras cannot claim that something of the nature of consciousness is not real, for consciousness is precisely what is real for them.[58] I presume that he has the same in mind here. From his own point of view, if external objects were shown to be of the nature of consciousness (as the original *sahopalambhaniyama* argument claims) then their reality would be threatened, but if the Self is shown to be of the nature of consciousness, this only confirms its reality, since consciousness is exactly what he has argued the Self to be repeatedly throughout the text.[59]

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[57] For evidence that this is the case, see p. 297 below, where Rāmakaṇṭha regards the Self's co-perception with I-cognition as more or less synonymous with the Self being the referent of I-cognition.

[58] For variations of this argument see 22,1–3; 22,11–14; 59,1–5.

[59] For example 13,5–14,5b; 15,1b–16,1; 17,3–20,11. For a Naiyāyika the Self's reality would of course not follow from its being reduced to consciousness. While such a reduction would nullify an *ātman* conceived as a substance in which consciousness inheres, it is claimed to prove a Śaiva one. As in Chapter 2, Rāmakaṇṭha's attitude is that his position is invulnerable to Buddhist lines of thought capable of destroying the *ātmavāda* of the Brāhmaṇical realist traditions.

The stage that requires most comment is stage 3. Why does it follow from the fact that Self and I-cognition are co-perceived that the Self is of the nature of consciousness? In one sense this is easy to answer: it follows by analogy with the fact that the co-perception of blue and cognition of blue led to the conclusion that blue is of the nature of consciousness. But that conclusion only obtained because of the intermediary step that blue and cognition of blue are not different. It is non-difference (*abheda, anarthāntaratva*) that is the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*) of the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument, not being of the nature of consciousness. Thus, if Rāmakaṇṭha derives the conclusion that the Self is of the nature of consciousness here, it can only be because he holds that the Self is not different from I-cognition. But significantly he omits to mention this middle stage. Indeed such non-difference could be problematic for Rāmakaṇṭha since (as he has stated earlier in the text)[60] I-cognition is determinative cognition, and determinative cognition is not single and unchanging, but plural.

Could Rāmakaṇṭha not argue that though the non-difference of Self and I-cognition is necessary for the line of argument here to go through, he is not committed to it himself because he does not accept the basic assumption that non-difference follows from necessary co-perception? Though he does independently accept that the Self is of the nature of consciousness, and claims that it is incumbent on the Buddhist to accept such a Self through this argument, he does not himself have to accept its stages since it is intended as an unwanted consequence for the Buddhist.

There would be a problem with such a reply though. If he himself were resisting the equation of Self and I-cognition on the grounds that I-cognitions are transitory and the Self is not, then to claim that it is the Buddhist alone who should accept that would be equally damaging. For if the Buddhist were forced to accept that the Self is simply I-cognition, he would not be troubled. I-cognition is momentary for the Buddhist, and thus he would see the argument as reducing the Self to discrete moments of cognition—not a conclusion that would threaten him at all.

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[60] 28,12–17.

There are certainly signs that Rāmakaṇṭha is resisting the non-difference of Self and I-cognition. The wording of his conclusion to the co-perception is that *both* are of the nature of consciousness and so *both* are real.[61] This hardly seems parallel to the Yogācāra version of the argument according to which blue simply is cognition of blue. In the following discussion also he seems to retain the duality between I-cognition and the Self as the referent of I-cognition, between the *adhyavasāya* and the *adhyavaseya.* The conclusion he aims to reach through the argument is that the Self as referent of I-cognition is real,[62] not that it is real as something non-different from I-cognition. The only non-difference between Self and I-cognition that he sees as following from the argument—to judge from the sentence above in which he lays out the four stages—is that they both have consciousness as their nature (*saṃvidrūpa*). To this extent he gives his argument the appearance of the reductionism that *sahopalambhaniyama* demands, but he does not seem to let go of the distinction between the I-cognition and a stable Self which is the referent of that I-cognition. In his application of the argument there is no reduction of two things to one. Thus it seems open to the Yogācāra to object that in his own argument about blue and consciousness of blue, there are, by contrast, no two things that are real. If Rāmakaṇṭha applied the argument in an exactly parallel manner, the reality of the Self should not be preserved, but rather dissolved into discrete I-cognitions.

It should be noted, though, that if Rāmakaṇṭha is resisting the complete identity of the two co-perceived entities, there are in fact plenty of Buddhist authors who did the same in their interpretation of Dharmakīrti's *sahopalambhaniyama* argument. Dharmakīrti's followers were divided over whether the property proved by the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument, the non-difference between objects and cognitions, means the identity of the two (*tādātmya*), or the mere negation of the difference (*bhedapratiṣedhamātra*). Dharmottara, for example, opts for the latter on the grounds that if the two were identical, then, since the object is unreal, so too should the cognition be; and if the two moons were identical then the unreality of one should mean the unreality of

[61] *iti dvayor api saṃvidrūpatvasiddheḥ satyatvam.*

[62] I argue on page 285 that after Rāmakaṇṭha has answered objection 1.1.3 we can deduce this to be the conclusion of his argument.

the other.[63] For him non-different means here neither completely the same, nor completely separate. By contrast, for Prajñākaragupta and Devendrabuddhi any difference between blue and cognition of blue belongs only to the level of illusion.[64] Śāntarakṣita, in his presentation of the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument that I gave on page 266, expressed the non-duality in two ways: '... a is not different from b,[65] or cannot be separated from it,[66] just like the own nature of a cognition of blue [from that cognition of blue] or just like the second moon [from the first].' The first way of stating the non-difference and the first example were intended by Śāntarakṣita to express identity; and the second way of stating the non-difference and the example of the two moons were intended to express the negation of difference.[67] Hence Rāmakaṇṭha would be quite able to resist the complete identity of Self and I-cognition and at the same time claim that he was being faithful to Buddhist lines of interpretation of the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument.

But even if he were to resist complete identity, he must accept at least a qualified identity of Self and I-cognition. There are two contentions he makes elsewhere that offer partial explanations of how he could have held that. 1) In the sentence looked at in the last chapter (section 4.3) he wrote: 'And the perceiver cannot be made into the perceived ... that is why it cannot be the referent of I-cognition; rather it is the very shining forth of I-cognition.'[68] So there he does indeed equate the perceiver, i.e. the Self, with the shining forth of I-cognition, if not with I-cognition itself. 2) In the next section of the text

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[63] Matsumoto 1980 18–20.

[64] Iwata 1991a Teil 1, p. 241. Which view one took was closely connected with whether or not one was a Nirākāravādin or Sākāravādin. Prajñākaragupta and Devendrabuddhi's denial of any difference in level of reality between the subject-aspect and object-aspect of cognition is enabled by the fact that they adhere to *sākāravāda*, the view that the form of the object within cognition is, like the cognition itself, real. This line was not open to Dharmottara, who, denying that cognition contains in reality subject and object aspects, was a Nirākāravādin.

[65] *tasmād avyatiriktaṃ tat.*

[66] *tat tato vā na vibhidyate.*

[67] See Matsumoto 1980 20.

[68] *na ca grāhakātmā grāhyīkartuṃ śakyate ... ata evāsyāhampratyayaviṣayatāpi na sambhavati, api tv ahampratyayaprakāśarūpataiva.*

(section 2 of this chapter) he argues that every single verbal cognition (*vimarśa*) contains an I-cognition, even such examples as 'this is a pot', where 'I' does not explicitly appear to be part of the content of the cognition. Thus as long as we are having verbal cognitions, I-cognition never ceases. Though this does not get over the problem of I-cognition ceasing when we are not having any verbal cognitions (in deep-sleep for example), it at least shows how Rāmakaṇṭha could consistently have envisaged it as enduring for long periods of time rather than lasting only as long as it takes to have a cognition such as 'I see a pot'. Hence the gap between Self and I-cognition is narrowed.

Now we have three objections that I group together as 1.1.1, 1.1.2, and 1.1.3. The first two claim that the Self is not actually the referent of I-cognitions and the third one points out that the Self should not be perceived *only* as the referent of I-cognitions for Rāmakaṇṭha, since it is perceived by us through self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) according to him.

> 1.1.1 *nanv ātmano vikalpātītatvenoktatvāt, mokṣakārikāsv ācāryeṇa buddhibodhyatvanirāsāc cāhampratyayagocaratvaṃ vādyasiddham eva.*
>
> 1.1.1 [Śūnyavādin:] Because the Self has been said to be beyond concepts[69] and because the master (i.e. Sadyojyotis) in his *Mokṣakārikā*[70] has refuted that it can be experienced through the *buddhi*, it is surely not established for the disputants [in this discussion] that the Self is accessible to I-cognitions.

Buddhism of course neither accepts a concept-transcending Self, nor regards the assertions of Sadyojyotis as an authoritative guide. So this objection draws not on the opponent's own beliefs, but concerns the consistency of the verse under discussion with claims made by Sadyojyotis elsewhere, and with Rāmakaṇṭha's claims, earlier in this text, that the Self is non-conceptual. There indeed seems to be some oscillation in Sadyojyotis' thinking between the *Mokṣakārikā* and this verse on the question of whether the Self is or is not the referent of I-cognitions. If it is, then surely it is indeed experienced by the *buddhi* (*buddhibodhya*), in that the *buddhi* is the instrument that produces

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[69] For example 26,7b–6b: *svarūpaṃ hy asyārthaprakāśātmakatvenāvibhinnarūpaṃ sarvadā vikalpātītaṃ prakāśate.*

[70] MoKā 102–105. Sadyojyotis there argues against the Sāṅkhya position that the Self is experienced through being reflected in the *buddhi*. I translate these verses in the Introduction in the section entitled, 'Knowledge of the Self.'

cognition. Rāmakaṇṭha is not afraid to expose this contradiction, drawing attention to it here, through the words of his opponent.[71]

> *satyaṁ, ātmādipratyayavat tu*[72] *kathaṃcid adūraviprakarṣeṇa so 'pi vyavahārārthaṃ tadviṣayo 'bhyupagamyate, iti nāsiddhiḥ.*
>
> [Siddhāntin:] True, but [we] hold that even the [Self][73] is their referent somehow, by a close approximation (*adūraviprakarṣeṇa*),[74] for the purposes of everyday linguistic usage (*vyavahāra*), just like cognitions of the Self[75] and the like,[76] so it is not unestablished [for the disputants that the Self is accessible to I-cognitions].

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[71] There has been one other occasion so far in NPP, which Rāmakaṇṭha does not have his opponent refer to directly here, that contradicts even more explicitly this verse and his explanation of it so far. That is the sentence that I gave on p. 277, note 68, where he asserted that the Self is not the referent of I-cognitions. *na ca grāhakātmā grāhyīkartuṃ śakyate ... ata evāsyāhampratyayaviṣayatāpi na sambhavati, api tv ahampratyayaprakāśarūpataiva.* Presumably the answer he is about to give to the objection just articulated is the same answer he would give if asked about this contradiction.

[72] *tu* Ked, B, L, P; omitted in Ped.

[73] I.e. even that which is in a sense beyond *vikalpas*, and the reach of the *buddhi*.

[74] Lit. 'by/with a not-far distance/separation'.

[75] Rāmakaṇṭha does not expand on these 'self-cognitions'. Presumably they are determinative cognitions whose verbalization includes / consists of the word *ātman*. Since they too apprehend the Self proximately, is there any reason why Rāmakaṇṭha focuses exclusively on I-cognitions and not at all on self-cognitions in his proof of the Self, other than that I-cognitions are what are mentioned in Sadyojyotis' verse? As mentioned above (page 278), Rāmakaṇṭha argues in section 2 of this chapter (= 41,6–42,8 of NPP) that every single verbal cognition (*vimarśa*) contains an I-cognition, even such examples as, 'this is a pot', where 'I' does not explicitly appear to be part of the content of the cognition. Thus the constancy of I-cognitions makes them better suited to establishing a stable Self.

[76] It is not immediately obvious what the *ādi* could be referring to. One possibility (suggested by Prof. Sanderson) is *Śiva*-cognitions. Cf. verse 101 of MoKā, *buddhibodhaprakāśyatvaṃ śivasyānyaiḥ samīhitam* | *śaivamānam avindadbhiḥ paśumānānuvāsitaiḥ* ||, a verse which would be in his mind at this point since his Buddhist opponent has just referred to it and the verses which follow it. Thus cognitions of *Śiva* would be analogous to I-cognitions and Self-cognitions in that they only to some extent grasp their referent, though their referent is of course not the Self. Alternatively the *ādi* here could refer to *mamapratyaya* and other cognitions that are of 'I' but in some case other than the nominative singular ('of me' / 'mine', 'by me' etc.).

Faced with the inconsistencies he has mentioned, Rāmakaṇṭha tones down the claim of the verse. The Self's concept-transcending nature was of crucial importance for his earlier overcoming of the Buddhist arguments against the Self.[77] The referents of determinative cognition (of which I-cognitions are an example) are, on the other hand, concepts. But Rāmakaṇṭha cannot ignore this verse claiming that the Self is the referent of I-cognitions and (whether for this reason alone or for independent reasons also) he does in fact hold that I-cognitions cognize the Self and will argue in the course of this chaper that they provide independent[78] proof of its existence. His—perhaps slightly unsatisfactorily vague and brief—explanation of how I-cognitions can have the Self as their referent despite the Self being beyond concepts and ungraspable by the *buddhi*, is to qualify in three ways the extent to which it is actually their referent: it is so 'for the sake of linguistic usage', 'somehow' and 'by a close approximation'. Much hangs on this qualification, for it is the only indication he gives of how to bridge the gap between two opposing tendencies of his in this passage: one, to claim that the Self is the referent of I-cognition, and the other, to claim that that which is perceived through self-awareness is not the same as that perceived through I-cognition.[79]

1.1.2 *nanu cādhyavasāyasyāvastuviṣayatvād asmākam adhyavaseyena*[80] *sahabhāvo na siddhaḥ.*

1.1.2 [Śūnyavādin:] But because determinative cognition[81] does not have a real referent [for us], its occurring together with[82] the object of the determinative cognition is not established for us.

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[77] 8,1b–14,5b. The potency of the Buddhist arguments there derived from the claim that no stable Self, but rather a momentary stream of cognition, is given to us nonconceptually. Only through insisting on the reverse could Rāmakaṇṭha surmount all of the Buddhist refutations of inferences of the Self.

[78] Independent from self-awareness.

[79] 39,2–11.

[80] *adhyavaseyena* Ked^{pc}, Ped; *adhyavasāyena* B, L, P, Ked^{ac}.

[81] Of which I-cognitions are an example.

[82] This is one of the cases, mentioned in note 41, where Rāmakaṇṭha uses the term *sahabhāva* (co-occurrence) as though interchangeable with *sahopalambha* (co-perception). The other two are on pages 281 and 284. As explained on page 267, this termino-

As noted above, the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument that Rāmakaṇṭha puts forward depends on a first stage that consists of the claim that I-cognition has the Self as its referent (cf. *ahampratyayasya sthiragrāhakaparāmarśarūpatvenātmaviṣayatvād*). The Yogācāra implicitly rejects that here by stating that no determinative cognition has a real referent. Thus he blocks the co-occurrence of I-cognitions with the Self through the more general blocking of the co-occurrence of any determinative cognition with its referent (*adhyavaseya*). Both the 'idealist' (Yogācāra) and 'realist' (Sautrāntika/Bāhyārthavādin) strands of Dharmakīrti's Buddhism distinguish sharply between perception (*pratyakṣa*) and determinative cognition (*adhyavasāya*), the former alone constituting valid knowledge. Perception is said to consist only of the initial pre-conceptual encounter with an object. As soon as a verbal cognition, which determines this, follows, for example 'I am seeing blue', one has moved out of the realm of perception to determinative cognition. The referents of determinative cognitions are not the real individuals (*svalakṣaṇa*s) encountered in the pre-conceptual perception, but universals such as the concept 'blue', which we superimpose on the individual. So, because for the Buddhist opponent referents of determinative cognition (*adhyavaseya*) are not real, that which corresponds to the word 'I' in I-cognitions is not real, and is thus not a suitable candidate for invariable co-perception.

> *yuktam etat kadācid bāhyārthavādino vaktum, bhavatas tv abodhātmano 'saṃvedyatvād adhyavaseyasyāpi*[83] *saṃvedyatvena bodharūpatayādhyavasāyasyeva*[84] *sattvam, iti nāsiddhis tena sahabhāvasyeti.*
>
> [Siddhāntin:] It might be correct for a Bāhyārthavādin to say this, but because, for you, anything not of the nature of consciousness is not experienced, the referent of determinative cognition, just like the determinative cognition itself,[85] exists, because it has consciousness as its nature since it is experienced. So the co-existence of [the I-cognition] with that [i.e. with the Self, the referent of the determinative cognition] *is* established.[86]

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logical variation is symptomatic of a significant difference between Dharmakīrti and Rāmakaṇṭha over what is required for *sahopalambhaniyama* to apply to two things.

[83] *adhyavaseyasyāpi*° Ked^{ac}, Ped, B, L, P; *adhyavasāyasyāpi*° Ked^{pc}.

[84] °*dhyavasāyasyeva* Ked^{ac}, Ped, B, L, P; °*dhyavaseyasyeva* Ked^{pc}.

[85] Which you Yogācāra do accept to be real.

[86] I.e. it is established even on your presuppositions.

Rāmakaṇṭha's argument here has two assumptions, the first argued for by stating its contrapositive, and the second implied: 1) for the Yogācāra anything that is experienced is of the nature of consciousness; 2) for the Yogācāra consciousness exists. Owing to these two the Yogācāra should accept that referents of determinative cognition, since they are experienced, exist. In fact he wants to confine real existence to the determinative cognition itself and deny it to its referent. Rāmakaṇṭha does not think that he can consistently maintain such a distinction, since both are, on his own presuppositions, of the nature of consciousness, so both should be equally existent/real.[87]

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[87] The way that Rāmakaṇṭha has responded to the charge that determinative cognition has *unreal* referents (38,4 *nanu cādhyavasāyasyāvastuviṣayatvāt* ...) by answering that those referents should *exist* (*adhyavaseyasya ... sattvam*) shows that here, as commonly in Indian Philosophy, unreality is not distinguished from non-existence and reality is not distinguished from existence.

Rāmakaṇṭha's contention here that the Yogācāra opponent is precluded from holding referents of determinative cognition to be unreal involves a conflation of two different senses of unreal. Rāmakaṇṭha assumes that the Yogācāra would hold *adhyavaseya*s to be unreal on the grounds that they do not exist as an external object. If that were the sense in which they were held to be unreal then their unreality would indeed be difficult to defend. For nothing external to consciousness exists for the Yogācāra, so how could he distinguish the real from the unreal?

The sense in which a Dharmakīrtian Yogācāra would hold *adhyavaseya*s to be unreal can be clarified by considering the case of a determinative cognition of silver with regard to what is actually mother-of-pearl. This example is representative of all determinative cognition for Dharmakīrtian Buddhists given that determinative cognition consists, for them, in superimposition. The referent of the determinative cognition, the silver, is 'unreal' in the sense that there is not a proper correspondence between it and that to which it is directed, the mother-of-pearl. This is precisely the sense in which all referents of determinative cognitions are unreal for Dharmakīrtian Buddhism. It is true that the Yogācāra, unlike the Sautrāntika, cannot distinguish the silver from the mother-of-pearl on the grounds that the former is mental and the latter external, for the mother-of-pearl is produced by a trace of consciousness. But he can still distinguish them; for the mother-of-pearl is a unique individual (*svalakṣaṇa*), and the silver is a concept that is superimposed on to that. It is this lack of correspondence between the superimposed and that on to which it is superimposed that constitutes the unreality of *adhyavaseya*s for both the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra strands of Dharmakīrtian Buddhism. Their unreality is not connected with whether they are external or mental. I am very grateful to Birgit Kellner for

1.1.3 [Ked p. 39] *tarhi vādyasiddho 'yam, ahampratyayābhāve 'pi svasaṃvedanenātmopalambhābhyupagamāt.*

1.1.3 [Śūnyavādin:] In that case,[88] this[89] is unestablished for the disputants, because [you] accept that the Self is perceived through self-awareness, even without the I-cognition.

Like the first objection (1.1.1), this one comes not from the point of view of Buddhism (which would obviously not accept that the Self is perceived through self-awareness), but points to an internal problem with Rāmakaṇṭha's position.[90] Unlike the first two it challenges the co-perception not by challenging that the Self is the referent of I-cognitions, but by pointing to the fact that the Self is perceived elsewhere than through them (according to Rāmakaṇṭha). The first two could be characterized as asserting the absence of perception of the Self in the sphere required by the argument ('I-cognitions'); and this one as asserting the over-extension of perception of the Self beyond the limits required by the argument. In the Yogācāra version of the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument it is crucial that we never experience blue independently of consciousness of blue, otherwise it clearly is not established that blue just is consciousness of blue. So similarly here, if the Self is experienced in any other context than in I-cognitions, then it does not follow that it is of the nature of consciousness, and hence real.

Of course the appearance of the Self outside of the sphere of I-cognitions would be evidence, of a different kind, for its existence, but it is of use to the opponent here because it blocks the co-perception under discussion, and so releases him from the unwanted consequence of the Self's reality.

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explaining this to me (e-mail 6.10.01). As she wrote, 'Rāmakaṇṭha's argument mixes the 'relational unreality' of conceptualization—it construes a false relation between two entities—with the 'relatum unreality' of an entity qua external or mental.'

[88] I.e. even if we grant that the Self is the referent of I-cognitions.

[89] I.e. the invariable occurring together of Self and I-cognition.

[90] I label it in the translation as having been put by the Buddhist however, because that is who Rāmakaṇṭha sees as its speaker, given that in the reply he writes, 'It has also been said by you' and then quotes Dharmakīrti.

Rāmakaṇṭha defends the necessary co-occurrence of Self and I-cognition by drawing a firm distinction between the Self as known through *svasaṃvedana* and the Self as known through I-cognitions (*ahampratyaya*), and excluding the former as irrelevant.

> *satyam. aham iti tv adhyavasāyena sahabhāvo 'dhyavaseyatātra hetuḥ, sā ca tadānīṃ nāstīti tena sahopalambhaniyamo nāsiddhaḥ. anyā hy adhyavasāya-parāmṛśyatānyā ca saṃvidrūpateti buddhisaṃvitpraviveka*[91]*prasaṅgena*[92] *pradarśitaṃ svāyambhuvoddyota eva. iha tv anupayogān nocyate.*
>
> [Siddhāntin:] True, but co-existence with the determinative cognition 'I', i.e., being the referent of determinative cognition, is the logical reason here, and that (i.e. being the referent of determinative cognition) does not occur then,[93] so invariable co-perception with it (i.e. the determinative cognition 'I') is not unestablished. For it is one thing to be verbally cognized through a determinative cognition, and another to have as one's nature consciousness, as was shown when the matter came up (°*prasaṅgena*) on the occasion of [the section dealing with] the distinction between the intellect and consciousness in [my[94]

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[91] °*praviveka*° Ked, Ped, B, P; °*praveka*° L.

[92] When reading this passage together, neither Prof. Sanderson nor Harunaga Isaacson were completely happy with the transmitted reading, °*pravivekaprasaṅgena*. Isaacson suggested emending to °*pravivekaprasaṅge*, after which Sanderson suggested °*praviveke prasaṅgena*. Isaacson later pointed me to the following sentence in the YBhā ad YS 1.8: *ete cittamalaprasaṅgenābhidhāsyante*. There, though *cittamala* is embedded in a (similar) compound, it must mean, 'on the occasion of [the section dealing with] the impurities of the mind'. Then Sanderson presented me with two more similar examples: *pūrvasūtravyākhyāprasaṅgena ... vyākhyātaprāyam etat sūtram* (*Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya* ad Sūtra 13); and *jñānādvaitadalanaprasaṅgena durācāraṃ nirbhartsayiṣyāmaha ity alaṃ vistareṇa* (NM(M) Vol. 1, 189,5–6). So it seems that we do not need to emend here.

[93] In the case you point to of self-awareness.

[94] We know that this text is by Rāmakaṇṭha because of the way he refers to it on pages 88–89: ... *iti vipañcitam asmābhiḥ svāyambhuvoddyote tata evāvadhāryam.* It has not come to light however, which is a pity because the section he refers to here might have thrown light on the tricky question of the relationship for Rāmakaṇṭha between unchanging consciousness (*saṃvit*) and transitory determinative cognitions produced by the *buddhi* (intellect). Furthermore it would have been useful to see whether in that section his account of the difference between being verbally cognized through a judgement and being consciousness left room for the latter being the former or gave any clues as to how he would have regarded that as being possible. (Since if the Self is the referent of I-cognition it must of course be possible.)

commentary on the *Svāyambhuvatantra*, the] Illumination of the *Svāyambhuva*.[95] But here it will not be stated because it is not useful.

For *sahopalambhaniyama* to be applicable here Rāmakaṇṭha must show that the referent of I-cognitions does not occur outside of the context of I-cognitions, in the same way that blue does not occur other than in cognitions of blue. Thus he must draw a distinction between the referent of I-cognitions and that which is apprehended through self-awareness. He does so on the grounds that the former is an *adhyavaseya* (referent of determinative cognition), while the latter is not. This distinction enables him to apply the argument only to the Self as referent of I-cognition, rendering the Self as it appears in self-awareness, *svasaṃvedana,* irrelevant. The co-perception as applied in this narrower way, is indeed invariable since the Self as referent of I-cognition does only ever appear in I-cognitions.

If the two things co-perceived are more restricted than previously apparent, then so too must the conclusion be. The conclusion can no longer be the reality of the Self, but must simply be the reality of the referent of I-cognitions, i.e. the Self as *adhyavaseya*.[96] Having said that, Rāmakaṇṭha never expressly articulates this narrowing down of the conclusion. In fact he gives the impression that the argument proves the reality of the Self per se.[97] This illustrates

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[95] Translation of the second half of this sentence supplied by Harunaga Isaacson: Letter 12/9/99.

[96] The restriction of the two co-perceived entities constitutes a disanalogy between the argument in its Yogācāra usage and its application by Rāmakaṇṭha here. The Yogācāra argument was not restricted to blue as perceived by one particular category of cognition, but was about blue per se. One could also identify a more subtle difference. The Yogācāra asserted the necessary co-perception of blue and cognition of blue in order to conclude something about the nature of blue. Rāmakaṇṭha, by contrast, as becomes clear from this limitation to the Self as *adhyavaseya*, is not really using the argument to conclude something about the nature of the Self. After all the nature of the Self is more closely and directly apprehended through self-awareness than I-cognitions. Rather he is using it to conclude something about the nature of I-cognitions, namely that their referent is real. (Or strictly speaking—bearing in mind his future distancing of himself from the argument at 40,5b–4b—that their referent should be considered to be real by Yogācāras.)

[97] See his conclusion *dvayor api ... satyatvam*, 38,13–14, where *dvayor* refers to I-cognition and Self.

what will be elaborated below,[98] namely that though the referent of I-cognition and that which is known through self-awareness are not completely identical for Rāmakaṇṭha, as he insists here, neither are they completely different. They are both the Self. So if the referent of I-cognition is proved to be real, the Self is effectively proved to be real.

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Rāmakaṇṭha's application of the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument appears to be circular. Its conclusion is that the referent of I-cognition is the real Self, but only if that is established to be the case do I-cognition and Self qualify for the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument at all. No further conclusion appears to be reached through the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument than what was already established in stage one,[99] before it was applied. He gives the impression that the principle of *sahopalambhaniyama* is relevant to the securing of the conclusion, in order to convey that it is incumbent on the Buddhist to accept the conclusion, but the latter seems to be smuggled into the assertion of the first stage that the referent of I-cognition is the Self.

Perhaps we should assume however that Rāmakaṇṭha would not be guilty of such an obvious flaw. If so, it is possible to rescue his argument from this circularity by assuming that stage one claims only that we apprehend what seems to be a stable perceiver; that its reality is not assumed at that stage, but derived from the fact that it is invariably co-perceived with I-cognition. Alternatively, one could admit that the claim of stage one—that the Self is the referent of I-cognition—already contains the conclusion, but point out that stage one is not unargued for. The *sahopalambhaniyama* between Self and I-cognition does not establish anything extra, but it shows that whatever we perceive in I-cognitions must be real for the Yogācāras. Stage one already claims that to be the Self, so the argument shows that they had better take stage one seriously and direct their attention to refuting it. That is exactly what they do (in 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.2.1, 1.2.2 and in Section 3).

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[98] Page 292.

[99] 38,12–13: *ahampratyayasya sthiragrāhakaparāmarśarūpatvenātmaviṣayatvād.*

The distinction that Rāmakaṇṭha mentions in his second sentence here ('For it is one thing to be ...') is useful as a summary of the two ways that the Self appears to us according to him. It is sometimes the referent of a particular act of consciousness—*adhyavasāya*, *parāmarśa*—and it is at all times consciousness appearing to itself. When we are aware of it as the first we can capture it in language. But our awareness of it as the second—*svasaṃvitti*, *svasaṃvedana*—is beyond language. That is what he seeks to illustrate by quoting the *Pramāṇavārttika* in the next sentence.

bhavadbhir apy uktam[100]

aśakyasamayo[101] *hy ātmā cetanānām*[102] *ananyabhāk* |
teṣām ataḥ svasaṃvittir nābhijalpānuṣaṅgiṇī || *iti.*

Even you have said:

For the nature of instances of consciousness[103] is not amenable to a linguistic convention, [since][104] it is unique. Therefore their awareness of themselves (*svasaṃvittiḥ*) is not connected with language.[105]

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[100] PVā 3.249, and PVin 1.21 (p. 62, notes 2 and 3). See note 102 for variants.

[101] °*samayo* Ked, Ped, B, P; °*samaye* L, kha.

Marginal insertion above *samayo* in B: *saṃketa.*

[102] *cetanānām* Ked, Ped, B, L, P; *rāgādīnām* PVā 3.249; *sukhādīnām* PVā 3.249 (according to the Tibetan translation of the verse and according to Devendrabuddhi's and Ravigupta's commentaries), PVin 1.21 (judging from bde in the Tibetan translation), MatV VP ad 6.23, ĪPVV Vol. 1, 116,1b; *nīlādīnām* TS(BBS) 1263.

Because *cetanānām* is picked up by *teṣām*, it must be the genitive plural of *cetanam*, not *cetanā*. I have not encountered a neuter *cetanam* in the meaning of consciousness elsewhere, but it is not impossible that we have a pair of nouns, not necessarily different in meaning, *cetanam* and *cetanā*, just as we have for instance *vedanaṃ* and *vedanā* or *ālocanam* and *ālocanā*.

[103] As can be seen from note 102, the occurrences of this verse in Dharmakīrti's writings read either *rāgādīnām* or *sukhādīnām* in place of *cetanānām*. The verses immediately following this in PVā argue that pleasure and the like (i.e. *caitta*s, mental factors associated with cognition/consciousness) are not of a different nature from cognition. This verse is intended to give evidence to that effect by showing how pleasure/craving and the like are aware of themselves rather than apprehended by a cognition that is other than them. Thus Dharmakīrti would not have been able to substitute a word for consciousness/cognition here for *rāgādi/sukhādi*. A word for consciousness rather than pleasure/craving and the like is, however, more or less demanded by the context in which this verse is quoted here. A verse about the self-awareness of pleasure/craving and the like

Rāmakaṇṭha's Buddhist opponent, Dharmakīrti, contends three things in this verse: 1) The nature of instances of consciousness is unique, therefore 2) it is not capturable by linguistic conventions, therefore 3) these instances' awareness of themselves is not arrived at through the medium of language. Rāmakaṇṭha quotes him as support for the idea that the Self, when we experience it simply as consciousness, through self-awareness, is different from that which becomes an object of our awareness in I-cognitions, which *can* be described in language by the word 'I'.

What does it mean that the nature of an instance of consciousness is unique, and therefore language-defying? Manorathanandin's commentary on this verse[106] justifies the uniqueness of the nature of craving, for example, on the grounds that it 'does not partake in anything else,[107] because it rests in its own nature alone.' Things which can be denoted by language, he continues, are

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would not have served Rāmakaṇṭha's purposes nearly so well, since he wants this verse to illustrate the point he has just made, that having as one's form *consciousness* (*saṃvit*) is different from being the referent of a determinative cognition. Thus it is not unlikely that it was Rāmakaṇṭha himself who changed that word in the verse. From Rāmakaṇṭha's point of view the phrase *ātmā cetanānām* also happens to be nicely ambiguous (though I do not suggest that this motivated him to change it): as well as 'nature of instances of consciousness' it can mean 'Self of conscious beings'. The latter meaning would of course lead to the verse being highly un-Buddhist.

[104] Dharmottara, Manorathanandin and the Tibetan translator of this verse all take *ananyabhāk* as a *hetau viśeṣaṇam.*

[105] The Tibetan of PVin 1.21ab (*gźan la brten min bdag ñid phyir | bde sogs rnams la brda nus min |*) construes *sukhādīnām* primarily with *aśakyasamayaḥ* as though the Sanskrit read *aśakyaḥ samayaḥ*; and it takes *hy ātmā ananyabhāk* as *yasmād ātmā ananyabhāk* giving the reason for *aśakya(ḥ)samayaḥ sukhādīnām.* The English would thus run something like: 'because [their] nature is unique, linguistic conventions for craving etc. are not possible.' But as Vetter (1966 104, note 37) points out, it is unlikely that PVin originally contained a different half verse from that of PVā. Rather its Tibetan translation seems to have been influenced by Dharmottara's interpretation. As Vetter mentions, PVin and Dharmottara's commentary on it were translated into Tibetan by the same person.

[106] PVV 194,5–9: *rāgādīnām ātmā svarūpam ananyabhāk nānyaṃ bhajate, svarūpamātrāvasthiteḥ. tasmād aśakyaḥ samayaḥ saṅketo 'smin ... vācyaṃ vācakena saṃyojyeta, na ca rāgādyātmā vācyaḥ, tatas tatprakāśo na śabdasaṅgataḥ.*

[107] In saying that, he is merely dissolving the word that I have been translating 'unique' (*ananyabhāk*) into a verbal form (*nānyaṃ bhajate*).

things which can be linked to denoters/signifiers (i.e. words). And craving (and other mental factors) are not such things.

But he does not make clear precisely why unique things cannot be linked to signifying words. Another passage from the *Pramāṇavārttika* clarifies this:[108]

> A particular[109] which is seen in one (place and time) is not seen anywhere else (or at any other time). [Therefore] a universal which is separate from this (particular) does not exist, since the (perceptual) cognition is not differentiated (as grasping both individual and universal). Therefore, all cognition that arises from the senses has a particular for its object. It is not possible for words to apply to particulars,[110] because a linguistic convention cannot apply to particulars, since they do not range over [anything else]; and only the object of words [, not a particular,] would be connected with them.

We see from this passage that what Dharmakīrti said of pleasure and the like (or instances of consciousness in Rāmakaṇṭha's version of the verse), namely that being unique, they are ineffable, applies to all particulars. The pot-moment in front of me has never been seen before and will never be seen again, so to use a word to denote it that refers also to every other pot-moment will not capture its specific nature. Sense-perception presents things as particular, not as general; and yet the conventions that determine word meanings do so by connecting the word with something general. Words are suitable for properties that occur in a range of individual instances, but they cannot apply

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[108] PVā 3.126–128:

> *ekatra dṛṣṭo bhedo hi kvacin nānyatra dṛśyate* |
> *na tasmād bhinnam asty anyat sāmānyaṃ buddhyabhedataḥ* ||
> *tasmād viśeṣaviṣayā sarvaivendriyajā matiḥ* |
> *na viśeṣeṣu śabdānāṃ pravṛttāv asti sambhavaḥ* ||
> *ananvayād viśeṣāṇāṃ saṅketasyāpravṛttitaḥ* |
> *viṣayo yaś ca śabdānāṃ saṃyojyeta sa eva taiḥ* ||

This passage was drawn to my attention by Birgit Kellner, who was, in turn, pointed to it by Tosaki's notes to his translation of PVā 3.249.

[109] *bheda* is used here in the sense of *viśeṣa*. Birgit Kellner sent me a translation of these verses, which I am following here.

[110] The text as embedded in PVBh reads *pravṛtter* for *pravṛttau*. The genitive is perhaps smoother.

to a collection of momentary particulars, since that collection will always be heterogeneous. A linguistic convention would only be able to apply to particulars if there were a different word for every single particular. This is not the case in practice, and unfeasable in principle.

The verse under comment was quoted with approval by Rāmakaṇṭha to illustrate a point that he himself had made. We can thus expect that he would agree to its main points. How then would he explain that the uniqueness of consciousness means that it is ineffable? For him it is not true, as it is for Dharmakīrti, that each moment of consciousness is distinct from the previous and subsequent moments. For Rāmakaṇṭha the nature of consciousness (i.e. the Self), does not vary over time. Far from being constituted by irreducibly separate point-instants, it shines forth constantly without interruption. Thus its ineffability would not be explained by Rāmakaṇṭha as by Dharmakīrti in the three verses just looked at.

The verse also occurs in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, and since three Sanskrit manuscripts of this text have recently come to light (and are being used by Prof. Steinkellner to produce a critical edition), we can consult Dharmakīrti's own prose surrounding the verse. Some explanations given here by Dharmakīrti are in accord with Rāmakaṇṭha's views. Perhaps it was these that Rāmakaṇṭha had in mind when he cited the verse with approval. Dharmakīrti writes:[111]

> For conceptualization is not possible in the self-experiencing of pleasure and the like, because:

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[111] The following was made available to me by Birgit Kellner and Prof. Steinkellner. I thank Birgit Kellner for her help, without which I would have struggled to derive sense from it.

na hi sukhādīnām ātmasaṃvedane vikalpaḥ sambhavati, yasmād

aśakyasamayo hy ātmā sukhādīnām ananyabhāk |

nānuditaḥ pratiniyataḥ sukhādyātmā viṣayīkriyate saṃvittyā, tasyās tadātmarūpatvāt. nainam iyam abhilāpena saṃsṛjati, tathāvṛtter ātmani virodhāt, tadrūpasya prāg adarśanād, abhilāpābhoge ca viṣayapratyastamayāt tadavivekena saṃvido 'py, agrāhyagrāhakasya ca samayasyābhāvāt, anyenāpy atītarūpasyāsaṃvedanāt, apunarbhāvini samayasya vaiyarthyāc ca.

teṣām ataḥ svasaṃvittir nābhijalpānuṣaṅgiṇī ||

The nature of pleasure and the like is after all (*hi*) not amenable to a linguistic convention, [since] it is unique.

The nature of pleasure and the like, not having arisen [ever before], and in each case restricted [by the causes and conditions that in individual situations produce pleasure as opposed to pain], cannot be made into an object by awareness, because the [awareness] is the nature of the [pleasure]. This [awareness] does not link the [nature of pleasure] with language, because to occur in such a way is contradictory with the nature [of pleasure]. For it is not the case that [any pleasure] of that particular nature has been experienced before; and [at the time] when the word ['pleasure'] is experienced, the object (i.e. the pleasure itself) has [already] ceased, and so has the awareness[112] [of pleasure] because it is not separate from it. [Its awareness does not link it with language] also because there can be no linguistic convention without a perceiver and a perceived object, because a past [object] cannot be experienced by a further [cognition], and because a linguistic convention is without purpose with respect to something that does not arise again.

Therefore their (i.e. pleasure and the like's) self-awareness is not connected with language.

I will not attempt to further analyze this rich and complicated passage, but will just note that while much of it assumes momentariness, like Dharmakīrti's explanations in PVā 3.126–128, not all of it does. It asserts that the nature of pleasure cannot become an object of awareness because awareness is its very nature; and that since there is thus no relation of perceiver and perceived, no linguistic convention can apply. Though Rāmakaṇṭha would not actually agree that this is so of pleasure, since for him pleasure is an object of perception, he would agree that it is so of consciousness, the topic of his version of the verse. So perhaps he would have used such ideas if asked to explain why the nature of consciousness is ineffable.

ata evopayogabhedād[113] *asya nātra gṛhītagrāhitvam.*

That is precisely why, because of a difference of use, this (i.e. I-cognition) does not grasp here what has been grasped [already through self-awareness].

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[112] This slightly surprising syntactical interpretation, with the the genitive *saṃvidaḥ* being taken as dependent on °*pratyastamayāt* follows the Tibetan translation.

[113] *evopayogabhedād* Ped, v.l. in Ked, B, L, P; *evobhayabhedād* Ked.

I-cognition uses determinative cognition to grasp the Self as roughly approximated to, and self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) uses consciousness' prelinguistic and pre-conceptual apprehension of itself to grasp the Self directly.

So Rāmakaṇṭha has two explicit motivations for distinguishing self-awareness and I-cognition here. One is that for his *sahopalambhaniyama* argument to work, he cannot have the Self being perceived outside the context of I-cognitions. But he has the problem of our perception of it in self-awareness. By distinguishing self-awareness from I-cognitions in the way that he does, he can at least maintain that the Self as referent of determinative cognition is never perceived outside the context of I-cognitions. His second reason for distinguishing them is that he does not want I-cognitions to grasp what is grasped through self-awareness (*gṛhītagrāhitva*) because that would make Sadyojyotis susceptible to the charge of going over the same ground as earlier in his text. By distinguishing self-awareness and I-cognition, any overlap between this verse (15) and verse 5, which Rāmakaṇṭha expounded as about self-awareness, is avoided. These two reasons are not of course why Rāmakaṇṭha adopts the distinction as part of his system, but they are the two reasons why the distinction is of importance to him at this point in the text.

> *api tu tāvanmātreṇa pramāṇatvam iti darśayiṣyāmaḥ.*
>
> Rather, as we will show,[114] [I-cognition] is an [independent] means of knowledge up to a certain point.[115]

Throughout the whole of Rāmakaṇṭha's response to this third objection (1.1.3) he has been maintaining a firm distinction (for both of the reasons mentioned in my previous comment) between that which is apprehended through self-awareness and the referent of I-cognitions. But he cannot afford for this difference to be too strong, for that which is apprehended through self-awareness is the Self; and the whole point of this section of the text is to show that the referent of I-cognitions is also the Self, albeit proximately. The tension is evident. When he states that it is one thing to be consciousness and another to be verbally cognized in a determinative cognition, and then sup-

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[114] In his commentary on the next verse (16).

[115] It does not grasp the Self directly, but 'up to a certain point', i.e. in its own terms, through concepts.

ports this with a verse stating that consciousness's nature defies linguistic conventions, it is tempting to conclude that that which is verbally cognized in the determinative cognition 'I' is not consciousness, i.e. not the Self. Rāmakaṇṭha would certainly not want us to draw such a conclusion, so we should not understand the distinction he draws to be between two completely different things. The content of the two types of perception differ, for Rāmakaṇṭha, not in that one is the real Self and the other not, but in that one is the Self in its form as consciousness and the other the Self as verbally perceived through a determinative cognition.[116]

The source of this tension is the strong influence on the philosophy of this period of the Dharmakīrtian distinction[117] between non-conceptual (*nirvikalpaka*) cognition (of which self-awareness is an example) and determinative cognition (*adhyavasāya*). Dharmakīrti bestowed the title of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) on the former alone,[118] arguing that the referents of the latter (concepts as opposed to unique individuals) are postulated by us, and do not accurately reflect that which appears to our senses. Rāmakaṇṭha wants to preserve determinative cognition (or most instances of it) as direct perception, but he feels he cannot but acknowledge Buddhism's distinction between non-conceptual cognition and determinative cognition, and its tendency to see the former as a more reliable guide to reality than the latter. His strategy is thus to adopt the distinction, even to make much of the differences between the two, but to refuse to give up the view that determinative cognition provides a reliable representation of the world outside the cognition. For Rāmakaṇṭha the referents of determinative cognition are not mentally constructed; they are close approximations to the referents of the corresponding pre-conceptual cognition. The referent of the determinative cognition 'blue', for example, corresponds to the initial pre-conceptual cognition of the patch of blue. Similarly the referent of an I-cognition is nothing other than the Self for Rāmakaṇṭha. The Buddhist distinction he has adopted forces him to qualify this

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[116] I write that in view of the fact that the distinction he makes before the Dharmakīrti verse is between *adhyavasāyaparāmṛśyatā* and *saṃvidrūpatā*. One could understand an *ātmanaḥ* to go with the two abstracts.

[117] Introduced, in fact, by Dignāga.

[118] As already mentioned under objection 1.1.2 on page 281.

slightly by saying that it is so 'somehow, by a close approximation ... for the purpose of language'[119] and that I-cognition is a means of knowing the Self 'up to a certain point'.[120] But he does not see why his adoption of the Buddhist distinction should force him to hold that the referent of an I-cognition is completely unrelated to and unrepresentative of the non-conceptual Self. Buddhism, for Rāmakaṇṭha, has latched on to a valid distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual referents but has made too much of it, seeing the two as radically unconnected and lacking any continuity.[121]

Objections 1.1.1, 1.1.2, and 1.1.3 exhibit a logical progression. The first challenged the basic assumption of Rāmakaṇṭha's four-staged *sahopalambhaniyama* argument (stage 1), namely that the Self is the referent of I-cognition. The second allows for a Self appearing as the referent of I-cognition, but states that such referents of determinative cognition are unreal. The third allows for the Self being the real referent of determinative cognition but points to a problem that arises even if that is the case (it being perceived in another kind of cognition).

I do not label the next objection 1.1.4, but group the next three objections together as 1.2.1, 1.2.2 and 1.2.3; the logical progression of the last three has stopped, the next one going back to the beginning as it were, by focussing again on the first stage of Rāmakaṇṭha's *sahopalambhaniyama* argument. It forms a group with the following two, because the three of them mirror, in a sense that will be explained below, the pattern of the first three objections.

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[119] 38,17–18: *kathaṃcid adūraviprakarṣeṇa ... vyavahārārtham.*

[120] In the sentence under comment: *tāvanmātreṇa.*

[121] Rāmakaṇṭha was of course not the first philosopher to both accept the distinction between non-conceptual and conceptual cognition and maintain that the latter constitutes valid perception. Among Naiyāyikas see Vācaspati Miśra's NVTṬ ad *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.4; and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's NM(M), Vol. 2, 515,14: *savikalpakaṃ pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam.* Jayanta holds that the object of the non-conceptual perception is the same as that of the conceptual, except that the former lacks any connection with a name: *tasmād ya eva vastvātmā savikalpasya gocaraḥ | sa eva nirvikalpasya śabdollekhavivarjitaḥ ||* (NM(M), Vol. 1, 256,5–6). Considerably earlier, Kumārila had already adopted the distinction and argued for the validity of determinative cognition. Rāmakaṇṭha quotes him later in this chapter on that point.

1.2.1 *nanu 'gauro 'haṃ kṛśo 'ham' ity anātmani śarīra evāhampratyayasya dṛṣṭer*[122] *viruddho hetuḥ.*

1.2.1 [Śūnyavādin:] Because we find that I-cognition [refers] only to the body, which is not the Self, in such cases as 'I am fair, I am slim', the logical reason is surely contradictory.

iti ata āha

> 1.15cd) *na cānyasminn*[123] *ahambuddhiḥ kvacid dṛṣṭā tu nirguṇā*[124] ||

Therefore (*ataḥ*) [since one might object] thus (*iti*) he says,

> 1.15cd) And I-cognition when not qualified is never seen [to refer] to anything else.

This translation represents Rāmakaṇṭha's understanding of the half-verse as inferred from his commentary below. Filling it out slightly, it means: cognitions of 'I' that are not qualified by adjectives such as fair or slim never refer to anything other than the Self. He explains in his commentary why those that are so qualified are not relevant. This translation is a highly unnatural construal of the Sanskrit. It is almost impossible, for example, to translate both of the two particles, *ca* and *tu*, if we understand it as a single proposition in this way. The syntactic markers indicate that Sadyojyotis would have wanted us to break after *ahambuddhiḥ*: 'And I-cognition does not refer to anything other [than the Self]. But it is sometimes seen to be unqualified.' This way the 'but sometimes' (*kvacit ... tu*) in this verse leads naturally on to the 'and sometimes' (*ca ... kvacit*) in the next half-verse. Thus Sadyojyotis seems to have held that no I-cognition ever refers to anything other than the Self; Rāmakaṇṭha, by contrast, that *unqualified* I-cognition never does so. Rāmakaṇṭha wants to narrow down that which refers to the Self to a subset of I-cognitions, not all of them, thus enabling him to neutralize the common Buddhist[125] objection that 'I' can be observed to refer to the body. By construing the verse in the way that he does, he can represent it as taking on board that objection,

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[122] °*pratyayasya dṛṣṭer* Ked, Ped, B, P; °*pratyayadṛṣṭer* L.

[123] *cānyasminn* Ked, Ped, B, L, P; *cānyasminy* M.

[124] *tu nirguṇā* Ked, Ped, B, L, P; *caturguṇā* M.

[125] And Cārvāka. Buddhism would of course often say that 'I' refers rather to the five psycho-physical constituents of the human being (*skandha*s).

by excluding I-cognition that refers to the body as irrelevant. Thus the difference between the two arises because Sadyojyotis has not bothered to concern himself with this group of I-cognitions at all, whereas Rāmakaṇṭha sees them as a possible counter-example to the Śaiva view that must be dealt with. What would Sadyojyotis' response to them be? Since he regards all I-cognition as referring to the Self, presumably those qualified by bodily attributes would not count as proper I-cognitions for him at all.

As to how this half-verse (15cd) relates to the last half-verse (15ab): the central assertion of 15ab was conditional upon the Self being the referent of I-cognition (*ahampratyayagocara*); for Sadyojyotis, 15c confirms that that is always the case, for Rāmakaṇṭha 15cd asserts the extent to which that is the case.

> *na, viśeṣitatvāt. gaurādibhiḥ padārthāntarair viśeṣito hy ahampratyayo māṇavakādau siṃhādipratyayavad guṇavṛttyā śarīre*[126] *vartate, tair aviśeṣitas tu mukhyatayātmany eva. sa eva* [Ked p. 40] *cātra hetur ukto na saviśeṣaṇaḥ, ity aviruddha eva.* ||1.15||
>
> [Siddhāntin:] No [I-cognition does not refer only to the body] because [the I-cognitions in the cases you cite] are qualified:[127] for an I-cognition qualified by other meanings such as 'fair' applies figuratively (*guṇavṛttyā*) to the body just like a cognition of a lion or such like [referring] to a student.[128] But [an I-cognition] unqualified by [such ideas] [refers] in its primary meaning to the Self alone. And it is [such an unqualified I-cognition] that is taught to be the logical reason here, not one which occurs with qualification, so [the logical reason] is not contradictory.

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[126] *śarīre* Ked, Ped, B, L; *śarīram* P.

[127] He uses *viśeṣita* here as an antonym of *nirguṇa* in the verse.

[128] To say 'I am fair' is like saying of a young student that he is a lion. Just as a person is not literally a lion, so the Self is not literally coloured (and therefore material). The lion example is much referred to in philosophical and *alaṅkāra* literature as an instance of figurative usage. (I thank Somdev Vasudeva for providing many references.) To take an example from Dharmakīrti: *teṣu sa ātmā kalpanāsamāropitaḥ syāt, siṃhatādivan māṇavakādiṣv iti* (PVSV 127,3b–2b ad 1.248cd). Uddyotakara tells us that it is *śauryam*, bravery, that the metaphor expresses: *yathā siṃho māṇavaka iti siṃha iva siṃhaḥ. kim punar atra upamīyate? śauryam* (NVā(NCG) 231,12–13).

To respond to the objection that 'I' refers to the body by claiming that it only does so metaphorically is a standard Ātmavādin move.[129] In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* Vasubandhu's opponent offers an explanation of why (in such sentences as 'I am fair', 'I am dark' etc.) this metaphorical usage occurs. He says that in such cases the Self is figuratively equated with the body to express the fact that the body is at the Self's service, as when someone equates themself with their servant.[130] The servant example aims at a deeper parallelism to the case of Self and body than the lion example, in that the Self-body relationship is mirrored by the master-servant relationship. Rāmakaṇṭha's example is parallel simply in that it is of metaphoric usage.

Note the way that Rāmakaṇṭha writes, 'and it is *that* that is taught to be the logical reason here', where 'that' refers to unqualified I-cognition. Whereas before he has given the impression that the logical reason is the co-existence/co-perception of Self and I-cognition,[131] and named it explicitly as such on one occasion,[132] here he says it is (unqualified) I-cognition.[133] This is partly owing to his attempt to do more with the verses than they actually state. Here he is probably being truer to the verses when he says the logical reason is just the unqualified I-cognition, but his superimposition on them of a continuation of the theme of co-perception has led him elsewhere to identify it as co-perception/co-existence.

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[129] One of the earliest examples is perhaps that in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*: *sandigdhas tūpacāraḥ* (VS(C) 3.2.12).

[130] AKBh(BBS) 1226,10–1227,1. The same idea is put forward by Uddyotakara NVā(NCG) 324,6–8, and by Candrānanda in his interpretation of *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 3.2.12 (VS(C), 30,14–16).

[131] 38,9; 38,19–20; 39,1.

[132] 39,3–4.

[133] In fact it is hard to see how he could construct an inference in which the logical reason was simply 'unqualified I-cognition'; presumably a fuller expression for the *hetu* would be something like 'being the object of unqualified I-cognition', *aviśeṣitāhampratyayagocaratvam* (see *ahampratyayagocaratvaṃ vādyasiddham eva* [38,19], not that *ahampratyayagocaratvaṃ* was there referred to as the logical reason).

This alternation also shows that the Self being the referent of (unqualified) I-cognition and the Self co-occurring with (unqualified) I-cognition are more or less synonymous for Rāmakaṇṭha in this passage.

> 1.2.2 *yady evam, pratyayavyatirekeṇānyasya kasya cid ātmanaḥ pratyeyasyā*[134]*nupalabdher vanādyekatvapratyayavad ahampratyayo 'pi nirviṣaya evety asiddho hetuḥ.*
>
> 1.2.2 [Śūnyavādin:] If that is the case,[135] [then we will try another objection, namely,] because we don't experience some other Self[136] that is the referent of [I-]cognition, separate from the cognition, [it follows that] I-cognition, just like a cognition of the unity of a forest and the like, is without a referent (*nirviṣaya*), so the logical reason is unestablished.

It would be natural to assume that 'logical reason' here denotes the same as when Rāmakaṇṭha just referred to it, namely 'unqualified I-cognition'.[137] That is possible. Weighing against that possibility, however, is the fact that in Rāmakaṇṭha's response to this objection, he writes,

> *iti na vanādyekatvādipratyayavan nirviṣayaḥ, tan nāsiddhiḥ prāguktasya sahopalambhasyeti.*

The way that closely mirrors the opponent's charge here,

> *vanādyekatvapratyayavad ahampratyayo 'pi nirviṣaya evety asiddho hetuḥ,*

indicates that here *hetuḥ* (logical reason) should mean *prāguktaḥ sahopalambhaḥ* (the earlier mentioned co-perception). This reinforces the impression, just commented on above, that Rāmakaṇṭha oscillates freely between these two ways of designating the logical reason as though the difference were insignificant.

Whereas the previous charge was contradictoriness (*viruddhatva*), i.e. that if something is the referent of I-cognition / if something is co-perceived with I-cognition, then it must be simply the body, not the Self, the charge here is

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134 *pratyeyasyā* Ked, B, L, P; *pratyayasyā* Ped.

135 I.e. even if we grant that 'I am fair' and the like are metaphorical and outside the scope of your logical reason.

136 The phrase 'some other Self' does not mean some second Self, but some Self outside the cognition. The 'other' is somewhat redundant in English.

137 Or something like, 'being the referent of I-cognition'.

that the logical reason is unestablished (*asiddhatva*). In other words even if I-cognition that seems to refer to the body can be explained away and we restrict ourselves to I-cognitions unqualified by bodily attributes, nothing is established to exist as the referent of such cognition / to be co-perceived with such cognition.

The Self is no more the referent of I-cognition, according to this objection, than the unity of a forest is the referent of a cognition of a group of trees. Cognitions that we take to be of a forest or a Self do not accurately reflect the reality outside the cognition. Though we may think we perceive a unitary forest we can analyze it further down into individual trees, and those in turn down to a number of shapes and colours, which are what actually appears to our senses. The concept of a unitary forest is something we impose onto those. Similarly we may think that we experience the Self in I-cognitions, but for the Buddhist these 'I's are just like trees both in that they themselves can be further broken down, and in that taken together they form no really existing greater entity. With regard to the first: any instance of 'I' occurring in cognition can be further broken down for the Buddhist in that it refers not to anything single but to a particular association of the five ever-changing constituents of personality (*skandha*). With regard to the second: different I-cognitions across time perceive something different, not the same Self every time. They take in distinct momentary perceivers which when taken together do not add up to a Self, just as different trees taken together do not constitute a forest except as our own mental construct.[138]

The tone of this objection is not necessarily Yogācāra. The forest example, common in Sautrāntika contexts, allows that there are things out there impinging on our senses from outside, to which we then apply concepts that are our own. A non-Yogācāra background to this objection can also be discerned

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[138] The explicit comparison the opponent makes is between I-cognitions and cognitions of the unity of a forest, neither of them having a referent. But in elucidating that I have compared 'I's not with the unity of a forest but with trees; and the Self with the unity of a forest. I take it that this does not really distort the meaning of the passage.

through its seeming assumption that if something does not exist separate from its cognition it is not a real referent.[139]

atrāpy āha

1.16) *kartṛkarmāvabhāsā ca*[140] *spaṣṭā dṛṣṭā*[141] *kvacin matiḥ* |
aham etat prapaśyāmīty ataḥ[142] *siddhaṃ sphuṭaṃ*[143] *dvayam* ||

[Siddhāntin:] And on this point he says,

1.16) And sometimes the clear cognition, 'I see this', is seen, in which agent and object shine forth. From it both of them are clearly established.

I take it that the wording of this translation would represent equally well Rāmakaṇṭha's and Sadyojyotis' construal of the syntax of the verse. But what it means for each of them differs. This is partly because it follows a half-verse that was construed completely differently by the two of them. We saw that in *pāda* d of the last verse Sadyojyotis introduced the first of two possibilities, this verse giving the second. Sometimes I-cognition can be unqualified (15d) and sometimes it can be of the form 'I see this' (16). This contrast for Sadyojyotis seems to be between 'I' appearing alone and 'I' appearing with an object, as the perceiver of that object. For Rāmakaṇṭha 'unqualified' I-cognition does not mean unqualified by an object of the cognition, but unqualified by

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[139] A distinction has to be made though between the tradition whose ideas are put forward in the objection, and the tradition of the speaker by whom Rāmakaṇṭha regards the objection as stated. The whole of this section is directed against the Śūnyavādin who used the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument to establish the non-difference of blue and cognition of blue. It would thus be reasonable to assume that Rāmakaṇṭha regards all of the objections in it as being put by the Śūnyavādin. This is supported by his usage of 'you' in remarks made by his *siddhāntin* and 'us' in objections, spread over the whole passage looked at in this chapter, without any indication of a change of opponent. Thus although the flavour of this objection is perhaps Sautrāntika rather than Yogacāra, and although the objections in the remainder of the passage looked at in this chapter are not specifically from a Yogācāra point of view, I label them all as said by the Śūnyavādin.

[140] °*āvabhāsā ca* Ped; °*āvabhāsāc ca* Ked, B, L, P, M. It is not impossible that Ped's reading arose through corruption and that °*āvabhāsāc ca* is original; but I marginally prefer the meaning of Ped's reading.

[141] *spaṣṭā dṛṣṭā* Ked, Ped, B, L, P; *sraṣṭā draṣṭā* M.

[142] *ataḥ* Ked, Ped, B, L, P; *ati* M.

[143] *sphuṭaṃ* Ked, Ped, B, L, P; *sphuṭa* M.

bodily attributes. Furthermore there is not such a contrast, for him, between the kind of I-cognition talked about in 15cd and the kind of I-cognition talked about in this verse. Both verse-sections are about the unqualified kind, in which 'I' is used in its primary meaning. Because the word *nirguṇa* (unqualified) in 15d is not analysed by Rāmakaṇṭha in accordance with Sadyojyotis' intentions, 'I see this' cognitions are 'qualified' for Sadyojyotis, but 'unqualified' for Rāmakaṇṭha.

That difference is of little consequence, but there is a more significant difference between the two authors with regard to verse 16. Sadyojyotis sees the mere occurrence of cognitions such as 'I see this' as capable of establishing the existence of both subject and object. Rāmakaṇṭha on the other hand seems to see this as naïve and so presents verse 16 as putting forward a subtler point. He regards it as a response to the Buddhist objection that I-cognition can no more be taken as evidence of a Self than cognitions of the unity of a forest can be taken as evidence for such a unity. That he does so is clear from the way that immediately after that Buddhist objection, he states *atrāpy āha* and then gives the verse. How the verse can be regarded as responding to that objection is far from clear. That it requires hermeneutical sleight is evidenced by the fact that in the first sentence of Rāmakaṇṭha's explanation of the verse he makes a point that is unrelated to anything stated explicitly in the verse:

> *satyam, syān nirviṣayo yady ātmā sarvārthaprakāśakatayā*[144] *svato nāvabhāseta, sa tu svasaṃvedanena vikalpātīta*[145] *eva sarvadā bhāsata ity uktam.*
>
> It is true, [I-cognition] would be without referent if the Self did not shine forth by itself as the revealer of all objects, but as we have said[146] it shines forth at all times through [its] self-awareness, beyond conceptualization.

If we experienced the Self only in I-cognitions, then Rāmakaṇṭha admits that it might be just a mentally constructed concept, not a real referent of cognition (*pratyeya*). But unlike the unity of a forest, the Self does actually appear to us directly, prior to our imposition of any concepts (*vikalpātīta*), in self-

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144 °*prakāśakatayā* Ked, Ped, B, P; °*prakāśatayā* L.

145 Ked wrongly includes a hyphen at the end of the line after *vikalpātīta.*

146 14,2 ff.; 26,15–17; 28,15–16.

awareness (*svasaṃvedana*). Hence we are experiencing a real referent in I-cognition, not some product of our own minds.

We can see how important the self-awareness mode of perceiving the Self is for Rāmakaṇṭha. Without it I-cognitions too would be able to prove nothing,[147] so perception (*pratyakṣa*) would be doomed as a means of establishing the Self. But the assertion that the Self does appear to us independently of concepts through its spontaneous awareness of itself (*svasaṃvedana*) both constitutes evidence of its existence in itself, and validates the other mode of perception of the Self, I-cognitions, enabling us to know that they are not devoid of a referent (*nirviṣaya*).

Note that, for Rāmakaṇṭha, while a cognition of an object would lack a real referent if the object did not exist independently of consciousness, that is not so of cognitions of 'I'. Their referent does not exist separate from consciousness but it is real. In its case it can be known to be real because it exists outside of I-cognition, namely in pre-conceptual cognition, not outside of consciousness altogether.

> *tadviṣayaś cāyaṃ proktanayenāhampratyayaḥ kvacid aham etat prapaśyāmītyādau parāmarśaviśeṣe spaṣṭaḥ*[148] *susphuṭānubhava eva dṛṣṭaḥ. iti na vanādyekatvādipratyayavan nirviṣayaḥ.*
>
> And this[149] I-cognition [can be known to] have that[150] as its referent in the way that has been stated,[151] [since it] is *sometimes seen to be clear* (*kvacit ...*

[147] I mentioned on p. 293 the strong influence on the philosophy of this period of the Dharmakīrtian distinction between non-conceptual (*nirvikalpaka*) cognition and determinative cognition (*adhyavasāya*), the latter not being a means of knowledge. That Rāmakaṇṭha admits here that in themselves I-cognitions are evidence of nothing shows he has taken on from Dharmakīrtian Buddhism a reluctance to see determinative cognition as straightforwardly valid. Even if this is just his strategy for overcoming Dharmakīrtian arguments, it shows that he at least perceived them as powerful and best refuted through accepting scepticism of determinative cognition to some extent.

[148] *spaṣṭaḥ* Ked, B, L, P; *sphuṭaḥ* Ped.

[149] 'This I-cognition' just means I-cognitions in general. The 'this' seems to be included simply because having just been talking about self-awareness he is now returning to the main topic of I-cognition.

[150] I.e. that which shines forth permanently through self-awareness.

spaṣṭaḥ ... dṛṣṭaḥ) [where sometimes means] when there is a particular verbal cognition in such a form as '*I see this*', [and where clear means that] the experience of it is very acute.[152] Therefore it is not—like cognitions of the oneness etc. of forests and the like—without referent.

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[151] This 'way' that has been stated refers back to Rāmakaṇṭha's point that 'for the purposes of linguistic usage' (*vyavahāra*) the referent of the I-cognition must be accepted to be the Self 'somehow' and 'by a close approximation' (38,17–18).

[152] My translation is admittedly forced. Looking at the syntax alone one would perhaps translate, 'And this I-cognition, having that as its referent in the way that has been stated, is *sometimes seen to be clear* ...'. This takes *kvacit ... spaṣṭaḥ ... dṛṣṭaḥ* as predicate and *tadviṣayaḥ* as an adjective to the subject. But bearing in mind the context and the main point Rāmakaṇṭha therefore wants this sentence to be making, it seems better if we could take *tadviṣayaḥ* as the predicate. Rāmakaṇṭha is in the process of answering the objection that I-cognition lacks an object; he has just stated that the Self appears in self-awareness; thus we need him here to assert that that is also the object of I-cognition. It would not be appropriate or justified for him to slip this point in adjectivally as though it were uncontroversial. Also, if it were not explicitly asserted here that that is the object of I-cognition, it would be hard to see what the 'therefore' in the next sentence ('Therefore it is not ... without referent') was referring back to. For both of these reasons I prefer to treat *tadviṣayaś cāyaṃ proktanayenāhampratyayaḥ* as the main sentence.

This leaves the problem though that *kvacid aham etat prapaśyāmītyādau parāmarśaviśeṣe spaṣṭaḥ susphuṭānubhava eva dṛṣṭaḥ* now seems unconnected to what comes before (and what comes after). To solve this problem I take *dṛṣṭaḥ* as an adjective that gives a reason (*hetau viśeṣaṇam*) for the preceding. Given that Rāmakaṇṭha introduces the verse as addressing the problem that I-cognition lacks an object, we would indeed expect him to hold that the claim of the verse (which is here being glossed) gives a reason for I-cognition having an object (as claimed in *tadviṣayaś cāyaṃ proktanayenāhampratyayaḥ*).

Nevertheless it should be said that the Sanskrit syntax and word order here does not lead naturally to my construal. Therefore we should consider the alternative that the sentence should indeed be translated in the way that I mentioned at the beginning of this note: 'And this I-cognition, having that as its referent in the way that has been stated, is *sometimes seen to be clear* ...'. In this case, since we want the phrase 'having that as its referent' to be an uncontroversial claim, we should not take 'that' as 'that which shines forth in self-awareness' but as 'that which reveals objects', i.e. as picking up *sarvārthaprakāśaka* or *ātmā sarvārthaprakāśakatayā.* This is not so controversial because 'I' in the cognition 'I see this' can be seen to be referring to the revealer of the object denoted by 'this'.

The first of these two sentences is another reminder of the tension described on p. 293. In order to overcome the present objection Rāmakaṇṭha claims that that which is perceived through self-awareness is the referent of I-cognition. But in his response to 1.1.3 he had to claim that the two are different.

This sentence is not a simple contradiction of the earlier one though, for it contains the qualification 'in the way that has been stated'. Thus we have to understand this sentence to mean that 'I' in such cognitions as 'I see this' has as its referent the same thing as that which we apprehend in self-awareness, by a close approximation and for the sake of language. 'I', being a word, does not denote exactly the content of the language-transcending self-awareness, but it certainly does not represent something completely different from it, as the Buddhist epistemologists would have it.

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As pointed out above, Rāmakaṇṭha introduces this verse (16) as though it answers the objection that I-cognitions, like cognitions of the unity of a forest, lack an object. Immediately under the verse he begins to answer that objection without making any reference to the verse. Here finally he inserts words from the verse and glosses them before concluding his response. Thus we would hope that by now it is clear how he sees the contention of the verse as answering the objection that I-cognitions lack an object. Unfortunately that is not the case. What is clear (from the first sentence after the verse) is that Rāmakaṇṭha regards the appearance of the Self in self-awareness as relevant to safeguarding the reality of the referent of I-cognition; and (from the way he introduces the verse and from the text-piece under discussion, whether translated in either of the two ways given in note 152) that he regards the occurrence of the 'clear', 'I see this' kind of I-cognitions as also relevant. What is not clear is precisely why clear 'I see this' I-cognitions enable us to know that

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As for the second difficulty, the 'therefore' in the following sentence would, on this construal, be picking up the fact that 'I see this' cognitions are seen to be clear. For what Rāmakaṇṭha's reasoning may have been in this case, see below.

I-cognition has the Self as object and is not like cognition of the unity of a forest.[153]

Perhaps we simply have to accept a weakness in Rāmakaṇṭha's argument here. Having stated the Buddhist objection that cognitions of 'I' are just like cognitions of the unity of a forest, he does not give a good reason why cognitions of the form 'I see this' enable us to see that they are not. Perhaps this weakness results from the tension between, on the one hand, accepting a firm difference between I-cognition and self-awareness, and, on the other, holding the former to perceive the same as the latter. Having separated the two, he may be having difficulty here bringing them together.

I suggest two possible alternatives. First, we could infer that Rāmakaṇṭha would have argued as follows. If 'I' only occurred in kinds of I-cognition other than those of the 'I see this' type, e.g. when qualified by bodily attributes, or completely alone, or as the agent of bodily actions, it would be difficult to know if it referred to the same thing as that which reveals itself in *svasaṃvedana*. But since self-awareness involves apprehending the illuminator of objects (see *sarvārthaprakāśakatayā* in the sentence before the one under discussion), and since in the cognition 'I see this' 'I' can clearly be seen to refer to that which illuminates the 'this', cognitions of this form allow us to know that the 'I'-part of them has as its referent the same as is grasped through self-awareness. The Buddhist objection that I-cognitions lack a referent because a referent is not seen anywhere outside of those cognitions can be seen to be false in the case of 'I see this', for the agent of the seeing of objects is exactly what we apprehend constantly through self-awareness.

A second explanation is that Rāmakaṇṭha is here doing two separate things that he only half-heartedly tries to bring together. On the one hand he wants to articulate and reply to the Buddhist objection that there is no Self outside of I-cognition, just as there is no unitary forest outside of cognition. His reply

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[153] In other words, if we translate this text-piece in the way given in my main translation, it is mysterious why *dṛṣṭaḥ* gives a reason for *tadviṣayaś cāyaṃ proktanayenāhampratyayaḥ*; and if we translate it in the way that I suggest in note 152 to be more natural to the syntax and word order, it is mysterious why *dṛṣṭaḥ* gives a reason for *na vanādyekatvādipratyayavan nirviṣayaḥ.*

is that the Self does appear outside of I-cognition, in self-awareness, so we can know that I-cognition has a real object. On the other, he needs to gloss, and explain the argument in, the verse. In fact the verse does not really contain an argument. It simply takes the fact that sometimes cognitions are formulated as containing distinct subject and object words as proof of a subject and an object. Thus Rāmakaṇṭha introduces the verse as answering the specific Buddhist objection, and glosses the verse in the middle of his response to the objection in order to give the impression that the verse is more sophisticated than it is. But he in fact gives no clues as to how precisely the claim of the verse fits into his argument.

> *tan nāsiddhiḥ prāguktasya sahopalambhasyeti.*
>
> Therefore the earlier stated co-perception (of I-cognition and Self) is not unestablished.

> 1.2.3 *yady evaṃ sahopalambhaniyamād ātmādvaitasiddhir itīṣṭavighātaḥ.*
>
> 1.2.3 [Śūnyavādin:] If that is the case, because of necessary co-perception [of 'I' and 'this', Self and object], it is proved that [objects] are not different from the Self. Therefore there is an obstruction of what [you] accept.

Up to this point all the objections have tried to block the co-perception of Self and I-cognition. Now that Rāmakaṇṭha has dealt with them and secured the co-perception he is faced with the converse problem of the Self spilling over into the realm of objects. Why this unwanted consequence is deemed to result is not made entirely explicit in the text, but it must be through applying *sahopalambhaniyama* to Self and object rather than Self and I-cognition.[154] For the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument in its original Yogācāra form stated that since objects are always perceived together with consciousness they must be non-different from consciousness. So similarly, if objects and the Self are al-

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[154] Hence the manner in which I have filled in the square brackets in my translation. It is a little surprising that the change from co-perception of Self and I-cognition to that of Self and object is not made explicit in the text. After all the *sahopalambha* referred to in the immediately preceding sentence, *tan nāsiddhiḥ prāguktasya sahopalambhasyeti*, is that between self and *I-cognition*. Perhaps the mentions of *karma* in *kartṛkarmāvabhāsāt* (in the verse); of '*etat*' in '*aham etat prapaśyāmi*'; and of the Self being cognized '*sarvārthaprakāśakatayā*' in the first sentence under the verse, are enough to indicate that objects could be seen to be co-perceived with the Self.

ways perceived together, as seen in cognitions such as 'I see this', then objects should be non-different from the Self (*ātmādvaita*).[155] This is the non-dualist Śaiva or Vedāntin position, but for Rāmakaṇṭha of course the Self is simply the illuminator of objects not their source. His response is not to deny that *ātmādvaita* follows from invariable co-perception, but to distance himself from the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument.

> *na, tvatpakṣe 'py apratikṣepyam*[156] *evātmasaṃvedanam ity evamparatvād asya.*
>
> [Siddhāntin:] No, because the [putting forward of the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument] (*asya*) was intended to show that, even in your position, experience of the Self cannot be denied.

He implies here that he does not himself believe in the logic of the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument, so he saves himself from *ātmādvaita*. But why then did he use the argument in order to prove the existence of the Self? His response is that it was in order to show that even in the Buddhist view *ātmasaṃvedanam* must be accepted. I explained at the beginning of my commentary to this passage (p. 273) that this was his attitude to the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument, and I have occasionally reminded readers of it in the course of expounding the passage. On the first time of reading this passage through, though, his comment here comes as something of a surprise, as Rāmakaṇṭha has not given many clues in the preceding discussion that he did not actually regard the argument as a valid proof of the Self.

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[155] In this sentence I assume that the co-perception is based on objects always appearing with the Self in instances of *determinative cognition* such as 'I see this'. I hinted at the possibility in my previous note though (through referring to the first sentence under the verse containing *sarvārthaprakāśakatayā*) that the co-perception is between the Self as revealed in self-awareness and pre-conceptual objects. If it is the latter that the text envisions then it is certainly true that whenever we perceive pre-conceptual objects we also perceive the Self through self-awareness, since self-awareness never ceases. But if the former, why is it that a determinative cognition of an object must necessarily include determinative cognition of the Self? In fact it does do so for Rāmakaṇṭha: we will see in section 2 that for him even such cognitions as 'this is a pot' include an elided determination of 'I'.

[156] P omits °*pratikṣepya*°—eyeskip from one *kṣepya* to the next.

But when one looks back over the passage, one sees that he did signal at the outset that the argument is based on Buddhist presuppositions. The sentence with which he introduces this entire passage, 'moreover even if non-difference follows from invariable co-perception there is no absence of a Self' (*kiṃ ca sahopalambhaniyamād abhede 'pi nātmābhāvaḥ*)[157] states as the condition for the Self existing something which he had himself argued against in his second and third level of response to the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument. Furthermore *sahopalambhaniyamād abhede 'pi* ('even if non-difference follows from invariable co-perception') in that sentence mirrors in the present sentence *tvatpakṣe 'py* ('even in your position'); and *nātmābhāvaḥ* ('there is no absence of a Self') there mirrors *apratikṣepyam evātmasaṃvedanam* ('experience of the Self cannot be denied'). (Thus by 'even in your position' (*tvatpakṣe 'pi*) he means, 'even if one accepts that non-difference follows from *sahopalambhaniyama*'.) Therefore the present sentence is not an *ad hoc* departure from Rāmakaṇṭha's earlier intentions but in fact a simple restatement of his introduction to this passage. His point in both places is that if you happen to be committed to the logic of this *sahopalambhaniyama* argument, you will find it hard to deny the Self (because the former can be used to prove that the Self exists in the form of consciousness just as it can be used to show that blue exists in the form of consciousness). Since he does not happen to be committed to its logic himself, he is not forced to accept *ātmādvaita* as a result of objects always appearing with the Self.

We do not need to conclude however that Rāmakaṇṭha does not believe that Self and I-cognition are co-perceived. All of the moves he makes to establish that involve claims that he himself would adhere to. But he does not accept that it follows from that that the Self is non-different from I-cognition, and that the Self is of the nature of consciousness. He accepts these—or certainly the latter—for other reasons, but he does not accept that anything follows from the co-perception. Only the Buddhist opponent is committed to accepting that.

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157 38,9.

It may appear strange that that which Rāmakaṇṭha claims the Buddhist cannot deny is *ātmasaṃvedana*, since *saṃvedana*, or at least *svasaṃvedana*, was excluded by him from being relevant to the co-perception of Self and I-cognition in his response to objection 1.1.3, where he restricted the argument to only *adhyavasāya* and *adhyavaseya*. Is not Rāmakaṇṭha therefore only entitled to claim that that which the Buddhist cannot deny is *ātmādhyavasāya*? Is he avoiding such an expression here because *adhyavasāya* alone is not enough to prove anything for the Buddhist, and instead claiming something that does not follow from the preceding argumentation? We do not need to conclude that Rāmakaṇṭha is being devious or inconsistent here, for though the term *svasaṃvedana* is always used by him to refer to (a particular kind of) non-conceptual cognition, that is not so of *saṃvedana*. He sometimes uses it to refer specifically to non-conceptual cognition;[158] but he also uses it in a more general sense.[159] An illustration of general usage that is particularly pertinent to the present point is an earlier sentence in this very chapter:[160] *yuktam etat kadācid bāhyārthavādino vaktum, bhavatas tv abodhātmano 'saṃvedyatvād* adhyavaseyasyāpi saṃvedyatvena *bodharūpatayādhyavasāyasyeva sattvam*. The fact that he there, when talking of *adhyavasāya*, refers to the *adhyavaseya* as being *saṃvedya* is evidence that he sometimes uses the verb *saṃvid* and its derivatives in a wider sense, to cover also *adhyavasāya*, i.e. to cover conceptual as well as non-conceptual cognition.

The claim there that Yogācāras should accept *saṃvedana* of *adhyavaseya*s, because they are of the form of consciousness is exactly parallel to the claim here that they should accept, as a result of the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument, *saṃvedana* of the referent of I-cognition, i.e. of the Self. I take him to be using *ātmasaṃvedana* here as a general word for an experience of the Self which is valid, but which he is not concerned in the present context to specify as either non-conceptual or conceptual. We have to remember that the

[158] For example in the next section in objection 2.1.2.

[159] For example in section 5.1 of Chapter 4 he uses it in a sense that, as is evident from the context, must include *parāmarśa*.

[160] His response to objection 1.1.2: 38,21–22.

difference between the two modes of perception is anything but unbridgeable for Rāmakaṇṭha.

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This concludes Rāmakaṇṭha's remarks on *sahopalambhaniyama*. I have already attempted to answer why he expounded these verses (15 and 16) in terms of it, in spite of the verses' making no mention of it.[161] Perhaps another factor is related to the point that both verses take I-cognition as firm evidence in itself of the Self's existence. Their mere assertion of the Self's existence on the basis of I-cognition was thought to be too simplistic by Rāmakaṇṭha, so he interprets them differently: as putting forward not a positive argument but one that the Buddhist should be committed to given his presuppositions.

Now he gives an actual positive reason for why Self and objects are distinct, glossing *ataḥ siddhaṃ sphuṭaṃ dvayam*, the last *pāda* of the verse.

> *paramārthatas tv ata ity aham etat prapaśyāmīti parāmarśabuddher apy asyāḥ sakāśād ātmā sarvārthaprakāśakatvena*[162] *sarvadā parāmarśanīyaḥ, arthas tu tatprakāśyatayā*[163] *krameṇa pratīyate. ity atyantabhinnam adhyavasīyamānatvāt* [Ked p. 41] *sphuṭam etad dvayaṃ siddham, iti na bhedo*[164] *'py ayuktaḥ. iti neṣṭavighātaḥ.*
>
> But in reality[165] *from it*, i.e. from this (*asyāḥ sakāśāt*)[166] verbal cognition [of the type] '*I see this*' as well,[167] the Self is every time (*sarvadā*)[168] determin-

[161] On page 273.

[162] °*prakāśakatvena* Ked, Ped, B, P; °*prakāśatvena* L.

[163] Interlinear gloss above *tatprakāśyatayā* in P: *tena sarvārthaprakāśakenātmanā prakāśyo bhāsyas tasya bhāvas tattātayā.*

[164] *na bhedo* Ked, Ped, B, L; *nābhedo* P.

[165] I.e. forgetting now about what follows from Buddhist presuppositions and concentrating on what is actually true.

[166] He glosses *ataḥ* with the words *aham etat prapaśyāmīti parāmarśabuddher apy asyāḥ sakāśād*. The point of *sakāśāt* is to show that he takes the *tas* suffix as denoting an ablative; and one not of cause for example, but in the sense of 'from'. According to this long sentence, Self and object are cognized (*ātmā ... parāmarśanīyaḥ, arthas tu ... pratīyate*) not, for example, 'because of' such cognitions as 'I see this', in the sense of cause and effect, but rather 'from them'. The *parāmarśa* 'contains them' / they are extracted out of it / it can be analyzed as containing them.

able as the [single, steady] revealer of all objects [which are different and changing], while [from that same verbal cognition][169] [different] objects are successively cognized as being revealed by that [Self]. So because they are determined completely separately, *both* of them are *clearly established*, so duality is not incorrect either.[170] Therefore there is no obstruction of what [we] accept.

While different objects are seen in different 'I see this'-type cognitions, the Self is seen in all of them. This contrast seems to be what, for Rāmakaṇṭha, enables these cognitions to prove both agent and object, and prove them to be separate. That which is common to all of them, remaining the same throughout, is the agent, and that which is different in each case is the object.

In his commentary to each of the three verse-segments so far looked at in this chapter, Rāmakaṇṭha has read more into them than they actually state. Broadly speaking this is because he wants to derive from them a more sophisticated rebuttal of the Buddhist doctrine of no-Self than the verses themselves present. This pattern is found fairly consistently throughout the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*. One feels sometimes that the gulf between the two authors is very large. It is not only that Sadyojyotis' arguments are more primitive, but frequently that his verses consist not of arguments but of assertions. That certainly seems to be the case here. The verses themselves take the

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[167] If this *api* is indeed original, it most likely signifies 'as well as from self-experience'. The point would be that despite what he said earlier about the I-cognition only having the Self as its referent by a close approximation, and despite the recently voiced Buddhist worry that I-cognitions are devoid of a referent, these kind of verbal cognitions too, as well as self-awareness, embrace the Self.

[168] I hesitate to translate as 'always', as Rāmakaṇṭha would presumably admit that there are times when we are not having I-cognitions / 'I see this'-type cognitions (deep sleep is an obvious example). So here *sarvadā* seems to mean 'in every "I see this"-type cognition'; it contrasts with *krameṇa* in the next part of the sentence.

[169] It is necessary to understand again 'from that same verbal cognition' because, given that the *ataḥ* in the verse governs the proof of both Self and object (*ataḥ siddhaṃ sphuṭaṃ dvayam*), its gloss in the commentary must cover the commentary's explanation of the proof of the object.

[170] Perhaps the sense of the 'either' here is: just as the Self's non-existence is not correct (cf. *ātmany asattvam no yuktam*, 1.15a), neither is its difference from objects incorrect (*ayukta*).

mere fact that I-cognitions occur, as decisive evidence for the existence of a Self. One can appreciate Rāmakaṇṭha's reluctance to settle for that. After all Buddhists have no problem admitting that we have cognitions of 'I'. The point at issue is rather whether that 'I' refers to anything, whether it is a valid representation of something existing outside of itself. In order to decide that question, the mere occurrence of I-cognitions is not enough.

Rāmakaṇṭha recognizes this and even acknowledges it explicitly in his first sentence under verse 16.[171] Thus he first adduces self-awareness as validation; and then adds this consideration that that which is common to all 'I see this' cognitions is the Self, and that which changes, their objects.

Perhaps because he is writing at a different stage of the history of Indian Philosophy, and perhaps because he was better read in Buddhist sources, Rāmakaṇṭha regarded much of the material that he inherited from Sadyojyotis as insufficient for the articulation of an adequate response to Buddhist challenges. One can observe him modifying the stream of Śaiva Siddhānta philosophy as a result and adding more detail to it.

> *tad uktam*[172]
>
> > *ayam eva hi vijñeyo bhedo bodhārthayoḥ sphuṭam |*
> > *pūrvas tv anubhavākāra uttaraś cānubhūyate || iti.*
>
> Therefore it has been said:
>
> > For you should understand clearly that the difference between cognition and object(s) is just this: the former is of the form of experience, and the latter is what is experienced.

The progression of objections 1.2.1, 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 mirrors the pattern of objections 1.1.1, 1.1.2 and 1.1.3. In both trios the first tackles the basic assumption of Rāmakaṇṭha's *sahopalambhaniyama* argument—that I-cognition refers to the Self. In both, the second allows for a Self *appearing* to be the referent of I-cognition, but states that it is not a real referent. In both, the third allows for the Self being the true referent of I-cognition but shows that even granting that, a further problem arises.

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[171] *satyam, syāt nirviṣayo yady ...* , 'It is true, [I-cognition] would be without referent if ...'.

[172] Verse 9 of NP.

2. The Constancy of I-Cognition

2.1.1 *nanv ayaṃ ghaṭa ityāder advayaviṣayasyāpi vimarśasya darśanād atrā-naikāntikatā.*

2.1.1 [Śūnyavādin:] Surely, because we also see verbal cognitions which have a singular referent,[173] such as 'this is a pot', [the attempt to establish both subject and object from cognition] is inconclusive.

tad ayuktam ity āha

1.17ab) *sarvam eva hi vijñānaṃ kartṛkarmāvabhāsakam* |

[Siddhāntin:] He claims that that is not right:

1.17ab) For absolutely every cognition manifests agent and object.[174]

ayaṃ ghaṭa ityādy api vimarśavijñānaṃ na vimṛśyamātraviṣayam eva yuktam, svātmano vimarśābhāvena paravimṛśyasyeva tadrūpatvāsiddheḥ.

Even such a verbal cognition (*vimarśavijñānam*) as 'this is a pot' cannot have[175] as its referent only the mere object that is [explicitly] verbally cognized (*vimṛśya*),[176] because as a result of there being no verbal cognition of one's own Self [in it] (*svātmano vimarśābhāvena*), [even this verbally cognized object (*vimṛśya*)] would, just like someone else's verbally cognized object (*vimṛśya*), not be established [for me] to have the form [that it does] (*tadrūpatva-*).[177]

So even verbal cognitions like 'this is a pot' must verbally cognize not only the pot but also one's own Self. Only if this is the case can the pot be estab-

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[173] I.e. which represent the object (*artha, karma*) but not the subject.

[174] In the preceding (15d–16d) Sadyojyotis has subdivided I-cognition into that which is unqualified (in which 'I' appears alone) and that which takes the form 'I see this'. When he states here that all cognition involves the appearance of subject and object, an obvious question arises: how about unqualified I-cognitions? How do they manifest an object? Perhaps in that case it is 'I' that is both subject and object (suggested by Prof. Sanderson).

[175] Literally, 'is not logically possible as having'.

[176] I.e. such cognitions do not only represent 'this pot', *ayaṃ ghaṭaḥ.*

[177] I thank Prof. Schmithausen for his help with this sentence.

lished as an object for me as opposed to for someone else. The cognition of the Self, though verbal, is not explicitly articulated here (as it is in the case of 'I see the pot'). But although it is silent it is still a verbal cognition (*vimarśa*). In sub-section 2.2 Rāmakaṇṭha calls it a 'silent verbal cognition' (... *aśabdaṃ vimarśam* ...).

Now we have an imagined objection, not from a Buddhist point of view but to do with a potential inconsistency with what Rāmakaṇṭha has said about the Self appearing in self-awareness.

> 2.1.2 *svātmanāpy asya tadānīṃ saṃvedanān*[178] *nāsiddhir*[179] *iti cet,*
>
> 2.1.2 If [you, Śūnyavādin,] say: '[The verbally cognized object] is not unestablished [for the particular cognizer] because, [according to you Śaivas,] it (i.e. one's own Self) is experienced at that time by one's own Self (*svātmanā*),[180]

The point is that the self-awareness that we have all the time should be enough to establish the object as cognized by me rather than by someone else.

> *na, saṃvedanasyāpy avimṛṣṭasya gacchatāṃ tṛṇādiviṣayasyevāsiddheḥ.*[181]
>
> [then we reply:] No, because even consciousness, if it is not made the referent of [either explicit or silent] verbal cognition (*avimṛṣṭasya*), is not established, in the way that objects like grass [on the side of the path are not established] for people going along.

If we only had non-conceptual awareness of our Self (i.e. our consciousness) in cognitions like 'this is a pot', the Self would not be sufficiently represented to bestow on the pot, as it were, the quality of being sensed as seen by me in particular. The fact that, in cognitions such as 'this is a pot', the pot is recognizably the object of *my* perception means that I must definitely and knowingly determine the Self in them, even if 'I' does not appear explicitly in their articulation.

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[178] *tadānīṃ saṃvedanān* Ked^{ac}, Ped, B, L, P; *tadānīm asaṃvedanān* Ked^{pc}.

[179] *nāsiddhir* Ked^{ac}, Ped, B, L, P; *na siddhir* Ked^{pc}.

[180] I am not sure about the *api*. Perhaps it is out of order (*bhinnakrama*) and should be taken to qualify the *asya*: '... because it too (i.e. the Self as well as the object, the pot) is experienced ...'.

[181] °*evāsiddheḥ* Ked^{ac}, B, L, P; °*eva siddheḥ* Ked^{pc}, Ped.

The verbal cognition of 'I' in such cases is one in which the verbalization has been elided or is latent. But it would not be correct to regard it as a non-verbal cognition, for Rāmakaṇṭha is firm here that what must be postulated is not merely self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*), but an actual verbal cognition (*vimarśa*) of the Self. One could perhaps characterize the difference between this 'silent verbal cognition' and self-awareness as that, unlike the latter, the former contains an *aham* that though not seen is not absent.

yad āhuḥ[182]

saṃvittir aparāmarśād vidyamānāpi vastutaḥ |
tṛṇādivittivad yātuḥ[183] *siddhaivāvidyamānavat* || *iti.*

As they have said,

> Consciousness, because it is not the referent of a verbal cognition (*aparāmarśāt*), even though it really exists (*vidyamānāpi vastutaḥ*), is established to be as good as non-existent just like consciousness of grass etc. for someone going along.

This example is helpful for understanding how self-awareness was envisaged. In self-awareness consciousness / the Self is like this grass by the side of the road, just beyond the fringes of determinative perception but nevertheless there.

One might infer from Rāmakaṇṭha's last point, and from this verse that he uses to substantiate it, that self-awareness (the principal means of knowing the Self according to the passage looked at in the last chaper) would not be enough on its own to establish the Self. The Self would seem to be 'as good as non-existent' if we only knew it through self-awareness. This may be true for Rāmakaṇṭha, but he would point to the fact that we do have the subsequent verbal cognition of it. Since the latter requires self-awareness for us to know that it is not objectless, is there a circularity? Probably not a vicious one because we do actually have a genuine verbal cognition of the Self, for Rāmakaṇṭha. I-cognition is not fake without self-awareness, rather it is confirmed by it.

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[182] Source unknown.

[183] Interlinear gloss above *yātuḥ* in P: *gacchataḥ*.

tasmād ātmakartṛka eva tenāsau[184] *vimarśanīyaḥ, ātmakartṛke ca viṣaye vimṛṣṭe svātmāpi tadupasarjanībhūto vimṛṣṭa eva sāmarthyād bhavati.*

Therefore it (i.e. the object) has to be verbally cognized by the [verbal cognition] as necessarily (*eva*) having the Self as the agent [of its cognition], and since the object is verbally cognized as having the Self as the agent [of its cognition] one's own Self too, having become an accessory of it, becomes (/ turns out to be) in fact verbally cognized by implication (*sāmarthyāt*).[185]

Objects are apprehended as having been perceived by a certain agent. Hence the agent attaches, as it were, to the object and is itself also verbally cognized. Thus any cognition of an object by a Self is also necessarily a cognition of the Self.

iti sarvam eva vimarśajñānaṃ kartṛkarmadvayaviṣayam[186] *eveti nānaikāntikatā.*

So absolutely every determinative cognition encompasses two things, i.e. agent and object. Therefore there is no inconclusiveness.

2.2 [Ked p. 42] *anumānenāpy etat siddham ity āha*

1.17cd) *trayaṃ saṃsmaryate yasmāt tad ahaṃ dṛṣṭavān iti* ||

2.2 He says that this is also established through inference:

1.17cd) because three things are remembered, [as illustrated by the cognition,] 'I saw that'.

*ayaṃ ghaṭa ityādivimarśaviṣayā*pi smṛtir[187] *bhavantī kartṛkarmakaraṇaviṣayā dṛṣṭeti karmakaraṇayor iva pūrvaṃ kartur apy aśabdaṃ vimarśaṃ gamayaty eveti sarvo vimarśo dvayaviṣaya eveti.*

Even when memory refers to verbal cognitions such as 'this is a pot' it is seen to encompass agent, object and instrument.[188] Therefore it does (*eva*) enable

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[184] *ātmakartṛka eva tenāsau* Ped, B, L, P, kha, ga; *akartṛka eva tenāsau* Ked.

[185] I have used the translation suggested by Preisendanz/Schmithausen in their examiner's report, which greatly improves on my previous attempt.

[186] L omits *eva vimarśajñānaṃ kartṛkarmadvayaviṣayam* (eyeskip from one *ev* to another).

[187] °*pi smṛtir* conj. Sanderson; *smṛtir* Ked^{pc}, Ped; *vismṛtir* Ked^{ac}, B, L, P.

[188] I.e. it takes the form 'I (agent) saw (instrument) that pot (object)'. It seems that Rāmakaṇṭha regards 'saw' (*dṛṣṭavān*) as indicating, not, as one might expect, the action, but rather the instrument, the faculty of sight. On the other hand, since the faculty of sight

> one to know [that there was] a silent verbal cognition previously, of the agent as well as of the object and instrument. So all verbal cognition actually (*eva*) encompasses both [agent and object].[189]

The point is that a cognition of the form 'this is a pot', though explicitly referring only to its object, is enough to enable us later, when remembering the cognition, to say '*I* saw a pot', where we describe the earlier cognition as having three elements not one. This shows that the earlier cognition 'this is a pot' must actually have encompassed all three elements of the later one, so it must have included a silent verbal cognition of the 'I'.

At the beginning of this sub-section (2.2) Rāmakaṇṭha introduced Sadyojyotis' half-verse and his commentary thereon as an inference.[190] It is not a direct inference of the Self's existence, but an inference to determine whether we are aware of the Self in certain verbal cognitions. It is another example of inference being used to clarify what we experience directly through *pratyakṣa*. A previous instance of this was 14,9–18, in section 3.1 of Chapter 2. In that case, after a long and self-assured description of how illumination / the perceiver (*prakāśa/grāhaka*) presents itself to us as always the same, Rāmakaṇṭha added an inference to that effect simply as extra evidence. Here, on the question of whether or not 'this is a pot' includes a silent verbal cognition of 'I', one imagines that description derived from inward observation would be less capable, and that inference would be required to *work out* the answer. But here too Rāmakaṇṭha presents the inference as a second line of supporting evidence. His first evidence was the claim that it is only through the silent verbal cognition of 'I' that the object of the cognition is recognizably one's own and not someone else's. The way that he then introduces the present argument with the words 'this is also established through inference' implies that he does not take the first reason as inference but rather as direct perception.

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is not sensed and so would surely not be remembered, it may be that Rāmakaṇṭha is using *karaṇa* here in the sense of action, *kriyā*.

[189] He has slipped from claiming a threefold referent to a twofold one because that is what is relevant in the wider context.

[190] 42,1.

This may seem surprising, as it does not seem like a simple adducing of direct perception or description of that, but rather a consideration that suggests—through unwanted consequence—that we experience these cognitions in a certain way. Why then does he consider it to be in a different category from what he introduces as inference (17cd)? Perhaps he would distinguish them along the following lines: 17cd infers something about 'this is a pot'-type cognitions from something other than them, namely the form that memories of those cognitions take; the first argument, by contrast, does not involve considering anything other than them and could be presented as principally pointing to the way that they *appear* as 'ours'.

To what extent is Rāmakaṇṭha's exegesis of verse 17 faithful to Sadyojyotis' intentions? It does indeed seem that Sadyojyotis intended to make the point that even cognitions such as 'this is a pot' manifest an agent. In the previous two verses (15 and 16) Sadyojyotis was talking of I-cognitions, and thus his mention of 'absolutely all cognition' in 17ab is likely to be extending his conclusions to include cognitions which do not contain an explicit 'I', such as 'this is a pot'. Whether or not Sadyojyotis would have characterized the manifestation of the agent in such cognitions as a wordless verbal cognition (*aśabdo vimarśaḥ*) is not certain, but Rāmakaṇṭha's claim to that effect smacks more of filling in detail than distortion. Where he could be seen to be slightly distortive is in his account of the evidence for this claim. Whereas Sadyojyotis' single evidence is the inference from the form that our memories of cognitions take (17cd), Rāmakaṇṭha, as noted above, gives a twofold justification. He seems to see Sadyojyotis' assertion in 17ab as containing an independent justification of itself, which he articulates as the claim that it is only through the silent cognition of 'I' that the cognition's object is recognizably ours and not someone else's.

What motivates Rāmakaṇṭha (and seemingly Sadyojyotis) to argue that even in 'this is a pot' the Self is verbally cognized? Perhaps it was thought that if the Self is consciousness it should be equally present in all cognition. Perhaps it was also held that if 'I' were cognized sporadically, interspersed with periods of absence, that would constitute dubious evidence of a stable Self.

3. Do Verbal Cognitions Have Real Referents?

Rāmakaṇṭha now turns to the question of whether the referents of verbal cognition are real and stays with it for the whole of this section. The relevance of this question to the wider context is, of course, that unless they can be relied on as real, the evidence of I-cognitions for the existence of the Self is undermined. In the background is the Buddhist view that the referents of verbal cognition are mental constructs. Rāmakaṇṭha did address this question briefly in section 1. He there (40,2–14, section 1.2.2) countered the charge that I-cognitions have no real referent outside themselves, with the response that we know the real referent directly, through non-conceptual self-awareness. In this section his focus is not I-cognitions specifically but verbal cognitions in general.

> 3.0 *ata eva nāvastuviṣayo vimarśaḥ pratyakṣavad vastvanvayavyatirekānuvidhānāt.*
>
> 3.0 That is why verbal cognition does not have things that are unreal as its referents, because, like direct perception, it conforms to positive and negative concomitance with real entities.

The concomitance that he claims between verbal cognition and real entities means that, given the presence of an agent and an object, a verbal cognition will occur that refers to that agent (silently perhaps) and that object; but if either are absent, a verbal cognition will not occur. The 'that is why' with which the sentence begins refers back, presumably, to the point just established that all cognition, even that in which the agent is not explicitly articulated, includes as its referents both agent and object.[191] How does that bear on the point made in this sentence? In a sentence of this structure, namely, 'that (A) is why B because C,' we normally find that A implies C which implies B. Thus we would expect the fact that the agent and object appear in all cognition (A) to be relevant for establishing positive and negative concomitance (C). Perhaps Rāmakaṇṭha's thinking was that if the agent appears in 'I see a pot', but not in 'this is a pot', the concomitance is broken, since in the world

[191] And instrument—but having mentioned that once he ceased to be interested in it.

outside the verbal cognition, which it is supposed to represent accurately, the agent is equally present at the time of both.[192]

anyair[193] *apy uktam*[194]

> *asti hy ālocanājñānaṃ*[195] *prathamaṃ nirvikalpakam* |
> *bālamūkādivijñānasadṛśaṃ śuddhavastujam* ||
>
> *tataḥ paraṃ punar vastu dharmair jātyādibhir yayā* |
> *buddhyāvasīyate sāpi pratyakṣatvena sammatā* || *iti.*

And someone else[196] has said:

> For there is seeing-cognition which [arises] first, lacks concepts, is similar to the cognitions of children, dumb[197] people and the like, and is produced from the pure object.[198]
>
> The determinative cognition,[199] by which after that the object is further determined through its properties such as [the] class [to which it belongs], is also held to be direct perception.

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[192] This suggestion is only plausible on the assumption that the concomitance referred to here means not just that given the presence of agent and object a cognition will occur, but further that the resulting cognition will represent that agent and object. That is perhaps more than what is usually meant by concomitance.

[193] Marginal insertion above *anyair* in B: *mīmāṃsakaiḥ*.

[194] ŚV(P_2) 1.1.4 (*pratyakṣa* chapter) 112 and 120.

[195] *ālocanājñānaṃ* B, P, ŚV(S), ŚV(U_1), ŚV(P_1), ŚV(P_2), ŚV(P_3), ad Mat VP 17.2 (p. 383), v.l. ad Mat VP 10.6–13b; *ālocanaṃ jñānaṃ* Ked, Ped, L, NPP ad 32cd (64,20–65,2), ad Mat VP 6.35bcd (pp. 174–5), ad Mat VP 10.6–13b (p.312), v.l. in ŚV(P_2) and ŚV(P_3); *locanaṃ jñānaṃ* v.l. ad Mat VP 6.35bcd; *ālocanajñānaṃ* v.l. ad Mat VP 6.35bcd.

[196] Kumārila.

[197] In the sense of those who cannot talk.

[198] 'Pure' in the sense that it is characterisable only by itself and uncontaminated by its qualifiers, which mark it as belonging to the same class as other objects, e.g. its 'potness'.

[199] Had Rāmakaṇṭha been writing this verse himself he would probably not have used the term *buddhi* but rather *vimarśa* or *adhyavasāya*. It is clear—both from the contents of the verse itself and from the surrounding context within which Rāmakaṇṭha decides to insert it—that that which Kumārila describes with the former term is regarded by Rāmakaṇṭha as precisely that which he has been denoting with the latter two. Hence I translate *buddhi* here with the same word that I use to translate *adhyavasāya*.

Rāmakaṇṭha quotes these verses very frequently in his works.[200] Their relevance here is of course that the status of 'determinative cognition' (*buddhiḥ*) referred to in the second verse is precisely the problem to which Rāmakaṇṭha has turned in this section (section 3). Kumārila here includes determinative cognition as a kind of direct perception (i.e. as having real objects), bracketing it with the initial dumb encounter with a thing characterisable only by itself. For the Buddhist of course—to whom this verse is directed—these two are of irreducibly different nature, only the initial encounter constituting direct perception.

3.1.1 *nanv asaty api vastuni ghaṭādivimarśo manorājyādau dṛṣṭaḥ.*

3.1.1 [Buddhist:] But even when a real entity is not there we find verbal cognition of things like pots in [states] such as daydreaming.[201]

satyam, ata eva tayor vastvavastuviṣayatvāt pratyakṣatadābhāsayor iva bhedaḥ.

[Siddhāntin:] True—that is precisely why there is a difference between [pseudo verbal cognitions such as daydreaming and genuine verbal cognition] based on whether they refer to real entities or unreal ones, just as [there is a difference between] direct perception and pseudo perception.

The Buddhist is prepared to accept a difference between genuine perception and pseudo perception, but he lumps all verbal cognition together as false. Why does he not allow for the same distinction among verbal cognitions?

If Rāmakaṇṭha admits that we have verbal cognition when there is no object (as indicated by his first word, 'true') is the concomitance not spoilt? His answer, I assume, would be that the concomitance is between the presence of an object and *genuine* verbal cognitions, just as in the case of perception the concomitance is between presence of object and genuine perception. Does this not mean, though, that one has no way of knowing whether a verbal cognition is genuine or not? Perhaps Rāmakaṇṭha would respond that that is no

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[200] For example at NPP 64,20–65,2; ad Mat VP 6.35, pp. 174–5; ad Mat VP 17.2, p. 383; and (112 only) ad Mat VP 10.6–13b, p. 312.

[201] And thus it is wrong to state that there is positive and negative concomitance between the presence of an object and a verbal cognition of that object; and hence wrong that verbal cognition has something real as its referent (*vastuviṣaya*).

reason to claim that all verbal cognitions are false. And perhaps he would say that, in the case of daydreaming and the like, subsequent events enable us to know that they were false, unlike in the case of genuine verbal cognitions.

3.1.2 *nanu vastuviṣayatvenābhimatasyāpi sa evāyaṃ ghaṭa ity evamādeḥ pūrvadṛṣṭatayā vimarśasya pravṛtteḥ, adhunā ca pūrvadarśanābhāvena tadasambhavād avastuviṣayatvam.*[202]

3.1.2 [Śūnyavādin:] Surely verbal cognitions such as 'this is that pot',[203] though they are held [by you] to have real referents, have non-real referents, because they function through the property of having been seen before[204] and because that [property] does not exist[205] now[206] since the previous seeing no longer exists.[207]

na,[208] *prāgdarśanābhāvāsiddheḥ, ātmaprakāśa evārthadarśanaṃ tac ca sarvadāstīty uktam.*

[Siddhāntin:] No, because it is not proved that the previous seeing no longer exists. The seeing of objects is simply the Self's [activity of][209] illumination,[210] and that,[211] as we have said,[212] exists all the time.

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[202] Interlinear speaker-indication above *avastuviṣayatvam* in P: *pūrvapakṣa.*

[203] I.e. recognitions.

[204] I.e. they grasp an object as something seen before.

[205] I am taking *asambhava* to be used synonymously here with *abhāva.*

[206] I.e. at the time of the recognition.

[207] We can infer that this objection regards recognition as based on two things: the pot that exists now in front of one's eyes and the property/fact that it has been seen before. For the recognition to have real referents the property must be existent now as well as the pot.

[208] Interlinear comment above *na* in P: *uttaram.*

[209] I include the contents of these square brackets to make clear that the genitive Tatpuruṣa *ātmaprakāśaḥ* must be construed as denoting a subjective and not an objective genitive. It cannot mean 'illumination of the Self' in the sense that the Self is that which is illuminated, for to equate that with the seeing of objects would be the non-dualist Śaiva position, and certainly unacceptable to Śaiva Siddhānta. For the latter (as we saw, for example, in section 1.2.3 above) the perceiver and the perceived are irreducibly separate.

[210] Worth considering is the possibility that the pre-Sandhi form of *ātmaprakāśa* is *ātmaprakāśe.* In that case either a subjective or an objective genitive would be possible: 'the seeing of objects [takes place] when the Self is manifest / when the Self illuminates'. I reject this possibility on the grounds that only the equating of the seeing of objects with the

Rāmakaṇṭha could have responded to the objection by accepting that the previous seeing no longer exists but denying that that entails that the property of having been seen no longer exists.[213] But he decides to challenge that the previous seeing no longer exists. He does that by construing 'seeing' not as an individual finite cognition here, but as the never ceasing illuminative power of the Self. He has already argued that over time, as an illumination of a pot gives way to an illumination of a smell and so on, the illumination itself does not change or cease. All that change are the individual determinative cognitions and the objects of illumination. The power that illuminates is always constant. It is not a great step to identify the seeing of objects with the illumination of objects, so it is consistent with his earlier views to claim that as we see different objects over time the seeing itself does not change. Hence he can arrive at the slightly strange sounding contention that my previous seeing of an object is the same as my current seeing.

> *ataḥ prāgdṛṣṭatāpīdānīṃ tatra vastv eveti nāvastuviṣayaḥ,*
>
> Therefore the property of having been seen previously is also[214] something real now in the [Self]. So [verbal cognition of this kind, i.e. recognition] does not have unreal referents.

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illumination of the Self is enough to guarantee the conclusion that the previous seeing of an object still exists.

[211] The gender of the *tat* is odd. We would expect it to be the gender of *prakāśaḥ*.

[212] He has said as much on countless occasions. The two main passages where he argues for it are 13,20–14,18, translated in section 3.1 of Chapter 2, and 27,7–28,20, translated in Chapter 4.1.

[213] His response accepts the opponent's view that for the property of having been seen before to exist now, the previous seeing must exist now. This is a little surprising. If the property in question was *dṛṣyamāṇatā*, then it is easy to accept that whenever that property exists in an object, seeing (*darśana*) of that object must exist. But given that the property in question is *dṛṣṭatā*, why should the original seeing, which gave rise to that property, have to continue to exist for as long as the property exists? In Sanskrit, verbal nouns sometimes have to be taken to be equivalent to abstracts of the past participle for the sentence to yield sense. For example *āśraya* or *āśrayaṇa* are sometimes used synonymously with *āśritatva*. If, similarly, *darśana* is used here as equivalent to *dṛṣṭatā* then obviously the *darśana* must exist for the *dṛṣṭatā* to exist.

[214] As well as the previous seeing.

Since the 'previous' seeing of the pot is in essence exactly the same as the 'current' illuminative activity of the Self, and so exists now, so too does the property that the pot has been seen before. I said in note 213 that there is something a little strange about the assumption running through this discussion that the property that the pot has been seen before can only exist when the seeing of the pot exists. It is also slightly strange that, as stated in this sentence, the property exists in the Self (as opposed to in the pot). Perhaps that results from a parallel assumption that the property must exist not only when the seeing exists but also where it exists. Perhaps this is further evidence for what I suggested at the end of note 213, that *pūrvadṛṣṭatā* in this passage may be being used as an actual synonym of *pūrvadarśana.*

> *na, ghaṭādau*[215] *kṣaṇikatvasyāsiddher* [Ked p. 43] *iti vakṣyāmaḥ.*
>
> No, because as we will explain,[216] it is not proved that pots and the like are momentary.

Fitting this point into the present context is difficult. The text cannot be correct as it stands because it begins with a 'no' implying that it is a Buddhist objection to the previous sentence of the Siddhāntin, but then supports this 'no' with a reason that is definitely stated by the Siddhāntin. One solution is to take the reading of Ked's corrigenda, which omits the *na.* But we are still left with a non-sequitur: why does the fact that pots are not momentary support the previous point about recognition having real referents owing to the property of having been seen before existing in the Self at the time of the recognition? Perhaps one could try to answer this by claiming that *tatra* in the

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[215] *na ghaṭādau* Ked[ac], Ped, B, L, P; *ghaṭādau* Ked[pc].

[216] Rāmakaṇṭha will devote a great number of pages to refuting momentariness. 48,6–56,11 deals with Dharmakīrti's *sattvānumāna*. 56,12–57,8 argues that on the Buddhist model of momentariness continual rebirth should result with no possibility of liberation. 66,1–74,10 gives arguments for non-momentariness through, among other things, recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) and the impossibility of a cause-effect relationship (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*) between momentary entities. Rāmakaṇṭha also argues for the existence of universals, *sāmānyas* (74,11–76,14), as an example of something non-momentary. 76,15–85,12 discusses Vasubandhu's *vināśitvānumāna*. If Rāmakaṇṭha has a specific passage in mind here it is perhaps 66,8ff., since he makes it clear there that he regards the previous discussions as establishing that the perceiver is stable and that he there turns to the stability of objects.

previous sentence meant not 'in the Self' but 'in the pot'.[217] If the claim there was that the property of having been seen before exists in the pot at the time of the recognition then the point about pots not being momentary could be seen as necessary to the truth of the previous sentence. But the flow of the argument strongly indicates that *tatra* should mean 'in the Self'.

Thus the best solution seems to be the following suggestion made by Prof. Sanderson. Some text has dropped out immediately prior to the *na*, which probably consisted of a Buddhist objection to which the *na* responds. If it began with *nanu* then eyeskip from the first letter of that word to the *na* that is in our text could provide a possible explanation. Harunaga Isaacson suggested that the content of the objection may have been along the following lines: because of the momentariness of pots, the pot that is being looked at now is different from the one that was seen earlier; hence the property that *this pot* has been seen before does not exist because it is false that this pot has been seen before; hence the verbal cognition, 'this is that pot' does not have real referents.

> 3.2.1 *evaṃ tarhi santamase spṛśato 'py ayaṃ ghaṭa ity adṛṣṭānāṃ rūpādīnām avamarśād*[218] *avastuviṣayo mānasa eṣa*[219] *smārto*[220] *vikalpa iti.*
>
> 3.2.1 [Śūnyavādin:] Even granting that, because even someone touching [a pot] in extreme darkness has a verbal cognition of the unseen colour and the like [of the pot] namely 'this is a pot', this must be mental conceptualisation, lacking a real referent, based on memory.

The person experiences a representation of a pot's colour that he is not actually seeing. It is memory and his own mind that must therefore provide the contents of the representation, not a currently apprehended colour. This goes against the claim made in Kumārila's verse that verbal cognition is a branch of perception, accurately reflecting real referents that are presented to it.

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[217] In Jayanta's explanation of recognition the earlier seeing (or past time according to his other explanation) qualifies the pot not the Self (NM 334,7ff).

[218] *avamarśād* Ked[ac], Ped, B, P; *avamarśśād* L; *avimarśād* Ked[pc].

[219] *eṣa* Ked, B, L, P; *eva* Ped.

[220] *smārto* Ked, B, P; *sānto* Ped, L, ka, ga.

na, teṣām[221] *ekasāmagrīpratibaddhatvena viśiṣṭāt sparśalakṣaṇāl liṅgād apratyakṣāṇām*[222] *api tadānīm anumānāt.*

[Siddhāntin:] No, because we infer those [features of the pot—its colour and the like], even though they are not directly perceived at that time, from an inferential mark, namely tangibility, which is qualified by the fact that it is invariably connected with the same causal complex [as colour and the like].

Rāmakaṇṭha responds that this example is not the kind of verbal cognition so far discussed, which is a type of perception, but inferential verbal cognition.[223] As support for this example being based on inference, he points to the fact that Dharmakīrti himself analyses it in this way.

yad uktaṃ bhavadbhir api[224]

ekasāmagryadhīnasya rūpāde rasato gatiḥ |
hetudharmānumānena dhūmendhanavikāravat || iti.

As you too have said:

Through inferring a property of the cause [of taste] from the taste [of an object], we come to know [the object's] colour[225] and the like, which are dependent on the same [causal] complex, just like [the inference of] the transformations of fuel [, such as ashes or coal,] from smoke.

These everyday inferences require careful explanation by Dharmakīrti for two reasons. First, he cannot infer an object's colour from its taste simply on the grounds that they necessarily exist simultaneously as related to the same whole, since he does not hold that there is a whole in addition to the individual taste, colour and the rest. Thus he infers a cause of the taste, and from that infers the colour. The cause of the taste is a causal complex consisting of, among other things, taste in the previous moment, which is its main cause (*upādānakāraṇa*), and colour in the previous moment, which is one of its auxiliary conditions (*sahakāripratyaya*). The colour in the previous moment is the main cause of the colour in the present moment (that which is being in-

221 Interlinear gloss above *teṣām* in P: *rūparasādīnāṃ.*

222 Interlinear gloss above *apratyakṣāṇām* in P: *rūpādīnāṃ.*

223 He calls it *anumānavimarśa* below (43,8).

224 PVā 1.11.

225 From tasting a mango, for example, we have a verbal cognition of its orange colour.

ferred), for which taste in the previous moment is one of the auxiliary conditions. So this causal complex can be inferred from taste in the present moment, and can then itself allow us to infer another of its effects, the colour in the present moment.

But this leads to the second potential problem. Inferences of effects from causes are inconclusive. Causes are not one of Dharmakīrti's two kinds of valid logical reason, namely essential property (*svabhāva*) and effect (*kārya*). Dharmakīrti writes in the verse quoted that we come to know the colour (in the present moment) through inferring from the taste [in the present moment] *a property of the cause* [*of that taste*]. What is this property? It is the causal complex's fitness (*yogyatā*) to produce colour. This fitness is essentially the same as the causal complex itself so it can be inferred through a *svabhāvahetu* (logical reason based on essential property).

This is still not quite enough to complete the inference though, since according to Dharmakīrti one cannot infer from the past to the future. The fitness in the previous moment cannot give certain knowledge of the colour in the present moment by either a *svabhāvahetu* (since the two things are not identical) or by an inference based on effect (since obviously the fitness in the previous moment is not an effect of the colour in the present moment). This problem is avoided through Dharmakīrti's insistence that the logical reason of this inference allows us to infer both things in the past (its material cause, taste, and its auxiliary conditions, colour and the rest) and things in the present (colour); but nothing in the future.[226] Thus the whole inference is carried out from the point of view of the present time, when the object of the inference is not an effect to be produced but an effect already produced. It is not two inferences, one to the past and then one from the past back to the present, but rather one inference with one logical reason. This logical reason (which is a *kāryahetu*) allows us to infer the causal complex in the past directly and the colour in the present indirectly.

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[226] PVSV 8,6–8: *tatrāpy atītaikakālānāṃ gatiḥ, nānāgatānām, vyabhicārāt.*

How about the example of infering ashes and coal from smoke? In this case the main cause of smoke is fire, its auxiliary condition wood-fuel, the main cause of ashes and coal the wood-fuel, and their auxiliary condition fire.[227]

Rāmakaṇṭha has admitted that this cognition is not an instance of direct perception and argues that it is based on inference. Is that enough to preserve his conclusion that all verbal cognition has real referents? He now addresses that question.

> 3.2.2 *na cānumānavimarśo 'py avastuviṣayaḥ, vastvanvayavyatirekānuvidhānena pramāṇatvāt pratyakṣatadvimarśavat.*
>
> 3.2.2 And neither does verbal cognition [based on] inference have unreal referents, because it is a means of knowledge since it conforms to positive and negative concomitance with real entities,[228] just like [pre-conceptual] perception and verbal cognition [based on] that.

Three kinds of cognition have now been mentioned as valid means of knowledge for Rāmakaṇṭha: pre-conceptual perception (*pratyakṣa*), an initial prelinguistic encounter with an object; verbal cognition based on perception (*tadvimarśa = pratyakṣavimarśa*), for example 'this is a pot'; and verbal cognition based on inference (*anumānavimarśa*), for example 'this is a pot' said by someone in the dark. This illustrates that though Rāmakaṇṭha can be said to regard the second of these as a kind of perception, following Kumārila, he also sometimes uses the word perception on its own (*pratyakṣa*) in a more restricted sense to cover only pre-conceptual perception. Perception (*pratyakṣa*) and verbal cognition (*vimarśa*) are certainly not synonymous for Rāmakaṇṭha but they overlap. Perception includes pre-conceptual perception which is certainly not verbal cognition; and verbal cognition includes that which is based on inference and (as we will see presently) that which arises from scriptural statements, neither of which are perception. Where they overlap is in the second of the three categories listed above, verbal cognition based on perception, which could be described either as perceptual verbal cognition, to bring out

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[227] My explanations in these paragraphs are based on PVSV 7,12–8,11, with much clarification from a letter from Prof. Steinkellner (3/4/2001) and from the translations and explanations in Iwata 1991b 89–92.

[228] I.e. inferential verbal cognition occurs when the object of the inference (such as the pot's colour in the example) is there and never when it is not.

that it is verbal cognition, or as conceptual perception, to bring out that it is perception.

Rāmakaṇṭha's point in quoting the Dharmakīrti verse that follows is to give the impression that it is because these three categories meet Dharmakīrti's own criterion for something being a valid means of knowledge that Rāmakaṇṭha holds all three to be valid.

> *tad uktaṃ bhavadbhir api*[229]
>
> *arthasyāsambhave 'bhāvāt*[230] *pratyakṣe 'pi pramāṇatā |*
> *pratibaddhasvabhāvasya taddhetutve samaṃ dvayam || iti.*
>
> Thus you too have said:
>
> Perception is also a valid means of knowledge because it does not exist when no object is there. Both [perception and inference] are the same in that their cause is that whose nature has an immutable connection.

The import of the verse is: 1) the reason that perception, as well as inference, are means of knowledge is that they do not occur when no object is there; 2) both arise in dependence on an immutable connection between two things. In the case of inference an example of such a connection would be the cause-effect relationship between fire and smoke. In the case of *pratyakṣa*, the connection is between, on the one hand, the presence of an object plus the other factors that are necessary such as sense-faculties, and, on the other, the rise of perceptual cognition.

> 3.2.3 *nāpy asphuṭāvabhāsatvenāsyāvastuviṣayatvaṃ pratyakṣasyāpy arthadūra*[231]*vartinas tatsambhavato 'naikāntikatvāt.*
>
> 3.2.3 Neither does it follow from it not appearing clearly that [inferential verbal cognition] has unreal referents,[232] because this is inconclusive since direct perception also can [appear indistinct] for someone who is far from the object.

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[229] PVin, p. 38,6 (1.3). Vetter gives the exact form in which this verse occurs here as the Sanskrit original of PVin 1.3, based on three citations in the *Tattvabodhavidhāyinī*, one in the *Pramāṇamimāṃsā* and one in the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*. He does not mention its occurrence here.

[230] °*sambhave 'bhāvāt* Ked, Ped, B, P; °*sambhavābhāvāt* L.

[231] *arthadūra*° Ked^{ac}, B, L, P; *arthasya dūra*° Ked^{pc}, Ped.

3.3 *āgamottho*[233] *'pi vimarśas tadāgamapraṇetṛ*[234]*jñānadvāreṇa vastuni pratibaddhatvād avañcakapitrādivākyaśrutijanitavimarśavad yathārtha eva.*

3.3[235] A verbal cognition which arises from scripture also certainly accords with [real] objects because it is connected to real entities by means of the cognition of the composer of that text, just like a verbal cognition produced by hearing a sentence from a trustworthy father or [other elder].

tad uktaṃ bhavadbhir api[236]

iṣṭo 'yam arthaḥ śakyeta jñātuṃ so 'tiśayo[237] *yadi* || *iti.*

Thus even you have said:

[We] accept this idea if (i.e. when) that excellence can be known.

This translation distorts the literal meaning of the verse in order to reflect Rāmakaṇṭha's reading of it. Rāmakaṇṭha uses this verse to support the view that verbal cognitions arising from the hearing of scriptural statements *can* be accepted when we know that their composer has that quality of excellence that indicates trustworthiness.[238] This is a Naiyāyika view. In fact Dharmakīrti's intended meaning would be better conveyed by the more literal translation: '[We] would accept this idea if that excellence could be known.' Dharmakīrti is being disingenuous because he does not think it is ever possi-

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[232] On touching the pot in the dark, or tasting a mango, the colour of the pot or the mango do not appear to us as vividly as they would if we were actually looking at the colours.

[233] *āgamottho* Ked^{ac}, Ped, B, L, P; *āgamokto* Ked^{pc}.

[234] °*praṇetṛ* Ked, B, L, P; °*prasotṛ* Ped.

[235] I have divided this section into three main sub-sections, 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. The first argues that verbal cognition based on perception is a type of direct perception having real referents; the second shows how inferential verbal cognition is just like these two (i.e. non-conceptual perception and verbal cognition based on that) in having real referents; and the third deals with verbal cognitions arising from scripture.

[236] *api* B, L, P; *eva* Ked, Ped.

PVā 1.220cd, which reads differently from the quote here (but conveys the same meaning): *iṣṭo 'yam arthaḥ pratyetuṃ śakyaḥ so 'tiśayo yadi* ||

[237] *so 'tiśayo* Ked^{ac}, Ped, B, L, P; *sātiśayo* Ked^{pc}, v.l. in B.

[238] Manorathanandin in his commentary to this verse explains that the quality of excellence is possessed by someone who 'sees things in accordance with reality and tells [others] about them', *yathābhūtārthadarśitadākhyātṛ* [*ākhyātṛ* MS; *ākhyāt* PVV].

ble to know this, and he is here arguing *against* the Naiyāyika idea. For him the only way to tell whether a speaker's statement is correct is to see if it conforms to reality or not. Hence we might as well just use this empirical test as our guide and forget about the 'excellence' of the speaker. The first half of his verse runs, 'Others (i.e. Naiyāyikas) hold that [statements] accord with reality depending on the excellence of the person [who made them].'[239] Thus in the half-verse quoted in NPP, 'idea' (*artha*) should refer to the Naiyāyika view. From the context in which it is quoted in NPP, however, it is clear that Rāmakaṇṭha intends it to refer to the contents of a scriptural statement.

pratyakṣānumānāgamabahiṣkṛtas tu vimarśo manorājyādivimarśavad vastupratibandhābhāvād avastuviṣayo 'stu. aham etat [Ked p. 44] *prapaśyāmīti tu vimarśaḥ saṃviditātmārthaviṣayatvān nāvastuviṣayaḥ, kiṃ tu proktanayena pratyakṣaviśeṣatvāt*[240] *pramāṇam evety ato 'py ātmasiddhiḥ.*

But I grant you that (*astu*) verbal cognitions that fall outside direct perception, inference and scripture do not have real referents, because they lack invariable concomitance with real entities, as verbal cognitions such as daydreams do. But the verbal cognition, 'I see this', does not have unreal referents, because its referents are the Self and an object [, both of which are] known directly[241] (*saṃvidita*). Rather it is certainly a means of knowledge because it is a particular kind of perception[242] in the manner that has been stated.[243] Therefore from this too[244] the Self is proved.

tataś ca bodhenety etad api pratijñāpadaṃ vyākhyātam iti.

And so the word '*bodhena*' from the assertion *sūtra* has also been explained.

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[239] *puruṣātiśayāpekṣaṃ yathārtham apare viduḥ.*

[240] °*n nāvastuviṣayaḥ, kiṃ tu proktanayena pratyakṣaviśeṣatvā* omitted in L (eyeskip from one *tvā* to the next).

[241] I.e. independently of the verbal cognition. Thus we know that the verbal cognition of the Self and the object is based on direct perception, and thus has a real referent.

[242] The conceptual (*savikalpaka*) kind.

[243] This could refer to all the places where he has said recently that it conforms to invariable concomitance with real entities, like direct perception; or it could refer to his remark in section 1 that I-cognition perceives the Self 'by a close approximation', 'for the sake of language'.

[244] I.e. from verbal cognitions of the form 'I see this' as well as from pre-linguistic self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*).

It is to be noted that though Rāmakaṇṭha is arguing against Buddhist positions throughout this last section, he conducts his whole defense of the validity of verbal cognition by appeal to Buddhist notions of what constitutes valid knowledge. He quotes Dharmakīrti three times, each time to support his own *pakṣa*, not as part of the *pūrvapakṣa*. He takes examples of verbal cognition that the Buddhist may take to be merely mental constructions (*vikalpa*s), and shows that according to Dharmakīrti's strictures, they should in fact count as genuine means of knowledge. For example in arguing for the validity of verbal cognitions that arise from scripture, it is the Buddhist criterion of *pratibandha* that Rāmakaṇṭha claims they meet. This illustrates a phenomenon that is repeated elsewhere in Indian Philosophy, namely, the spread of an idea to an opposing tradition as a result of the attempts of the tradition adopting the idea to overcome other views held by its originator.

CHAPTER 4:
The Equating of Self and Cognition

Preliminary Remarks

For a presentation of Rāmakaṇṭha's arguments for the existence of the Self, the primary aim of this work, NPP is the most important source. That is the text in which he goes into greatest detail on the matter, devoting many more pages (112 in the KSTS edition) to it than in any other of his texts. I have had to be selective in deciding which passages on which to focus. First I excluded passages in which Rāmakaṇṭha confronts his Śaiva view with that of non-Buddhists, for example Sāṅkhyas and Vedāntins. For there what is at stake is not the existence of the Self but its nature. Left with those passages in which a Buddhist opponent's views are discussed, I next excluded the very large number of pages that are devoted not primarily to the Buddhist doctrine of no-Self but to either the doctrine of momentariness or the Yogācāra doctrine of the non-difference of the perceiver and the perceived.[1] The majority of what that left has been translated and commented upon in the first three chapters.[2]

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[1] Rāmakaṇṭha, like Udayana in the *Ātmatattvaviveka* for example, regarded an independent refutation of these two doctrines as a necessary condition of the establishment of the existence of the Self.

[2] Not quite all; for there is a section following on from that looked at in Chapter 2, which begins with the Buddhist asking how, if there is no Self over and above cognition, and cognition is unchanging, different objects could be perceived. Much of this section is focussed on refuting the Yogācāra doctrine of the non-difference of perceiver and perceived. But there is also much that concerns specifically the Self. The most significant passage that falls into the second category is that looked at in the first half of this chapter.

But a central, and somewhat puzzling, feature of Rāmakaṇṭha's notion of a Self, which leaves the reader wanting more explanation, has still not been examined in detail. We saw in Chapter 2 that Rāmakaṇṭha, distancing himself from other traditions that accept the existence of the Self such as Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, aligned himself with Buddhism in denying the existence of a further perceiving entity beyond cognition. Rāmakaṇṭha's Self is of the nature of cognition/consciousness (*jñānātman/saṃvidrūpa*), which enabled his remark at the beginning of Chapter 2 that the Buddhist, in describing and arguing for *jñāna*, was actually describing and arguing for the Self, just using a different word. It is also what enabled him, in Chapter 3, to claim that the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument actually secures the reality of the Self (in that it can be seen to reduce the Self to consciousness).

But the Self is single and unchanging, whereas cognition is accepted not only by Buddhists but also by Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas to be plural and transitory. Thus the closer Rāmakaṇṭha allows his concept of the Self to come to simple cognition, the harder it becomes for him to demonstrate that it is eternal and unchanging. Is not the transitoriness of cognition a fact of experience? Cognition of a pot ceases and gives way to cognition of a tree. A painful sensation in my head ceases; a pleasurable sensation that was not present before comes into being.

Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas have no problem acknowledging these changing instances of cognition as well as an eternal Self, in that they hold the latter to be something separate from cognitions, in which they inhere. Since Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas maintain a distinction between properties (*dharma*) and property-possessors (*dharmin*), they can hold that the Self, the *dharmin*, does not change, while its properties, such as cognition, do. But Rāmakaṇṭha stands with Buddhism not only on the specific point of denying a further entity beyond cognition, but also on the general point that there is no *dharmin* separate from its properties, no possessor of powers (*śaktimat*) separate from its powers (*śakti*). For him, if the second changes then the first changes, so it is not an option to say that cognition, being a power of the Self, can change without the Self changing. His only option is to hold that cognition does not change.

Rāmakaṇṭha defends his position that cognition is eternal, in some detail, in one more passage in NPP, an examination of which will form the first half of this chapter. But he also tackles it in the *Mataṅgavṛtti,* in a passage that will form the subject of the second half.

1. Simultaneous and Sequential Illumination

We will pick up the NPP passage at a point where the Buddhist asks,

> 1 *kas tarhi nīlaprakāśāt pītaprakāśasya*[3] *bhedaḥ?*
>
> 1 [Yogācāra:] What then is the difference between the illumination of yellow and the illumination of blue?
>
> *na kaś cit, yugapatprakāśa iva.*
>
> [Siddhāntin:] There is no [difference], just like [there is no difference between the blue part and the yellow part of an illumination] when [blue and yellow are] simultaneously illuminated.

The structure of the following discussion is encapsulated in this one sentence. It will claim that as cognition[4] of yellow is followed by cognition of blue and so on, cognition itself does not change; and it will render this plausible by first arguing that cognition is single at one point in time despite illuminating more than one object; and then arguing that, if that is the case, there is no reason to regard it as plural over time just because it illuminates different objects.

So first he gives a justification of illumination/cognition being single at one point in time by way of an unwanted consequence of plurality.

> 2 *tatra hi tayor bhede*[5] *viśeṣābhāvāt tadavayavabhedenāpi bhedaḥ, iti pratiparamāṇubhedataś*[6] *citrapaṭādipratibhāsābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ.*

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[3] *pītaprakāśasya* B, P, Ked, Ped; *pītaprakāśa*° L.

[4] *prakāśa* is here used synonymously with *saṃvit* or *jñāna*.

[5] *bhede* Ked, B, L, P; *bheda*° Ped.

> 2 For if the two were different [illuminations] in that case,[7] they would be differentiated also according to their parts, because there is no difference [between the differentness of the blue and yellow and the differentness of the parts of those two colours]. So it would unwantedly follow that an image of a multi-coloured cloth or such like could not exist, because every atom[-like pixel] [of the image] would be different.

If we hold that illumination at one point in time cannot be single if it contains both blue and yellow, then why stop at two? The different pixels that make up those two are just as different as those two, being slightly different shades and occurring at different locations within the image. But then, claims Rāmakaṇṭha, we would have thousands of different manifestations completely separate without anything bringing them together into one perception. This is the unwanted consequence that is the subject of this sub-section (2).[8]

> *na ca vikalpa*[Ked p. 27]*ghaṭitaṃ tad iti vācyam, udghāṭitanetrasya jhaṭity eva yugapat tadavabhāsanāt, tadānīṃ ca vikalpāsambhavād*[9] *asaṃvedanāc ca.*

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[6] *pratiparamāṇubhedataś* Ked[pc], Ped; *pratiparamāṇu bhedataś* Ked[ac]; *pratiparamāṇujñānabhedataś* B, P; *paramāṇubhedataś* L. The *jñāna* in B and P's reading could be correct; but I have judged it more likely to be an interlinear explanatory note, subsequently mistaken for part of the text.

[7] I.e. when occurring simultaneously.

[8] On the problems arising from holding cognition to consist of atom-like parts, see the following verse by Śāntarakṣita: *ci ste rnam paḥi graṅs bźin du rnam par śes pa khas len na | de tshe rdul phran ḥdrar gyur paḥi dpyad pa ḥdi las bzlog par dkaḥ* (MaAl v. 49). This is cited in the Tibetan version of the *Tarkabhāṣā* and translated by Kajiyama in his study of that text as: 'if knowledge were admitted [by you to consist of parts] as many as the number of [its variegated] forms, then it would be difficult [for you] to avert the same kind of criticism which is made regarding [the reality of] atoms' (Kajiyama 1988 150). It occurs (in the *Tarkabhāṣā*) in the context of a Mādhyamika attack on the Yogācāra belief in the reality of cognition. I mention it here simply to show that it was not only Rāmakaṇṭha, but also Buddhist thinkers, who thought that if we regard cognition at one point of time as divided then its very coherence is threatened. I do not think that Śāntarakṣita's reason—that all the Yogācāra arguments about the impossibility of objects being composed of atoms can then be turned against cognition—is necessarily Rāmakaṇṭha's reason.

[9] *vikalpāsambhavād* Ked, Ped, L, P; *vikalpāsadbhāvād* B, but above *sadbhā* is also written *sambha*.

> And it should not be said that [even though the pre-conceptual illumination is different per pixel] an [image of a multi-coloured object][10] is brought about through conceptual cognition; because 1) as soon as one opens one's eyes the [image] is manifest to one at that very moment (*jhaṭity eva*) and simultaneously, and no conceptualizing is possible then;[11] and 2) no [conceptualization] is perceived.

Rāmakaṇṭha imagines the Buddhist asserting the plurality of illumination at one point in time, but averting the unwanted consequence through appealing to conceptual cognition as that which unifies the multiple non-conceptual illuminations. He rejects this for the reasons stated.

> *yad uktam*[12]
>
> > *na cemāḥ kalpanā apratisaṃviditā*[13] *evodayante vyayante vā yena satyo 'py anupalakṣitāḥ syuḥ, iti.*
>
> As [Dharmakīrti] has stated:
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> > 'Nor do these notions arise or pass away without being sensed at all so that they might be unnoticed even though they exist.'

The second reason that Rāmakaṇṭha gave for rejecting conceptual cognition as a way of averting the unwanted consequence was that conceptualization is not perceived. He gives this quotation as a defence against the imagined objection that it could occur without being perceived.

> *vikalpajñānasyāpy ekatvāt katham anekātmakaś citrāvabhāsaḥ.*
>
> And[14] because the conceptual cognition is single, how could [it enable] a multi-coloured image [to appear, if, as you are arguing, that image is] plural by nature.

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[10] Because of the gender of *tat*, it cannot refer to *citrapaṭādipratibhāsa*, so a more literal translation would be, 'the fact that there is an image of a multi-coloured object'.

[11] Quite how he would justify it being impossible is not certain. Probably the point is that, as the Buddhist would also accept, there must be an initial moment of non-conceptual apprehension immediately after opening one's eyes.

[12] PVin 50,20–22 (identified by Stern 1991).

[13] *apratisaṃviditā* Ped, B, L, P; *asaṃviditā* Ked. *apratisaṃviditā* is also the reading of the two other quotations of this sentence found by Stern (1991 156).

[14] Taking the *api* not as a sentence-connector but as qualifying *vikalpajñāna* would yield good sense: the conceptual cognition is single, *as well as* (according to us Śaivas) *prakāśa*, so it does not solve the problem to give up the idea of a single *prakāśa* and to re-

This is a third reason for conceptual cognition being incapable of averting the unwanted consequence. The unwanted consequence results from assuming that a plurality of objects can only be illuminated by a plurality of illuminations. Rāmakaṇṭha here points out that if the Buddhist were to try to escape it through appealing to a unifying conceptual cognition, he would in effect be claiming that one thing can bring about the appearance of many. If the Buddhist is prepared to accept that possibility, why does he not accept that one *prakāśa* could do the same? That that is the intention behind this sentence is made clear in the first half of the next.

Thus far he has substantiated one part of the claim made in the opening sentence, namely that cognition at one point of time is single however variegated the images cognized. In the following (final) sub-section (3) he argues that exactly the same holds for cognition over a sequence of time.

3.1 *tad yathā tatra nīlapītādyanekaprakāśyabhede*[15] *'py anubhūyamānasyai*[16]*-kasya jñānātmano*[17] *na bhedaḥ, na ca tadabhedāt tasya nīlapītāder arthabhedasyāsiddhiḥ,*[18] *ekasyānekaprakāśanaśaktisiddher bhavadbhir apīṣṭatvāt, tathā kramaprakāśe*[19] *'py anubhavasiddhasyaikasyaiva prakāśātmano 'nekaprakāśanaśaktiyogāt kramavyavasthitāneka*[20]*prakāśakatvam anubhavasiddham eṣṭavyam. na ca tadabhedād arthabhedāsiddhidoṣaḥ. na hi dikkramāvabhāsāt kālakramāvabhāsasya prakāśātmani kaś cid bhedo 'nubhūyata iti.*

3.1 In that case (of perceiving a multiple thing at one point in time) the one cognition that is experienced is undivided even though there is a plurality of several illuminated objects such as blue and yellow, and it does not follow from its being undivided that that[21] plurality of objects such as blue and yellow is unestablished, because you too accept (in your proposal just stated that one *vikalpa* unifies a complex) that one [thing] can be established to have the power to illuminate several [things].

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assign the unifying role to a conceptual cognition. But such a construal would leave this sentence lacking a connector with the last.

15 °*prakāśyabhede* B, P, Ked, Ped; °*prakāśabhede* L.

16 *anubhūyamānasyai*° B, L, Ked, Ped; *anubhūyasyai*° P.

17 *jñānātmano* B, L, Ked, Ped; *jñānātmāno* P.

18 °*siddhiḥ* Ked, Ped, L, P; °*saddhiḥ* B.

19 *kramaprakāśe* Ked^{pc}, Ped, B, L, P; *kramaprakāśo* Ked^{ac}.

20 *kramavyavasthitāneka*° B, P, Ked, Ped; *kramavyavasthita neka*° L.

21 Alternatively the *tasya* could mean, (unestablished) 'for it'.

> So in the same way it should be accepted that, in the case of illumination of a sequence too, it is *one* illumination,[22] known to exist through experience, that is the illuminator[23] of several [things] arranged in a sequence, because it has the power to illuminate several [things], [the more so since this fact too is] proved by experience.[24] And the problem of not establishing a plurality of objects does not follow from it being one thing. For we do not experience any difference between an appearance in spatial sequence and an appearance in temporal sequence qua illumination (so if a spatial succession of objects can be revealed by the one illumination, why can a temporal succession of objects not be?).

The first half of the first sentence summarizes the argument so far with regard to simultaneous illumination: in that case a single cognition illuminates a plurality of objects. Even the Buddhist is prepared to accept this, for he suggested that a single conceptual cognition brings about the appearance of a multi-coloured object. The second half claims that in the sequential case too it is established through experience (*anubhavasiddha*) that a single thing illuminates many. That is a reference to the rhetorical passage looked at in Chap-

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[22] Notice that in this *yathā ... tathā* sentence one of the differences between the two clauses is that *jñānātmanaḥ* is paralleled by *prakāśātmanaḥ*. In the first clause, about one moment, he talks of *jñāna* but in the second clause, about a sequence of time, he talks of *prakāśa*. In general Rāmakaṇṭha uses *prakāśa* to refer to the kind of cognition that is unchanging over time; and *jñāna* to refer either to that kind, or to a kind which, as we will see in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* passage in the second part of this chapter, he admits as differing over time, namely determinative cognition.

[23] The thing we experience as always having the same form is, as can be seen from this sentence, sometimes referred to as *prakāśa* and sometimes as *prakāśaka*. This is parallel to, and explainable by, the fact that for Rāmakaṇṭha cognition (*jñāna*) is not different from the perceiver (*jñātṛ*). *prakāśa* is a convenient word for narrowing the gap between action and agent given that it can mean either the action of illumination or the thing that illuminates, light. If Rāmakaṇṭha were urged to distinguish it from *prakāśaka* he would say that it is the operation of *prakāśaka*'s *śakti*. But he sees ultimately no difference between a thing (*śaktimat*) and its *śakti*, just as, as seen in Chapter 1, he rejects the existence of a *dharmin* over and above a *dharma*.

[24] The compound *anekaprakāśanaśakti*° could also be translated (both here and in the description above of simultaneous illumination) 'because it has several powers of illumination', for in the rest of this passage the model is of illumination having several different, but compatible powers.

ter 2, in which Rāmakaṇṭha described our experience of the perceiver as being always constant despite the appearance to it of different objects. He points out here that any hesitation the Buddhist feels in having one thing as the illuminator of many objects over time can be seen to be misplaced through recognizing a) that he is prepared to accept the illumination of many by one in the simultaneous case, and b) that the sequential situation is in no significant way different from the simultaneous situation. In both cases we have a plurality of objects arranged in a sequence (it just happens to be a spatial sequence in the first case, and a temporal sequence in the second); and in both cases we experience the illumination itself to be equally undivided.[25]

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A note on terminology:

I think it is clear from the above passage that that which Rāmakaṇṭha regards as occurring in a (temporal or spatial) sequence is not *prakāśa* itself, but the objects that are illuminated—for there is nothing that divides *prakāśa* itself into parts of a sequence. Rather it is always 'switched on',[26] constant and the same. Thus when Rāmakaṇṭha writes *kramaprakāśe*, he would not want us to infer that illumination itself is sequential.[27] When I use the expression 'sequential illumination' in my exegesis, it is simply as a short way of signaling that I am talking of illumination over a period of time, not illumination at one point in time.

Rāmakaṇṭha uses the synonyms *pratibhāsa* and *avabhāsa* in this passage not completely synonymously with *prakāśa* but to refer to the appearance or image of the object, i.e. to something that in its object-aspect is sequential, but

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[25] Note how in the course of the text-piece under discussion, *anubhū* or its derivatives are used four times. They refer here specifically to pre-conceptual, and therefore infallible, experience. As illumination proceeds over a course of time we may think that one cognition is being followed by another and so on, but if we attend pre-conceptually to the unfolding of cognition we will sense it to be one unbroken thing.

[26] To use an expression more appropriate to contemporary lights than lights in mediaeval India.

[27] Prof. Sanderson suggested as a grammatical interpretation of the compound, *krameṇa anekeṣām avabhāsānāṃ prakāśaḥ*, the genitive being objective.

in its illumination-aspect is always the same. That the terms are more object-oriented than *prakāśa* can be seen from the way he qualifies *dikkramāvabhāsa* and *kālakramāvabhāsa* with the word *prakāśātmani* ('qua illumination'). Rāmakaṇṭha wants to divide the image (*prati-/avabhāsa*) in two, where the Buddhist regards it as one.[28] He wants to separate the image itself from its object, the former being nothing other than the unchanging *prakāśa*.

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Now the Buddhist responds by arguing that the case of sequential illumination is not parallel to the case of simultaneous illumination.[29]

> 3.2 *nanu dikkramaprakāśe prakāśātmano bhedāsaṃvedanāt*[30] *pradīpāder vartidāhatailakṣapaṇaprakāśasvajñānajananādivad eka*[31]*syānekakāryakartṛtvena*[32] *virodhābhāvāc chaktīnāṃ samuccayo*[33] *na virodhaḥ.*[34] *kālakrame tu*

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[28] Of course for the Sākāravādin Yogācāras the division of the image into subject and object aspects was real, but it was nevertheless a division of one thing, unlike for Rāmakaṇṭha.

[29] I use 'sequential' and 'simultaneous' as short ways of referring to the two situations; but the latter is, of course, also 'sequential' in the sense that it involves a spatial sequence.

[30] *bhedāsaṃvedanāt* B, P, Ked, Ped; *saṃvvedanāt* L.

[31] *vad eka°* Ked, B, P; *vedaka°* Ped, L.

[32] *°kartṛtvena* Ped, B, L, P; *°kartṛkatvena* Ked.

[33] *samuccayo* Ked[ac], Ped, B, L, P; *samuccaye* Ked[pc]. I prefer the nominative, primarily because of the parallel sentence below, *chaktīnāṃ samuccaya eva yukto na virodhaḥ*, where *yukto* means that *samuccaya* must be a nominative.

[34] This passage, and particularly this sentence, is referred to at 82,16–18: *pradīpasya hi vartidāhatailakṣapaṇaprakāśasvajñānādyanekakāryanirvartakaḥ svabhāvo 'bhyupagato bhavadbhiḥ, na tu kāryabhedena svabhāvabhedaḥ, iti darśitaṃ prāg eva.* See also MatV VP 164,1–2 (in the context of whether something non-momentary is capable of *arthakriyā*): *dharmaś cāyam akṣaṇikasyaiva* [*°syaiva* ṛ, ṝ; *°sya* ed.; *°sya vā* ū] *ghaṭādeḥ krameṇa kṣīradadhidhāraṇādikaḥ pradīpādeś ca yugapad vartidāhatailakṣapaṇādiko 'rthakriyākāritvalakṣaṇaḥ pratyakṣeṇa* [*pratyakṣeṇa* ū, ṛ, ṝ; omitted in ed.] *siddhaḥ, iti* [*iti* ū, ṛ, ṝ; omitted in ed.] *na tena sahāsya virodhaḥ*; NPP ad 1.22cd, p. 54: *pradīpādeś ca vartidāhatailakṣapaṇādikā yugapad dṛśyate*; and PMNKV ad 46cd, p. 298, 5–6: *pradīpasya hy ekasyaiva vartidahanatailakṣapaṇasvajñāpanādyanekakāryanivartakaikasvabhāvo 'bhyupagato bhavadbhiḥ. na tu kāryabhedena svabhāvabhedaḥ.*

prakāśaśaktīnāṃ parasparābhāvarūpatvena[35] *ghaṭapaṭādiśaktīnām iva bhedād vastubhedakatvam.*

3.2 [Yogācāra:] Surely in the case of illumination of a spatial sequence, because we do not experience any division of the illumination, there is no contradiction in one [thing][36] being the agent of many effects,[37] just like such [effects] as the burning of the wick, the lessening of the oil, illumination and making itself known of a candle for example.[38] Hence the accumulation of powers [in this case] is not a contradiction.

In the case of temporal sequence, though, because illumination's powers are different in the sense of mutually exclusive, like the powers of a pot and a cloth for example,[39] they divide the thing.

Although in both cases there is a plurality of powers, they can all belong to the same thing in the simultaneous case, because we experience no division in that thing, but they cannot belong to the same thing in sequential illumination, because they are mutually exclusive (in the sense that they cannot be present in the same locus at the same time).

yad āhuḥ[40]

śaktir hi bhāvābhāvābhyāṃ bhidyamānā vastv api bhinatti, na punaḥ kāryabhedena, [Ked p. 28] *iti.*

As they say, 'For power, when divided by its occurrence and non-occurrence, divides the thing [that has the power] too. But [it does] not [do so when divided] through [having] a plurality of effects.'

This verse articulates the principle that was employed by the Buddhist to arrive at the unity of illumination at one point in time, but its plurality over time: in the former case all we have is a plurality of effects, so the powers

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[35] °*rūpatvena* B, P, Ked, Ped; °*rūpatve* L.

[36] I.e. the illumination.

[37] Dr. Ruzsa suggested that it would be better to assume an elided *ca* after *virodhābhāvāt*, understanding two separate reasons *bhedāsaṃvedanāt* and *virodhābhāvāt*.

[38] At one point of time, when all of these effects of the candle are observed to take place, we do not experience the candle itself to be in any way divided. Similarly, at one point in time, when a number of different colours spread over a spatial sequence are illuminated, we do not experience the illumination itself to be divided.

[39] You cannot use a cloth to carry water, or a pot for the purposes that a cloth is used.

[40] Source unknown.

that bring about those effects can belong to the same illumination; in the latter case the powers actually cease to exist, so that which has them must cease to exist.

> 3.3 *tad ayuktam asiddhatvāt. na hi tatrāpi*[41] *śakter bhāvābhāvabhedo 'sti sarvadaikarūpasyaiva prakāśātmano 'nāropitarūpasya saṃvedanād ity uktam. na ca kāryābhāvāc chakter abhāvaḥ 'nāvaśyaṃ kāraṇāni*[42] *tadvanti bhavanti' iti nyāyāt. tad atrāpi*[43] *vastu*[44]*bhedāsiddheḥ, tadvac*[45] *chaktīnāṃ samuccaya eva yukto na virodhaḥ.*
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> 3.3 [Siddhāntin:] That is not correct because it has not been proved. For power is not divided in the [temporal sequence] either, through its occurrence or non-occurrence, because, as we have said,[46] we experience a constantly uniform illumination [and one] whose character [as such] has not been superimposed [on it]. And just because an effect is absent does not mean that the power is absent, because of the rule, 'causes do not necessarily have those (i.e. effects)'.[47] Therefore because it is not proved that there is a division of the thing [that has the power] in this case [of temporal sequence] too, it is an accumulation, not a contradiction, of powers that is correct, as in the [case of spatial sequence].

According to both the Buddhist and Rāmakaṇṭha, the plurality of powers of illumination at one point in time does not imply that illumination itself is plural. But the Buddhist maintained that the case of illumination over time is not analogous, because there the powers are plural not only in that they produce a plurality of effects, but in the stronger sense that individual powers cease to

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[41] Interlinear gloss above *tatrāpi* in B: *kālakrame.*

[42] *kāraṇāni* Ked, B, P; *karaṇāni* Ped, L.

[43] *tad atrāpi* B, P, Ked, Ped; *tatrāpi* L.

[44] Interlinear gloss above *vastu* in B: *prakāśa.*

[45] Interlinear gloss above *tadvac* in B: *dikkramavat.*

[46] He refers here to the text given in sections 3 and 4 of Chapter 2. In section 3 he argued, and convinced the Buddhist, that we experience cognition as always the same; and in section 4 he responded to the Buddhist objection that that sameness or stability is superimposed. He summed up with a sentence similar to this one: *tad evaṃ sarvadaikarūpasthiragrāhakaprakāśātmānāropita eva sarvārthasākṣitayā ... pratipuruṣaṃ svasaṃvedanasiddhaḥ.*

[47] We sometimes have clouds without rain, for example. He is here quoting Dharmakīrti: *kāryānupalabdhāv api nāvaśyaṃ kāraṇāni* [ed. reads *kāranāṇi*] *tadvanti bhavantīti tadabhāvaḥ kutaḥ* (PVSV ad v. 4, p. 5,20–21).

exist and give way to new ones. Thus they enable us to know that illumination itself is plural over time. Rāmakaṇṭha here disputes this, arguing that the two cases are analogous because even over time the power of illumination does not cease.

The way he uses the word for power in the singular is striking. Since he admits that illumination has a plurality of powers even at one point of time, would we not expect him to admit a plurality of them over time? Indeed we can see that he does accept such a plurality from the way that he concludes this text piece by saying that illumination's powers over time can be accumulated. I suggest that Rāmakaṇṭha would explain this oscillation by employing the distinction used in the verse that the Buddhist quoted. Illumination's power is plural, both at one time and over time, in the sense that it brings about a plurality of effects. But it is singular, both at one time and over time, in the sense that it has no *bhāvābhāvabheda*: it never actually ceases to exist.

Rāmakaṇṭha supports this first by referring back to his earlier description of *prakāśa* as permanently sensed in the same form (it is only its objects that are experienced as having different forms) and to his arguments against the possibility that this results from superimposition. He then cites Dharmakīrti's principle that causes can exist without producing their effects. The implication is that if the Buddhist applied this principle, he would not need to conclude that the power to illuminate an object ceases to exist when its effect, a cognition of that particular object, ceases.

> *api ca parokṣasya dharmiṇaḥ kāryabhedād indriyāder iva śaktibhedataḥ svarūpabhedaḥ, na*[48] *pratyakṣasiddhābhedasya,*[49] *tasya hi pradīpāder ivaikasyānekakāryakartṛtvena bhavadbhir apīṣṭatvāt. pratyakṣasiddhābhedaś cātmā, ity uktam. ato na tasyāpi śaktibhedād bhedaḥ kalpayituṃ yuktaḥ.*
>
> Moreover, owing to different effects of an imperceptible property-possessor, like a sense-faculty or such like, [we *can* infer] different own-natures from different powers;[50] [but] not [owing to different effects] of something whose

[48] *svarūpabhedo na* Ked, B, L, P; *svarūpabhedena* Ped.

[49] °*siddhābhedasya* Ked^{pc}, Ped, B; °*siddhabhedasya* Ked^{ac}, L, P.

[50] Or alternatively, 'Moreover when an imperceptible property-possessor has different effects, [we *can* infer] different own-natures, like [we do] from the different powers of the sense-faculties and such like.'

> unity is a fact of perception, for you too hold that something [whose unity is a fact of perception], like a candle or such like, being one thing, is the agent of many effects.[51] Now, as we have already said,[52] the Self is something whose unity is a fact of perception. Therefore it is not right to suppose a division of that too[53] as a result of its having different powers.

Up to this point Rāmakaṇṭha has accepted the general principle, articulated in the citation, that the Buddhist uses to relate a thing and its power (*śaktir hi bhāvābhāvābhyāṃ bhidyamānā vastv api bhinatti*).[54] But he here points out that the final part of the citation, *na punaḥ kāryabhedena*, was not correct: in fact there are cases of *kāryabheda* which allow one to infer a difference of the thing. Imperceptible property-possessors can be differentiated on grounds of different *śakti*s, as a result of different effects: we do not think it is the same faculty that sees and hears.

But difference of effects is indeed not enough in itself to justify the inference of a difference in the thing that brings them about, because it also happens that things whose unity is a fact of perception have a plurality of effects, as the Buddhist himself pointed out to be the case with the illuminator at one point of time, and with a candle. The Self, Rāmakaṇṭha argued in Chapter 2, is something whose unity can be perceived, so the fact that it can illuminate a series of different objects in sequence in no way indicates that it is plural.

> *iti yugapatprakāśa iva na kramaprakāśe 'py arthabhedāsiddhiḥ.*
>
> Therefore there is no problem with establishing a plurality of objects in the case of illumination [of objects] in sequence just as [it is not problematic] in the case of illumination [of objects] simultaneously.

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[51] This is another example of Rāmakaṇṭha's seemingly tautologous usage of both *hi* and an ablative.

[52] Sections 3 and 4 of Chapter 2.

[53] The 'too' implies: as well as the sense-faculties, where it would be correct. The Self is parallel, rather, to a lamp in this respect.

[54] At least his remark in the previous text piece *na hi tatrāpi śakter bhāvābhāvabhedo 'sti ... tad atrāpi vastubhedāsiddheḥ* ... implied that he did. But the issue has been confused a little by his talk in the previous text piece of an accumulation of powers, and his acceptance here of *śaktibheda*. The solution I suggested was that he regards these powers as plural in the sense that they have a plurality of effects, but not plural in the sense that they cease to exist and give way to other new ones.

This concluding remark returns the reader to the wider context at this point of NPP, which is the Buddhist objection that if cognition is always the same, then cognition of blue and cognition of yellow should be exactly the same: the plurality of objects would not be established (*arthabhedāsiddhiḥ*). Rāmakaṇṭha has shown in the course of this passage that even though there is no difference between cognition of blue and cognition of yellow on the side of cognition/illumination itself, that does not mean that there is no difference on the side of its effects and its objects. The central point of the passage has been that since the Buddhist is prepared to accept that one cognition at one point in time can illuminate several different objects through different powers, he should accept that over a sequence of time the illumination of different objects through different powers can be carried out by one illumination.

Philosophical Summary

Rāmakaṇṭha and the Buddhist opponent in this passage are in agreement in their analyses of illumination at one point in time, in so far as they both accept a relation of one and many there.[55] The issue that separates them is that Rāmakaṇṭha accepts this relation of one and many over a sequence of time also, whereas for the Buddhist there is no one illumination or illuminator there, rather a plurality.

What reasons does the Buddhist give for this position? He argues that illumination cannot be single over time because the powers of illumination are not single over time. His reason for holding the latter is that the power of illumination of one object at one point in time is 'mutually exclusive' of the power of illumination of another object at the next point in time. By this he means that when the power of illumination at time t exists, the power of illumination at time t+1 does not, and cannot exist, and vice versa; or, to state the mutual exclusion in an object-oriented rather than a time-oriented way, that when a

[55] They both accept that in that case one thing (*vastu*), the illuminator, brings about several effects, the seeing of the different colours of an object, for example.

pot is illuminated for someone, a tree is not and cannot be illuminated for that person, and vice versa.

But for Rāmakaṇṭha this argument is circular. The Buddhist has not provided any independent criteria for treating illumination over time differently from illumination at one time. Why does he not hold the illumination of the blue part of a multicoloured object to be mutually exclusive of the illumination of the red part of it? The Buddhist holds that these two illuminations are compatible and can therefore be accumulated; but they are just as circumscribed as illuminations in two consecutive moments or of two consecutive objects. It is just that they are restricted to different points of space rather than different points of time. If the Buddhist cannot provide independent criteria for treating spatial illuminations as singular but temporal ones as plural, then he is being indefensibly inconsistent.

If the Buddhist claims that spatial illumination is also plural at one point of time, but unified by a conceptual cognition, then he is still not being consistent, for he is still accepting a unitary cognition over and above the plural illumination at one point of time, but accepting nothing over and above the plural illumination over time.

A feature of Buddhism that prevents it from accepting the existence of general illumination over and above the transitory instances of illumination of blue, illumination of yellow and so on, is that illumination is differentiated by its objects. This is as true for a Sautrāntika as it is for a Yogācāra. For the former, cognition may be different from its object, but it has the form of the object, so that it is impossible for the same cognition first to illuminate blue and then, in the next moment, yellow; for cognition is itself thereby changed. For Rāmakaṇṭha, on the other hand, illumination is unaffected by its objects, in the way that a light is unaffected by whatever objects pass within its range.

Could the Buddhist perhaps therefore underpin his reluctance to accept one cognition over time through arguments for the interdependence of objects and cognitions, given that the plurality of objects over time is disputed by no one?

He does indeed try this,[56] but it will not work, for at one point of time too there is a plurality of objects, or a plural object; so if he is prepared to accept a unitary cognition there he should be prepared to accept a unitary cognition over time.

A second, and even more basic, feature of Buddhism that prevents it from accepting an unchanging illumination separate from the transitory images of different objects is, of course, the doctrine of momentariness. For Buddhism it is simply the nature of a temporal sequence, but not necessarily of a spatial sequence at one point of time, that its elements are mutually exclusive. It is Buddhist doctrine that that which exists at time t is not the same thing as that which exists at time t+1. Whether we are talking of cognitions or objects, time divides things into distinct point instants. But Rāmakaṇṭha points out in this passage that though Buddhists uncompromisingly apply atomism to time, they do not do so to space: two colours occurring simultaneously and close to each other in space can be perceived by the same cognition; but two colours occurring consecutively in time cannot.

That cognition is in fact experienced by us as single over time was what Rāmakaṇṭha undertook to establish in his rhetorical passage in Chapter 2. He ridiculed the idea that we think with regard to our cognition in adjacent moments, 'that is not me and not mine'. The Buddhist held each cognition to be different since at any point in time the adjacent cognitions do not exist. But Rāmakaṇṭha would respond that their non-existence at the present moment of time is exactly analogous to the non-existence of the appearance of the blue part of an object at the spatial location of the red part of the object. If these two appearances can belong to one cognition, why cannot two adjacent moments of cognition be phases of one thing?

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[56] Which is why the first chapter of NPP, despite having as its primary purpose the establishment of the existence of the Self, contains so many pages taken up with the Buddhist view of the non-difference of perceiver and perceived. This interconnection of the issue of the existence of the Self with the question of whether the perceiver is distinct from the perceived was recognized by other authors, as witnessed by, for example, the fact that Udayana devotes one of the four chapters of his *Ātmatattvaviveka* to refuting the non-difference of perceiver and perceived.

2. The Self's Cognition and the Buddhi's Cognition

We will pick up the *Mataṅgavṛtti* passage at a point where the Buddhist opponent objects as follows.[57]

> 1 *nanv evaṃ grāhakātmano jñānarūpasyākṣaṇikatve 'pi 'pāde me vedanā, śirasi me vedanā,*[58] *sukhavedanā, duḥkhanāśo 'bhūd*[59] *bhaviṣyati vā' ity utpattyapavargayoḥ saṃvedanād anityataiva.*
>
> 1 Objection: But granting all of that (*nanv evam*), even though the perceiver, whose nature is cognition, is non-momentary, it is certainly not eternal (*anityataiva*) because we experience it to rise and cease in [such cases as] 'there is a sensation in my foot, there is a sensation in my head, there is a feeling of pleasure, [my] sorrow went away or it will go away'.

How can cognition be eternal when we can easily give examples of it that arise, endure for a while, and then pass away?

The opponent now quotes the *Vākyapadīya* to give a further illustration of different, discrete instances of cognition.

> *yad āhuḥ*[60]
>
> *ghaṭajñānam* iti[61] *jñānam ghaṭajñānavilakṣaṇam* |
> *ghaṭa ity api yaj jñānaṃ*[62] *viṣayopanipāti tat* || *iti.*
>
> As they say:
>
> The cognition that one is cognizing a pot (*ghaṭajñānam iti jñānam*) is different from cognition of a pot. And cognition of a pot[63] [, unlike

[57] Beginning at 172,7, introducing 6.34c–35a.

[58] *pāde me vedanā, śirasi me vedanā* is an old expression. It goes back at least to Maṇḍanamiśra (BS p. 7), and is found also at NM(M), Vol. 2, 469.

[59] *duḥkhanāśo 'bhūd* ed.; *duḥkhāśābhūd* ū, ṛ, ṝ.

[60] VāPa(I) 3.1.105.

[61] *iti* em.; *idam* ed. *iti* is the reading of the *Vākyapadīya*, and of the *Mataṅgavṛtti* when it quotes this verse at 175,7 ad 6.35b–d.

[62] *ity api yaj jñānaṃ* ed.; *ity abhi yaj jñānaṃ* ū; *ity abhivijñānaṃ* ṛ, ṝ.

[63] It is fairly clear that the verse (slightly confusingly) intends *ghaṭa ity jñānaṃ* in the third *pāda* to refer to exactly the same thing as *ghaṭajñāna*° in the second *pāda*. I thus for

cognition that we are cognizing a pot,] is in immediate contact with[64] the object.

We need not concern ourselves with the context of this verse in the *Vākyapadīya*. Nor is the precise nature of the difference that is mentioned between the kinds of cognition—the fact that one 'touches' the object and the other does not—of importance here.[65] Rāmakaṇṭha's opponent quotes it at this point just to show that *jñāna* is not single and eternally unchanging, because there are different kinds of it.

That concludes the objection, an answer to which will form the subject of all the four remaining sections of this passage.

2 *atrocyate*

6.34c–35a) *āśirolakṣaṇe*[66] *kāye yeyaṃ saṃvic citeḥ*[67] *sadā* ||
āhlāde vāpy athodvege

citiḥ grāhakātmā. yad vakṣyati[68] *'citeś cit sahajo dharma'.iti. tasyā āśiro*[69]*lakṣaṇe kāye viṣaye anekasmin yugapad yā saṃvid āhlāde*[70] *vāpy athodvege sukhaduḥkhādiviṣaye krameṇa sā sadā sarvakālam. yattador nityam abhisambandhāt sety anuvartate 'tra. tad ayam arthaḥ, na grāhyabhede 'pi grāhakātmā yugapad iva krameṇāpi bhinno 'vabhāsate.*

2 [Siddhāntin:] To this it is said:[71]

6.34c–35a) This cognition[72] that the perceiver has (*saṃvic citeḥ*) of the body from head to toe,[73] or of joy or fear, is always [there].

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the sake of clarity translate the different Sanskrit phrases with the same English expression.

[64] Literally, 'flies down to'.

[65] It could just be said in passing that Helarāja describes *ghaṭajñāna* as 'pot-formed cognition' (*ghaṭādyākāram jñānam*); and the other kind as making that into its object through *parāmarśa*. This differs from *ghaṭajñāna* in that it is not produced directly by the object (*sākṣād viṣayeṇājanitaḥ*) (VāPa(I) 103,3–5).

[66] *āśirolakṣaṇe* ed.; *aśirolakṣaṇe* ū, ṝ.

[67] *yeyaṃ saṃvic citeḥ* ed.; *ye saṃvittiś citeḥ* ū, ṝ; *yaṃ saṃvittiś citeḥ* ṛ.

[68] MatPā, *vidyāpāda* 6.81ab.

[69] *āśiro* ed.; *aśiro* ṝ.

[70] *saṃvid āhlāde* ed.; *cāhlāde* ū.

[71] I translate as Rāmakaṇṭha interprets it, not the way the author of the *Mataṅga* intends. For a suggestion for the latter, see note 76.

citi means the perceiver. As [the Lord] will say, 'cognition is an innate property of the perceiver (*citeḥ*)'.[74] The perceiver's (*tasyāḥ*) *cognition* is *always*, [that is to say,] exists at all times, [whether] with regard to *the body, from head to toe,* a plural object (*viṣaye*)[75] simultaneously, [or] sequentially with regard to such objects as pleasure and pain [which is the meaning of] *or of joy or fear* (*āhlāde vāpy athodvege*) [in the verse]. Because relative and correlative are always related, *sā* is brought down here.[76] So this is the meaning:

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[72] In my translation of NPP passages I translated *jñāna* as 'cognition' and *saṃvit* as 'consciousness'. I explained in note 23 of Chapter 3 that I could not find any evidence of difference of meaning, but that I used different English words for formal reasons in order to indicate to the reader that Rāmakaṇṭha is using different Sanskrit words. In the translation of this *Mataṅgavṛtti* passage, however, I translate both as cognition, for as I will show, it is quite clear that they are being used completely interchangeably.

[73] Literally 'which has as its characteristic [everything] up to the head'.

[74] Usually Rāmakaṇṭha describes consciousness/cognition as the Self or the nature of the Self. But the scriptures on which he comments sometimes make such claims as that consciousness is a property of the Self. Since for Rāmakaṇṭha, as I said above, there is no *dharmin* over and above its *dharmas*, he would deny that there is any significant difference between the two contentions.

I will not attempt to answer the question of whether Rāmakaṇṭha is correct that the *Mataṅga* means by *citi* the perceiver / the Self.

[75] The gloss *viṣaye* expresses that the reason for *kāye* being in the locative is that it is the object of the cognition.

[76] There is a *sā* in the preceding verse but it does not seem to be syntactically related to this phrase; and the *yā* here is picked up naturally by the *tām* in the next line. So it is unnatural of him to read again the *sā* and make *sadā* the predicate instead of just an adverb within the relative clause. What were the original intentions of the author of the Tantra in 34c–35 (*āśirolakṣaṇe kāye yeyaṃ saṃvic citeḥ sadā* || *āhlāde vāpy athodvege manaḥsaṅkalpitā satī* | *bubhoja bhoktā tāṃ paścād ahaṃ bhoktā na cānyathā* ||)? Here are two possibilities: 'The awareness of consciousness in the body from head to toe, being determined by the mind always, whether [in times of] joy or fear, is enjoyed by the enjoyer (*bubhoja bhoktā tām*) [who only] later [thinks] 'I was the enjoyer'; and [it does] not [happen] otherwise.' Alternatively one could take 35cd as 'I enjoyed [it], I will enjoy it later, I am the enjoyer [now]; and [it does] not [happen] otherwise.'

This verse is of some significance for attempting to identify the course of development of Śaiva Siddhānta teaching about the Self. As we have already seen, Rāmakaṇṭha does not think that the Self can be inferred, arguing instead that it is known directly through perception. In none of the other Saiddhāntika scriptures that predate Rāmakaṇṭha, am I aware of a claim that the Self can be perceived. Its existence is either asserted with-

just as at one moment of time (*yugapat*) the perceiver does not appear differentiated even though it may have different objects, so over a sequence of time too (*krameṇāpi*) [even though it may have different objects it does not appear differentiated].

Rāmakaṇṭha reads into this verse-segment the point he made in the NPP passage we have just looked at. He does so by taking the mention of the body as giving an example of an object of cognition at one point in time; 'from head to toe' as pointing to its plurality; and the mention of joy and fear as giving examples of sequential objects of cognition. Because we do not think of cognition as being plural just because it is simultaneously aware of different parts of the body, so the implication goes, why should it be plural over time when its objects change from joy to fear for example?

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He now defends further the position that cognition / the perceiver does not change over time, by giving a passage that is almost word-for-word identical to that examined in sections 3 and 4 of Chapter 2:

3 *api tu sarvadaiva grāhyopādhibhede 'py anāsvāditasvātmabhedaḥ, kālatraye 'pi tiraskṛtasvagataprāgabhāvapradhvaṃsābhāvaḥ, nānāvidhapramāṇādyanekacittavṛttyudayasaṃvedane 'py akampitatadgrāhakasthairyavedanaḥ, vṛttyantarāle 'py aviluptajyotiḥ, suṣuptādāv apy akhaṇḍitasvasaṃvit, satatam evārthāvagamakatvena bhāsanād ātmapadapratipādyaḥ pratipuruṣaṃ svasaṃvedanasiddhaḥ sthira eva,*[77] *iti kim atrānyena sādhanena. na hi 'uṣṇo 'gniḥ, śītaṃ himam' ityādau*[78] *pratyakṣavyatirekeṇānyat sādhanam upapadyate. tām eva cā*[79]*tmasaṃvidam abhinnām anapāyinīṃ cāśritya sarvaiḥ kālāntaraphalāni karmāṇy ārabhyante.* kṣaṇikatve[80] hi[81] *tasyāḥ sarvavyavahā-*

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out supporting evidence, or it is supported with inferences. In the *Parākhya* the question of how the Self can be known is explicitly asked, and the response contains only inferences. Does this *Mataṅga* verse put the view that the Self is perceived? Whether the Tantra means by *citi* the Self is not certain, but this verse does look as though it maintains that consciousness, at least, is directly perceived.

[77] *sthira eva* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *sthirabhāva* ed.

[78] *himam' ityādau* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *himam' ityādāv api* ed.; *himādāv' ity api* e.

[79] *eva cā* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *evā* ed.

[80] *kṣaṇikatve* conj. Sanderson; *kṣaṇikatvavad anityatve* ed.; *anityatve* a; *kṣaṇikatvavedinityatve* ū, ṛ, ṝ.

rapratyastamayaḥ, sarvajñānānāṃ jñānāntarotpattikāla eva dhvastatvāt[82] *kaḥ pravarteta*[83] *kutra*[84] *kimarthaṃ vā yataḥ. na ca tato 'nyat saṃvidrūpaṃ paśyāma ity uktam. tad ayam anapahnavanīya eva grāhakātmano jñānasya sarvadā sthirarūpaḥ prakāśo vyavahārahetubhūtaḥ kālāntarabhāviphalapravṛttikāraṇaṃ sarvair eva. na ca tatrāropaḥ sambhavatīty uktam. nāpi bādhaḥ*[85] *sarvam ālambane*[86] *bhrāntaṃ*[87] *na svātmani yataḥ.*[88] *nāpi sthirasyārthakriyānupapattir bādhakam,*[89] *arthabhedavyavasthānupapattir vety uktam. tat sthūlasūkṣmayor iva sthiratvāsthiratvayoḥ parasparaviruddharūpatvād vidyudādāv asthairyaṃ*[90] *siddhaṃ sat*[91] *sthairyaṃ vyāvartayati yathā, tadvad atra svātmany āropāsambhavena sthairyam avabhāsamānam asaṃśayaṃ asthairyaṃ vyavacchinatti, tṛtīyaprakārāsambhavād iti.*

There are only a small number of extra sentences there that do not occur in the passage translated and commented on in Chapter 2. The first is *na hy 'uṣṇo 'gniḥ, śītaṃ himam' ityādau pratyakṣavyatirekeṇānyat sādhanam upapadyate*, which simply underlines the contention that no further proof is needed to support something known by direct experience, by pointing out that it would be ridiculous to seek any proof, other than direct perception, of the facts that fire is hot or snow cold.

The second is *na ca tato 'nyat saṃvidrūpaṃ paśyāma ity uktam* ('and we have said that we do not see anything else of the nature of cognition beyond that). This is just the kind of sentence one finds repeatedly in Buddhist sources or Buddhist *pūrvapakṣa*s to deny that there is some other entity over and above momentary cognitions in which they reside. Rāmakaṇṭha himself uses this Buddhist sounding sentence to assert that he recognises only one thing, not two (a separate Self or perceiver and cognition) as Naiyāyikas and

[81] *hi* conj. Sanderson; *'pi* ed.

[82] *°kāla eva dhvastatvāt* ed.; *kāle 'stamayatvāt* 5 MSS; *kālāstamayasthatvāt* ai.

[83] *pravarteta* ed.; *pravartate* 4 MSS.

[84] *kutra* ed.; *ataḥ* a.

[85] *nāpi bādhaḥ* ū, ṛ, ṝ; omitted in the other MSS and in ed.

[86] *ālambane* 4 (non-Kashmirian) MSS; *ālambanaṃ* ed.

[87] *bhrāntaṃ* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *bhrāntir* ed.

[88] *yataḥ* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *kadācana iti* ed.

[89] *bādhakam* ū, ṛ, ṝ and 5 other MSS; *bādhikā* ed.

[90] *asthairyaṃ* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *asthairyatvaṃ* ed.

[91] *sat* ed.; om. in ṛ, ṝ; *sa°* ā, ū.

Vaiśeṣikas do. But since it follows a long description establishing that this one thing is stable rather than momentary, its upshot is that there is no momentary cognition beyond stable cognition. He turns a Buddhist principle against them to arrive at a non-Buddhist conclusion.

The third is *tad ayam anapahnavanīya eva grāhakātmano jñānasya sarvadā sthirarūpaḥ prakāśo vyavahārahetubhūtaḥ kālāntarabhāviphalapravṛttikāraṇaṃ sarvair eva*, which is no more than a summing up of what has been argued for up to there. It is worth using this sentence, though, to underline that Rāmakaṇṭha has no reservations about using the word *jñāna* to refer to that which shines forth as always the same. One could imagine that in response to the Buddhist objection that cognition (*jñāna*) can be seen to be non-eternal because we can easily point to transitory instances of it, such as sensations in various parts of the body, Rāmakaṇṭha would accept that there are momentary instances of *jñāna*, but differentiate them from, and relate them to, an unchanging cognition for which he reserves another word such as *saṃvit*. We will see that he does accept a category of changing cognition, but refers to it with either the word *saṃvit* or *jñāna*, as he refers to unchanging cognition with either of these words.

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There is one more feature of this passage that is not completely parallel in NPP. The NPP passage offered, as a possible reason for refuting (*bādhaka*) the stable shining forth of cognition, the impossibility of something stable having efficacity (*arthakriyā*). This passage mentions not only that but also a second possibility: *arthabhedavyavasthānupapattiḥ*, the impossibility of establishing a difference of objects [if cognition is stable]. Rāmakaṇṭha devotes enough time to answering this objection—in NPP principally, but also in other of his texts—to have enabled me to devote a whole chapter to looking into the problem. Considerations of time and space prevented me from doing so.

Instead I will simply give the first articulation of the objection in NPP.[92] It follows the passage we looked at in Chapter 2.

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[92] NPP introducing 1.6ab, p. 17,3–9. See also MatV VP ad 6.19c–21b, p. 151,6–9 for a short statement of this problem.

yady evaṃ grāhakātmanaḥ sarvārthān[93] *praty aviśeṣān nīlasyeyaṃ saṃvin na pītasyeti pratyarthaṃ saṃvidbhedāsiddhiḥ. na hi dvāv upalambhau staḥ, eko 'rthasyāparaś cātmanaḥ. ātmopalambhātmake ca viṣayopalambhe saty ātmano 'viśeṣāt tasyāpy aviśeṣaḥ. tataś cārthaviśeṣasyāpy*[94] *asiddher anubhavavirodhaḥ.*

If that were the case (i.e. if the Self shone forth always as the revealer of objects and as nothing other than cognition), then, because the perceiver would not differ with regard to each of its objects, one would not be able to establish [the way that] cognition differs in regard to [different] objects, [as when we say,] 'this is a cognition of blue, not of yellow'. For there are not two perceptions, one of the object and one of the Self. And given [therefore] that perception of the object is of the nature of perception of the Self,[95] [it follows that] because the Self does not differ, the [objects of perception] too would not differ. And because, therefore, even a difference of objects would not be established, we have an incompatibility with how things are experienced.

We came across this Buddhist line of thinking in the first part of this chapter. For we noted, in the NPP passage being examined there, the Buddhist assumption that a plurality of objects can only be illuminated by a plurality of illuminations. In the philosophical summary I pointed out that this is the case for Sautrāntikas, as well as obviously Yogācāras, because for the former cognition has the form of its objects. The idea is that objects would not be perceived unless they modified cognition in some way. How could cognition register the presence of the object if it remained unchanged and unaffected? Cognitions differ from each other precisely because they perceive different objects, and bear the marks of their objects. A Buddhist analogy compares cognition to fire, which differs according to the kind of fuel that produces it.

This idea that cognition is differentiated by its objects is more threatening to Rāmakaṇṭha than it is to those Ātmavādins who accept the existence of a further perceiving entity beyond cognition. For they have a place for both cognitions that do indeed differ with their objects, and a single perceiver. But if, as

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[93] *sarvārthān* Ked^{pc}, B, P; *sarvān* Ked^{ac}, Ped.

[94] °*viśeṣasyāpy* Ked, Ped, P; °*viṣayasyāpy* B.

[95] Rāmakaṇṭha does indeed hold that 'perception of the object is of the nature of perception of the Self' in that for him (as for Buddhism) it is the same cognition that reveals both its object and itself.

Rāmakaṇṭha holds, the perceiver is nothing more than cognition, so that cognition is unchanging, what is left to register objects? And if, as Rāmakaṇṭha holds, cognition of the perceiver (i.e. of itself) is not separate from cognition of the object, then given that the perceiver is always the same, how can we account for cognition of different objects? There is not space here to give a detailed account of all those parts of Rāmakaṇṭha's system that are relevant to a solution to this problem. I will just mention three points in passing.

1) The NPP passage looked at in the first part of this chapter was to a large extent an attempt to answer this objection. It did so by pointing out that when we perceive a multi-coloured object at one point in time, even the Buddhist accepts that cognition is single. Thus a plurality of objects should not have to mean a plurality of cognitions.

2) For Rāmakaṇṭha 'perceiving cognition' (*grāhakātmasaṃvit*) is not produced by its objects, as a fire is produced by its fuel. Rather it is the illuminator of whatever objects happen to come within its range. Thus its relation to objects is like the relation of a light to objects within its range: it exists independently from them, does not cease even when none are there, and is not changed by them.

3) The function of 'registering', in the sense of being modified by, objects is assigned not to perceiving cognition but to the Buddhi. This takes on the form of the object and presents it to the perceiver, who illuminates it with the help of a further instrument, Vidyā, one of a group of *tattva*s known as the cuirasses (*kañcuka*s),[96] higher up the scale than Buddhi. The Buddhi is an important enabler of the unchanging nature of perceiving cognition, as we will see in more detail presently.

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Let us return now to the *Mataṅgavṛtti* passage. Rāmakaṇṭha has thus far argued that perceiving cognition is unchanging. He has not yet dealt with the specific question of how seeming instances of changing cognition, such as pleasure, pain or bodily sensations, can be accounted for on that picture. He now addresses the problem of the relationship between unchanging and per-

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[96] For more about these see page 82.

manent cognition, i.e. the perceiver, and pleasure and pain and the like, which are certainly changing, and which are commonly referred to as cognitions.

4 *ata eva nāhlādodvegādīnāṃ saṃviddharmatvam,*[97] *tadapāye 'pi*[98] *saṃvido 'napāyāt, api tu saṃvedyatvam eva.*

4 That is precisely why[99] pleasure and pain and the like are not properties of cognition, because cognition does not cease even though they cease / when they cease. Rather they are just objects of cognition.

If pleasure and pain were properties of cognition, then, given Rāmakaṇṭha's view that there is no property-possessor over and above properties, the transitoriness of pleasure and pain would mean the transitoriness of cognition; so they are not its properties but its objects.

What the Buddhist encompasses under the single terms *jñāna* or *saṃvit*, Rāmakaṇṭha sees as having two components: an unchanging perceiver, and its objects such as pleasure and pain.

yad api[100]

aviśeṣe 'pi bāhyasya viśeṣāt prītitāpayoḥ |
bhāvanāyā viśeṣeṇa nārtharūpāḥ sukhādayaḥ ||

iti teṣāṃ saṃviddharmatvā[101]*numānam, tad api pratyakṣaviruddhatvād*[102] *ayuktam eva, bhāvanāviśeṣeṇa buddhiviśeṣasiddhyā*[103] *teṣāṃ viśeṣasyānyathāsiddhatvāc ca.*

As for the inference that they are properties of cognition—

Because pleasure and pain differ [between people],[104] owing to a difference of mental predisposition (*bhāvanā*), even when the external [object] is the same, pleasure and the like are not of the nature of objects [but rather properties of cognition]—

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[97] *saṃviddharmatvam* ed.; *taddharmatvam* a, ā, ī, u, e, ai.

[98] *tadapāye 'pi* ed.; *tadapāye* ai.

[99] I.e. because *saṃvit* is *sthira*.

[100] *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1.23 (identified in Stern 1991).

[101] °*dharmatvā*° ed.; °*dharmā*° a, ṛ.

[102] *pratyakṣaviruddhatvād* ed.; *pratyakṣatvād* ū, ṛ; *apratyakṣaviruddhatvād* e.

[103] *siddhyā* ed.; *siddhā* a, ū.

[104] Perhaps this verse could also mean that there is a difference of pleasure, pain and the like in one person when confronted by the same object at different times, not necessarily between different people.

> that is also certainly incorrect because it is contradicted by direct experience;[105] and because their (i.e. pleasure, pain and the like's) difference can be otherwise established by establishing a difference of *buddhis*[106] on account of a difference in mental predisposition.

Dharmakīrti's inference points to the fact that some get pleasure from exactly the same external object that causes others pain, because their mental conditioning differs. One person may find the midday sun pleasurable while another may find it oppressive. This indicates that pleasure and pain are more subjective than inert objects impinging on cognition from outside, uncontrollable by it, and not compromising its unchanging nature. For if something can be manipulated through conditioning the mind, then it would seem to be internal to cognition, not separate from it.

Rāmakaṇṭha's second response (his first being to adduce direct perception) is that, while this consideration may indicate that pleasure and pain are not firmly connected to the external object, it does not show that they belong to cognition (*saṃvit*), i.e. the perceiver. For there is a third possibility: that they are connected to the Buddhi and the determinative cognition that it produces. The fact that pleasure and pain differ between people does not reflect any difference of cognition in the sense of the perceiver, but simply a difference of *buddhis*. It is this difference of *buddhis* that differences of mental conditioning can bring about, not any difference in cognition proper (i.e. the perceiver), which looks on to pleasure and pain and the like without in any way being changed by them. The perceiving cognition of one person in the midday sun is just the same as anyone else's in the midday sun.

Thus pleasure and pain differ because they are dependent on *buddhis*, which means they can be kept out of the realm of perceiving cognition and on the

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[105] I presume the claim is that pleasure and pain can be directly experienced to be objects of perception, not properties of the perceiver.

[106] The word *buddhi* is ambiguous. It can mean the faculty (in which case I either translate 'Intellect' or simply write 'Buddhi') or that which the faculty produces, namely determinative cognitions (*adhyavasāya*). Thus what could be being referred to here is either that different people's Intellects differ, or that their determinative cognitions differ. In order to leave both possibilities open I talk, in my exegesis of this sentence, in terms of a difference of *buddhis*.

object side of the divide (*saṃvedya*).[107] The Buddhi plays a crucial role for Rāmakaṇṭha in that it can account for changes and differences in what many would call cognition (*jñāna*), allowing cognition in the sense of the perceiver to remain unchanging. As an intermediary between external objects and cognition proper, it can account for the subjective aspect of things like pleasure and pain despite them being objects of cognition.[108]

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[107] If the form they take is dependent on *buddhi*s, how can they be objects? Are not objects independent from, and therefore unaffected by, the instruments of perceiving subjects? Determinative cognitions, which characterize the Buddhi, have their own objects, but they are also themselves perceived by the Self according to Śaivism, i.e. they are its objects. Thus Rāmakaṇṭha would be able to hold both that pleasure and pain are objects and that they are affected by differences in *buddhi*s in one of two ways. Either he could hold that pleasure and pain are the objects of determinative cognitions, or that they *are* determinative cognitions. In the latter case it is easy to see why they would be affected by differences in people's Buddhis: the Buddhi would be that which produces them. How about in the former case? There one could say that the Buddhi causes the determinitive cognition to rise with a certain kind of object: pleasure if it has been conditioned in a certain way, pain if in another.

[108] In accord with his argumentation here, Rāmakaṇṭha holds at NPP ad 1.72 (110,10–15) that pleasure, pain, passion (*rāga*) etc. are not qualities of the Self, but belong to *prakṛti*. However he seems to have compromised this view elsewhere. For he glosses *bhoktā* in MatV VP 6.12a as *rāgadveṣecchādyāśrayabhūtaḥ*. Similarly he glosses *jñātā* in 6.13cd as *rāgadveṣādyāśrayabhūto draṣṭā*. To claim that the experiencer/perceiver is the substrate of passion, aversion and desire conflicts explicitly with what he says of passion in the NPP passage just mentioned; and it seems to conflict with what he says of pleasure and pain both there and in the passage under comment, for it is natural to assume that pleasure and pain fall within the same category as passion, aversion and desire—he treats passion with pleasure and pain in the NPP passage.

This conflict can be partly explained as a result of a difference of context. There he is arguing not against Buddhists but against the Cārvāka view that the perceiver is simply the body. Thus he needs to establish the existence of an immaterial Self. Since passion, desire and aversion are considered by most to be immaterial, their substrate will also be immaterial. So to regard them there as properties of the perceiver, rather than its objects, serves his purpose well. His motive for claiming pleasure and pain to be objects of cognition here, namely the need to demonstrate that cognition itself is unchanging, is not present there.

It is interesting to note that two of the Kashmirian manuscripts and a third non-Kashmirian one omit the *ādi* in the first gloss. One possible explanation is that a trans-

The wider context here is still the claim that the perceiver / cognition (*grāhakātmā jñānarūpaḥ*) is not eternal, because things like pleasure, pain or bodily sensations can be seen to rise and pass away. Let us briefly cast our eye back over Rāmakaṇṭha's response so far. He first argued (through exegesis of the verse) that *saṃvit*, an innate property of the perceiver, is always there (both simultaneously and sequentially). He then summarised this as making the point that the perceiver (*grāhakātmā*) appears (*avabhāsate*) as undivided (both simultaneously and sequentially) despite having different objects. In the long passage in section 3, which occurred also in Chapter 2, he referred to this stable appearance of the perceiver (or appearance of a stable perceiver) as *grāhakasthairyavedana*, *ātmasaṃvit* and *jñānasya prakāśaḥ*. In section 4 he removed the threat to the unchanging nature of *saṃvit* that would result if pleasure and pain were its properties. Thus so far he has dealt with the Buddhist objection by interpreting *jñāna/saṃvit* to refer to that which perceives, and by showing that that never changes and that anything that does change (e.g. pleasure and pain) is not that or its properties, but rather its objects.

He now makes explicit that that is what he has done before moving on to a different interpretation of *jñāna/saṃvit.*

> 5.1 *evaṃ ca*[109] *jñānaśabdena bhavatāṃ*[110] *yady atra grāhakātmasaṃvid eva vivakṣitā tadāsiddho*[111] *hetuḥ, tatrotpattyapavargayoḥ saṃvedanābhāvād*[112] *yugapatpratibhāsa iva*[113] *kramapratibhāse 'pi prameyabhedena*[114] *ghaṭa*[115]*-jñānādibhedasya*[116] *kalpitatvād iti.*

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mittor of the text removed the *ādi* because he took it to refer to *jñāna*, something that Rāmakaṇṭha denies to have as substrate (*āśraya*) the Self many more times than he denies the same of pleasure and pain.

[109] *evaṃ ca* ed.; om. a, ā, ī, u, e, ai.

[110] °*śabdena bhavatāṃ* ed.; °*śabde ca bhavatāṃ* ṝ.

[111] *tadāsiddho* ed.; *tad apy siddho* ū, ṛ.

[112] °*ābhāvād* ed.; °*abhāvād* a, ā.

[113] *iva* ed.; *eva* ai.

[114] °*bhedena* ed.; °*bhede 'pi* ū, ṛ, ṝ.

[115] *ghaṭa*° ed.; om. a, ā, ī, u, e, ai.

[116] °*bhedasya* ū, ṛ, ṝ; °*bhedasyātra* ed.

> 5.1 And thus if by the word *jñāna* you intend here actually (*eva*) perceiving cognition,[117] then the logical reason is unproved;[118] because we do not experience (*saṃvedanābhāvāt*) rising and ceasing in that [perceiving cognition], because the difference between a cognition of a pot and other [cognitions] (*ghaṭajñānādibhedasya*)[119] is [falsely] imagined (*kalpita*) on the basis of a difference of object of knowledge (*prameya*), even in the sequential appearance [of cognition], just like in its appearance at one time.[120]

Again he alludes to the commonly accepted unity of cognition at one point in time to render more plausible its unity over time. The things that do rise and pass away, now the sensation in my foot, now the sensation in my head, are simply objects of cognition. If we think cognition differs we are mistakenly extrapolating from a difference of its objects to a difference of itself: we arrive at that judgement not through *saṃvedana* but through *kalpanā*.

Having dealt with the possibility that the opponent meant by cognition that changes, perceiving cognition (*grāhakātmasaṃvit*), he now introduces a second possibility that determinative cognition (*adhyavasāya*) was intended.

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[117] Literally, 'cognition, whose nature is the perceiver'.

[118] The logical reason here is the statement from the beginning of this passage that we experience the rise and passing away of *jñāna* (and the conclusion is that *jñāna* is non-eternal).

[119] He could be referring here to the difference between *ghaṭajñāna* and *ghaṭajñāna iti jñāna* perhaps, if he is thinking of the *Vākyapadīya* verse; or the difference between cognition of a pot and cognition of a cloth or such like.

[120] The reading of the Kashmirian MSS—°*bhede 'pi*—is possible and could be translated as either, 'because we do not experience rising and ceasing in that [perceiving cognition], because the difference between a cognition of a pot and other [cognitions] is [falsely] imagined despite a difference of object of knowledge, even in the sequential appearance [of cognition], just like in its appearance at one time'; or '... because [we] do not experience rising and ceasing in that [perceiving cognition] even in the sequential appearance [of cognition], just like in its appearance at one time, even though there is a difference of object of knowledge, because the difference between a cognition of a pot and other [cognitions] is [falsely] imagined'. The first of these seems more likely given the word order of the Sanskrit, but seems to have less force than if we accept *prameyabhedena*.

atha tadgrahaṇottarakālabhāvinī yādhyavasāyātmikā[121] *saṃvit sātra*[122] *jñāna-śabdenocyata iti, tatrāpy ucyate*[123] *manaḥsaṅkalpitetyādi.*

If cognition that is of the nature of a determinative cognition,[124] taking place subsequent to the grasping by that [perceiving cognition], is denoted here by the word *jñāna*, in response to that [position], for its part (*api*), the [next verse segment] beginning, 'determined by the mind', is taught.

6.35b–d) *manaḥsaṅkalpitā satī* |
bubhoja bhoktā tāṃ[125] *paścād ahaṃ bhoktā na cānyathā*[126] ||

saiva grāhakātmasaṃvin manaḥpraṇidhānena viṣayīkṛtā satī yadā bhavati tadā tām evātmā paścād[127] *arthagrahaṇottarakālaṃ bubhoja*[128] *bhuktavān. bhogasya*[129] *saṃvedanātmakatvāt,*[130] *'ghaṭam ahaṃ jānāmi'*[131] *ityādāv iva*[132] *ahaṃ iti parāmarśena viṣayīkṛtavān ity arthaḥ. tasya gauro*[133] *'ham ityādiviśeṣaṇayuktasya*[134] *śarīrādiviṣayatvena nirviśeṣaṇasya*[135] *nānyathopapattir yataḥ.*

6.35b–d) The enjoyer enjoyed that [perceiving cognition] later, when it is determined by the mind, [thinking] I am the enjoyer. And it is not otherwise.

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[121] *yādhyavasāyātmikā* ed.; *yādhyavasāyātmaka*° a; *yā vyavasāyātmikā* ū, ṝ; *yā vyavasāyātmika*° ṛ.

[122] *sātra* ed.; *manasātra* ā.

[123] *tatrāpy ucyate* ed.; *tatrocyate* a, ī, u, ū.

[124] The fact that Rāmakaṇṭha uses the word *saṃvit* here to refer to determinative cognition should remove any lingering suspicion we may have that, though he uses *jñāna* to refer to both that which changes and that which does not (determinative cognition and non-conceptual cognition), he reserves *saṃvit* for the latter of these two pairs. Rather both words can, in different contexts, refer to either.

[125] *bhoktā tāṃ* ed.; *bhoktṛtāṃ* u.

[126] *na cānyathā* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *ca nānyathā* ed.

[127] *paścād* ed.; *paścād iti* ā, ī, u, ṛ, ṝ, e, ai.

[128] *bubhoja* ed.; *bubhojeti* ū, ṛ, ṝ.

[129] *bhogasya* ed.; *bhogyasya* ai.

[130] *saṃvedanātmakatvāt* ed.; *asaṃvedanātmakatvāt* ū; *saṃvedanātmatvāt* ṛ.

[131] *jānāmi* ed.; *vedmi* ā, ī, u, ū, ṛ, ṝ, e, ai.

[132] *iva* ed.; *eva* ū, ṛ, ṝ.

[133] *gauro* ed.; *paro* ū, ṛ, ṝ.

[134] *viśeṣaṇayuktasya* ed.; *viśeṣayuktasya* ā.

[135] *nirviśeṣaṇasya* ā, ī, u, e, ai; *nirviśeṣeṇa* ed.; *viśeṣaṇasya* ū, ṛ, ṝ.

As for that very perceiving cognition, *being* (*satī*), i.e. when (*yadā*) it is, made into an object by the employment of the *mind*, the Self *experienced*[136] *it later*, i.e. subsequent to the perception of the object.[137] Because experience is of the nature of cognition,[138] the meaning is that [the Self] made [the perceiving cognition] into an object through the awareness '*I*' as [a pot or such like is made into an object] in such cases as 'I am aware of a pot'.[139] For that [verbal cognition 'I' when] unqualified[140] is not appropriate except as [referring to the perceiver], since [only when][141] linked with a qualification as in 'I am fair' does it have as its object the body or such like.

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[136] *bubhoja* is glossed with the synonymous *bhuktavān*.

[137] The English in that sentence is awkward. Part of the reason is an awkwardness in the Sanskrit; for Rāmakaṇṭha is trying to derive a meaning from the verse that would be more natural if °*saṅkalpitā* and *satī* were in the accusative rather than the nominative. For suggestions for the original meaning of the verse see note 76. The reason for the nominatives seems to be that they are agreeing with the relative *yā saṃvit* in the previous verse segment, which is then picked up by the correlative *tām* in this verse-segment. But Rāmakaṇṭha wishes to sever that relative from this verse-segment by taking it as going with a *sā* from verse 34a rather than with the *tām* here.

[138] Rāmakaṇṭha states here that *bhoga* is of the nature of *saṃvedana* to justify speaking in terms of *parāmarśa* about what the verse speaks of in terms of *bhoga*. Thus it is clear that this is a case where Rāmakaṇṭha uses the term *saṃvedana* not to refer specifically to non-conceptual cognition, as he frequently does, but to cognition in general, including *parāmarśa*.

The Śaiva concern with equating *bhoga* and (*saṃ*)*vedana* goes back to the *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha*: *bhogo 'sya vedanā puṃsaḥ sukhaduḥkhādilakṣaṇā* (SvSūSa 1.12ab).

[139] We could accept the variant *eva* for *iva*, in which case 'I am aware of the pot' would be intended as an example of the Self being made into an object, not an object being made into an object. But I accept the reading of the edition here, and not that of the Kashmirian manuscripts, for two reasons. First, *eva* would be completely redundant. Secondly, according to the definition of I-cognition (*aham iti parāmarśaḥ*) that Rāmakaṇṭha is giving here, it is something that happens after the perception of an object. What form would it take? *ātmānam* (/*saṃvidam*) *ahaṃ jñānāmi* perhaps. Or simply the phrase from the verse *ahaṃ bhoktā*.

[140] Unqualified here means that it does not occur in apposition with things like fair, dark, fat, thin.

[141] It is possible that this sentence is corrupt. The only way I can make it yield satisfactory sense is by adding in this 'only when' in square brackets. Rāmakaṇṭha makes the

After cognition perceives an object we can then make that perceiving cognition itself into an object through the verbal cognition 'I'.

Before the verse-segment, Rāmakaṇṭha signalled that the discussion would now turn to the question of whether determinative cognition (that being a possible interpretation of *jñāna* in the Buddhist objection) changes. He led us to believe that the verse would address that. But in fact the verse (as interpreted by him) is not about determinative cognition in general but I-cognition; and not about whether it changes, but about the way in which it grasps the perceiver. This is a symptom of the fact that Rāmakaṇṭha's agenda in his commentary at this point is not that of the verses. He is superimposing on them a discussion of whether cognition changes, cognition being interpreted in two different ways. It would have been extremely difficult and distortive, when glossing this verse-segment, to present it as addressing that question, so he interprets it (mildly distortively, but less so) as arguing that the Self can be perceived through I-cognition, and then returns to the question of whether determinative cognition changes below (in 5.2). His concern in this section (5.1), then, is to describe this process whereby subsequent to perceiving an object the Self makes itself, i.e. makes *saṃvit*, into an object, in the verbal cognition 'I'; and to establish that this is a genuine case of direct perception.

> *so 'pi ca parāmarśapratyayaḥ*[142] *pratyakṣa eva.*
>
> And that verbal cognition is certainly direct perception too.

> *yad āhuḥ*[143]
>
> > *asti hy ālocanajñānaṃ*[144] *prathamaṃ nirvikalpakam |*
> > *bālamūkādivijñānasadṛśaṃ śuddhavastujam ||*

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point made in this sentence (assuming I have interpreted it correctly) and argues for it in more detail, in section 1.2.1 of Chapter 3.

142 *so 'pi ca parāmarśapratyayaḥ* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *so 'pi parāmarśaḥ* ed.

143 ŚV(P_2) 1.1.4 (*pratyakṣa* chapter) 112 and 120.

144 *ālocanajñānaṃ* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *ālocanaṃ jñānaṃ* ed. The former is preferred on the grounds that *ālocana* is not attested as an adjective. The variants of the *Ślokavārttikā* editions, and of the other quotations of this verse by Rāmakaṇṭha, are given in section 3 of Chapter 3. In the NPP passage being looked at there, and in a passage in a later chapter of

tataḥ paraṃ punar vastu dharmair jātyādibhir yayā |
buddhyāvasīyate sāpi pratyakṣatvena saṃmatā || iti.

As [Kumārila] says:[145]

For there is seeing-cognition, which [arises] first, lacks concepts, is similar to the cognitions of children, dumb people and the like, and is produced from the pure object.

The determinative cognition, by which after that the object is further determined through its properties such as [the] class [to which it belongs], is also held to be direct perception.

tataś ca ghaṭo 'yam itivad anubhavapṛṣṭhabhāvinā niścayapratyayena viṣayīkṛtatvād[146] *ātmāpi pratyakṣeṇa niścita*[147] *eva.*

And therefore because [the Self] is made into an object by a determining cognition[148] like 'this is a pot', which comes after a [perceptual] experience,[149] the Self too is certainly determined by direct perception.

This sentence is ambiguous because it is not possible to be sure whether *ghaṭo 'yam itivad* is intended as an example of *anubhava* or *niścayapratyaya*. If the former (in which case I would take *ghaṭo 'yam itivadanubhavapṛṣṭhabhāvinā* as all one compound), then I would translate as, 'And therefore because [the Self] is made into an object by a determining cognition, which comes after a [perceptual] experience like "this is a pot" ...'. The point would be that after the non-conceptual perception, 'this is a pot', we form a determinative cognition of the form, 'I am looking at a pot', in which the Self becomes an object. But it seems slightly more pointed if we translate as I have done, and assume the implication to be that just as the determining cognition 'this is a pot', which comes after the non-conceptual perception of a pot, is

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the *Mataṅgavṛtti* that is given on page 370, I judge Rāmakaṇṭha to have quoted this verse with the reading *ālocanājñānam.* But I would not consider it justified to emend to that here, given the unproblematic reading of the Kashmīri manuscripts.

145 I translate these verses in exactly the same way as I did in section 3 of Chapter 3, and do not bother to repeat the annotation to the translation, which can be seen there.

146 *viṣayīkṛtatvād* ed.; *viṣayīkṛtatvena* a, ā, ī, u, e, ai.

147 *niścita* ed.; *niścīyata* a.

148 *niścayapratyaya* is here synonymous with *parāmarśa* or *adhyavasāya.*

149 *anubhava* here refers to what the verse referred to as *ālocanajñāna*, i.e. preconceptual experience.

readily admitted to directly perceive that which is described in it, namely a pot, so the determining cognition in which 'I' becomes an object should be admitted to directly perceive the Self.[150]

5.2 *tasya ca*[151] *parāmarśātmano jñānasyotpattyapavargayogasiddhāv api buddhyahaṅkāradharmatvena vyadhikaraṇatvān na*[152] *grāhakātmany anitya-tvasādhane sāmarthyam. yathā* caitat tathā[153] *buddhyahaṅkāraprakaraṇayor vakṣyāmaḥ.*

5.2 And even though that cognition that is of the nature of verbal determination is proved to rise and pass away, [it] is not capable of proving the non-eternality of the perceiver, because it occurs in a different locus [from the perceiver] in that it is a property of the Buddhi and the Ahaṅkāra. And how this is so we will show in the sections dealing with the Buddhi and the Ahaṅkāra.[154]

Here he reverts to the question that he signalled, before the last verse-segment, would be addressed, namely whether determinative cognition in general, not specifically I-cognition, changes or not. His response is that it does indeed, but that, since it is a property of the Buddhi and Ahaṅkāra, it cannot allow us to infer anything about the perceiver, so it does not help the Buddhist objection.

tadapekṣayā ca
ghaṭajñānam iti jñānaṃ ghaṭajñānavilakṣaṇam |
ityādijñāna[155]*bhedo vāstava evety avirodhaḥ.*

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[150] The first of these two interpretations is more suitable if we accept the variant *eva* above, and the second if we accept, as I did, *iva.* See note 139.

[151] *ca* ed.; om. in ū and ṛ.

[152] *vyadhikaraṇatvān na* ed.; *vyadhikaraṇāsiddhatvān na* ā, ī, u, e; *vyadhikaraṇa-siddhatvān nanu* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *viṣayīkaraṇasiddhatvān na* ai.

[153] *caitat tathā* diagnostic conj. Isaacson; *cāsya* ed.

[154] I.e. the 17th and 18th *paṭala*s respectively.

[155] °*jñāna* ed.; °*vijñāna* ū, ṛ, ṝ.

> And with reference to that,[156] the difference of cognition [noted in] such [claims] as
>
> > the cognition that one is cognizing a pot is different from cognition of a pot
>
> are indeed real. Therefore there is no contradiction.[157]

In 5.1 he said that if by cognition we mean perceiving cognition, then the difference between cognition of a pot and other kinds of cognition is falsely imagined (since all that differs is the objects of cognition). This claim admits that a determinative cognition of a pot is indeed different from determinative cognitions of other objects and from non-conceptual cognition. Either way that which changes is not the perceiver, which looks on unaffected.[158]

Having dealt with the question of whether determinative cognition changes, he now concludes this passage with one sentence that returns to the question of how the Self is perceived.

> *evaṃ svaparātmaprakāśakatayā jñānaśaktirūpeṇa parāmarśāc cātmā*[159] *pratyakṣa uktaḥ.*
>
> Thus the Self is said to be directly perceptible through [its] power of cognition[160] as the revealer of its own and other people's Selves;[161] and from verbal awareness.

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[156] I.e. with reference to determinative cognition, as opposed to cognition in the sense of the perceiver.

[157] I.e. there is no contradiction between the claim of this *Vākyapadīya* verse and Rāmakaṇṭha's claim that (perceiving) cognition is the same at all times.

[158] To respond to a Buddhist claim about *jñāna* by first interpreting it to mean the perceiver, and then *adhyavasāya* is something we have observed Rāmakaṇṭha to do elsewhere. In the previous chapter (p. 262), his response to the Buddhist argument that blue and cognition of blue are not different, because they are invariably perceived together, was to show first that cognition of blue in the sense of the *prakāśaka* of blue sometimes occurs without blue, and then that the same is true of the *bauddhādhyavasāya* 'blue'.

[159] *parāmarśāc cātmā* ed.; *parāmarśaś cātmā* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *parāthaś cātmā* e; *parāmarśātmā* ai.

[160] My translation would perhaps be more natural if the text read *jñānaśaktyā* in place of *jñānaśaktirūpeṇa*. Perhaps it would be better to interpret the latter as if it read *jñānaśaktirūpatvena*: '... said to be directly perceivable in the form of [its] power of cognition ...'.

The Self's power of cognition, which is both single and the illuminator (*prakāśaka*), and this power's perception of itself, are what were described in section 3. The Self's perception of itself through *parāmarśa*—which is not single, but plural and changing—was what was described in 5.1.

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Reading this subsection (5.2) alone we might wonder how, if common instances of cognition such as *ghaṭajñāna* occur in a completely different locus from the perceiver, Rāmakaṇṭha's perceiver is of the nature of cognition? It would seem to be no more of the nature of cognition than a Naiyāyika Self. In fact the distance between cognition and the Self now seems even greater than in Nyāya, for whom cognition at least occurs in the Self.

But if we remember that Rāmakaṇṭha in this subsection is talking only of determinative cognition, then we can assume that non-conceptual cognition occurs in the Self, and deduce that all Rāmakaṇṭha's mentions of cognition as the nature of the Self, or the same as the Self, refer to non-conceptual cognition.

That this is the case is stated explicitly in parallel passages in: 1) KV,[162] where determinative cognition is distinguished from non-conceptual cognition and the latter is described as *pauruṣa* and *grāhakarūpa*; and 2) the *Buddhiprakaraṇa* of the MatV VP,[163] to which Rāmakaṇṭha has just referred the reader.

> 1) *ataś ca jñānasyāpi guṇatvāsiddhes tadrūpa evātmā siddha ity uktam. tarhi jñānasyānityatvena saṃvedanād anityatvam asya. tad ayuktam, dvividhaṃ hi*

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[161] It reveals its own Self in self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) and other people's through carrying out inference (*anumāna*). While doing the latter it is aware of itself as the inferrer (*anumātṛ*). See for example MatV VP ad 2.1, p. 22,8–9: *sa ca sarvārthaprakāśakatayā parātmānumātṛtvena* [*parātmānumātṛtvena* ed.; *paramātmāṇumātratvena* a; *parānumātratvena* ā, e; *parātmānumātratvena* ī, u, ḷ] *ca pratyātmānaṃ svasaṃvedanasiddho bhinna eva nityo vyāpakaś ca. bhinnaḥ* there does not of course mean that it is plural over time, but rather that souls are distinct from each other, unlike in the view of Vedānta or non-dualistic Śaivism.

[162] Ad 2.25ab, p. 53,10–54,17.

[163] Ad 17.2, p. 382,12–1b.

jñānam, adhyavasāyātmakam itarac ca. tatra yad adhyavasāyātmakaṃ tad buddhidharmatvenāsmābhir apy anityam iṣyata eva. yad anadhyavasāyātmakaṃ pauruṣaṃ saṃvedanātmakaṃ jñānam, tasya na kadācid apy abhāvaḥ saṃvedyate, sarvadaiva grāhakarūpatayaikarūpeṇa saṃvedanāt. nāpi tasya krameṇārthakriyānupapattir ityādi sarvaṃ darśitam asmābhir nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśe vistareṇeti tata evāvadhāryam.

Goodall translates,[164]

'And so, because knowledge too has not been proved to be a [separable][165] quality, it is established that the soul has the form of knowledge. This is what is taught.[166] But in that case (*tarhi*), because we experience knowledge as transient, the soul (*asya*) too[167] must be transient. This is wrong. For there are two kinds of knowledge: that which is of the nature of mental apprehension (*adhyavasāyātmakam*) and other [knowledge]. Of these two (*tatra*) that which is mental apprehension we too hold to be transient, because it is a quality of the *buddhi* (*buddhidharmatvena*). That which is not mental apprehension is knowledge that is of the nature of experience (*saṃvedanātmakam*) and belongs to the human condition (*pauruṣam*). An absence of that is never experienced, because it is at all times experienced as that which perceives and as one. Nor is it impossible that it produces effects in sequence—all this we have shown at length in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, and it must be understood from there.'[168]

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[164] Goodall 1998 253.

[165] I would have omitted this word.

[166] It may be that Rāmakaṇṭha is there referring back to previous parts of his commentary. Some possibilities are: *api tv ātmanaś ciddharmatvena* ... ad 2.14cd, p. 44,17; ... *tasya ciddharmatvena vakṣyamāṇatvāt* ... ad 2.16–17, p. 46,2; *yady evaṃ cidrūpa evātmā pāśyo vyavasthita* ... ad 2.22, p. 51,1; or the following sentence at the beginning of his commentary to the the verse with which he is currently dealing. *cit jñānam eva dharmaḥ svabhāvo yasya sa tathābhūtaḥ* † *pumity anubhavati sarvam iti pumān* †. Goodall translates, 'That whose own nature (*svabhāvaḥ = dharmaḥ*) is knowledge (*jñānam = cit*) is called soul (*pumān*) because he experiences everything,' adding a note that he has not found a root from which *pumiti* could derive, and that this belongs to a group of sentences that may be an interpolation.

[167] I would have put 'too' in square brackets.

[168] Goodall inserts a footnote at this point saying, 'It is difficult to pick out particular passages that Rāmakaṇṭha must be referring to, because these topics are dealt with at considerable length. For the refutation of the view that all things that exist produce effects

2) *dvividho hi bodho bhāvānām adhyavasāyātmako 'nadhyavasāyarūpaś ca. yad āhuḥ*:

asti hy ālocanājñānaṃ prathamaṃ nirvikalpakam |
bālamūkādivijñānasadṛśaṃ śuddhavastujam ||

tataḥ paraṃ punar vastu dharmair jātyādibhir yayā |
buddhyāvasīyate sāpi pratyakṣatvena saṃmatā || iti.

tatra yo 'nadhyavasāyātmakaḥ sa sarvadā grāhakarūpeṇaiva bhāsamāna ātmasvabhāva evety uktaṃ pumpāśeśvaraprakaraṇe. yas tv adhyavasāyarūpaḥ sa utpannāpavargitvenāvabhāsamāno na puṃsvabhāvaḥ, nityasyānityasvabhāvatvāyogāt, tatsvabhāvatve vā nityatvaprasaṅgāt saṃvedanasyeva. na ca nityo 'nubhūyate. tato na puṃsaḥ svabhāvaḥ, iti yasya svabhāvaḥ sā buddhiḥ bhāvānām adhyavaseyatotpādikā, na tāṃ vinā teṣām adhyavaseyatā sambhavati yataḥ.[169]

For there are two kinds of cognition of objects, that of the nature of determinative cognition and that not of the nature of determinative cognition. As [Kumārila] says:[170]

> For there is seeing-cognition, which [arises] first, lacks concepts, is similar to the cognitions of children, dumb people and the like, and is produced from the pure object.
>
> The determinative cognition, by which after that the object is further determined through its properties such as [the] class [to which it belongs], is also held to be direct perception.

Of these two that which is not of the nature of determinative cognition, shining forth always in the form of the perceiver itself (*eva*), is nothing other than the own nature of the Self. That has been said in the chapter dealing with the soul, the bonds and the Lord.[171] But that whose nature is determinative cognition, appearing as having arisen and as passing away, is not the own nature of

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and are momentary, and the demonstration that something can produce effects simultaneously or in series whether it is or is not momentary, see particularly NPP ad 1.22, p. 52.'

The passage beginning on that page (and continuing to p. 56), occurring in the course of his refutation of Dharmakīrti's *sattvānumāna*, may well have been in Rāmakaṇṭha's mind. Another certainly relevant passage is that which we looked at in the first part of this chapter: it deals not just with whether 'something' can produce effects in sequence, but specifically with whether cognition can do so. 73,9–14, ad 1.40, is also relevant.

[169] Aghoraśiva paraphrases this passage, barely changing the wording, in his commentary to BhoKā 48 (p. 214,7b–2b), and to TaSa 6–7 (p. 118,20–26).

[170] ŚV(P_2) 1.1.4 (*pratyakṣa* chapter) 112 and 120.

[171] In the passage we have just read.

> the soul, since that which is eternal cannot have as its own nature something transitory; and since, if, on the other hand, it *were* the own nature of the [soul], it would undesirably follow that [determinative cognition] would be eternal, like [non-conceptual] cognition.[172] And it is not experienced as eternal; therefore it is not the own nature of the soul. Thus that of which it is the own nature is the Buddhi, which enables things to become determinatively cognized; for without it, it is impossible for them to become determinatively cognized.

Thus Rāmakaṇṭha superimposes the distinction between non-conceptual and conceptual cognition on to the distinction between the soul/perceiver and the Buddhi. The result is a marked discontinuity between the two kinds of cognition: one is the perceiver, or its nature, and the other is not; one is eternal and the other constantly changing; one is located in the soul and the other is located in a faculty of a very different nature.

The idea that a kind of cognition can be eternal should be less strange to us now than at the beginning of this chapter, for we have seen Rāmakaṇṭha argue for it in various different ways in the two passages with which this chapter is primarily concerned. But it is a little unfortunate that in this passage Rāmakaṇṭha gives the first of the two Kumārila verses as a description of the kind of cognition that is eternal. For it is described there as 'produced by the pure object', and Rāmakaṇṭha would not regard something produced as eternal. Rāmakaṇṭha regarded the two verses as useful for conveying to the reader the existence of two kinds of cognition, one non-conceptual and the other conceptual. But he and Kumārila would disagree with each other over whether or not non-conceptual cognition is eternal. For Kumārila it is not, but Rāmakaṇṭha would argue that it contains an eternal core, which is identical to the perceiver, and that that part of it that does change is in fact not cognition proper, but rather its objects.

The existence of two different kinds of cognition in Śaivism is, in a sense, written into the ontology of its scriptures by the facts that *jñāna* features as, on the one hand, a power of the Self; but, on the other, one of the qualities of

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[172] Note that here Rāmakaṇṭha uses *saṃvedana* where it cannot include determinative cognition, its function being precisely to contrast with that. Compare note 138.

the Buddhi (along with *dharma, vairāgya, aiśvarya* and their opposites).[173] In a parallel passage in NPP,[174] which follows immediately on from the passage looked at in the first part of this chapter, Rāmakaṇṭha brings up the scriptural acknowledgement of *jñāna* as one of the eight qualities of the Buddhi.

> *kathaṃ tarhi*
>
> > *ghaṭajñānam iti jñānaṃ ghaṭajñānavilakṣaṇam*[175] |
> > *ghaṭa ity api yaj jñānaṃ viṣayopanipāti tat* ||
>
> *ityādilaukikajñānabhedaḥ. na grāhakātmabhedāt tasya sarvadaikarūpabheda*[176]*prakāśātmatayā saṃvedanāt, api tv adhyavasāyabhedāt. adhyavasāya eva ca jñānaṃ buddhiguṇatvāj jñānasya. yad uktam, 'buddhir aṣṭaguṇā*[177] *smṛtā* | *lakṣyate 'dhyavasāyena' iti.*[178]
>
> [Objection:] How then [if *prakāśa* is one thing] are everyday differences of cognition [noted in] such [claims] as
>
> > the cognition that one is cognizing a pot is different from cognition of a pot: and cognition of a pot[, unlike cognition that we are cognizing a pot,] is in immediate contact with an object'
>
> [possible]?
>
> [Siddhāntin:] It is not owing to a difference of that which perceives, because we experience that as being always of the nature of a single illumination of a plurality [of objects]. Rather it is owing to a difference of determinative cognition; and cognition (*jñāna*), since it is a quality of the Buddhi, is nothing other than determinative cognition (*adhyavasāya*).[179] As has been said, 'The

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[173] What is not so explicit in the scriptures however is the idea that the Self's cognition is non-conceptual and the Buddhi's conceptual.

[174] NPP 28,12–19.

[175] *ghaṭajñānavilakṣaṇam* Ked, B; *paṭajñānavilakṣaṇam* Ped, L, P.

[176] °*rūpabheda*° Ked^{ac}, Ped, B, L, P; °*rūpābheda*° Ked^{pc}.

[177] *aṣṭaguṇā* Ked, Ped, L; *aṣṭaguṇa* B, P.

[178] *iti* Ked; om. in Ped, B, L, P. (Ked reads, *yad uktam, 'buddhir aṣṭaguṇā smṛtā* | *lakṣyate 'dhyavasāyena' iti. iti darśayiṣyāmaḥ*; the other witnesses transmit only one *iti.* The second *iti* makes good sense to me, picking up what was said before the parenthetical remark beginning *yad uktam.*)

[179] His claim here that *jñāna* is simply determinative cognition is enabled by the fact that in this passage he has been using the word *prakāśa* for the kind of cognition that does not change.

Buddhi has been revealed in scripture to have eight qualities. It is characterized by[180] determinative cognition'.[181]

The assigning of the second kind of cognition, *adhyavasāya*, to the Buddhi, one of the products of Primal Matter, has two consequences for its nature that are somewhat strange from the perspective of other traditions of Indian philosophy. Before looking at them, however, we will note the wider importance in Śaivism of the distinction we have just seen manifested.

Excursus on the *Pauruṣa-Bauddha* Distinction in Śaivism

The distinction between that which belongs to the Buddhi (*bauddha*) and that which belongs to the Self (*pauruṣa*), one that was of importance in Sāṅkhya, was applied in Śaivism not only to *jñāna* but also to *ajñāna,* ignorance, another of the Buddhi's eight qualities. Rāmakaṇṭha utilizes the distinction bet-

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[180] Or 'recognized by', i.e. known to exist because of the existence of determinative cognition. This particular verb is commonly used in this context. Corresponding to NPP's *lakṣyate 'dhvayasāyena*, for example, is the YD's: *tatra vaktavyaṃ kiṃlakṣaṇā punar buddhir iti. ucyate adhyavasāyo buddhiḥ.*

[181] I have not traced this quotation. The scriptures certainly hold the Buddhi to have eight qualities though. See, for example, MatPā 17.2; PaTa 4.74–75b (where they are referred to as its 'parts' *aṅga*). For post-scriptural references to *jñāna* as one of the eight qualities of the Buddhi (which are also referred to as its *rūpa*, *bhāva*s of it, or *vāsanā*s within it), see, for example, BhoKā 55 and Aghoraśiva's commentary ad loc.; and Sadyojyotis' commentary ad SvSūSa 2.12. Commenting on MatV VP 17.2, Rāmakaṇṭha regards the eight as latent traces (*saṃskāra*), which must be postulated to explain rewards such as heaven that result from such acts as the performance of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* rite well after the actions that comprise the rite have ceased; or to explain dreams, memories and the like, which occur when their objects are not present. These traces cannot exist in the Self, he argues, for that would entail that the Self be transformed: rather they are unconscious (*jaḍa*) and exist in the Buddhi.

Both the Buddhi's definition as *adhyavasāya* and its having eight qualities, one of which is *jñāna*, are inherited from Sāṅkhya. See SK 23: *adhyavasāyo buddhiḥ, dharmo jñānaṃ virāga aiśvaryam | sāttvikam etad rūpaṃ tāmasam asmād viparyastam ||* (Rāmakaṇṭha sometimes quotes this verse, for example when commenting on NP 2.17.)

ween the two kinds of ignorance when trying to justify the central Saiddhāntika soteriological claim that knowledge is incapable of removing the deep ignorance that is responsible for our presence in *saṃsāra*.

> NPP ad 3.148c–149b: *iha prathamakāṇḍoktajñānavad ajñānam api dvividham. adhyavasāyātmakam eva viṣayasādṛśyāvivekena śuktikārajatādiṣu viparītajñānātmakam utpadyate. iti yuktaiva tasya pratipakṣabhūtāt samyagjñānān nivṛttiḥ, yat punar anadhyavasāyātmakaṃ tad dravyāntarād andhakārāder bhavat svahetuvipakṣād dravyāntarād evādityāder* nivṛtta[182]*svabhāvaṃ siddhaṃ na pratipakṣajñānāt. anadhyavasāyātmakaṃ ca pauruṣam ajñānaṃ suṣuptāvasthāsv iha pūrvaṃ pratipāditam, adhyavasāyātmano bauddhatvāt.*[183]
>
> Here ignorance too, just like knowledge/cognition as described in the first chapter, is of two kinds. It is only [the first type, namely,] that of the nature of determinative cognition that arises[184] [and does so] as having the nature of incorrect knowledge of things like silver with regard to [what is in fact] mother-of-pearl, as a result of not determining the similarity of an object [to other objects of the same kind]. Therefore it is indeed correct that that kind can cease through correct knowledge, which is that which opposes it.[185] But [the other kind], which is not of the nature of determinative cognition, exists because of another substance, such as darkness. [Therefore] it is a fact that its own nature ceases only owing to another substance, such as the sun, which is the opposite of its own cause: not owing to counteracting knowledge.[186] And the ignorance that is intimately linked with being a bound soul (*pauruṣam ajñānaṃ*), which has been explained earlier in this [text] as existing in states of deep sleep, is not of the nature of determinative cognition, because that which is of the nature of determinative cognition belongs to the Buddhi.

This distinction between *pauruṣa* and *bauddha* ignorance was important for non-dualistic Śaivas also. It is used by Abhinavagupta, for example, at the

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[182] *nivṛtta*° em. Sanderson; *nivṛtti*° ed.

[183] See also MatV VP ad 2.2c–3, p. 27,19–28,8.

[184] The other kind has always been there.

[185] Its nature being, as stated in the previous sentence, incorrect knowledge.

[186] Alternatively, 'not owing to knowledge of what counteracts it'. Either way the point is that in the kind of ignorance that is not of the nature of determinative cognition, as exemplified by ignorance of what is around us when we are surrounded by darkness, knowledge of what is causing that ignorance and of what is required to remove it is not enough.

very beginning of his *Tantrasāra* in order to counter the Saiddhāntika point just made by Rāmakaṇṭha about the inability of knowledge to bring about liberation.

iha jñānaṃ mokṣakāraṇam, bandhanimittasyājñānasya virodhakatvāt. dvividhaṃ cājñānam: buddhigataṃ pauruṣaṃ ca. buddhigatam aniścayasvabhāvaṃ viparītaniścayātmakaṃ ca. pauruṣaṃ tu vikalpasvabhāvasaṅkucitaprathātmakam. tad eva ca mūlakāraṇaṃ saṃsārasyeti vakṣyāmo malanirṇaye. tatra pauruṣam ajñānaṃ dīkṣādinā nivartetāpi. kiṃ tu dīkṣāpi buddhigate 'dhyavasāyātmake[187] *ajñāne sati na sambhavati heyopādeyaniścayapūrvakatvāt tattvaśuddhiśivayojanārūpāyā dīkṣāyāḥ. iti tatrādhyavasāyātmakaṃ buddhiniṣṭham eva jñānaṃ pradhānam. tad eva cābhyasyamānaṃ pauruṣam apy ajñānaṃ nihanti, vikalpasaṃvidabhyāsasyāvikalpātmatāparyavasānāt.*

Prof. Sanderson translates this as follows:[188]

In this [doctrine] the cause of liberation is knowledge, for that [alone] opposes the ignorance [which we hold to be] the [sole] cause of bondage. Now, ignorance is of two kinds[. There is] that [which may be] present in [an individual's] judgements; and [there is the deeper ignorance which is] implicit in individuality itself. To be ignorant on the level of judgement is to be uncertain [of something] or else to misconstrue [it]. But the [ignorance] implicit in individuality is the light [of consciousness] contracted as differential awareness [of any kind]. I shall explain below, when I come to analyse Impurity, that it is this [kind of ignorance] that is the fundamental cause of reincarnation.

Now, it is true that of the two forms of ignorance that which is implicit in individuality ends [not through knowledge but] through initiation and [the regular observances and other elements of Śaiva discipline that follow it]. But initiation itself is impossible while there is intellectual ignorance on the level of judgement. For to initiate is to purify each of the [non-ultimate] levels of reality and [then] to fuse [the candidate at the ultimate level] with Śiva [himself]. It therefore depends upon [the guru's] having a firm understanding of the [various levels] to be transcended and the [final] goal [beyond them]. So in the ritual of initiation it is intellectual knowledge on the level of judgement that is the principal factor. Furthermore, when that [knowledge] is continuously reinforced through repetition it also destroys the ignorance implicit

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[187] *'dhyavasāyātmake* em. Sanderson; *anadhyavasāyātmake* KSTS ed.

[188] In a draft translation of the beginning of the *Tantrasāra* that he gave to those attending his class in 1996.

in individuality. For when any differential awareness is constantly reinforced it will finally become non-differential.

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Returning now to the main thread: Rāmakaṇṭha locates non-conceptual cognition in the Self and determinative cognition in the Buddhi. This has the consequence that determinative cognition is something unconscious (*acetana, jaḍa*). For as in Sāṅkhya, so in Śaivism, everything below Primal Matter (*māyā*), evolving out of it, is unconscious. Determinative cognition is therefore also not something that perceives or experiences.[189] For Buddhism cognition is that which perceives, and for their Naiyāyika opponents, although cognition is not the perceiver, it is certainly conscious. The Śaiva position that one kind of cognition is neither is paralleled only in Sāṅkhya, and its presence in Śaivism is a result of its inheritance of Sāṅkhya's cosmological and ontological hierarchy of principles (*tattva*).

The second strange consequence to which I alluded above is related, and concerns the relation between the perceiver and the cognition that is located in the Buddhi. What can their relation be? Determinative cognition cannot be a quality of the perceiver or inhere in it, because 1) that would mean that, owing to the Śaiva rejection of a substrate over and above qualities, when determinative cognition changes, the perceiver would have to change; 2) something unconscious could not, for Rāmakaṇṭha, be a quality of something conscious; and 3) it is anyway a quality of the Buddhi, so cannot be also a quality of something else. The answer is that it is held to be simply an object of perception for the perceiver. See for example Rāmakaṇṭha's comment in the KV ad 1.15:[190] 'The same is true of the fact that [the soul] is without qualities (i.e. this too is established by experience), because [determinative] cognition, pleasure, pain and the like are experienced as having the property opposite to [that of] the [perceiver], i.e. as objects of [rather than subjects of] perception,

[189] Commenting on MoKā 104, Rāmakaṇṭha cites precisely this as an unwanted consequence of an opponent's proposition: *buddhibodhasya bhoktṛtvaprasaṅgaḥ.*

[190] *evaṃ nirguṇatvam api buddhisukhaduḥkhādīnāṃ kādācitkatvenānubhavato ghaṭāder iva grāhyatvena tadviruddhadharmatayānubhavāt* (18,33–35).

like pots and such like, as they are experienced as happening only occasionally.'[191]

If cognition in the Buddhi is only an object of perception, and not something that perceives or is conscious, why is it termed cognition (*jñāna*) at all? Conversely, if it *is* cognition and is located in the Buddhi, surely it is the Buddhi and not the Self that is of the nature of cognition. The ambiguous nature of the Buddhi's cognition, presented both as cognition and as nothing more than an unconscious object of cognition, was something that prompted both the authors of the Tantras themselves, and the early commentators, to articulate, and then answer, objections thereto.[192] Thus at PaTa 4.90 the interlocutor

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[191] For instances in earlier Śaiva literature of the view that *buddhi* is an object of cognition, see, for example, PaTa 4.93ab: *buddhir yā viṣayākārā sā bhogyaṃ bhoktur īpsitam*; TaSa 13ab: *buddhir viṣayākārā sukhādirūpā samāsato bhogyam* (these two half-verses are similar enough to prompt us to wonder if one was composed with the other one in view—if that were the case, then it would be slightly more likely that the Tantra is borrowing from Sadyojyotis than the other way round: see Goodall 2002 lii); MT 1.10.23: *buddhitattvaṃ tato nānābhāvapratyayalakṣaṇam | paraṃ tad ātmano bhogyaṃ vakṣyamāṇārthasaṃskṛtam* || ('Then [comes] the principle of the Buddhi, characterized by its many Bhāvas and Pratyayas. It is the Self's supreme object of experience, adorned with the things that are about to be recounted'); and the two verses by Sadyojyotis given in note 196. See also the article devoted to precisely this topic by Boccio (2002).

Aghoraśiva takes on this view that cognition that changes belongs to the Buddhi and is not the perceiver, only the perceived: *asya bauddhasya jñānasyotpattyapavargayogitvena bhogyatvam eva, na tu bhoktṛtvam, tasya sarvadā grāhakarūpeṇa sthirasyaiva svasaṃvedanasiddhatvād ity uktam* (ad BhoKā 64c–65b). 'This cognition belonging to the Buddhi, since it arises and ceases, is just what is experienced, not the experiencer. For the [experiencer] is established by self-awareness to be always completely (*eva*) stable in the form of the perceiver. So we have said.' Here, as elsewhere, he echoes Rāmakaṇṭha's wording (in, for example, the passage given above from the *Buddhiprakaraṇa* of the MatV VP) closely.

[192] Such objections had already been made against Sāṅkhya by its opponents. See for example TS(BBS) 301-302: *buddhimattvāt pradhānasya sarvam asyāvirodhi cet | buddhimattvena tu prāptaṃ caitanyaṃ puruṣeṣv iva || buddhir adhyavasāyo hi saṃvit saṃvedanaṃ tathā | saṃvittiś cetanā ceti sarvaṃ caitanyavācakam ||* If [you say], 'Because Primal Matter contains the Buddhi, all [this] (i.e. knowing what is required to be produced for the soul) is not contradictory for it [despite its insentient nature],' then since [it] contains the Buddhi, [it] must be conscious, like souls. For [such Sāṅkhya claims as that] 'the Buddhi

states that if the Buddhi is that which determines (*adhyavasāyakṛt*), and has as its qualities *jñāna* and the rest, then it must be the Buddhi, not the soul, that is conscious.

Also at NP 2.17ab, Sadyojyotis states an argument for the existence of God along the lines that Pradhāna would not be able to commence creation after a period of cosmic resorption (*mahāpralaya*) if there were not a conscious entity to prompt it to act. He then, in the next *pāda*, has his opponent object: *nanu jñānaṃ pradhāne 'sti*, 'surely there is cognition in Pradhāna.' Rāmakaṇṭha expands this objection as, *pradhānakāryasya buddher jñānābhyupagamāt pradhānam api jñānātmakaṃ sidhyatīti kim anyad anumīyate*, 'Because [you Śaivas] accept that the Buddhi, a product of Pradhāna, has cognition, Pradhāna too is established to be of the nature of cognition, so what further [conscious entity] can be inferred?'

The responses to such objections differ according to context. In the second chapter of NPP Rāmakaṇṭha distinguishes two different senses of *jñāna*: *jñāyate 'neneti jñānaṃ prakāśātmakam* and *jñaptirūpaṃ jñānam*, that by which things are cognized, which is of the nature of light, and that which brings about or causes cognition. He accepts that the first belongs to the Buddhi, and holds that the second is the own nature of the Self.[193]

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is determinitive cognition; [and] consciousness (*saṃvit*) and experience (*saṃvedanam*); [and] knowing (*saṃvittiḥ*) and sentience (*cetanā*)', are all expressive of consciousness.

193 *buddhau jñāyate 'neneti jñānaṃ prakāśātmakam asmābhir abhyupagamyate, na tu jñaptirūpam eva tasya puruṣaikasvabhāvarūpatvāt* (ad 2.18ab, p. 144,8–10). Is it not surprising that Rāmakaṇṭha associates *prakāśa* here with the Buddhi (a Sāṅkhya position) when he usually treats *prakāśa* as the nature of the Self? Throughout his passages looked at up to now, the Self has repeatedly been called the *prakāśaka*, this sometimes being specified as *viṣayaprakāśaka/sarvārthaprakāśaka/svaparātmaprakāśaka* or such like. In some passages *prakāśa* has actually been used as a synonym of the Self; for a particularly explicit example see the first sentence of section 3.1 of Chapter 2, where the word *prakāśaḥ* is qualified by *ātmapadapratipādyaḥ*. Thus the present sentence represents something of a departure, at the very least on the level of terminology. I suggest that he has in mind here a position more frequently put forward by Sadyojyotis than him, that *prakāśa* is associated with the Buddhi (see the two verses by Sadyojyotis in note 196); and that there is a tension in his system between influence from this view and influence

At other places the view that the Buddhi, its *adhyavasāya* and its eight qualities are merely objects of cognition and insentient is stressed; and the claim that *jñāna* and the other seven qualities belong to the Buddhi is downplayed. Thus for example the PaTa responds to the objection outlined above by stating that the Buddhi is that which awakens the eight qualities (which presumably exist until that time as latent traces, *vāsanā*), and they are therefore metaphorically described as its qualities, although responsibility (*adhikāritvam*) for them rests with the soul.[194] In the same passage, the reason that the Buddhi is described as the locus of cognition is said to be simply that it takes on the form of the object of cognition.[195] Thus we do not have to conclude that it is conscious or a cognizer. It produces *adhyavasāya* in this same sense that it takes on the object's form. It is admitted to determine an object, but if there were no conscious soul in addition, nothing would be aware of the object. The function of the Buddhi is to render the object graspable by the Self. The Self directly grasps not the external object, but rather an object that

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from the Buddhist view that the perceiver is the *prakāśaka*, its own nature being *prakāśa*. As to how he can hold the Buddhi to be insentient if its cognition is of the nature of *prakāśa*, see note 196.

What is the difference between the two senses of *jñāna* that Rāmakaṇṭha attempts to distinguish here? Is not that by which things are cognized the same as that which brings about cognition? Light may perhaps be thrown on what Rāmakaṇṭha had in mind here by the following passage from the BhoKā: *sainikān vijayāyeha prayuṅkte nṛpatir yathā* | *prayuṅkte mahadādīni bodhādyartham aṇus tathā* ||50|| *sainikasthe jaye rājñaḥ kartṛtvaṃ tu yathā tathā* | *buddhyādisaṃsthe bodhādau puṃsaḥ kartṛtvam iṣyate* ||51|| *svātmārthaṃ sainikānāṃ tu vijayo neti te yathā* | *sādhanaṃ vijayasyeṣṭās tathaiva mahadādayaḥ* ||52|| 'Just like a King in this world marshals his soldiers for victory, so the soul marshals its Mahat (i.e. Buddhi) and other [faculties] for cognition and the like. But just as it is the King (and not the soldiers) who is the agent of the soldiers' victory, so it is the soul that we hold to be the agent of the cognition etc. that exist in the Buddhi and other [faculties]. The victory is not for the soldiers' own sake. Just as they are held to be the means of victory, the Mahat and other [faculties] are in exactly the same way [held to be the means of cognition and the like].' (For these and other verses of the BhoKā concerned with the Buddhi, see Boccio 2002.) The distinction here between the means of cognition and the agent of cognition may be what Rāmakaṇṭha has in mind when he distinguishes between that by which things are cognized and that whose nature is *jñapti*.

[194] My choice of English words here follows Goodall's translation.

[195] See PaTa 4.93cd given below.

has been determined by the Buddhi (*buddhyadhyavasitam artham*). Thus external objects are objects of experience, *bhogya*, for the Buddhi, but the Buddhi is in turn *bhogya* in relation to the Self.

This model of perception, derived from Sāṅkhya (and adapted by Śaiva texts through the addition of a further role to Vidyā, one of the cuirasses (*kañcukas*)),[196] would seem to fit conceptual perception better than non-conceptual perception. It thus seems possible that it was taken over by Śaivism when the latter was not much concerned with non-conceptual perception, owing to, perhaps, not having at that stage begun detailed dialogue with Buddhism. To investigate this question would require further research. I suggest as a possibility though that Rāmakaṇṭha's contention that non-conceptual cognition belongs to the Self and conceptual to the perceiver is an idea that was not part of the Śaivism of Sadyojyotis or the scriptures known to Rāmakaṇṭha. When the PaTa states[197] *bhogyākārā yato buddhir bhoktur bhogasamāśrayā*, which Goodall translates as, 'Since *buddhi* takes the form of the experienced objects, she is the locus of the experiencer's experience', it seems to me quite possible that it intended to claim that the Buddhi is the locus of all experience, not just one kind (determinative as opposed to non-conceptual). This is also the impression one gets from Sadyojyotis' statement,[198] *pumbodhavyaktibhūmitvād bodho vṛttir mater matā*: 'The activity [known as] cognition is

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[196] On the question of why in addition to the Buddhi, a further faculty, Vidyā, is required, see TaSa 14: *ravivat prakāśarūpo yadi nāma mahāṃs tathāpi karmatvāt* | *karaṇāntarasāpekṣaḥ śakto grāhayitum ātmānam* || 'Even if the Mahat (= Buddhi) is of the nature of illumination, like the sun, nevertheless, [only] with the aid of a further instrument can it perceive itself, because it is an object'; and BhoKā 95cd–96ab *pradīpaḥ karaṇaṃ puṃsaḥ stambhādyarthopalabdhiṣu* || *dīpopalabdhau cakṣuś ca buddhāv apy evam iṣyatām* | 'The soul's instrument for its perceptions of objects like posts is a lamp, and for its perception of a lamp, the faculty of seeing. That is how things should be accepted with regard to the Buddhi too.' In other words even though the Buddhi is the faculty whose illumination enables objects to be seen, in order to see the Buddhi a further faculty is required, just as the sun or a lamp, though capable of illuminating objects, are not capable of seeing themselves. See also Torella 1998, Boccio 2002 and Goodall 2002 235, note 326.

[197] 4.93cd.

[198] BhoKā 46cd.

held to belong to the Buddhi (*mater*) because [the latter] is the locus of the manifestation of the soul's cognition.' If Rāmakaṇṭha used the expression *pumbodha* one would expect it to refer to non-conceptual cognition in the soul (*puṃs, puruṣa*), which he would *not* hold to manifest in the Buddhi. Most likely *bodhaḥ* in Sadyojyotis' verse refers to all cognition, so that for him all cognition manifests in the Buddhi, but has as its agent the soul.[199]

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To conclude let us briefly return our attention to the *Mataṅgavṛtti* passage that was the principal topic of this second part of the chapter. Before the last section (5) it had seemed that the distinction between that which does not change and that which does correlated neatly with the distinction between cognition and its objects. Other traditions make the mistake of regarding cognition as changing because they take what are actually objects of cognition—pleasure, pain and so on—as cognitions. In fact anything that changes falls on the object-side of the divide.[200] In section 5.2 the picture became slightly

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[199] Commenting on this verse, Aghoraśiva quotes *Mṛgendratantra,* 1.11.8: *iti buddhiprakāśo 'yaṃ bhāvapratyayalakṣaṇaḥ* | *bodha ity ucyate bodhavyaktibhūmitayā paśoḥ* || It seems fairly likely that one of these verses is the source of the other. (As well as the close resemblance of the second halves of the two verses, the first half of Sadyojyotis's verse—*prakāśo viṣayākāro devadvāro na vā kvacit*—like the first half of the *Mṛgendra* verse, contains the word *prakāśa.*) Since the Buddhi is, in the *Mṛgendra* verse, said to be the locus of the manifestation of cognition *for the bound soul,* there is room for the view that it is not the locus of the manifestation of some other kind of cognition, which occurs in the Self. But Sadyojyotis' verse does not seem to leave room for that view. In that sense the *Mṛgendra* verse could be seen as intermediate between Sadyojyotis's view and Rāmakaṇṭha's view. On its own this would of course not be enough to count as evidence for the *Mṛgendra* being later than Sadyojyotis. But it could be mentioned here that Goodall (2002 lii) has pointed to the former's knowledge of illusionist Vedānta and the latter's ignorance of it as evidence of this.

[200] Rāmakaṇṭha left just one clue that there was one kind of cognition that he accepts as changing. In the middle of the long rhetorical passage in section 3, he named *cittavṛtti* as something which is plural and changing: *nānāvidhapramāṇādyanekacittavṛttyudayasaṃvedane 'py akampitatadgrāhakasthairyavedanaḥ*, 'even though experiencing the rise of many mental events of various kinds such as means of knowledge, its (i.e. *prakāśa*'s) experience of the stability of the perceiver of those [mental events] is unshaken.' In the light of the rest of the *Mataṅgavṛtti* passage and the other passages we have looked at

more complicated in that determinative cognition was admitted to change. Thus it seemed to be only in the realm of non-conceptual cognition that anything that changes is simply the objects of cognition. That is certainly one way we could characterize the situation. But now we have seen that for Śaivism determinative cognition is itself *bhogya*, or *saṃvedya*, i.e. an object of cognition in relation to the perceiver. Thus it is still true in a sense to say that all that changes, as a stream of cognition proceeds, is its objects.

since, we can now assume that Rāmakaṇṭha uses *cittavṛtti* to refer to the determinative cognition of the Buddhi; and that his expression 'the perceiver of those [*cittavṛttis*]' (°*tadgrāhaka*°), indicates that *cittavṛttis* are objects of perception.

CONCLUSION

Rāmakaṇṭha's refutation of the Buddhist doctrine of no-Self has two main stages. In the first, covered in Chapter 1, he demonstrates that Buddhist arguments are capable of undermining Naiyāyika, Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya inferences of the Self's existence. He shows that each of the features of human life judged by those schools to be impossible in the absence of a permanent Self can be accounted for on the existence of cognition (*jñāna, vijñāna*) alone. The existence of cognition is accepted by all disputants, being directly perceived by everyone. So we should accept it as their explanation, not some imperceptible Self.

Rāmakaṇṭha, unlike the three above-mentioned Brāhmaṇical schools, agrees with Buddhism that we are not justified in positing some invisible entity beyond cognition, but he holds that cognition itself is the Self. Thus the second stage consists in an examination of cognition to determine whether it is momentary or stable. Both agree that cognition is aware of itself (*svasaṃvedanasiddha*), so Rāmakaṇṭha focuses on our direct experience of ourselves. His description of it maintains that though various different thoughts and objects pass before us, we are never aware of a discontinuity in the perceiver of those thoughts and objects. We feel as though we are the same thing from moment to moment. All action is predicated on this sense of continuity, for the fruits of an action will not come to us until, at the very least, some moments after the act itself.

The Buddhist agrees that we appear to ourselves as continuous; and that we undertake action thinking that it will be us who will benefit from it in the future. But he maintains that we are wrong to think that: our appearance to ourselves as stable is mistaken. In fact what 'I' am in every moment is separate from and of a different nature than what 'I' am in every other moment. But each momentary phase succeeds the previous so rapidly and is so similar to it, that we are fooled into mistaking a plurality for a unity. Driven on by an at-

tachment to our own (imagined) identities, we superimpose stability on to what is momentary.

The rest of this second stage of Rāmakaṇṭha's refutation argues for the incoherence of the idea that our appearance to ourselves as stable perceivers (*sthiragrāhakaprakāśa*) is false. Rāmakaṇṭha has three main arguments. First, the notion that the Buddhist appeals to to explain the falsity, superimposition, involves a superimposer applying an inappropriate concept on to something external to him- or herself.[1] So if the stable appearance of ourselves were something superimposed, it would appear as external to us. But it does not.

Secondly, a perceiver that existed for only a moment would not have time to observe several consecutive momentary phases of itself, note their similarity, and on the basis of that similarity superimpose stability on to them. From where, furthermore, could it ever acquire the notion of stability when both it and the objects it encounters last only a moment?

His third argument appeals to a doctrine of the Buddhists themselves, which the Śaivas shared. In maintaining that our stable self-perception is mistaken, the Buddhist relies on the distinction between non-conceptual perception, which gives valid knowledge of its objects, and determinative cognition, which, according to him, superimposes on to objects concepts that do not represent them faithfully. But the Buddhists themselves hold that even though determinative cognitions do not give accurate information about the objects they are directed towards, they do give an accurate picture of themselves (*svātmany avikalpako vikalpakaḥ*). Thus if the subject of cognition were momentary, it would appear to itself in determinative cognitions (as well as in non-conceptual perception) as momentary. Our stable self-appearance, which the Buddhist accepts, cannot therefore be accounted for except as an accurate apprehension of our nature.

In texts other than NPP in which he deals with the issue, such as the *Kiraṇavṛtti* and the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*, his refutation of the Buddhist doctrine of no-Self ends there. But in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* he has to

[1] Or perhaps 'itself' would be more appropriate since it is cognitions that carry out superimposition.

comment on a verse that claims that the Self is the object of I-cognition (*ahampratyaya*). Thus, in a passage examined in Chapter 3, he argues that the Self is validly perceived through I-cognition.

There are three sections in this passage, which give, respectively: 1) reasons why the Yogācāras' own presuppositions should commit them to the validity of I-cognition; 2) a reason why all determinative cognitions, even ones in which 'I' is not explicitly articulated, contain an I-cognition; and 3) refutations of the Buddhist doctrine of the invalidity of all determinative cognition, of which I-cognition is an example.

In the first, Rāmakaṇṭha argues that Dharmakīrti's *sahopalambhaniyama* argument can be turned against Yogācāras and used to produce the conclusion that the Self is real. Dharmakīrti and his followers claimed that since one never experiences the individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) objects of pre-conceptual cognition without also experiencing the pre-conceptual cognition itself, and vice versa, the individual object is not different from the cognition. Rāmakaṇṭha applies the principle that if two things are always perceived together they must be non-different, to determinative cognition, specifically I-cognition, and its object.

Dharmakīrti and his followers would not accept that determinative cognition and its objects (*adhyavaseya*s) are co-perceived, because they held that *adhyavaseya*s, unlike the determinative cognition itself, are unreal. Rāmakaṇṭha counters this in 1.1.2, and in 1.2.2. In 1.1.2 he argues that though Sautrāntikas could consistently make this claim, it is incompatible with another Yogācāra doctrine. In 1.2.2 he implicitly accepts that *adhyavaseya*s such as the unity of a forest are unreal, mental constructs to which nothing corresponds in the world outside the determinative cognition. But he distinguishes the object of I-cognition from them, in that the former is indeed found outside determinative cognitions, as the content of self-experience (*svasaṃvedana*). Whether these two arguments are strong or not, I would say that Rāmakaṇṭha's wider attempt to show that acceptance of the reality of the Self follows undesirably for Buddhists who accept the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument is uncompelling. For even if it were accepted that Self and I-cognition were co-perceived, what should follow is merely that the Self is the same as I-cognition, not that

it is real. Since I-cognition is momentary for the Buddhist, he would not be troubled by the reduction of the Self to it.

In the second section Rāmakaṇṭha argues that even such determinative cognitions as 'this is a pot', in which 'I' is not explicitly articulated, contain a verbal cognition (*vimarśa*) of their agent's Self, for otherwise the pot would not be established as seen by that particular agent rather than by someone else. If only the object, and not the agent, were verbally cognized, the agent would not be able to say subsequently '*I* saw that pot.'

In the third section he tackles the general Dharmakīrtian position that determinative cognition (*adhyavasāya, vimarśa*) is not a means of knowledge. The Dharmakīrtian opponent gives daydreaming as an example of determinative cognition where there is clearly no real object there. Rāmakaṇṭha responds that he does not hold all determinative cognitions to be means of knowledge: when we dream of a blue object, there is indeed no real object there. But just as there are false perceptions (*pratyakṣābhāsa*) and real ones, as the Dharmakīrtians accept, so for Rāmakaṇṭha there are cases of valid determinative cognition, which are genuine means of knowledge, and cases of false determinative cognition. Why should the Buddhist accept that distinction in the case of perception and yet lump all determinative cognition together as false?

Dharmakīrti's criterion for accepting perception as a valid means of knowledge is that it occurs when a real entity is there and does not when one is not (*vastvanvayavyatireka*), indicating that perception has a firm connection with a real object (*vastupratibandha*). He holds that determinative cognition occurs when no real entity is there and so does not depend on a connection. Rāmakaṇṭha adopts Dharmakīrti's criterion and shows that in valid determinative cognitions there are indeed real entities with which the cognition is inseparably connected. Thus, for example, in the case of valid instances of recognition such as 'this is the pot that I saw earlier', those entities are the pot and the previous seeing of it, which is retained in the Self. Or in the case of determinative cognition based on scripture, the cognition and the object are connected through the cognition of the composer of the text. In general it could be said that Rāmakaṇṭha's strategy is to take whatever features the Buddhist attributes to determinative cognition as rendering it invalid, and to show that that feature can also apply to perception. Thus when, for example,

the Buddhist asserts that the unreality of the objects of inferential determinative cognition is indicated by the fact that they do not appear clearly, Rāmakaṇṭha points out that the same is often true of perception, for example when the objects are far away.

If, as Rāmakaṇṭha holds, the Self is nothing other than cognition, then cognition must be permanent. The fourth chapter presented two passages in which Rāmakaṇṭha defends this position. In the first he counters the Buddhist argument that cognition, since it would only be able to perceive a plurality of objects if it was different with respect to each object, must be plural. He first shows that even at one moment of time, when the Buddhist accepts that cognition is unitary, it sometimes perceives a plurality of objects; and then argues that there is no reason to assume that this relation of one perceiver to a plurality of objects cannot hold over a sequence of time. In the second passage he argues that what others take to be finite, changing instances of cognition, such as pleasure and pain, are in fact objects of cognition. He does admit that determinative cognition is changing, but this is located in the Buddhi, not the Self, and is an object of perception in relation to the real perceiver.

Throughout my presentation of these passages, one of my tasks has been to place Rāmakaṇṭha's ideas within the context of the other schools that he was either opposing or drawing from. The Buddhist Epistemological School was of central importance to this period of Indian philosophy, especially in Kashmir. The perceived power of their arguments led to different strategies of response from their opponents. Naiyāyikas, for example, often retreated into entrenched realist positions making little or no concessions to Buddhism.[2] Rāmakaṇṭha, by contrast, absorbs many features of Buddhism, for example the idea that cognition does not inhere in a substrate, that it is simultaneously aware of itself and its object, and that pre-conceptual (*nirvikalpaka*) perception is a more reliable guide to reality than conceptual perception. Śaiva Siddhānta had more space for innovation because its scriptures did not much concern themselves with philosophical details concerning the Self and cogni-

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[2] See Stcherbatsky 1984 48–49. Their liberation doctrine and certain features of their logic (e.g. Uddyotakara's *hetucakra*) are examples that show influence from Buddhism however.

tion. Since the evolution of Śaiva philosophy into a mature form did not occur until after the Buddhist epistemological ideas were well-known and understood, there was much opportunity for cross-fertilization. The present work demonstrates how, as a strategy to undermine Buddhist arguments, a Śaiva Siddhāntin author creatively assimilated certain features of Buddhism, thereby strengthening his own armoury, and then used these to overcome those other features of Buddhism that conflicted with the core essentials of his own tradition. The philosophy of early Śaiva Siddhānta remains a little-studied corner of Indology. This is in part due to the fact that Rāmakaṇṭha did not succeed in eliciting a tradition of response from the non-Śaiva philosophical schools, or in producing a lasting lineage of Kashmirian Saiddhāntika writers. Śaiva Siddhānta not being known for its philosophy, some may have assumed that, when it came to deal with a philosophical matter such as the refutation of Buddhism, it simply borrowed the arguments of the non-Buddhist philosophical schools. We have seen that this is not the case; Rāmakaṇṭha's voice in the Self/no-Self debate is a distinct one, and he succeeds in articulating a sophisticated stance, worthy of taking its place alongside those found in the better studied philosophical traditions. The philosophical texts of early Śaiva Siddhānta contain treasures not only for those interested in the History of Śaivism but also for those interested in the History of Philosophy.

TEXT PASSAGES*

CHAPTER 1

1 *yady evam, bhedasya satyatvāt,*[1] *pratiśarīram iva pratyartham*[2] *pratikṣaṇaṃ ca bāhyasyārthasyānahaṅkārāspadasyāhaṅkārāspadaṃ vijñānaṃ*[3] *bhinnam eva grāhakam anubhavasiddham astu, nānyaḥ kaś cid ātmā* nāma,[4] *tasyo*[5]*pa-labdhi*[6]*lakṣaṇaprāptasyā*[7]*nupalabdheḥ.*[8] *anupalabhyasvarūpasya ca* [Ked p. 9] *sattā duḥsādhyaiva.*[9]

2.1 *satyam.*[10] *ata evendriyādir iva*[11] *kāryāt so 'pī*[12]*cchātmakād*[13] *anumīyata iti naiyāyikāḥ. tad ayuktam.*[14] *kāryād dhi kāraṇamātraṃ sadṛśam evānumīyate.*

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* There is no extra material in this chapter—in either its main text or its footnotes—that is not in Chapters 1–4. Its only purpose is to print the text uninterrupted by translations and comments and to include those footnotes of relevance to its constitution.

1 *satyatvāt* P, Ked, Ped; *satvatvāt* B.

2 Interlinear gloss above *pratyarthaṃ* in P: *pratipadārthaṃ.*

3 *vijñānaṃ* B, P, Ked; *pratikṣaṇaṃ vijñānaṃ* Ped.

4 *nāma* conj. Goodall; *nāmeti vaibhāṣikāḥ* B, P, Ked, Ped. This labelling of the school of the opponent would be very unlikely to occur halfway through the opponent's assertion. Moreover the very last words of the passage looked at in this chapter, *ity ātmaśūnya-vādinaḥ*, seem to refer to the whole of this passage and thus make this speaker label redundant. Most likely then *iti vaibhāṣikāḥ* was originally an interlinear comment in a manuscript that a subsequent scribe took to be part of the text. (B and P abound in such interlinear speaker-labels.)

5 Interlinear gloss above *tasyo*° in B and P: *ātmanaḥ.*

6 Interlinear gloss above °*opalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyā*° in P: *upalabhyasyety arthaḥ.*

7 °*prāptasyā*° P, Ked, Ped; °*prāptasya* B.

8 See MatV VP 150,3–4: *te ca sarva eva prāguktajñānavyatirekeṇa nānyaḥ kaś cid ātmābhidhāno 'rtho vidyata ity āhuḥ, jñānavyatirekeṇa tasyopalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyā-nupalabdheḥ.*

9 *duḥsādhyaiva* P, B, Ked; *duḥsāddhaiva* Ped.

10 Interlinear comment in P above *satyam*: *etat iti śeṣaḥ.*

tac ca pūrvakaṃ[15] *vijñānam eva pūrvatarajñānajasaṃskārasahāyam ubhaya-vādi*[16]*siddhaṃ nīlapītādijñānānām ivāsyāḥ kāraṇam astīti*[17] *kuto visadṛśatarādṛṣṭahetvantara*[18]*siddhiḥ.tad uktam*[19]

> *yasmin sati*[20] *bhavaty eva yat*[21] *tato 'nyasya*[22] *kalpane |*
> *taddhetutvena sarvatra hetūnām anavasthitiḥ || iti.*

2.2 *na, nīlādijñānānām*[23] *ivāsyāḥ*[24] *kāryatvāsiddheḥ. icchā hi pūrvānubhūta-sukhasādhanatvādyanusandhānasāmarthyasiddhatatsamānakartṛtvajñāna*[25]*-sahabhāvinī. iti jñātrantarebhya iva śarīravijñānāntarādibhyo 'pi kāryatvena vyāvartamānā viśiṣṭaṃ jñātāraṃ sthiram anumāpayatīty ātmasiddhiḥ. na hi ya evāhaṃ draṣṭā sa evaiṣṭe*[26]*ty etad anyatropapadyate yataḥ.*[27]

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[11] Marginal comment next to °*endriyādir iva* in P: *yathā hy anupalabhyo 'pīndriyādiḥ kāryeṇa kāraṇānumānam iti. anupalabhyasya śravaṇādeś śabdopalabdhikāryeṇa yathā tad anumānaṃ tathety arthaḥ.*

[12] *so 'pī*° P, B, Ked; *ātmāpī*° Ped.

[13] Interlinear gloss above *so 'pīcchātmakād* in B: *kāryāt.*

[14] Interlinear comment above *tad ayuktam* in B and P: *vaibhāṣikavacanaṃ.*

[15] *tac ca pūrvakaṃ* P, Ked; *ataś ca pūrvaṃ* Ped; *tataś ca pūrvakaṃ* B.

[16] Interlinear gloss above *ubhayavādi*° in P: *vaibhāṣikanaiyāyika.*

[17] Interlinear gloss above *asyāḥ kāraṇam astīti* in B and P: *icchāyāḥ.*

[18] Interlinear gloss above *visadṛśatarādṛṣṭahetvantara*° in B: *ātmākhya.*

[19] PVā 2.24.

[20] Interlinear gloss above *yasmin sati* in B: *kāraṇe.*

[21] Interlinear gloss above *yat* in B: *kāryaṃ.*

[22] Interlinear gloss above *'nyasya* in B: *kāraṇād anyasya kāraṇasya.*

[23] Interlinear comment above *na nīlādijñānānām ivā* in B: *etat na nīlādijñānānām i*[*i* em.; *e* B]*vetyādikaṃ naiyāyikavacanaṃ*; in P: *pūpa, naiyāyikavacanam.* The first word is of course an abbreviation of *pūrvapakṣa.*

[24] Interlinear gloss above °*syāḥ* in B and P: *icchāyāḥ.*

[25] Marginal gloss above *anusandhānasāmarthyasiddhatatsamānakartṛtvajñāna* in B: *ya evāhaṃ draṣṭā sa eveṣṭetyādi.* Rāmakaṇṭha writes *ya evāhaṃ draṣṭā sa evaiṣṭā* below (with *eveṣṭā* transmitted in B) as his formulation of the awareness of same agency.

[26] *evaiṣṭe*° P, Ked; *eveṣṭe*° B, Ped.

[27] Interlinear gloss above *anyatra* in P: *ātmani*; in B: *ātmavyatirikte vijñāna.* Perhaps the reason that the author did not write *vijñāne* was that if one inserted this phrase into the text instead of *anyatra*, sandhi would result in *vijñāna.* B's gloss seems appropriate, P's not.

2.3 *na,*[28] *asiddhatvāt. na hi tatsamāna*[29]*kartṛtva*[30]*jñānasahabhāvitvam asyāḥ*[31] *siddham, tatsiddhatve hi jñānaviṣayatvāt pratyakṣa evātmoktaḥ syād iti nityānumeyatvābhyupagamavirodhaḥ. nanv*[32] *ata*[33] *eva tad api*[34] *sarvātmanāṃ sukhasādhanatvādyanusandhānasāmarthyataḥ sādhyata ity uktam. kim idaṃ sāmarthyaṃ*[35] *yena tasya siddhiḥ? anyathānupapattir eva. sā kasya? na tāvad icchāyāḥ, anusandhānajñānata evāsyāḥ samutpatteḥ.*[36] [Ked p. 10] *atha*[37] *tasyaivānupapattir*[38] *iti na, tasyāpi pūrvānubhavasaṃskārata*[39] *eva bhavadbhir apy utpādābhyupagamāt.*

2.4 *tarhi sa eva*[40] *saṃskāro nityena dharmiṇā vinā nopapadyata iti tatas tatsiddhiḥ. na, anityānām*[41] *evonmatta*[42]*bījānāṃ lākṣādisaṃskāras*[43] *tatpuṣpāruṇimādinā siddha*[44] *iti vijñānasantatāv eva kramavatyāṃ sa*[45] *sidhyati nānyatrātyantāsiddhe.*[46]

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[28] *na* omitted in P. Interlinear comment above *na* in B: *etat.*

[29] Interlinear comment above *asiddhatvāt na hi tatsamāna* in B: *śabdavācye śarīrendriyādau vā*. The intention of the comment is not clear to me. Harunaga Isaacson suggested the following partial explanation. It is intended as a note on *(tatsamāna)kartṛtva-(jñāna)*. With the Buddhist speaking one might find it slightly problematic who the *kartṛ* is thought to be. *śabdavācye* is thus an abbreviation of *kartṛśabdavācye.*

[30] °*kartṛtva*° Ked, B, P; °*kartṛ*° Ped.

[31] Interlinear gloss above *asyāḥ* in P: *icchāyāḥ.*

[32] Interlinear—incorrect—comment above *nanu* in P: *vaibhāṣikavacanam.*

[33] Marginal comment referring to *nanv ata* in B: *nanv ata naiyāyika.*

[34] Interlinear gloss above *tad api* in B: *tatsamānakartṛtvajñānasahabhāvitvaṃ.* Marginal comment referring to *tad api* in P: *tatsamānakartṛtvajñānasahabhāvatvasya parāmarśas tad apīty anena.*

[35] Interlinear comment above *kim idaṃ sāmarthyaṃ* in B: *vaibhāṣikavacanaṃ.*

[36] *samutpatteḥ* B, Ked; *samutpādāt* Ped; *samupapatteḥ* P.

[37] Interlinear gloss above *atha* in B and P: *yadi.*

[38] *tasyaivānupapattir* B, Ked, Ped; *tasyaivānupapittir* P.

Interlinear gloss above *tasyaivā*° in B: *anusandhānajñānasyaiva*; in P: *anusandhānasya.*

[39] °*saṃskārata* B, Ked, Ped; °*saṃskāra* P.

[40] Interlinear comment above *tarhi sa eva* in B and P: *naiyāyikavacanaṃ.*

[41] Interlinear comment above *na anityānām* in B and P: *vaibhāṣikavacanaṃ.*

[42] °*vonmatta*° B, P, Ked; °*votpanna*° Ped. Interlinear comment above °*onmatta*° in P: *dhatūra.*

[43] Marginal gloss of *lākṣādisaṃskāras* in P: *lākṣādinā rañjanaṃ nāma saṃskāraḥ.*

[44] Marginal comment in P referring to this sentence: *datūrabījānāṃ rañjitānāṃ vāpenāruṇāny eva datūrapuṣpāni jāyante, na tu śvetāni, iti loke prasiddham.*

2.5 *iti na vidmaḥ prayoga*[47]*ḍambaravyatirekeṇa kasyānyasya*[48] *siddhir yena tad api hetuviśeṣaṇabhūtaṃ jñānaṃ sādhyate.*

3.1 *etena vaiśeṣikoktam api prāṇāpānanimeṣonmeṣajīvanamanogatīndriyāntaravikāraiḥ*[49] *smṛtyādibhiś cātmānumānaṃ pratyuktam. tathā hi tiryaggatisvabhāvasya vāyor ūrdhvādhaḥpreraṇaṃ nopapadyate, bhastrādhmāteva kaś cit kalpyaḥ. evaṃ nimeṣonmeṣādīnāṃ dehāvayavāśritānām api yantrapuruṣavat prayatnayukto 'dhiṣṭhātā, jīvanasyāpi dharmādharmakāryatayā tadguṇāśrayabhūtaḥ, manaso 'py ācaitanyād*[50] *rathāder iva prayatnavān prerakaḥ, dāḍimādyambla*[51]*tararasaphaladarśanena dantodakātmakarasanendriya*vikārasya darśanād a[52]*nekagavākṣa*[53]*vat sarvendriyārthānusandhātā kaś cit kalpyaḥ. tac ca vijñānam eva pravāhātmakaṃ saṃskārādivaśataḥ pūrvoktāśeṣārthakriyānirvartakam ubhayavādisiddham astīti kuto 'nyaḥ sidhya*[54]*ti.*

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[45] Interlinear gloss above *sa* in B and P: *saṃskāraḥ.*

[46] Interlinear gloss above *nānyatrātyantāsiddhe* in B and P: *khapuṣpatulye ātmākhye dharmiṇi.*

[47] *prayoga*° B, P, Ked; *prayogā*° Ped.

[48] *kasyānyasya* Ked^{pc}, Ped; *kasyā* B, Ked^{ac}; *kasya* P. In deciding which reading to accept here, i.e. in deciding whether to regard the inclusion of the *anyasya* as original, I have been influenced by the following sentence that occurs shortly: *rūparasādisamudāyavyatirekeṇānyasya kasya cid āmraphalāder dharmiṇo 'nupalambhāt.* It is not necessary to translate both °*vyatirekeṇa* and *anyasya* into English, but it is natural to include both in Sanskrit.

[49] VS(C) 3.2.4: *prāṇāpānanimeṣonmeṣajīvanamanogatīndriyāntaravikārāḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnaś cety ātmaliṅgāni.* On this sūtra, and the very similar lists of *liṅga*s of the Self in the *Carakasaṃhitā*, see Preisendanz 1994 263–274.

[50] *ācaitanyād* Ked, P^{ac}; *acaitanyād* B, P^{pc}, Ped.

[51] The more usual form is *amla.*

[52] °*vikārasya darśanād a*° conj. Sanderson; *vikārasyā*° B, P, Ked, Ped. I follow this diagnostic conjecture—as support for which Sanderson pointed to *rasanavikriyādarśanād* in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, given on page 170—because I do not see anything that °*vikārasya* can be construed with in the transmitted text. Since the genitives that parallel *vikārasya* in the other phrases in this sentence (*nimeṣonmeṣādīnām, jīvanasya* and *manasaḥ*) are all qualified by an *api*, we could conjecture the loss of one more syllable here: °*vikārasyāpi darśanād a*°.

[53] °*gavākṣa*° P, Ked, Ped : °*gavākṣi*° B.

[54] *kuto 'nyaḥ sidhya*° P, Ked, Ped; not readable in the photocopy I have of B. It has been inadvertently covered up by a scrap of paper on which is written '*dravyaguṇakarmasamavā ...*' (breaks off there).

3.2 *yad apīcchādīnām acākṣuṣapratyakṣatvād rasādivad guṇatve saty ayāvaddravyabhāvitvāc charīrādiviśeṣaguṇatvapratiṣedhena*[55] *pāriśeṣyād ātmano*[56] *guṇino 'numānam,*[57] *tad api dṛṣṭā*[Ked p. 11]*ntāsiddher vyāptyabhāvād anaikāntikam.*[58] *na hi rasādīnāṃ guṇatvam asmākaṃ*[59] *sāṅkhyānām api vā prasiddham, rūparasādisamudāyavyatirekeṇānyasya kasya cid āmraphalāder dharmiṇo 'nupalambhāt.*[60] *ata evāmrasya rasa iti bhedavyapadeśaḥ samudāyaikadeśatva*[61]*khyāpanāya vanasya dhavaḥ śobhana iti*[62]*vad upapadyata eva. kasya tarhīyam icchā? iṣyamāṇasya karmaṇo grāmāder eva. atha hetoḥ kasyeti, ucyate yato 'nantaraṃ dṛśyate tasya viśiṣṭasyaiva jñānasya pūrvatarajñānajasaṃskāraparipākātmanaḥ. kathaṃ tarhi devadattasyecchetyādiko 'tra kartṛtvavyavahāro laukikaḥ? kutarkadarśanābhyāsa*mūla upahata *eva,*[63] *vita-*

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[55] °*guṇatvapratiṣedhena* Ped; °*guṇapratiṣedhena* B, P, Ked.

[56] *ātmano* P, Ked, Ped; *ātmaṇo* B.

[57] See the parallel in MatV VP (where he attributes the argument to Naiyāyikas, not Vaiśeṣikas): *nanu jñānasyotpattimattve sati niyamenācākṣuṣapratyakṣatvato rasādivad guṇatvāt, ayāvaddravyabhāvitvena ca śarīrādiguṇatvāsiddheḥ, avaśyaṃ guṇinā bhavitavyam* [*bhavitavyam* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *bhavitavyam ity* ed.]. *yatra* [*yatra* ū, ṛ; *atra* ed.] *ca guṇatayāvasthitaṃ tat, sa* [*guṇatayāvasthitaṃ tat, sa* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *guṇitayāvasthitas tatra* ed.] *ātmeti naiyāyikāḥ* (153,5–7).

[58] See the parallel passage in KV ad 2.25ab, p. 53: *nanu jñānaṃ tāvad asmadādipratyakṣatve saty acākṣuṣapratyakṣatvād rasādivad guṇaḥ. guṇena ca dravyāśritena bhavitavyam iti. yas tasyāśrayaḥ sa tadvilakṣaṇatvād ajñānarūpa evātmā sidhyati ... so 'py ayuktaḥ dṛṣṭāntasyāsmān prati sādhyadharmāsiddhatvāt.*

[59] Interlinear gloss above *asmākaṃ* in B: *ātmaśūnyavādinā*; in P: *ātmaśūnyavādināṃ.*

[60] See KV ad 2.25ab, lines 4–8: *nanu jñānasya rasāder iva guṇatve hetur ukta eva. so 'py ayuktaḥ dṛṣṭāntasyāsmān prati sādhyadharmāsiddhatvāt. rasādayo hi bhāvāḥ saṃhatā eva jāyamānāḥ saṃhatā eva niruddhāś ca, sāṅkhyasaugatādibhir ivāsmābhir api pramāṇasiddhatvād arthakriyākaraṇāḥ kathyante, na tv anyaḥ kaś cit teṣām āśrayabhūtas tadvyatirekeṇa tasyānupalambhanād iti.* See also MatV VP 153,8–11.

[61] Goodall (1998 252, note 281) conjectures °*deśa* in place of °*deśatva*, perhaps prompted by the parallel in KV (*viśiṣṭasamudāyaikadeśapratipādanāya*). The transmitted reading seems to me to construe naturally however. Furthermore, when the Buddhist, in a few sentences, comes to extrapolate this remark about expressions such as *āmrasya rasaḥ* to expressions such as *devadattasyecchā* he describes the latter as *viśiṣṭajñānapravāhasambandhitāpradarśanārthaḥ*. The fact that he uses an abstract suffix in this corresponding compound, makes the conjecture hard to defend.

[62] *śobhana iti* Ked, B, P; *śobhata iti* Ped.

[63] °*mūla upahata eva* em. Goodall; °*mūlopahata eva* Ked, Ped, B, P. See *mūlo bhrānta eva* in the next note but one.

stāyāḥ pravāha itivad vā[64] *viśiṣṭajñānapravāhasambandhitāpradarśanārtho yukta eva.*[65] *ātmavādinām api vā devadattasya svātmaivātra pramāṇam iti katham asau vyavahāraḥ. pramāṇenānupapadyamānaḥ kalpita eveti cet, kṛtaṃ vyavahāreṇa. pramāṇam eva hi satyetaratvavyavasthāpanāyānusaraṇīyam, tac cetaratrāpi samānam, iti jñānam eva viśiṣṭam icchā, na tu guṇaḥ kasya cit.*

4.1 *yad api sāṅkhyaiḥ saṃhatānāṃ pārārthyaṃ śayanādīnām iva kāryakaraṇānāṃ parasiddhāv anumānam upanyastam, tad apy ubhayavādisiddhaṃ vijñānam eva sādhayatīti siddhasādhanam. nanu*[66] *tasya*[67] *anityatvāt krameṇa saṃhatatvam iti tato 'py anyo 'saṃhataḥ paro*[68] *'numeyaḥ. satyam, yadi tathābhūtena vyāptiḥ siddhā* [Ked p. 12] *bhavet. saṃhatānāṃ hi dṛṣṭānte saṃhataśarīrādiviṣayam eva pārārthyaṃ siddham, iti jñānam eva tathābhūtaṃ sidhyati. ante 'py anavasthāparihārārthaṃ kasya cit tathābhūtasyaivābhyupagamān nānyo 'tathābhūtaḥ. na hi yad dṛṣṭāntāparidṛṣṭam asiddhavyāptikaṃ vastu, tad dhetuḥ*[69] *svaśaktyaiva*[70] *sādhayituṃ śaknoti, jñāpako 'yaṃ na kārako yataḥ.*

4.2 *na ca jñānam asmākam asiddham iti vācyam. arthaprakāśo hy ayaṃ sakalalokaprasiddho 'nubhūyata eva. na cāsāv arthadharmaḥ,*[71] *arthavailakṣaṇyenādhyātmam anubhavāt, arthasya sarvān praty aviśeṣāt sarvapratyakṣatā*[72]*-prasaṅgāc ca. nāpi puṃsvabhāvas, tasyāsiddheḥ.*[73] *siddhau cāprakāśātmano*

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[64] *itivad vā* Ked, B, P; *itivac cā* Ped.

[65] See KV ad 2.25ab, lines 8–10: *kathaṃ tarhi pṛthivyāṃ gandha ityādivyavahāraḥ. kudarśanābhyāsamūlo bhrānta eva. yadi vā viśiṣṭasamudāyaikadeśapratipādanāya vanasya dhavaḥ śobhana itivad yukta eveti.* See also MatV VP 153,12–13.

[66] *nanu* Kedpc, B; omitted in Ped, Kedac; *vakra* P.

[67] *tasya* B, P; *vijñānasya* Ked, Ped.

Marginal gloss above *tasya* in B and P: *vijñānasya.*

[68] Marginal gloss above *paro* in B: *puruṣaḥ.*

[69] Above *taddhetuḥ* in B is a marginal gloss: *tasyānumāna*. This implies that its author takes *taddhetuḥ* to be a compound. I have not done so.

[70] *svaśaktyaiva* B, P, Ped; *svaśaktyā* Ked.

[71] Marginal gloss under *na cāsāv arthadharmo*: *kaumārilamataṃ dūṣayati na cāsāv arthadharma.*

[72] *sarvapratyakṣatā*° P, Ked, Ped; *sarvāpratyakṣatā*° B.

[73] *tasyāsiddheḥ* B, Ked, Ped; *tasyāḥ siddheḥ* P.

vyatirekābhāvāt tasyāpy aprakāśarūpatvam ity āyātam āndhyam aśeṣasya jagataḥ.tad uktam[74]

apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadṛṣṭiḥ prasidhyati || *iti.*

pradīpavat svaparaprakāśaikasvabhāvatvena viśiṣṭārthaprakāśakaṃ vijñānam anubhavasiddhaṃ nāpahnotuṃ śakyam iti. tad idam uktam[75]

jñānārthau saha rūpadīpa[76]*tulayā jātau vibhāṣāmate* |

iti ātmanā bhoktrā[77]*dirūpeṇānyena śūnyāḥ skandhā ity ātmaśūnyavādinaḥ.*

CHAPTER 2

1 *atrācārya āha* [Ked p. 13]

1.5) *nābhāvaḥ śakyate vaktuṃ pratyaye sarvasākṣiṇi*[78] |
śūnyatā tena sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ bodhabādhitā ||

2 *yady evaṃ sarvārthasākṣātkaraṇapravṛtte jñānātmani grāhakasvarūpe pratyakṣasiddhe saty abhāvo nātmanaḥ śakyaḥ pratipādayitum, anubhavasiddhatvāt. bhoktṛtvaṃ hi jñātṛtvam ucyate tad eva ca pāramārthikam ātmano rūpam. tac ca bhavadbhir apy anubhavasiddham ity uktam. ataḥ kim anyat sādhyam iti. nanu ca pratyarthaṃ pratikṣaṇaṃ ca bhinnam evedaṃ grāhakarūpaṃ vijñānam asmābhiḥ pratipāditam, na tv ātmābhidhānaḥ kaś cit sarvārthasākṣibhūto 'rthaḥ. yadi ca tad evāsāv ity ucyate, bhavatu nāmabhedaḥ param, sarveṇa tv ātmavādinā sthirarūpo 'sau darśanīyaḥ iti cet, ucyate nātra bhavadabhyupagamo 'ṅgatvenāsmābhir uktaḥ. na hi pratidarśanaṃ vyavasthāpakānāṃ sarvapramātṝṇām*[79] *anubhavabhedaḥ sambhavati, tasya svabhāvasiddhatvāt. yad āhuḥ*[80]

jñānaṃ praty abhilāpaṃ ca sadṛśau bālapaṇḍitau || *iti.*

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[74] PVin 1.55cd. Also quoted at NPP 61,1; NVV Vol. 1, 209,27–28; TSP(BBS) Vol. 1, 490,5b–4b and Vol. 2, 705,17; NM(M) Vol. 2, 490,10 and 498,7; and by Jayaratha ad *Tantrāloka* 10.96c–97b.

[75] Source unknown.

[76] *rūpadīpa*° Ked, B; *bhāvarūpa*° Ped.

[77] *bhoktrā* Ked, Ped ; *bhoktā* B.

[78] *sarvasākṣiṇi* Ked, Ped, B, P; *sarvasākṣiṇaḥ* M.

[79] *vyavasthāpakānāṃ sarvapramātṝṇām* Ked, Ped; *pramātṝṇām vyavasthāpakānām* B; *vyavasthāpakānāṃ pramātṝṇām* P.

[80] VāPa III *sambandhasamuddeśa* 55cd.

tat sa evāyaṃ sakalalokaprasiddhaḥ svānubhavo nirūpyatām. kiṃ pratyarthaṃ pratikṣaṇaṃ cāpūrvo 'pūrvaḥ pūrvottarābhyām [Ked p. 14] *anubhavābhyāṃ bhinnaḥ*[81] *kṣaṇamātrarūpāvabhāso grāhakaḥ prakāśata uta sarvadaivābhinna*[82] *iti.*

3.1 *tatrāyaṃ sthirarūpaḥ prakāśaḥ sarvadaiva grāhyopādhi*[83]*bhede 'py* anāsvādita[84]*svātmabhedaḥ, kālatraye 'pi tiraskṛtasvagataprāgabhāvapradhvaṃsābhāvaḥ, nānāvidhapramāṇādyanekacittavṛttyudayavyayasaṃvedane 'py akampitatadgrāhaka*[85]*sthairyavedanaḥ, vṛttyantarāleṣv apy*[86] *aviluptajyotiḥ, suṣuptādāv apy akhaṇḍitasvasaṃvit, satatam eva svaprakāśatvena gamyatvād ātmapadapratipādyaḥ pratipuruṣaṃ svasaṃvedanasiddhaḥ, iti kim atrānyena sādhanena.*[87] *tām eva cābhinnām anapāyinīṃ cātmasaṃvidam āśritya sarvaiḥ*

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[81] *bhinnaḥ* Ped; omitted in Ked^{ac}; *bhinna*° Ked^{pc}, B; *bhinnala*° P. *bhinnaḥ* makes best sense, and is supported by the parallel sentence in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti.*

[82] °*aivābhinna* B, P, Ped, Ked^{pc}; °*aiva bhinna* Ked^{ac}.

[83] *grāhyopādhi*° P, Ked, Ped; *grāhyopādi*° B.

[84] *anāsvādita* em. Sanderson; *anāsādita* Ked, Ped, B, P. See *Mataṅgavṛtti* p. 172: ... *sarvadaiva grāhyopādhibhede 'py anāsvāditasvātmabhedaḥ kālatraye 'pi* ... attention to which is drawn in note 116 on page 197 of Goodall 1998 in the context of this emendation by Prof. Sanderson. See also *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* ad 43: ... *sarvadaiva grāhyopādhibhede 'py anāsvāditasvātmabhedaḥ kālatraye 'pi* ... (AP 294,28).

[85] *akampitatadgrāhaka*° Ked, B, P; *akampitatattadgrāhaka*° Ped.

[86] *vṛttyantarāleṣv apy* Ked^{pc}, Ped, B, P; *vṛttyantarāle pi* Ked^{ac}.

[87] Goodall (1998 xxiv) points out that a distinctive feature of Rāmakaṇṭha's writing is his consistency of expression when treating the same topic in different texts. The fact that occasionally large sections of text are repeated almost word-for-word in other of his texts is a great help for an editor, meaning that corruptions can sometimes be easily spotted and removed. This passage, for example, occurs almost unchanged in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* and the *Mataṅgavṛtti.* The most recent edition of the former reads: ... *nāma tat. sa* [correct to: ... *nāma. tat sa*] *evānapahnavanīyasvabhāvo nirūpyatām. kiṃ pratikṣaṇaṃ pūrvaḥ pūrvaḥ* [correct to: *apūrvo 'pūrvaḥ,* also the reading of MSS] *pūrvottarakṣaṇābhyāṃ bhinnaḥ kṣaṇamātrarūpāvabhāso grāhakaḥ prakāśata atha* [correct, perhaps, to: *uta*] *sarvadaiva. bhinna iti tatrāyaṃ* [correct to: *sarvadaivābhinna iti. tatrāyaṃ*] *sthirarūpaḥ prakāśaḥ sarvadaiva grāhyopādhibhede 'py anāsvāditātmabhedaḥ kālatraye 'pi tiraskṛtasvaprāgabhāvapradhvaṃsābhāvaḥ, nānāvidhapramāṇād* [correct to: *pramāṇādy*°, also the reading of MSS] *anekacittavṛttyudayavyayasaṃvedane 'py ekam api* [correct *ekam api* to: *akampita,* also the reading of MSS]*tadgrāhakasthairyavedanaḥ, vṛttyantareṣv* [correct to: *vṛttyantarāleṣv,* also the reading of MSS] *apy aviluptajyotiḥ, suṣuptādāv apy akhaṇḍitasvasaṃvit, satatam eva svaprakāśatvena gamyatvād ātmapadapratipādyaḥ pratipuruṣaṃ svasaṃvedanasiddhaḥ, iti kim atrānyena sādhanena* (AP 294,

kālāntaraphalāni karmāṇy ārabhyante. kṣaṇikatve tu tasyāḥ sarvavyavahārapratyastamayaḥ, sarvānubhavānāṃ kṣaṇamātravedanottarakālaṃ dhvaṃsatāṃ kṣaṇāntare[88] *sambhavābhāvāt kaḥ pravarteta*[89] *kutra kimarthaṃ vā yataḥ. na hi kṣaṇātmavedinaḥ kṣaṇāntare*[90] *'nāhaṃ na*[91] *mama' iti paśyataḥ pravṛttir ghaṭate. iti nirīhaṃ svarūpamātraprakāśaniṣṭhaṃ heyopādeyabuddhivikalam amithyājñānaṃ vicārabodhādyanekajñānaśūnyaṃ jagad etad bhavet, iti sarvānubhavavirodhaḥ, sthiragrāhakaprakāśapūrvakatvād evamāder iti.*[92]

25–32). Thus putting these two texts side-by-side enables, in the space of three sentences, improvement of NPP in two places and of PMNKV in six or seven places. The MSS referred to in this note, and subsequent notes giving passages from PMNKV, are all from South India. One was collated by me during my doctoral research, and the rest, since then, by Dominic Goodall as part of our project to critically edit and translate the text for the first time.

The parallel passage in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* reads, *na grāhyabhede 'pi grāhakātmā yugapad iva krameṇāpi bhinno 'vabhāsate. api tu sarvadaiva grāhyopādhibhede 'py anāsvāditasvātmabhedaḥ, kālatraye 'pi tiraskṛtasvagataprāgabhāvapradhvaṃsābhāvaḥ, nānāvidhapramāṇādyanekacittavṛttyudayasaṃvedane 'py akampitatadgrāhakasthairyavedanaḥ, vṛttyantarāle 'py aviluptajyotiḥ, suṣuptādāv apy akhaṇḍitasvasaṃvit, satatam evārthāvagamakatvena bhāsanād ātmapadapratipādyaḥ pratipuruṣaṃ svasaṃvedanasiddhaḥ sthira eva* [*sthira eva* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *sthirabhāva* ed.], *iti kim atrānyena sādhanena* (MatV VP 172,16–21).

KV ad 2.25ab, 53,2–3 reads: *ātmā svasaṃvedanena svaparātmaprakāśatayā pratipuruṣaṃ sidhyati, kim anyena sādhanena.* For my discussion of Goodall's translation and my suggested emendation, see note 30 on page 221.

[88] *kṣaṇāntare* Ked, Ped, B; *rakṣaṇāntare* P.

[89] *pravarteta* Ped; *pravartate* Ked, B, P. B's reading looks slightly more like *pravartate* than *pravarteta* since the right-hand side of the interlinear horizontal line that represents *e* falls above the second of the *t*'s. But it is not impossible that the scribe wrote *pravarteta* as in some cases the right-hand side of his interlinear markings fall to the right of the sign beneath that they modify.

[90] *kṣaṇāntare* Ked, B, P; *kṣaṇāntare 'pi* Ped.

[91] *nāhaṃ na* Ked, B, P; *nāhaṃ* Ped.

[92] Again, if the editors of PMNKV had located this parallel passage in NPP they would have enabled improvement of their texts. The latest edition of PMNKV reads: *tām evātmasaṃvidam abhinnām anapāyinīṃ cāśritya sarvaiḥ kālāntaraphalāni karmāṇy ārabhyante. kṣaṇikatve tu tasyāḥ sarvavyavahārapratyastamayam* [correct to: °*pratyastamayaḥ*] *sarvajñānānāṃ kṣaṇamātravedanottaradhvaṃsataḥ kṣaṇāntare sambhavābhāvāt kaḥ pravarteta kutra kimarthaṃ vā? yataḥ* [the editions of both texts wrongly punctuate

3.2 *syād etat. asty ayam ekarūpasthiragrāhakaprakāśaḥ, anapahnavanīya*[93] *eva. sa punar na svasaṃvedyaḥ, api tu grāhakakṣaṇapravāha evānubhūyamāne tatsādṛśyadarśanabhrāntair vikalpair adhyāropito 'mbhaḥpravāhasyevaikyam iti*[94] *bhrānta eva. ata evāsyātmagrahatvāt sarvānarthamūlatvenopa-*

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after the *vā*, instead of after the *yataḥ*] *na hi kṣaṇātmavādinaḥ* [perhaps correct to: *kṣaṇātmavedinaḥ*, and probably include NPP's *kṣaṇāntare*] *'nāhaṃ na mama' iti paśyataḥ pravṛttir ghaṭate. iti nirīhaṃ svarūpaniṣṭhaṃ prakāśamātraṃ heyopādeyabuddhivikalaṃ mithyājñānavicārabodhādy*[MSS read °*bādhādy*°]*anekajñānaśūnyaṃ jagad bhavet.* [remove punctuation] *sthiragrāhakaprakāśapūrvatvād* [correct to: °*pūrvakatvād*] *evamādeḥ sarvasyety anapahnavanīyo 'yaṃ prakāśo vyavahārahetubhūtaḥ kālāntarabhāviphalapravṛttikāraṇaṃ sarvadaiva* [correct to the reading of the MSS: *sarvair eva*] *syāt* (PMNKV 294,32–295,2).

A parallel passage in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* (ad 6.23) runs: *tām eva hi sthiratarām ātmasaṃvidam āśritya sarvaiḥ kālāntaraphalāni karmāṇy ārabhyante. kṣaṇikatve tu tasyāḥ sarvavyavahārapratyastamayāt sarvajñānānāṃ kṣaṇamātravedanottaradhvaṃsataḥ kṣaṇāntare sambhavābhāvataḥ kaḥ pravarteta* [*pravarteta* ū, ṝ; *pravartate* ed.] *kutra* [*kutra* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *tatra* ed.] *kimarthaṃ vā. iti nirīhaṃ heyopādeyabuddhivikalaṃ mithyājñānavicārabādhādyanekajñānaśūnyaṃ jagad bhavet. iti sarvavyavahārābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ* [*sarvavyavahārābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ* corr.; *sarvavyavahārā bhāvaprasaṅgaḥ* ed.] *sthirabodhapūrvakatvād evamādeḥ sarvasyeti ātmasiddhiḥ, sthirasyaiva saṃvedanasyātmatvād ity uktam* (MatV VP 158,5–10). In NPP, in PMNKV (according to my corrections), and in the passage given in the following footnote, *kaḥ pravarteta kutra kimarthaṃ vā yataḥ* gives a reason for *sarvavyavahārapratyastamayaḥ*, whereas in the just quoted passage *sarvavyavahārapratyastamayāt* gives a reason for *kaḥ pravarteta kutra kimarthaṃ vā.* Both seem possible.

A second parallel passage in the *Mataṅgavṛtti,* fifteen pages after the one given in the previous note, reads: *tām eva cā*[*eva cā* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *evā* ed.]*tmasaṃvidam abhinnām anapāyinīṃ cāśritya sarvaiḥ kālāntaraphalāni karmāṇy ārabhyante. kṣaṇikatve hi* [*kṣaṇikatve hi* conj. Sanderson; *kṣaṇikatvavad anityatve 'pi* ed.; *anityatve 'pi* a; *kṣaṇikatvavedinityatve 'pi* ū, ṛ, ṝ] *tasyāḥ sarvavyavahārapratyastamayaḥ, sarvajñānānāṃ* [°*pratyastamayaḥ, sarvajñānānāṃ* ed.; °*pratyastamayasarvajñānānāṃ* ai] *jñānāntarotpattikāla eva dhvastatvāt* [°*kāla eva dhvastatvāt* ed.; *kāle 'stamayatvāt* 5 MSS; *kālāstamayasthatvāt* ai] *kaḥ pravarteta* [*pravarteta* ed.; *pravartate* 4 MSS] *kutra* [*kutra* ed. *ataḥ* a] *kimarthaṃ vā yataḥ. na ca tato 'nyat saṃvidrūpaṃ paśyāma ity uktam. tad ayam anapahnavanīya eva grāhakātmano jñānasya sarvadā sthirarūpaḥ prakāśo vyavahārahetubhūtaḥ kālāntarabhāviphalapravṛttikāraṇaṃ sarvair eva* (MatV VP 173,1–7).

93 *'napahnavanīya* Ked, Ped, P; *'napahnavīya* B.

94 °*vāhasyevaikyam iti* Ked, B, P; °*vāhasyavaikyam iti* Ped.

śamāya bhagavatā [Ked p. 15] *sugatena nairātmyaviṣayaḥ pratipakṣabhāvanākhyo yatnaḥ*[95] *prārabdhaḥ. yad āhuḥ*[96]

mithyādhyāropa[97]*hānārthaṃ yatno 'saty api moktari*[98] | *iti.*[99]

4.1 *tad ayuktam,* viṣayavailakṣaṇyenākarmatayā[100]*dhyātmam asya saṃvedanāt. yadi hy ayam āropitaḥ syāt, tadāropakād*[101] *grāhakarūpād bhedena vi-*

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[95] *yatnaḥ* B, Ked^{pc}; *yatna*° P; *viṣayaḥ* Ked^{ac}, Ped.

[96] PVā 2.192ab.

[97] *mithyādhyāropa*° Ked^{pc}, supported by PVā; *mithyādhyānopa*° Ked^{ac}, Ped, B, P.

[98] *moktari* B, P, PVā; *bhoktari* Ked, Ped. Since *mo* in Śāradā is virtually indistinguishable from *bho* in Devanāgarī it is possible that the reading *bhoktari* arose through editors used to reading Devanāgarī misreading their Śāradā manuscript(s).

[99] The parallel passage in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* runs: *satyam, asty eveyam ātmasaṃvittir ā saṃsārād nairātmyapratipakṣabhūtā. sā tu na saṃvedanātmikā, api tu* [*api tu* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *catuḥ* ed.] *kṣaṇātmavijñānapravāha eva saṃvedyamāne sadṛśāparāparotpattivipralambhād vikalpena sa evāyam ity aikyam adhyāropya prakāśyate* [*prakāśyate* 7 of ed.'s MSS including ū and ṛ; *prakāśate* ed.]. *yad uktam, 'mithyādhyāropahānārthaṃ yatno 'saty api moktari' iti* (MatV VP 158,11–159,1). The Dharmakīrti half-verse is also quoted at MatV VP ad 6.19c–21b (154,9).

Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *satyam* [*satyam* conj. Isaacson; *satyaṃ grāhako 'py* ed., MSS] *ayam ekarūpasthira*[*ekarūpasthira*° MSS; *ekarūpaḥ sthira*° ed.]*grāhakaprakāśaḥ sarvavyavahārasampādanakṣamo 'napahnavanīya eva, sa punar na svasaṃvedyo 'pi tu grāhakakṣaṇapravāha evānubhūyamāne tatsādṛśyadarśanabhrāntair vikalpair āropya* [*vikalpair āropya* MSS; *vikalpenāropya* ed.] *prakāśyate* [*prakāśyate* 1 MS; *prakāśyaḥ* ed.; *prakāśyeta* MSS] *ambhaḥ*[*ambhaḥ* conj. Isaacson; *ataḥ* MSS; *tataḥ* ed.] *pravāhasyevaikyam* [°*syevaikyam* em.; °*syaivaikyam* ed., MSS] *iti* (295,3–5). In PMNKV, written before NPP and MatV VP, Rāmakaṇṭha does not give the Dharmakīrti quotation.

Rāmakaṇṭha's father, Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, can be seen to be the source of this NPP passage and its parallels in other of Rāmakaṇṭha's texts. He writes ad MT 1.2.24: *saṃvedana eva kṣaṇike jaladhārāpravāhavat sadṛśaparāparotpattibhramād vikalpena sthairyam adhyāropyata ity avidyājanitā seyam ātmadṛṣṭiḥ. tad uktaṃ*

mithyādhyāropahānārthaṃ yatno 'saty api moktari [*moktari* em. *bhoktari* ed.] |

iti. ātmagrahe hi sati tadanyatra paratvābhimānāt svaparabhedaḥ, tataś ca rāgadveṣādyanarthodbhavād ātmagraho bandha iti bhagavatā sugatena nairātmyabhāvanopadiṣṭā. yad uktam

ātmani sati parasañjñā svaparavibhāgāt parigrahadveṣau |
anayoḥ sampratibaddhāḥ sarve doṣāḥ prajāyante || (PVā 2.219)

iti (MTV 85,7–18).

ṣayavad bhāseta devadattabodhaḥ sthira itivat. na caivam ayam anubhavaḥ,[102] *api tu viṣayaprakāśaka*[103]*tvenāntargrāhakasvabhāvaḥ.*

4.2 *tatsamāropakābhimatagrahītṛrū*patve ca[104] *tadāpi sthira eva saṃvedyate, tasyāpi hi svataḥ kṣaṇamātrarūpatvenāpratibhāsanāt, tatpratibhāsitve*[105] *hy āropānupapatteḥ,*[106] *āropasya pūrvāparaparāmarśarūpatvena sthirabodhanirvartyatvāt.*[107] *na ca kṣaṇātmano 'pi yugapatpūrvāparakālayuktadīrghaviṣayatvataḥ samāropakatvam ayojanātmakatvenāvikalpakatvāt,*[108] *alātacakrādipratibhāsavat.*[109] *ata eva yugapacchabdārthaviṣayatve 'pi yogijñānam*

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[100] *viṣayavailakṣaṇyenākarmatayā* conj.; *viṣayavailakṣaṇyena karmatayā* Ked, Ped, B, P. I discuss this conjecture in note 82 on page 237.

[101] *tadāropakād* B, P, Ked^{pc}; *āropakād* Ked^{ac}, Ped.

[102] *ayam anubhavaḥ* Ked, Ped; *ayam anabhavaḥ* P; *anubhavaḥ* B.

[103] *viṣayaprakāśaka*° Ked^{pc}, B, P; *viṣayaprakāśa*° Ked^{ac}, Ped.

[104] °*rūpatve ca* conj.; °*rūpatvena* Ked, Ped, B; °*rūpatvenā* P.

[105] *tatpratibhāsitve* B, P, Ked^{ac}, Ped; *tadapratibhāsitve* Ked^{pc}.

[106] We could consider emending *āropānupapatteḥ* to *āropānupapattiḥ*: Kashmirian transmissions of texts often confuse *e* and *i* owing to non-difference of pronunciation between the two in that region. But Rāmakaṇṭha quite often uses tautologous combinations of *hi* and an ablative. See the previous sentence for example: *tasyāpi hi svataḥ kṣaṇamātrarūpatvenāpratibhāsanāt.*

[107] °*nirvartyatvāt* B, P; °*nivartyatvāt* Ked, Ped, parallel sentence in PMNKV.

Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *sa* [*sa* conj. Sanderson; *na* ed., MSS] *punar bhrama eva, viṣayavailakṣaṇyenākarmatayā* [*viṣayavailakṣaṇyenākarmatayā* MSS; *viṣayavailakṣaṇyena karmatayā* ed.; *karmavailakṣaṇyenākarmatayā* 1 MS] *tadaikyasya saṃvedanāt. yadi hy etad āropitaṃ syāt, tadāropakā*[looks, from comparison with NPP, as though text has dropped out here]*bhimatasya* [*tadāropakābhimatasya* MSS; *tadāropikābhimatasya* ed.] *svataḥ kṣaṇamātradhvaṃsitvenāpratibhāsanāt, tatpratibhāsitve hy āropānupapatteḥ* [*tatpratibhāsitve hy āropānupapatteḥ* conj.; *tatpratibhāsitve hy ātmatvopapatteḥ* ed., MSS; *tatpratibhāsitve 'py ātmatvāpatteḥ* 1 MS], *āropasya pūrvāparaparāmarśarūpatvena sthirabodhanirvartyatvāt* [°*nirvartyatvāt* MSS; °*nivartyatvāt* ed.; °*nirvatyatvāt* 1 MS] (295,5–8).

[108] *vikalpakatvāt* Ked, Ped; *vikalpatvāt* B, P.

[109] Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *na ca kṣaṇātmano 'pi yugapatpūrvāparayuktadīrghaviṣayatvataḥ samāropakatvam ayojanātmakatvenāvikalpakatvāt, alātacakrādipratibhāsavat* (295,8–10).

Parallel passage in MatV VP runs: *na ca kṣaṇātmano 'pi* [6 MSS, not including the Kashmirian ones, lack the *'pi*] *sa evāyam iti pūrvāparakālayuktadīrghārthaprakāśakatvena vikalpakatvam iti vācyam ayojanātmakatvāt, alātacakrādipratibhāsavat, yojanā hi kalpanā* [*kalpanā* ṛ, ṝ; *vikalpanā* ed.] *yataḥ* (160,10–11). The reason I prefer the reading of

avikalpakam ity uktaṃ bhavadbhiḥ.[110] *yojitaviṣayaṃ tad iti cet, sarveṣāṃ kṣaṇikatvena*[111] *yojanānupapatter na kiṃ cid etat.*[112] *ata evānekasyāpi kramabhāvino vikalpakṣaṇasyānāropakatvam,*[113] *ity āropāsambhavād astaṅgatā vikalpāḥ.*[114]

4.3 *na ca grāhakātmā grāhyīkartuṃ śakyate yena svātmany adhyāropeṇa sthairyam āropitam ity ucyeta,*[115] *svātmany avikalpako vikalpo yataḥ.*[116] *ata*

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those two Kashmirian manuscripts is that Dignāga wrote *yojanā kalpanā* in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, and Rāmakaṇṭha quotes this later in this text (ad 1.22cd, p. 49,2b–1b).

[110] *ity uktaṃ bhavadbhiḥ* Ked, Ped, P; *bhavadbhir ity uktaṃ* B.

Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *ata eva yugapat sarvārthaviṣayatve 'pi yogijñānam avikalpakakalpam ity uktam* (295,10–11).

Parallel passage in MatV VP continues: *ata eva yogijñānam yugapac chabdārthaviṣayatve* [*chabdārthaviṣayatve* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *sarvārthaviṣayatve* ed.] *'py avikalpakam bhavadbhir iṣyate* (160,12).

[111] *kṣaṇikatvena* Ked, Ped, P; *kṣaṇikatve* B.

[112] Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *yojitaviṣayaṃ tad iti cet, sarveṣāṃ kṣaṇikatvena yojanānupapatter na kiṃ cid etat* (295,11–12).

[113] Parallel passage in MatV VP continues: *nāpi ca bahūnāṃ kramabhāvināṃ jñānānāṃ vikalpakatvaṃ yuktam* (160,12–13).

[114] °*staṅgatā vikalpāḥ* Ked^{pc}, B; °*staṅgatā vikalpaḥ* P; °*staṃgatatāvikalpaḥ* Ked^{ac}; °*staṃgatas tava vikalpaḥ* Ped.

Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *ata evānekeṣām api kramabhāvinām vikalpakṣaṇānāṃ nāropakatvam, ity āropāsambhavāt astaṅgatā vikalpāḥ* [*astaṅgatā vikalpāḥ* conj.; *tadaṅgatāvikalpanāt* ed.; *asaṃgatā vikalpā* (with following *na*—see continuation of this passage below—so we can probably assume a pre-sandhi form of *vikalpāḥ*) 1 MS] (295,12–13).

[115] *ucyeta* P; *ucyate* Ked, Ped, B.

[116] Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *na ca grāhakātmāpy evaṃ gṛhyeteti* [*grāhakātmāpy evaṃ gṛhyeteti* 1 MS; *grāhakātmany eva* ed., MSS] *vaktuṃ śakyate, yena svātmany avikalpako vikalpaḥ* (295,13–14). Comparison with NPP reveals that text may have dropped out in PMNKV owing to a scribe's eye skipping from one *svātmani* to the next. Perhaps it is possible to make sense of the PMNKV sentence as constituted above however: 'And it cannot be said that the perceiver, for its part, could be grasped [by itself] in this way (i.e. as stable, by conceptual cognition), for conceptual cognition is nonconceptual with regard to itself.'

Parallel sentence in MatV VP: *svātmany avikalpako vikalpa* [*avikalpako vikalpa* ṛ, ṝ; *avikalpiko vikalpa* ū; *na vikalpa* ed.] *iti ca* (161,2).

evāsyāhampratyayaviṣayatāpi[117] [Ked p. 16] *na sambhavati, api tv ahampratyayaprakāśarūpataiva tadāpi tena rūpeṇa sthiratayaiva bhāsanāt.*[118] *na hi kālatraye 'pi grāhakātmano dhvaṃsaḥ saṃvedyata ity uktam.*[119] *yasya hi prāgabhāvaḥ sa utpanna ucyate, yasya tu pradhvaṃsaḥ sa naṣṭaḥ. yasya punaḥ*[120] *pūrvottarayoḥ koṭyor nāsty abhāvasaṃvit sa pratikṣaṇam utpanno*[121] *niruddho veti na śakyate vaktum.*[122] *na cāsvasaṃvedyaḥ saṃviddharmo bhavatīti*[123] *vakṣyāmaḥ.*[124] *tat sthūlasūkṣmayor iva sthirakṣaṇikayoḥ parasparaviruddharūpatvād*[125] *yathā vidyudādau kṣaṇikatvaṃ pramāṇasiddhaṃ sad akṣa-*

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[117] Interlinear comment above *ata eva* in P: *ahaṃpratyayagamyo hy ātmeti mānasapratyakṣa ātmā jaiminīyānām.*

[118] Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *ata evāsyāhampratyayaviṣayatāpi na sambhavati, api tv ahampratyayaprakāśarūpataiva, tadāpi tena rūpeṇa sthiratayaivāhambhāsanāt* [°*āhambhāsanāt* MSS; °*āhamavabhāsanāt* ed., MSS] (295,14–15). I am tempted to delete the *ahaṃ* in the final compound. The argument flows more smoothly if the object of *bhāsanāt/avabhāsanāt* is that which is referred to by *asya* at the beginning of the sentence, i.e. *grāhakātmā,* the perceiver. If it were not that but *aham,* then the contention that the perceiver is the shining forth of I-cognition would not follow.

[119] *ity uktam* Ked, B, P; *iti yuktam* Ped.

[120] *yasya punaḥ* Ked, B, P; *yasya* Ped.

[121] *pratikṣaṇam utpanno* Ked, B, P; *pratikṣaṇaṃ sa samutpanno* Ped.

[122] Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *na hi kālatraye 'pi grāhakātmano dhvaṃsaḥ saṃvedyata ity uktam. yasya hi prāgabhāvaḥ sa utpannaḥ, yasya tu* [*tu* MSS; *hi* ed.] *dhvaṃsaḥ* [*dhvaṃsaḥ* MSS; *puṃsa utpattiḥ* ed., 1 MS] *sa naṣṭaḥ. ahampratyayasya* [*ahaṃpratyayasya* ed., MSS; *pratyayasya* MSS] *punaḥ pūrvottarayoḥ koṭyor nāsty abhāvasaṃvit* [*abhāvasaṃvit* 1 MS; *abhāvaḥ. saṃvit* ed., MSS]. *pratikṣaṇam utpanno niruddho* [*utpanno niruddho* 1 MS; *utpannā niruddhā* ed., MSS] *bhaved iti na śakyate vaktum* (295,15–18). All witnesses apart from one point to a sentence break before *saṃvit,* and feminine endings on *utpannā* and *niruddhā.* But the fact that the one witness, a Nandināgarī manuscript from Mysore, is consistently the best manuscript, combined with its support from the NPP parallel, weighs in its favour.

We still have to break what in NPP is one sentence, into two here: 'But there is no consciousness of the absence of I-cognition at some previous or subsequent extremity. It cannot be said to arise and cease in every moment.' Thus some may want to adjust PMNKV further to bring it in line with NPP. To do so would involve emending *ahampratyayasya/pratyayasya* to *yasya* and inserting a *sa* before *pratikṣaṇam.*

[123] *bhavatīti* Ked, Ped, P; *bhavabhavatīti* B.

[124] Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *na cāsvasaṃvedyaḥ* [*cāsvasaṃvedyaḥ* 1 MS; *vā svasaṃvedyaḥ* ed.] *saṃviddharmo bhavatīti vakṣyāmaḥ* (295,18).

[125] *parasparaviruddha*° Ked, B; *paraspaviruddha*° P; *paraspara*° Ped.

nikatvaṃ vyāvartayati, evaṃ grāhakātmany apy āropāsambhavāt sthairyam avabhāsamānam asaṃśayaṃ kṣaṇikatvaṃ vyāvartayatīti yuktam.[126]

4.4 *na ca svasaṃvedanasya tathātve bādhaḥ sambhavati bādhakābhimatasyāpi tenaiva sthirātmanā saṃvedanād*[127] *anyathā bādhakatvāyogād. bhrāntyabhāvāc ca. bhrāntam api hi vijñānaṃ sarvam ālambane bhrāntaṃ na svātmanīti darśayiṣyāmaḥ.*[128] *na ca pramāṇasiddhasya bādhakam antareṇānyathābhyupagamo matim āvarjayati vipaścitām.*[129] *sthirasyārthakriyānupapattir*[130] *eva bādhakam iti cet,*[131] *na, tatraiva tasyāḥ samutpatter*[132] *iti vakṣ-*

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[126] Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *tat sthūlasūkṣmayor iva sthirakṣaṇikayoḥ parasparaviruddharūpatvād vidyudādau kṣaṇikatvaṃ pramāṇasiddhaṃ sad akṣaṇikatvaṃ vyāvartayati yathā, evam atra svātmāropāsambhavena sthairyam avabhāsamānam asaṃśayaṃ kṣaṇikatvaṃ vyavacchinattīti yuktam* (295,18–21). We could conjecture *svātmany āropāsambhavena* for *svātmāropāsambhavena* on the basis of *svātmany āropāsambhavāt* in one MatV VP parallel, *svātmany āropāsambhavena* in the other (see below) and *grāhakātmany apy āropāsambhavāt* in NPP. If we retain *svātmāropāsambhavena*, we certainly have to interpret it as *svātmany āropāsambhavena.*

A parallel sentence in MatV VP reads: *tasmāt svātmany āropāsambhavād grāhakātmanaḥ sthairyam avabhāsamānam svasaṃvedanasiddham* [*svasaṃvedanasiddham* ed.; *saṃvedanam* ū, ṛ, ṝ] *evābhyupagantavyam* (161,2–3).

Later on in the same chapter (173,7–10) there is an even more similar sentence: *tat sthūlasūkṣmayor iva sthiratvāsthiratvayoḥ parasparaviruddharūpatvād vidyudādāv asthairyaṃ* [*asthairyaṃ* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *asthairyatvaṃ* ed.] *siddhaṃ sat* [*sat* ed.; om. in ṛ, ṝ; *sa°* ā, ū] *sthairyaṃ vyāvartayati yathā, tadvad atra svātmany āropāsambhavena sthairyam avabhāsamānam asaṃśayaṃ asthairyaṃ vyavacchinatti, tṛtīyaprakārāsambhavād iti.*

[127] *saṃvedanāt* Ped; *svasaṃvedanāt* Ked, B, P.

[128] Parallel sentence in MatV VP: *nāpi bādhaḥ* [*nāpi bādhaḥ* ū, ṛ, ṝ; omitted in the other MSS and in ed.] *sarvam ālambane* [*ālambane* 4 (non-Kashmirian) MSS; *ālambanaṃ* ed.] *bhrāntaṃ* [*bhrāntaṃ* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *bhrāntir* ed.] *na svātmani yataḥ* [*yataḥ* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *kadācana iti* ed.] (173,6).

Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *na ca svasaṃvedanasya bādhaḥ sambhavati, yena bhrāntatā bhaved iti vakṣyāmaḥ* (295,21–22). Unlike NPP and MatV VP, PMNKV does not give reasons for this claim but just points forward, either to 297,10 (ad v. 46): ... *svasaṃvittau bhramābhāvāt*; or 302,8–12 (ad v. 49).

[129] Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *na ca pramāṇasiddhasya bādhakam vinānyathābhyupagamo matim āvarjayati vipaścitām* (295,22–23).

[130] °*nupapattir* Ked^{ac}, Ped, P; °*nupattir* B, °*nutpattir* Ked^{pc}.

[131] Interlinear note below *iti cet* in P: *sthiro hy ekasvabhāvaḥ, arthakriyā hi anekasvabhāvavastuniṣpādyā, anekasvabhāvaṃ hi kṣaṇikaṃ eva, na tv akṣaṇikam ity artha*[*ity ar-*

yāmaḥ.[133] *tad evaṃ sarvadaikarūpasthiragrāhakaprakāśātmānāropita*[134] *eva sarvārthasākṣitayā yena pratipuruṣaṃ svasaṃvedanasiddhaḥ, tena kāraṇenā*[135]*tmaśūnyāḥ skandhā iti pakṣaḥ pratyakṣanirākṛta eva.* [Ked p. 17] *tad iyatā pratijñāsūtrāj*[136] *jñāteti padaṃ vyākhyātam.* ||1.5||

CHAPTER 3

1.0 [Ked p. 38] *kiṃ ca sahopalambhaniyamād abhede 'pi nātmābhāvaḥ ity āha*

1.15ab) *ātmany asattvaṃ*[137] *no yuktam ahampratyayagocare* |

ahampratyayasya sthiragrāhakaparāmarśarūpatvenātmaviṣayatvād asty evādhyavaseyenātmanā sahopalambhaniyamaḥ, iti dvayor api saṃvidrūpatvasiddheḥ satyatvam iti nairātmyābhāvaḥ.

1.1.1 *nanv ātmano vikalpātītatvenoktatvāt, mokṣakārikāsv ācāryeṇa buddhibodhyatvanirāsāc cāhampratyayagocaratvaṃ vādyasiddham eva. satyam, ātmādipratyayavat tu*[138] *kathaṃcid adūraviprakarṣeṇa so 'pi vyavahārārthaṃ tadviṣayo 'bhyupagamyate, iti nāsiddhiḥ.*

1.1.2 *nanu cādhyavasāyasyāvastuviṣayatvād asmākam adhyavaseyena*[139] *sahabhāvo na siddhaḥ.yuktam etat kadācid bāhyārthavādino vaktum, bhavatas tv abodhātmano 'saṃvedyatvād adhyavaseyasyāpi*[140] *saṃvedyatvena bodharūpatayādhyavasāyasyeva*[141] *sattvam, iti nāsiddhis tena sahabhāvasyeti.*

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tha° em.; *ityatirtha*° MS]*kriyānupapattir eva bādhakaṃ pramāṇam iti nanasvabhāvo hi kṣaṇikaḥ, sthiro hy ekasvabhāva iti bauddhāḥ.*

[132] *samutpatter* Ked, Ped; *samutpattir* B; *samupapatter* P.

[133] Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: *sthirasyārthakriyānupapattir eva bādhiketi cet, na, tadanupapattes tatra niṣetsyamānatvenābādhakatvāt* (295,23–24). He is pointing forward there to his commentary on verse 46.

[134] °*ātmānāropita* Ked^{pc}, Ped, B, P; °*ātmā nāropita* Ked^{ac}.

[135] *kāraṇenā*° Ked^{pc}, B, P; *kāraṇā*° Ked^{ac}, Ped.

[136] *pratijñāsūtrāj* Ked, B; *pratijñāsūtrāntaṃ* Ped.

[137] *asattvaṃ* Ked, Ped, B, L, P; *asatyatvan* M.

[138] *tu* Ked, B, L, P; omitted in Ped.

[139] *adhyavaseyena* Ked^{pc}, Ped; *adhyavasāyena* B, L, P, Ked^{ac}.

[140] *adhyavaseyasyāpi*° Ked^{ac}, Ped, B, L, P; *adhyavasāyasyāpi*° Ked^{pc}.

[141] °*dhyavasāyasyeva* Ked^{ac}, Ped, B, L, P; °*dhyavaseyasyeva* Ked^{pc}.

1.1.3 [Ked p. 39] *tarhi vādyasiddho 'yam, ahampratyayābhāve 'pi svasaṃvedanenātmopalambhābhyupagamāt.satyam. aham iti tv adhyavasāyena sahabhāvo 'dhyavaseyatātra hetuḥ sā ca tadānīṃ nāstīti tena sahopalambhaniyamo nāsiddhaḥ. anyā hy adhyavasāyaparāmṛśyatānyā ca saṃvidrūpateti buddhisaṃvitpraviveka*[142]*prasaṅgena pradarśitaṃ svāyambhuvoddyota eva. iha tv anupayogān nocyate. bhavadbhir apy uktam*[143]

aśakyasamayo[144] *hy ātmā cetanānām*[145] *ananyabhāk* |
teṣām ataḥ svasaṃvittir nābhijalpānuṣaṅgiṇī || *iti.*

ata evopayogabhedād[146] *asya nātra gṛhītagrāhitvam api tu tāvanmātreṇa pramāṇatvam iti darśayiṣyāmaḥ.*

1.2.1 *nanu 'gauro 'haṃ kṛśo 'ham' ity anātmani śarīra evāhampratyayasya dṛṣṭer*[147] *viruddho hetuḥ, iti ata āha*

1.15cd) *na cānyasminn*[148] *ahambuddhiḥ kvacid dṛṣṭā tu nirguṇā*[149] ||

na, viśeṣitatvāt. gaurādibhiḥ padārthāntarair viśeṣito hy ahampratyayo māṇavakādau siṃhādipratyayavad guṇavṛttyā śarīre[150] *vartate, tair aviśeṣitas tu mukhyatayātmany eva. sa eva* [Ked p. 40] *cātra hetur ukto na saviśeṣaṇaḥ, ity aviruddha eva.* ||1.15||

1.2.2 *yady evam, pratyayavyatirekeṇānyasya kasya cid ātmanaḥ pratyeyasyā*[151]*nupalabdher vanādyekatvapratyayavad ahampratyayo 'pi nirviṣaya evety asiddho hetuḥ.iti na vanādyekatvādipratyayavan nirviṣayaḥ, tan nāsiddhiḥ prāguktasya sahopalambhasyeti. vanādyekatvapratyayavad ahampratyayo 'pi nirviṣaya evety asiddho hetuḥ, atrāpy āha*

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142 °*praviveka*° Ked, Ped, B, P; °*praveka*° L.

143 PVā 3.249, and PVin 1.21 (p. 62, notes 2 and 3). See note 145 for variants.

144 °*samayo* Ked, Ped, B, P; °*samaye* L, kha.

Marginal insertion above *samayo* in B: *saṃketa.*

145 *cetanānām* Ked, Ped, B, L, P; *rāgādīnām* PVā 3.249; *sukhādīnām* MatV VP ad 6.23, ĪPVV Vol. 1, 116,1b, PVin 1.21 (judging from bde in the Tibetan translation); *nīlādīnām* TS(BBS) 1263.

146 *evopayogabhedād* Ped, v.l. in Ked, B, L, P; *evobhayabhedād* Ked.

147 °*pratyayasya dṛṣṭer* Ked, Ped, B, P; °*pratyayadṛṣṭer* L.

148 *cānyasminn* Ked, Ped, B, L, P; *cānyasminy* M.

149 *tu nirguṇā* Ked, Ped, B, L, P; *caturguṇā* M.

150 *śarīre* Ked, Ped, B, L; *śarīraṃ* P.

151 *pratyeyasyā* Ked, B, L, P; *pratyayasyā* Ped.

1.16) *kartṛkarmāvabhāsā ca*[152] *spaṣṭā dṛṣṭā*[153] *kvacin matiḥ* |
aham etat prapaśyāmīty ataḥ[154] *siddhaṃ sphuṭaṃ*[155] *dvayam* ||

satyam, syān nirviṣayo yady ātmā sarvārthaprakāśakatayā[156] *svato nāvabhāseta, sa tu svasaṃvedanena vikalpātīta*[157] *eva sarvadā bhāsata ity uktam. tadviṣayaś cāyaṃ proktanayenāhampratyayaḥ kvacid aham etat prapaśyāmītyādau parāmarśaviśeṣe spaṣṭaḥ*[158] *susphuṭānubhava eva dṛṣṭaḥ. iti na vanādyekatvādipratyayavan nirviṣayaḥ. tan nāsiddhiḥ prāguktasya sahopalambhasyeti.*

1.2.3 *yady evaṃ sahopalambhaniyamād ātmādvaitasiddhir itīṣṭavighātaḥ. na, tvatpakṣe 'py apratikṣepyam*[159] *evātmasaṃvedanam ity evamparatvād asya. paramārthatas tv ata ity aham etat prapaśyāmīti parāmarśabuddher apy asyāḥ sakāśād ātmā sarvārthaprakāśakatvena*[160] *sarvadā parāmarśanīyaḥ, arthas tu tatprakāśyatayā*[161] *krameṇa pratīyate. ity atyantabhinnam adhyavasīyamānatvāt* [Ked p. 41] *sphuṭam etad dvayaṃ siddham, iti na bhedo*[162] *'py ayuktaḥ. iti neṣṭavighātaḥ. tad uktam*[163]

ayam eva hi vijñeyo bhedo bodhārthayoḥ sphuṭam |
pūrvas tv anubhavākāra uttaraś cānubhūyate || *iti.*

2.1.1 *nanv ayaṃ ghaṭa ityāder advayaviṣayasyāpi vimarśasya darśanād atrānaikāntikatā. tad ayuktam ity āha*

1.17ab) *sarvam eva hi vijñānaṃ kartṛkarmāvabhāsakam* |

ayaṃ ghaṭa ityādy api vimarśavijñānaṃ na vimṛśyamātraviṣayam eva yuktam, svātmano vimarśābhāvena paravimṛśyasyeva tadrūpatvāsiddheḥ.

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152 °*āvabhāsā ca* Ped; °*āvabhāsāc ca* Ked, B, L, P, M. It is possible that Ped's reading arose through corruption and that °*āvabhāsāc ca* is original; but I marginally prefer the meaning of Ped's reading.

153 *spaṣṭā dṛṣṭā* Ked, Ped, B, L, P; *sraṣṭā draṣṭā* M.

154 *ataḥ* Ked, Ped, B, L, P; *ati* M.

155 *sphuṭaṃ* Ked, Ped, B, L, P; *sphuṭa* M.

156 °*prakāśakatayā* Ked, Ped, B, P; °*prakāśatayā* L.

157 Ked wrongly includes a hyphen at the end of the line after *vikalpātīta.*

158 *spaṣṭaḥ* Ked, B, L, P; *sphuṭaḥ* Ped.

159 P omits °*pratikṣepya*°—eyeskip from one *kṣepya* to the next.

160 °*prakāśakatvena* Ked, Ped, B, P; °*prakāśatvena* L.

161 Interlinear gloss above *tatprakāśyatayā* in P: *tena sarvārthaprakāśakenātmanā prakāśyo bhāsyas tasya bhāvas tattātayā.*

162 *na bhedo* Ked, Ped, B, L; *nābhedo* P.

163 Verse 9 of NP.

2.1.2 *svātmanāpy asya tadānīṃ saṃvedanān*[164] *nāsiddhir*[165] *iti cet, na, saṃvedanasyāpy avimṛṣṭasya gacchatāṃ tṛṇādiviṣayasyevāsiddheḥ.*[166] *yad āhuḥ*[167]

saṃvittir aparāmarśād vidyamānāpi vastutaḥ |
tṛṇādivittivad yātuḥ[168] *siddhaivāvidyamānavat || iti.*

tasmād ātmakartṛka eva tenāsau[169] *vimarśanīyaḥ, ātmakartṛke ca viṣaye vimṛṣṭe svātmāpi tadupasarjanībhūto vimṛṣṭa eva sāmarthyād bhavati. iti sarvaṁ eva vimarśajñānaṃ kartṛkarmadvayaviṣayam*[170] *eveti nānaikāntikatā.*

2.2 [Ked p. 42] *anumānenāpy etat siddham ity āha*

1.17cd) *trayaṃ saṃsmaryate yasmāt tad ahaṃ dṛṣṭavān iti ||*

*ayaṃ ghaṭa ityādivimarśaviṣayā*pi smṛtir[171] *bhavantī kartṛkarmakaraṇaviṣayā dṛṣṭeti karmakaraṇayor iva pūrvaṃ kartur apy aśabdaṃ vimarśaṃ gamayaty eveti sarvo vimarśo dvayaviṣaya eveti.*

3.0 *ata eva nāvastuviṣayo vimarśaḥ pratyakṣavad vastvanvayavyatirekānuvidhānāt. anyair*[172] *apy uktam*[173]

asti hy ālocanājñānaṃ[174] *prathamaṃ nirvikalpakam |*
bālamūkādivijñānasadṛśaṃ śuddhavastujam ||

tataḥ paraṃ punar vastu dharmair jātyādibhir yayā |
buddhyāvasīyate sāpi pratyakṣatvena sammatā || iti.

3.1.1 *nanv asaty api vastuni ghaṭādivimarśo manorājyādau dṛṣṭaḥ. satyam, ata eva tayor vastvavastuviṣayatvāt pratyakṣatadābhāsayor iva bhedaḥ.*

3.1.2 *nanu vastuviṣayatvenābhimatasyāpi sa evāyaṃ ghaṭa ity evamādeḥ pūrvadṛṣṭatayā vimarśasya pravṛtteḥ, adhunā ca pūrvadarśanābhāvena tadasam-*

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164 *tadānīṃ saṃvedanān* Ked^{ac}, Ped, B, L, P; *tadānīm asaṃvedanān* Ked^{pc}.

165 *nāsiddhir* Ked^{ac}, Ped, B, L, P; *na siddhir* Ked^{pc}.

166 °*evāsiddheḥ* Ked^{ac}, B, L, P; °eva *siddheḥ* Ked^{pc}, Ped.

167 Source unknown.

168 Interlinear gloss above *yātuḥ* in P: *gacchataḥ.*

169 *ātmakartṛka eva tenāsau* Ped, B, L, P, kha, ga; *akartṛka eva tenāsau* Ked.

170 L omits *eva vimarśajñānaṃ kartṛkarmadvayaviṣayam* (eyeskip from one *ev* to another).

171 °*pi smṛtir* conj. Sanderson; *smṛtir* Ked^{pc}, Ped; *vismṛtir* Ked^{ac}, B, L, P.

172 Marginal insertion above *anyair* in B: *mīmāṃsakaiḥ.*

173 ŚV(P_2) 1.1.4 (*pratyakṣa* chapter) 112 and 120.

174 *ālocanājñānaṃ* B, P, ŚV(S), ŚV(U_1), ŚV(P_1), ŚV(P_2), ŚV(P_3), ad Mat VP 17.2 (p. 383), v.l. ad Mat VP 10.6–13b; *ālocanaṃ jñānaṃ* Ked, Ped, L, NPP ad 32cd (64,20–65,2), ad Mat VP 6.35bcd (pp. 174–5), ad Mat VP 10.6–13b (p.312), v.l. in ŚV(P_2) and ŚV(P_3); *locanaṃ jñānaṃ* v.l. ad Mat VP 6.35bcd; *ālocanajñānaṃ* v.l. ad Mat VP 6.35bcd.

bhavād avastuviṣayatvam.[175] *na,*[176] *prāgdarśanābhāvāsiddheḥ, ātmaprakāśa evārthadarśanaṃ tac ca sarvadāstīty uktam. ataḥ prāgdṛṣṭatāpīdānīṃ tatra vastv eveti nāvastuviṣayaḥ, na, ghaṭādau*[177] *kṣaṇikatvasyāsiddher* [Ked p. 43] *iti vakṣyāmaḥ.*

3.2.1 *evaṃ tarhi santamase spṛśato 'py ayaṃ ghaṭa ity adṛṣṭānāṃ rūpādīnām avamarśād*[178] *avastuviṣayo mānasa eṣa*[179] *smārto*[180] *vikalpa iti. na, teṣām*[181] *ekasāmagrīpratibaddhatvena viśiṣṭāt sparśalakṣaṇāl liṅgād apratyakṣāṇām*[182] *api tadānīm anumānāt. yad uktaṃ bhavadbhir api:*[183]

> *ekasāmagryadhīnasya rūpāde rasato gatiḥ |*
> *hetudharmānumānena dhūmendhanavikāravat || iti.*

3.2.2 *na cānumānavimarśo 'py avastuviṣayaḥ, vastvanvayavyatirekānuvidhānena pramāṇatvāt pratyakṣatadvimarśavat. tad uktaṃ bhavadbhir api*[184]

> *arthasyāsambhave 'bhāvāt*[185] *pratyakṣe 'pi pramāṇatā |*
> *pratibaddhasvabhāvasya taddhetutve samaṃ dvayam || iti.*

3.2.3 *nāpy asphuṭāvabhāsatvenāsyāvastuviṣayatvaṃ pratyakṣasyāpy arthadūra*[186]*vartinas tatsambhavato 'naikāntikatvāt.*

3.3 *āgamottho*[187] *'pi vimarśas tadāgamapraṇetṛ*[188]*jñānadvāreṇa vastuni pratibaddhatvād avañcakapitrādivākyaśrutijanitavimarśavad yathārtha eva. tad uktaṃ bhavadbhir api*[189]

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[175] Interlinear speaker-indication above *avastuviṣayatvam* in P: *pūrvapakṣa.*

[176] Interlinear comment above *na* in P: *uttaram.*

[177] *na ghaṭādau* Ked^{ac}, Ped, B, L, P; *ghaṭādau* Ked^{pc}.

[178] *avamarśād* Ked^{ac}, Ped, B, P; *avamarśśād* L; *avimarśād* Ked^{pc}.

[179] *eṣa* Ked, B, L, P; *eva* Ped.

[180] *smārto* Ked, B, P; *sānto* Ped, L, ka, ga.

[181] Interlinear gloss above *teṣām* in P: *rūparasādīnāṃ.*

[182] Interlinear gloss above *apratyakṣāṇām* in P: *rūpādīnāṃ.*

[183] PVā 1.11.

[184] PVin, p. 38,6 (1.3). Vetter gives the exact form in which this verse occurs here as the Sanskrit original of PVin 1.3, based on three citations in the *Tattvabodhavidhāyinī,* one in the *Pramāṇamimāṃsā* and one in the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*. He does not mention its occurrence here.

[185] °*sambhave 'bhāvāt* Ked, Ped, B, P; °*sambhavābhāvāt* L.

[186] *arthadūra*° Ked^{ac}, B, L, P; *arthasya dūra*° Ked^{pc}, Ped.

[187] *āgamottho* Ked^{ac}, Ped, B, L, P; *āgamokto* Ked^{pc}.

[188] °*praṇetṛ* Ked, B, L, P; °*prasotṛ* Ped.

[189] *api* B, L, P; *eva* Ked, Ped.

iṣṭo 'yam arthaḥ śakyeta jñātuṃ so 'tiśayo[190] *yadi* || *iti.*

pratyakṣānumānāgamabahiṣkṛtas tu vimarśo manorājyādivimarśavad vastupratibandhābhāvād avastuviṣayo 'stu. aham etat [Ked p. 44] *prapaśyāmīti tu vimarśaḥ saṃviditātmārthaviṣayatvān nāvastuviṣayaḥ, kiṃ tu proktanayena pratyakṣaviśeṣatvāt*[191] *pramāṇam evety ato 'py ātmasiddhiḥ. tataś ca bodhenety etad api pratijñāpadaṃ vyākhyātam iti.*

CHAPTER 4

1. Simultaneous and Sequential Illumination

1 *kas tarhi nīlaprakāśāt pītaprakāśasya*[192] *bhedaḥ? na kaś cit, yugapatprakāśa iva.*

2 *tatra hi tayor bhede*[193] *viśeṣābhāvāt tadavayavabhedenāpi bhedaḥ, iti pratiparamāṇubhedataś*[194] *citrapaṭādipratibhāsābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ. na ca vikalpa-*[Ked p. 27]*ghaṭitaṃ tad iti vācyam, udghāṭitanetrasya jhaṭity eva yugapat tadavabhāsanāt, tadānīṃ ca vikalpāsambhavād*[195] *asaṃvedanāc ca. yad uktam*[196]

PVā 1.220cd, which reads differently from the quote here (but conveys the same meaning): *iṣṭo 'yam arthaḥ pratyetuṃ śakyaḥ so 'tiśayo yadi* ||

[190] *so 'tiśayo* Ked[ac], Ped, B, L, P; *sātiśayo* Ked[pc], v.l. in B.

[191] °*n nāvastuviṣayaḥ, kiṃ tu proktanayena pratyakṣaviśeṣatvā* omitted in L (eyeskip from one *tvā* to the next).

[192] *pītaprakāśasya* B, P, Ked, Ped; *pītaprakāśa*° L.

[193] *bhede* Ked, B, L, P; *bheda*° Ped.

[194] *pratiparamāṇubhedataś* Ked[pc], Ped; *pratiparamāṇu bhedataś* Ked[ac]; *pratiparamāṇujñānabhedataś* B, P; *paramāṇubhedataś* L. The *jñāna* in B and P's reading could be correct; but I have judged it more likely to be an interlinear explanatory note, subsequently mistaken for part of the text.

[195] *vikalpāsambhavād* Ked, Ped, L, P; *vikalpāsadbhāvād* B, but above *sadbhā* is also written *sambha*.

[196] PVin 50,20–22 (identified by Stern 1991).

na cemāḥ kalpanā apratisaṃviditā[197] *evodayante vyayante vā yena satyo 'py anupalakṣitāḥ syuḥ, iti.*

vikalpajñānasyāpy ekatvāt katham anekātmakaś citrāvabhāsaḥ.

3.1 *tad yathā tatra nīlapītādyanekaprakāśyabhede*[198] *'py anubhūyamānasyai*[199]*kasya jñānātmano*[200] *na bhedaḥ, na ca tadabhedāt tasya nīlapītāder arthabhedasyāsiddhiḥ,*[201] *ekasyānekaprakāśanaśaktisiddher bhavadbhir apīṣṭatvāt, tathā kramaprakāśe*[202] *'py anubhavasiddhasyaikasyaiva prakāśātmano 'nekaprakāśanaśaktiyogāt kramavyavasthitāneka*[203]*prakāśakatvam anubhavasiddham eṣṭavyam. na ca tadabhedād arthabhedāsiddhidoṣaḥ. na hi dikkramāvabhāsāt kālakramāvabhāsasya prakāśātmani kaś cid bhedo 'nubhūyata iti.*

3.2 *nanu dikkramaprakāśe prakāśātmano bhedāsaṃvedanāt*[204] *pradīpāder vartidāhatailakṣapaṇaprakāśasvajñānajananādivad eka*[205]*syānekakāryakartṛtvena*[206] *virodhābhāvāc chaktīnāṃ samuccayo*[207] *na virodhaḥ.*[208] *kālakrame tu*

[197] *apratisaṃviditā* Ped, B, L, P; *asaṃviditā* Ked. *apratisaṃviditā* is also the reading of the two other quotations of this sentence found by Stern (1991 156).

[198] °*prakāśyabhede* B, P, Ked, Ped; °*prakāśabhede* L.

[199] *anubhūyamānasyai*° B, L, Ked, Ped; *anubhūyasyai*° P.

[200] *jñānātmano* B, L, Ked, Ped; *jñānātmāno* P.

[201] °*siddhiḥ* Ked, Ped, L, P; °*saddhiḥ* B.

[202] *kramaprakāśe* Ked[pc], Ped, B, L, P; *kramaprakāśo* Ked[ac].

[203] *kramavyavasthitāneka*° B, P, Ked, Ped; *kramavyavasthita neka*° L.

[204] *bhedāsaṃvedanāt* B, P, Ked, Ped; *saṃvvedanāt* L.

[205] *vad eka*° Ked, B, P; *vedaka*° Ped, L.

[206] °*kartṛtvena* Ped, B, L, P; °*kartṛkatvena* Ked.

[207] *samuccayo* Ked[ac], Ped, B, L, P; *samuccaye* Ked[pc]. I prefer the nominative primarily because of the parallel sentence below, *chaktīnāṃ samuccaya eva yukto na virodhaḥ*, where *yukto* means that *samuccaya* must be a nominative.

[208] This passage, and particularly this sentence, is referred to at 82,16–18: *pradīpasya hi vartidāhatailakṣapaṇaprakāśasvajñānādyanekakāryanirvartakaḥ svabhāvo 'bhyupagato bhavadbhiḥ, na tu kāryabhedena svabhāvabhedaḥ, iti darśitaṃ prāg eva.* See also MatV VP 164,1–2 (in the context of whether something non-momentary is capable of *arthakriyā*): *dharmaś cāyam akṣaṇikasyaiva* [°*syaiva* ṛ, ṝ; °*sya* ed.; °*sya vā* ū] *ghaṭādeḥ krameṇa kṣīradadhidhāraṇādikaḥ pradīpādeś ca yugapad vartidāhatailakṣapaṇādiko 'rthakriyākāritvalakṣaṇaḥ pratyakṣeṇa* [*pratyakṣeṇa* ū, ṛ, ṝ; omitted in ed.] *siddhaḥ, iti* [*iti* ū, ṛ, ṝ; omitted in ed.] *na tena sahāsya virodhaḥ*; NPP ad 1.22cd, p. 54: *pradīpādeś ca vartidāhatailakṣapaṇādikā yugapad dṛśyate*; and PMNKV ad 46cd, p. 298, 5–6: *pradīpa-*

prakāśaśaktīnāṃ parasparābhāvarūpatvena[209] *ghaṭapaṭādiśaktīnām iva bhedād vastubhedakatvam. yad āhuḥ*

śaktir hi bhāvābhāvābhyāṃ bhidyamānā vastv api bhinatti, na punaḥ kāryabhedena, [Ked p. 28] *iti.*

3.3 *tad ayuktam asiddhatvāt. na hi tatrāpi*[210] *śakter bhāvābhāvabhedo 'sti sarvadaikarūpasyaiva prakāśātmano 'nāropitarūpasya saṃvedanād ity uktam. na ca kāryābhāvāc chakter abhāvaḥ 'nāvaśyaṃ kāraṇāni*[211] *tadvanti bhavanti' iti nyāyāt. tad atrāpi*[212] *vastu*[213]*bhedāsiddheḥ, tadvac*[214] *chaktīnāṃ samuccaya eva yukto na virodhaḥ. api ca parokṣasya dharmiṇaḥ kāryabhedād indriyāder iva śaktibhedataḥ svarūpabhedaḥ, na*[215] *pratyakṣasiddhābhedasya,*[216] *tasya hi pradīpāder ivaikasyānekakāryakartṛtvena bhavadbhir apīṣṭatvāt. pratyakṣasiddhābhedaś cātmā, ity uktam. ato na tasyāpi śaktibhedād bhedaḥ kalpayituṃ yuktaḥ, iti yugapatprakāśa iva na kramaprakāśe 'py arthabhedāsiddhiḥ.*

2. The Self's Cognition and the Buddhi's Cognition

1 *nanv evaṃ grāhakātmano jñānarūpasyākṣaṇikatve 'pi 'pāde me vedanā, śirasi me vedanā, sukhavedanā, duḥkhanāśo 'bhūd*[217] *bhaviṣyati vā' ity utpattyapavargayoḥ saṃvedanād anityataiva. yad āhuḥ*[218]

> *ghaṭajñānam* iti[219] *jñānam ghaṭajñānavilakṣaṇam* |
> *ghaṭa ity api yaj jñānaṃ*[220] *viṣayopanipāti tat* || *iti.*

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sya hy ekasyaiva vartidahanatailakṣapaṇasvajñāpanādyanekakāryanivartakaikasvabhāvo 'bhyupagato bhavadbhiḥ. na tu kāryabhedena svabhāvabhedaḥ.

209 °*rūpatvena* B, P, Ked, Ped; °*rūpatve* L.

210 Interlinear gloss above *tatrāpi* in B: *kālakrame.*

211 *kāraṇāni* Ked, B, P; *karaṇāni* Ped, L.

212 *tad atrāpi* B, P, Ked, Ped; *tatrāpi* L.

213 Interlinear gloss above *vastu* in B: *prakāśa.*

214 Interlinear gloss above *tadvac* in B: *dikkramavat.*

215 *svarūpabhedo na* Ked, B, L, P; *svarūpabhedena* Ped.

216 °*siddhābhedasya* Ked[pc], Ped, B; °*siddhabhedasya* Ked[ac], L, P.

217 *duḥkhanāśo 'bhūd* ed.; *duḥkhāśābhūd* ū, ṛ, ṝ.

218 VāPa(I) 3.1.105.

219 *iti* em.; *idam* ed. *iti* is the reading of the *Vākyapadīya*, and of the *Mataṅgavṛtti* when it quotes this verse at 175,7 ad 6.35b–d.

220 *ity api yaj jñānaṃ* ed.; *ity abhi yaj jñānaṃ* ū; *ity abhivijñānaṃ* ṛ,ṝ.

2 *atrocyate*

6.34c–35a) *āśirolakṣaṇe*[221] *kāye yeyaṃ saṃvic citeḥ*[222] *sadā* ‖
āhlāde vāpy athodvege

citiḥ grāhakātmā. yad vakṣyati[223] *'citeś cit sahajo dharma' iti. tasyā āśiro*[224]*-lakṣaṇe kāye viṣaye anekasmin yugapad yā saṃvid āhlāde*[225] *vāpy athodvege sukhaduḥkhādiviṣaye krameṇa sā sadā sarvakālam. yattador nityam abhisambandhāt sety anuvartate 'tra. tad ayam arthaḥ, na grāhyabhede 'pi grāhakātmā yugapad iva krameṇāpi bhinno 'vabhāsate.*

3 *api tu sarvadaiva grāhyopādhibhede 'py anāsvāditasvātmabhedaḥ, kālatraye 'pi tiraskṛtasvagataprāgabhāvapradhvaṃsābhāvaḥ, nānāvidhapramāṇādy-anekacittavṛttyudayasaṃvedane 'py akampitatadgrāhakasthairyavedanaḥ, vṛttyantarāle 'py aviluptajyotiḥ, suṣuptādāv apy akhaṇḍitasvasaṃvit, satatam evārthāvagamakatvena bhāsanād ātmapadapratipādyaḥ pratipuruṣaṃ svasaṃvedanasiddhaḥ sthira eva,*[226] *iti kim atrānyena sādhanena. na hi 'uṣṇo 'gniḥ, śītaṃ himam' ityādau*[227] *pratyakṣavyatirekeṇānyat sādhanam upapadyate. tām eva cā*[228]*tmasaṃvidam abhinnām anapāyinīṃ cāśritya sarvaiḥ kālāntaraphalāni karmāṇy ārabhyante.* kṣaṇikatve[229] hi[230] *tasyāḥ sarvavyavahārapratyastamayaḥ, sarvajñānānāṃ jñānāntarotpattikāla eva dhvastatvāt*[231] *kaḥ pravarteta*[232] *kutra*[233] *kimarthaṃ vā yataḥ. na ca tato 'nyat saṃvidrūpaṃ paśyāma ity uktam. tad ayam anapahnavanīya eva grāhakātmano jñānasya sarvadā sthirarūpaḥ prakāśo vyavahārahetubhūtaḥ kālāntarabhāviphalapravṛttikāraṇaṃ sarvair eva. na ca tatrāropaḥ sambhavatīty uktam. nāpi bādhaḥ*[234] *sarvam ālambane*[235] *bhrāntaṃ*[236] *na svātmani yataḥ.*[237] *nāpi*

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[221] *āśirolakṣaṇe* ed.; *aśirolakṣaṇe* ū, ṝ.

[222] *yeyaṃ saṃvic citeḥ* ed.; *ye saṃvittiś citeḥ* ū, ṝ; *yaṃ saṃvittiś citeḥ* ṛ.

[223] MatV VP 6.81ab.

[224] *āśiro* ed.; *aśiro* ṝ.

[225] *saṃvid āhlāde* ed.; *cāhlāde* ū.

[226] *sthira eva* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *sthirabhāva* ed.

[227] *himam' ityādau* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *himam' ityādāv api* ed. *himādāv' ity api* e.

[228] *eva cā* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *evā* ed.

[229] *kṣaṇikatve* conj. Sanderson; *kṣaṇikatvavad anityatve* ed.; *anityatve* a; *kṣaṇikatva-vedinityatve* ū, ṛ, ṝ.

[230] *hi* conj. Sanderson; *'pi* ed.

[231] °*kāla eva dhvastatvāt* ed.; *kāle 'stamayatvāt* 5 MSS; *kālāstamayasthatvāt* ai.

[232] *pravarteta* ed.; *pravartate* 4 MSS.

[233] *kutra* ed. *ataḥ* a.

[234] *nāpi bādhaḥ* ū, ṛ, ṝ; omitted in the other MSS and in ed.

sthirasyārthakriyānupapattir bādhakam,[238] *arthabhedavyavasthānupapattir vety uktam. tat sthūlasūkṣmayor iva sthiratvāsthiratvayoḥ parasparaviruddharūpatvād vidyudādāv asthairyam*[239] *siddhaṃ sat*[240] *sthairyaṃ vyāvartayati yathā, tadvad atra svātmany āropāsambhavena sthairyam avabhāsamānam asaṃśayaṃ asthairyaṃ vyavacchinatti, tṛtīyaprakārāsambhavād iti.*

4 *ata eva nāhlādodvegādīnāṃ saṃviddharmatvam,*[241] *tadapāye 'pi*[242] *saṃvido 'napāyāt, api tu saṃvedyatvam eva. yad api*[243]

aviśeṣe 'pi bāhyasya viśeṣāt prītitāpayoḥ |
bhāvanāyā viśeṣeṇa nārtharūpāḥ sukhādayaḥ ||

iti teṣāṃ saṃviddharmatvā[244]*numānam, tad api pratyakṣaviruddhatvād*[245] *ayuktam eva, bhāvanāviśeṣeṇa buddhiviśeṣasiddhyā*[246] *teṣāṃ viśeṣasyānyathāsiddhatvāc ca.*

5.1 *evaṃ ca*[247] *jñānaśabdena bhavatāṃ*[248] *yady atra grāhakātmasaṃvid eva vivakṣitā tadāsiddho*[249] *hetuḥ, tatrotpattyapavargayoḥ saṃvedanābhāvād*[250] *yugapatpratibhāsa iva*[251] *kramapratibhāse 'pi prameyabhedena*[252] *ghaṭa*[253]*-jñānādibhedasya*[254] *kalpitatvād iti. atha tadgrahaṇottarakālabhāvinī yādhya-*

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[235] *ālambane* 4 (non-Kashmirian) MSS; *ālambanaṃ* ed.

[236] *bhrāntaṃ* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *bhrāntir* ed.

[237] *yataḥ* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *kadācana iti* ed.

[238] *bādhakam* ū, ṛ, ṝ and 5 other MSS; *bādhikā* ed.

[239] *asthairyaṃ* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *asthairyatvaṃ* ed.

[240] *sat* ed.; om. in ṛ, ṝ; *sa°* ā, ū.

[241] *saṃviddharmatvam* ed.; *taddharmatvam* a, ā, ī, u, e, ai.

[242] *tadapāye 'pi* ed.; *tadapāye* ai.

[243] *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1.23 (identified in Stern 1991).

[244] *°dharmatvā°* ed.; *°dharmā°* a, ṛ.

[245] *pratyakṣaviruddhatvād* ed.; *pratyakṣatvād* ū, ṛ; *apratyakṣaviruddhatvād* e.

[246] *siddhyā* ed.; *siddhā* a, ū.

[247] *evaṃ ca* ed.; om. a, ā, ī, u, e, ai.

[248] *°śabdena bhavatāṃ* ed.; *°śabde ca bhavatāṃ* ṝ.

[249] *tadāsiddho* ed.; *tad apy siddho* ū, ṛ.

[250] *°ābhāvād* ed.; *°abhāvād* a, ā.

[251] *iva* ed.; *eva* ai.

[252] *°bhedena* ed.; *°bhede 'pi* ū, ṛ, ṝ.

[253] *ghaṭa°* ed.; om. a, ā, ī, u, e, ai.

[254] *bhedasya* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *bhedasyātra* ed.

vasāyātmikā[255] *saṃvit sātra*[256] *jñānaśabdenocyata iti, tatrāpy ucyate*[257] *manaḥsaṅkalpitetyādi.*

6.35b–d) *manaḥsaṅkalpitā satī* |
bubhoja bhoktā tāṃ[258] *paścād ahaṃ bhoktā ca nānyathā*[259] ||

saiva grāhakātmasaṃvin manaḥpraṇidhānena viṣayīkṛtā satī yadā bhavati tadā tām evātmā paścād[260] *arthagrahaṇottarakālaṃ bubhoja*[261] *bhuktavān. bhogasya*[262] *saṃvedanātmakatvāt,*[263] *'ghaṭam ahaṃ jānāmi'*[264] *ityādāv iva*[265] *ahaṃ iti parāmarśena viṣayīkṛtavān ity arthaḥ. tasya gauro*[266] *'ham ityādiviśeṣaṇayuktasya*[267] *śarīrādiviṣayatvena nirviśeṣaṇasya*[268] *nānyathopapattir yataḥ. so 'pi ca parāmarśapratyayaḥ*[269] *pratyakṣa eva. yad āhuḥ*[270]

asti hy ālocanajñānaṃ[271] *prathamaṃ nirvikalpakam* |
bālamūkādivijñānasadṛśaṃ śuddhavastujam ||

tataḥ paraṃ punar vastu dharmair jātyādibhir yayā |
buddhyāvasīyate sāpi pratyakṣatvena saṃmatā || *iti.*

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[255] *yādhyavasāyātmikā* ed.; *yādhyavasāyātmaka°* a; *yā vyavasāyātmikā* ū, ṝ; *yā vyavasāyātmika°* ṛ.

[256] *sātra* ed.; *manasātra* ā.

[257] *tatrāpy ucyate* ed.; *tatrocyate* a, ī, u, ū.

[258] *bhoktā tāṃ* ed.; *bhoktṛtāṃ* u.

[259] *ca nānyathā* ed.; *na cānyathā* ū, ṛ, ṝ.

[260] *paścād* ed.; *paścād iti* ā, ī, u, ṛ, ṝ, e, ai.

[261] *bubhoja* ed.; *bubhojeti* ū, ṛ, ṝ.

[262] *bhogasya* ed.; *bhogyasya* ai.

[263] *saṃvedanātmakatvāt* ed.; *asaṃvedanātmakatvāt* ū; *saṃvedanātmatvāt* ṛ.

[264] *jānāmi* ed.; *vedmi* ā, ī, u, ū, ṛ, ṝ, e, ai.

[265] *iva* ed.; *eva* ū, ṛ, ṝ.

[266] *gauro* ed.; *paro* ū, ṛ, ṝ.

[267] *viśeṣaṇayuktasya* ed.; *viśeṣayuktasya* ā.

[268] *nirviśeṣaṇasya* ā, ī, u, e, ai; *nirviśeṣeṇa* ed.; *viśeṣaṇasya* ū, ṛ, ṝ.

[269] *so 'pi ca parāmarśapratyayaḥ* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *so 'pi parāmarśaḥ* ed.

[270] ŚV(P_2) 1.1.4 (*pratyakṣa* chapter) 112 and 120.

[271] *ālocanajñānaṃ* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *ālocanaṃ jñānaṃ* ed. The former is preferred on the grounds that *ālocana* is not attested as an adjective. The variants of the *Ślokavārttika* editions, and of the other quotations of this verse by Rāmakaṇṭha, are given in section 3 of Chapter 3. In the NPP passage being looked at there, and in a passage in a later chapter of the *Mataṅgavṛtti* that is given on page 370, I judge Rāmakaṇṭha to have quoted this verse with the reading *ālocanājñānam.* But I would not consider it justified to emend to that here, given the unproblematic reading of the Kashmīrian manuscripts.

tataś ca ghaṭo 'yam itivad anubhavapṛṣṭhabhāvinā niścayapratyayena viṣayīkṛtatvād[272] *ātmāpi pratyakṣeṇa niścita*[273] *eva.*

5.2 *tasya ca*[274] *parāmarśātmano jñānasyotpattyapavargayogasiddhāv api buddhyahaṅkāradharmatvena vyadhikaraṇatvān na*[275] *grāhakātmany anityatvasādhane sāmarthyam. yathā* caitat tathā[276] *buddhyahaṅkāraprakaraṇayor vakṣyāmaḥ. tadapekṣayā ca*

ghaṭajñānam iti jñānaṃ ghaṭajñānavilakṣaṇam |

ityādijñāna[277]*bhedo vāstava evety avirodhaḥ. evaṃ svaparātmaprakāśakatayā jñānaśaktirūpeṇa parāmarśāc cātmā*[278] *pratyakṣa uktaḥ.*

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272 *viṣayīkṛtatvād* ed.; *viṣayīkṛtatvena* a, ā, ī, u, e, ai.

273 *niścita* ed.; *niścīyata* a.

274 *ca* ed.; om. in ū and ṛ.

275 *vyadhikaraṇatvān na* ed.; *vyadhikaraṇāsiddhatvān na* ā, ī, u, e; *vyadhikaraṇasiddhatvān nanu* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *viṣayīkaraṇasiddhatvān na* ai.

276 *caitat tathā* diagnostic conj. Isaacson; *cāsya* ed.

277 °*jñāna* ed.; °*vijñāna* ū, ṛ, ṝ.

278 *parāmarśāc cātmā* ed.; *parāmarśaś cātmā* ū, ṛ, ṝ; *parāthaś cātmā* e; *parāmarśātmā* ai.

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